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
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
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
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
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THE FLYING SPIDER—OBSERVATIONS BY JONATHAN EDWARDS WHEN A BOY.

FROM AN UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT.

[With Facsimiles. See Frontispiece.]

PROFESSOR ALLEN, in his recent interesting and helpful rendering of the life and thoughts of Jonathan Edwards, notices, with other indications of early intellectual promise, his "elaborate and instructive account of the habits of the field spider, based upon his own observations," and written, it is supposed, before he was thirteen years of age.

Earlier writers have been equally impressed by the significance of this production. Dr. Sereno E. Dwight, who first brought it to light, and published with it a letter in which the youthful naturalist modestly apologizes for sending his observations to some foreign correspondent of his father's, repeatedly refers to it as evincing remarkable "mental superiority." . . . "Rare indeed," he says, "is the instance, in which the attention of such a boy"—eleven or twelve years of age—"has been so far arrested, by any of the interesting phenomena in either of the kingdoms of nature, that he has been led, without prompting and without aid, to pursue a series of exact observations and discoveries as to the facts themselves; to search out their causes; and as the result of the whole, to draw up and present a lucid, systematic, and well-digested report of his investigations. . . . Perhaps it may be questioned whether higher evidence of a mature and

manly mind, in so young a child, has hitherto been presented to the world."

In the same vein are the comments of the distinguished essayist, Henry Rogers:—

"All the most striking peculiarities of Edwards's mind are well exhibited in one of his very earliest efforts: we refer to those extremely interesting observations (made at the age of twelve years) on the habits of a certain species of spider; observations which, at the request of his father, he transmitted to a naturalist in England. Indications of a mind of wondrous power are blended with all the simplicity of a child, in a manner which sheds over this singular composition a charm ineffable. The observations are prefaced by an apologetical letter, the unfeigned humility and modesty of which afford as strong an exhibition of the chief peculiarities of Edwards's moral nature, as the observations themselves furnish of the peculiarities of his intellectual character."

No less emphatic and discriminating are the remarks of the late Dr. I. N. Tarbox, in the admirable address made by him at the Edwards Reunion at Stockbridge, Mass., in 1870. "This paper on spiders," he says, referring to the one published by Dr. Dwight, "may justly be regarded as one of the wonders of literature. It would be difficult, from all the centuries, to find a production, written by a child of that age, showing such a masterly comprehension of a difficult subject; such close and delicate observation; such philosophical arrangement and compass of thought. . . . And he was an original explorer in this field. This boy, untaught by books, unprompted by others, saw and comprehended what none before him had seen, and what few now have the eye to see, even though the whole process has been described. . . . And the beauty of it all . . . is, that, while he was doing what none of the full-grown men along that valley had ever done before, he seems not to be aware that it is anything unusual. As one reads the production, he might infer that the boy who wrote it supposed this was the natural occupation of boys of twelve years, and that lads generally of that age were doing the same or similar things."

No one will be likely to question the justness of these recognitions of the striking mental powers and high moral qualities manifested in these early productions. I am happy to add a testimony to their scientific value from very high authority. Dr. A. S. Packard, of Brown University, after reading the paper which now appears for the first time, writes:—

"In this essay Jonathan Edwards certainly showed remarkable

powers of observation, and has anticipated modern observers, who so far as I know have not added much to his statements.

"He has noticed (1) their raising themselves on tip-toe and turning their bodies up; (2) that the silk fluid within the body becomes hard silk on exposure to the air; and (3) that it is drawn out of the body by the current of the air; (4) that the thread is light enough and long enough to balance the weight of the spider; and (5) he notices the 'train of glistening web before them,' acting as balloons. No additional points have been added, so far as I am aware, by subsequent observers, and Edwards should have the credit of making the first scientific observations on these aeronauts.

"What he adds about the wind blowing them into the ocean is not necessarily true. This autumn I saw vast numbers of the webs, on telegraph poles, wires, trees, and herbage, on a day when the wind was blowing *from* the ocean, *i. e.* from the southwest.

"It is evident that Edwards was a natural observer, that he supplemented his observations by experiments, while the philosophical and somewhat speculative spirit characterizing the boyish essay prove that in another age and under other training he might have been a naturalist or natural philosopher of a high order."

The paper submitted to Professor Packard is referred to by Dr. Dwight, and perhaps was in his mind when he describes Edwards's "examination of the character and habits of the Wood-spider" as "pursued through a long series of observations and deductions." It exhibits more fully than the one which was published the method of the youthful investigator, and has a freshness of feeling and *naïveté* of expression which invest it with a peculiar charm. It was also written earlier, though not necessarily much earlier.

Dr. Dwight supposes the later document to have been composed when Edwards was not more than twelve years of age. There are available two positive indications of time. The writer could still speak of himself as a "child," and also of remembering when he "was a boy." The first epithet he would not be likely to apply to himself after he became a freshman; the latter he elsewhere employs in referring to experiences when he was seven or eight years of age. He was born October 5, 1703, and entered college in September (or October?), 1716. Numerous allusions suggest that he wrote the later account after the end of October. This would imply that the experiments were made not later than the summer and early autumn of 1715; that is, when

the boy was completing his twelfth year. The internal evidence from spelling, punctuation, chirography, superiority of thought and diction to attainment in grammar and rhetoric, point to, or at least are consistent with, the same early period.

In comparing the Spider manuscripts with others which are supposed to belong to Edwards's college days, particularly the last two years, I came upon a detached paper, not published, which on its face seemed to resemble those now under consideration. On closer examination the orthographical similarities increased, and the contents also were found to bear a striking likeness in modes of thought and expression. Something of the same fascination belongs to it that has been felt by readers of the other papers. It is entitled "Of the Rainbow." The writer has become acquainted with "Sir Isaac Newton's Different Reflexibility and Refrangibility of the Rays of light," and proceeds to demonstrate to any one "of an ordinary logacity" how the rainbow is formed. His apparatus for experimenting consists of a "Globular Glass bottle with water," — "the Glass of it must be very thin & Clear;" "a Drop of water upon the end of a stick," held "up On the side that is Opposite to the sun" and moved "along towards One side or Other;" "Drops of Water Dash'd up by a stick from a puddle," — the drops must be "fine," or "they wont be thick enough," and the experiment must be tried when "the sun is near enough to the horizon;" and, most unique of all, a contrivance for producing spray which perhaps no other boy has ever put to so scientific a use, and which we are informed of in words that evidently imply successful experimentation: "It Cannot be the Cloud from whence the Reflection is made as was once thought . . . for [I] Can Convince any man by Ocular Demonstration In two Minutes On a fair Day that the Reflection is from Drops by Only taking a little water into my mouth and standing between the sun & something that looks a little Darkish & spurting of it into the Air so as to Disperse all into fine Drops And there will appear as Compleat & plain a Rainbow with all the Colours as ever was seen in the heavens" — the accuracy of the boy appearing in his carefully substituting by a mark of erasure "two" for "three" minutes and "a little water" for "a Mouthfull." Besides the suggestion of his rural home and childhood conveyed by the simplicity of his apparatus, there is another hint in the remark, that "we almost alwaies see the End of Rainbows Come Down Even in amongst the trees below the Hills," the observation of a boy who was familiar with but one horizon; and there is a similar

indication in this allusion: "And I have frequently heard my Countrymen who are Used to sawmills Say that they have seen a Rainbow upon the Drops that are Dispersed in the Air by the Violent Concussion of the Waters in the mill." If anything can be affirmed on this point, I should say that this interesting and very early composition is probably later than the essay "Of insects."

In all these papers the command of words is much greater than the acquaintance with literary form and skill in composition. The family life, though isolated, was a stimulating school. The father superintended the instruction. There were four girls, older than the boy, who studied in the same room with him. Two very interesting letters before me, from his father, show that the son had made progress in his Latin as early as August, 1711.¹ His home training opened many studies to his active mind in advance of his college course. He could study Optics with a glass bottle, with a stick and a puddle.

The first Facsimile prefixed to this article presents a portion of the first page of the hitherto unpublished paper, "Of insects." The entire essay is here given, and follows the original text without variation so far as I can recover it. It has been impossible always to determine whether the writer intended to use a capital letter or not. The forms of several letters are the same, whether large or small, and there is an intermediate size. The letter *s* is at times hopelessly uncertain. Occasionally I have inserted a letter or word, but have always inclosed it in brackets.

"Of insects."

"Of all Insects no one is more wonderfull than the Spider especially with Respect to their sagacity and admirable way of

¹ Under date of August 3, 1711, the father, who was absent from home, writes, "I would have Jonathan keep what he hath Learnt in his Grammar, & so I would have the Girls do, & I would have none of them forget their writing."

And again, August 7, "I desire thee to take care that Jonathan dont Loose w^t he hath Learned but y^t as he hath got y^e accidence, & about two sides of *propria Quae maribus* by heart so y^t he keep what he hath got, I would therefore have him Say pretty often to the Girls; I would also have y^e Girls keep what they have Learnt of the Grammar, & Get by heart as far as Jonathan hath Learnt, he can help them to Read as far as he hath Learnt; and would have both him & them keep their writing, & therefore write much oftener than they Did when I was at home. I have left Paper enough for them which they may use to y^e end, only I would have you reserve enough for your own use in writing Letters &c." The letters from which these extracts are taken are addressed to Mrs. Edwards.

working. these Spiders for the Present shall be Distinguished into those that keep in houses and those that keep in forests upon trees bushes shrubs &c and those that keep in rotten Logs for I take em to be of very Different kinds and natures ; there are also other sorts some of which keep in rotten Logs hollow trees swamps and grass.¹ Of these last every One knows the truth of their marching in the air from tree to tree and these sometimes at five or six rods Distanss sometimes, nor Can any one Go out amongst the trees in a Dewey ² morning towards the latter end of august or at the beginning of ³ september but that he shall see hundreds of webbs made Conspicuous by the Dew that is lodged upon them reaching from one tree & shrub to another that stand at a Considerable Distance, and they may be seen well enough by an observing eye at noon Day by their Glistening against the sun and what is still more wonderfull : i know I have severall times seen in a very Calm and serene Day at that time of year,⁴ standing behind some Opaque body that shall Just hide the Disk of the sun and keep of his Dazling rays from my eye and looking close by the side of it, multitudes of little shining webbs and Glistening Strings of a Great Length and at such a height as that one would think they were tack'd to the Sky by one end were it not that they were moving and floating, and there Very Often appears at the end of these Webs a Spider floating and sailing in the air with them, which I have Plainly Discerned in those webs that were nearer to my eye and Once saw a very large spider to my surprise swimming in the air in this manner, and Others have assured me that they Often have seen spiders fly, the appearance is truly very Pretty And Pleasing and it was so pleasing as well as surprising to me that I Resolved to endeavour to Satisfy my Curiosity about it by finding Out the way and manner of their Doing of it, being also Persuaded that If I could find out how the[y] flew I could easily find out how they

¹ The words, "and those that keep in rotten Logs," are interlined ; as are these, "There are also other sorts some of which keep in rotten Logs hollow trees swamps and grass." Probably the first interlineation was to be erased.

² The word "dewey" is substituted for "a fogging," the latter being marked out.

³ The words "at the beginning of" are interlined and very indistinct.

⁴ These words were next written and then marked out : "when I have Stood behind some Opaque body that should Just hide the Disk of the sun and looking along Close beside it multitudes of little Glistening Shining webs of a great length at a Prodigious height in the air." The word "standing" is written over "stood" and left unerased, though afterwards repeated.


made webs from tree to tree, and accordingly at a time when I was in the Woods I happened to see one of these spiders on a bush, so I went to the bush and shook it hoping thereby to make him Uneasy upon it and provoke him to leave it by flying and took Good Care that he should not Get of from it any other way, So I Continued Constantly to shake it, which made him severall times let himself fall by his web a little but he would presently creep up again till at last he was pleased ho[w]ever to leave that bush and march along in the air to the next but which way I Did not know nor Could I Concieve but Resolved to watch him more narrowly next time so I brought [him] back to the same bush again and to be sure that there was nothing for him to Go upon the next time I whisked about a stick I had in my hand on all side[s] of the bush that I might breake any web Going from it if there were any and leave nothing else for him to Go on but the Clear air, and then shook the bush as before but it was not long before he again to my surprize went to the next bush I took [him] of upon my stick and holding of him near my eye shook the stick as I had Done the bush wherupon he let himself Down A little hanging by his web and [I] Presently Percieved a web Out from his tail a Good way into the air. I took hold Of it with my hand and broke it off not knowing but that I might take it out to the Stick with him from the bush, but then I Plainly Percieved another such a string to Proceed Out of his tail I now Concieved I had found out the Whole mystery. I Repeated the triall Over and Over again till I was fully satisfied of his way of working which I Dont only Conjecture to be on this wise viz they when they would Go from tree [to] tree or would Sail in the air let themselves hang Down a little way by their webb and then put out a web at their tails which being so Exceeding rare when it first comes from the spider as to be lighter than the air so as of itself it will ascend in it (which I know by Experience) the moving air takes it by the End and by the spiders Permission Pulls¹ it out of his tail to any length and If the further End Of it happens to catch by a tree or any thing, why there's a web for him to Go over upon and the Spider immediately percieves it and feels when it touches, much after the same manner as the soul in the brain immediately Percieves when any of those little nervous strings that Proceed from it are in the Least Jarred by External things; and this very way I have seen Spiders Go from one thing

¹ Four words are interlined, the second very obscure: "and draws [?] it out."

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to another I believe fifty time[s] at least since I first Discovered it : but if nothing is in the way of these webs to hinder their flying out at a sufficient Distance and they Dont catch by any thing, there will be so much of it Drawn out into the air as by its ascending force there will be enough to Carry the spider with it, or which is all one now there is so much of this web which is rarer than the air as that the web taken with the spider shall take up as much or more space than the same quantity of which if it be equall they together will be in a perfect equilibrium or Poise with the air so as that when they are loose therein they will neither ascend nor Descend but only as they are Driven by the wind, but if they together be more will ascend therein, like as a man at the bottom of the sea if he has hold on a stick of wood or any thing that is lighter or takes up more Space for the Quantity of matter than the water, if it be a little piece it may not be enough to Carry him and Cause him to swim therin but if there be enough of it it will Carry him up to the surface of the water, if there be so much as that the Greater rarity shall more than Counterballance the Greater Density of the man and if it be Doth but Just Cause to balance, Put the man any where in the water and there he'll keep without ascending or Descending ; tis Just so with the Spider in the air as with the man in the water, for what is lighter than the air will swim Or ascend therein as well as that which is lighter than the water swims in that, and If a spider has hold on so much of a web that the Greater Levity of all of it shall more than counterpoise the Greater Gravity of the spider, so that the ascending force of the web shall be more than the Descending force of the spider the web by its ascending will necessarily Carry the Spider up unto such a height as that the air shall be so much thinner and lighter as that the lightness of the web with the Spider shall no longer prevail. Now Perhaps here it will be asked how the spider knows when he has put out web enough and when he Does know how Does he Get himself loose from the web by which he hung to the trees I answer there is no occasion for the spiders knowing, for their manner is to let out their web untill the ascending force of their web And the force the wind has upon it together with the weight of the spider shall be enough to break the web by which the spider hung to the tree for the stress of all these Comes upon that and nature has so provided that Just so much web as is sufficient to break that shall be sufficient to carry the spider. And this verry way I very frequently have seen spiders mount away into the air with a Vast train of Glisten-

ing web before them, from a Stick in my hand and have also shewed it to others and without Doubt they Do it with a Great Deal of their sort of Pleasure. there remains only two Difficulties. the One is how should they first begin to spin out this so fine and even a thread of their bodies if once there is a web Out it is easy to Concieve how if the end of it were once out how the Air might take it and so Draw it out to a greater length but how should they at first let Out of their tails the End of a fine string when in all Probability the Web while it is in the Spider is a certain liquour with which that Great bottle tail of theirs is filld, which immediately upon its being Exposed to the air turns to a Dry Substance and very much rarifies, and extends itself now if it be a liquour it is hardly Concievable how they should let out a fine string except by Expelling a small Drop at the End of it, but none such Can be Discovered: to find out this Difficulty I once Got a very large Spider of the sort. for in lesser ones I Could not Distinctly Discern how they Did theirs nor Can One Discern their webs at all except they are held up against the sun or some Dark Place. I took this Spider and held him up against an open Door Which being Dark helped me Plainly to Discern and shook him wherupon he let himself Down by his Web as in the figure by the web. c. b. and then with his tail fixt with his tail one end of the Web that he intended to let out into the Air to the web by which he let himself Down at. a. then pulling away his tail one end of the Web Was thereby Drawn out which being at first exceeding slender the Wind Presently broke it at d. and Drew it out as in figure the second, and it was immediately spun



out to a very Great length. the Other Difficulty is how when they Are Once Carried Up into the air how they Get Down again or whether they are necessitated to Continue till they are beat Down by some shower of Rain without any sustenance which [is] not probable nor Agreeable to Natural Providence. I answer there is a way Whereby they May Come Down again when they Please by only Gathering in their Webs into them again by Which way they may Come Down Gradually and Gently,¹ but whether that be their Way or no: I Cant say but without scruple that or a better for we Alwaies find things Done by nature as well or better than [we] can imagine beforehand

¹ Cf. Rev. Dr. McCook's *Tenants of an Old Farm*, pp. 198, 199.

“Coroll: We hence see the exuberant Goodness of the Creator Who hath not only Provided for all the Necessities but also for the Pleasure and Recreation of all sorts of Creatures And Even the insects and those that are most Despicable

“Another thing Particularly Notable and worthy of being Inquired into About these Webs is that they which are so exceeding small and fine as that they Cannot be Discerned except held in a particular Position with Respect to the sun, or against some Dark place when held Close to the eye should Appear at such a Prodigious height in the air when Near betwixt us and the sun so that they must needs some of em appear as big as A Cable would Do if it Appeared Exactly secundum Rationem Distantiae. to solve we ought to Consider that these webs as they are¹ thus Posited very vividly Reflect the Rays of the sun so as to Cause them to be very light-some bodies and then see if we Can't find any Parallel Phænomena in other lightsome bodies and Every body knows that A Candle in the night appears² exceedingly bigger at a Distance than it ought to Do³ and we may observe in the moon towards the new When that Part of it that is not Inlightened by the sun is visible how much the Inlightened Part thereof is enlarged and extended beyond the Circumference of the other Part, and astronomers also know how Exceedingly the fixt stars are beyond their bounds to our naked eye so that without Doubt they appear many hundreds of times bigger than the[y] Ought to Do the reason may be that the multitude and Powerfullness of the Rays affects a Greater Part of the Retina than their space which they immediately strike Upon, but we find that a light that so Does when it is alone and when No part of the Retina is affected by any thing else but that, so that the least impression is felt by it, wont Do so or att least Not so much in the midst of other Perhaps Greater light, so that other Parts Of the Retina are filled with impressions of their Own; but these webs are an instance of the Latter so that this Reason Does not seem fully to Solve this so great a magnifying though without Doubt that helps, but the Chief Reason must be Referred [to] that incurvation of the Rays Passing by the edge of any body which Sir Isaac Newton has proved

“One thing more I shall take notice of before I Dismiss this

¹ The words “they are” are written twice.

² This word is interlined, evidently as a substitute for “is,” which is not marked out.

³ This word is now lost by the fraying of the MS. It is preserved in a copy, which, however, did not follow the capitals.

Subject Concerning the End of Nature in Giving Spiders this way Of flying Which though we have found in the Corollary to be their Pleasure and Recreation, yet we think a Greater end is at last their Destruction and what makes us think so is because that is necessarily and Actually brought to Pass by it and we shall find nothing so brought to Pass by nature but what is the end of those means by which it is brought to pass. and we shall further evince it by and by by shew[ing] the Great Usefulness of it, but we Must shew how their Destruction is brought to pass by it I say then that by this means almost all the spiders Upon the Land must necessarily be Swept first and last into the Sea for we have Observed already that they never fly except in fair Weather and we may now observe that it is never fair weather neither in this Country nor any other except when the Wind blows from the Midland Parts and so towards the Sea, so here in newengland I have Observed that they never fly except when the wind is westerly and I Never saw them fly but when they were hastening Directly towards the sea and [the] time of the flying being so long even from the Middle of August to the Middle of October tho their Chief time here in newengland is in the time as was said before towds the Latter End of Aug, And the beginning of Sept, and the[y] keep flying all that while towards the sea must needs almost all of them Get there before they have Done and the same indeed holds true of all other sort of flying insects for at that time of Year the Ground trees and houses the Places of their Residence in summer being Pretty Chill they leave em whenever the sun shines Pretty Warm and mount up into the air and Expand their Wings to the sun and so flying for Nothing but their Ease and Comfort they Suffer themselves to Go that way that they find they Can Go Withe Greatest Ease And so wheresoever the Wind Pleases and besides it being warmth they fly for and it being warmer flying with the wind than against it or sideways to it for thereby the wind has less Power upon them and as was said Of spiders they Never flying but when the winds that blow from the Midland Parts, towards the sea bring fair Weather, they must necessarily flying so long a time all the while towards the sea Get there at last. and I very well Remember that at the same time when I have been viewing the spiders with their webs, In the air I also saw vast Multitudes of flies many of 'em at a Great height all flying the same way with the spiders and webs, Directly seaward and I have many times at that time of Year Looking westward seen Myriads of them towards sunsetting flying

Continually towards the sea and this I believe almost every body Specially of my own Country will Call to mind that they have also seen ; and as to Other sorts of flying insects such as butterflies, Millers, Moths, &c. I Remember that when I was a boy¹ I have at the same time of year Lien on the Ground upon my Back and beheld Abundance of them busy All Flying southeast which I then thought were Going to a Warm Country so that without any Doubt almost all of all manner of aeriall insects And also spiders which Live upon them and are made up of them are at the end of the year Swept and Wafted in to the sea and buried in the Ocean, and Leave Nothing behind them but their Eggs for a New stock the Next year

“Coroll : hence also we may behold and admire at the wisdom Of the Creator and be Convinced from Prvd [Providence] there is exercised about such little things, in this wonderfull Contrivance of Annually Carrying of and burying the Corrupting nauseousness of our Air, of which flying insects are little Collections in the bottom of Ocean where it will Do no harm and Especially the strange way of bringing this About in Spiders (which are Collections of these Collections their food being flying insects) which want wings where by it might be Done ; and what Great inconveniences should we labor Under if there were no such way for spiders and flies are so Exceeding Multiplying Creatures that If they Only slept or lay benumbed in [Winter?] and were raised again in the Spring which is Commonly supposed it would not be many years before we should be as much Plagued with their vast numbers as Egypt was, and If they Died for good and all in winter they by the Renewed heat of the sun would Presently Again be Dissipated into those nauseous vapours of which they are made up of. and so would be of no use or benefit in that [in] which now they are so verry serviceable

“Coroll. 2 : Admire also the Creator in so nicely and mathematically adjusting their Multiplying nature that Notwithstanding their Destruction by this means and the Multitudes that are eaten by birds that they Do not Decrease and so by little and little come to nothing, and in so adjusting their Destruction to their multiplication that they Do neither increase but taking one year with another there is alwaies Just an equall number Of them

¹ Edwards uses the same phrase in speaking of experiences which Dr. Dwight supposes to have occurred when he was seven or eight years of age. His words are : “The first time was when I was a boy, some years before I went to college, at a time of remarkable awakening in my father’s congregation.”

"Another Reason why they will not fly at any other time but when a dry wind blows is because a moist wind moistens the webb and makes it heavier than the air

"And if they had the sense to fly themselves, we should have hundreds of times more spiders and flies by the sea shore than any where else."

For the purpose of comparison I reproduce the letter published by Dr. Dwight, restoring it to its original orthography. Another reason for republishing it is, that, except in extracts,¹ it has been accessible only in an edition of Edwards's Works long out of print.

"There Are some things that I have happily seen of the wondrous way of the working of the Spider. Although every thing belonging to this insect is admirable, yet there Are some Phenomena, Relating to them, more Particularly wonderfull: Every body that is used to the Country knows of their marching in the Air from one tree to Another, sometimes at the Distance of five or six Rods. Nor Can One Go Out in a Dew'y Morning at the Latter End of August And the beginning of September but he Shall see multitudes of webbs made visible by the Dew that hangs on them, Reaching from one tree branch & shrub to Another which webbs Are Commonly thought to be made in the Night, because they appear only in the morning wheras none of them Are made in the night, for these Spiders never Come Out in the night when it is Dark and the Dew falling, but these webbs may be seen well enough in the Day time by An observing Eye by their Reflection of the Sunbeams. Especially Late in the afternoon may these webs that Are between the Eye and that Part of the horizon that is under the sun be seen Very Plainly being advantageously posited to Reflect the Rays, and the Spiders themselves may be very often seen travelling in the Air from one Stage to Another amongst the trees in a very unaccountable manner. But I have Often seen that which is much more astonishing, in very Calm and serene Days in the forementioned time of Year. Standing at Some Distance behind the End of an house or some other Opaque body so as Just to hide the Disk of the sun and keep off his Dazling Rays, and looking along Close by the side of it, I have seen vast multitudes of little shining webbs, and Glistening strings brightly Reflecting the Sunbeams and some of

¹ Professor Tyler, *History of American Literature*, i. 183 sqq., makes a long quotation, with appreciative comments.


them, of a Great length and at such a height that One would think they were tackd to the vault of the heavens and would be burnt like tow in the Sun And make a very beautifull, pleasing, as well as surprizing Appearance. It is wonderfull at what a Distance these webs may Plainly be seen in such a Position, to the Sunbeams, which are so fine that they Cannot be seen without such a position near the eyes Some that are at a Great Distance appear, (it cannot be Less than) several thousand times as big as they ought. I believe they appear under as Great an angle as a body of a foot Diameter ought to Do at such a Distance, So Greatly Doth Comparison increase the apparent bigness of bodies at a Distance, as is observed of the fixed stars

“But that which is the most astonishing is that very often appears at the End of these webs Spiders Sailing in the Air with them which I have often beheld with wonderment and pleasure and shewed to Others and since I have seen these things I have been very Conversant with Spiders Resolving if Possible, to find out the mysteries of these their astonishing works. And I have been so happy as very frequently to see their manner of working that when they would Go from one tree to Another, or would fly in the air they first Let themselves Down a little way from the twig they stand on by a web, as in Fig 1. and then laying hold of it by his fore feet as in Figure 2 and bearing him self by that puts Out a web as fig 3 which being Drawn out of his tail with infinite Ease by the Gently moving Air to what length the Spider pleases, and if the further end happens to Catch by a Shrub or the branch of a tree the Spider immediately feels it, and fixes the hither End of it to the web by which he let himself Down and Goes over by that web which he Put out of his tail, and this my Eyes have innumerable times made me sure of

“Now Sir it is Certain that these webs, when they first Proceed from the Spider, are So Rare a substance that they are lighter than the Air, because they will ascend in it, as they will immediately in a Calm Air, and never Descend except Driven by a wind and tis as Certain that what swims and ascends in the Air is lighter than the air, as that what ascends and swims in water is lighter than y^e so that if we should suppose Any such time wherein the Air is perfectly Calm, this webb is so easily Drawn Out of the Spider's tail that if the End of it be Once Out, barely the levity of it is sufficient to draw it out to any length; wherefore if it Dont happen that the End of this web b. c. Catches by a tree or some other body, till there is so long a web Drawn

Out that it[s] levity shall be so Great as more than to Counterbalance the Gravity of the Spider or so that the web and the Spider taken together shall be lighter than such a quantity of Air as takes up equal Space then according to the universally acknowledged laws of nature the web and the Spider together will ascend and not Descend in the Air, as when a man at the bottom of the water if he has hold of a piece of timber so Great that the wood's tendency upward is Greater than the man's tendency Downwards he together with the wood will ascend to the surface of the water, and therefore when the Spider Percieves that the web b. c. is long enough to bear him up by its ascending force, he lets Go his hold of the web a. b. Fig 4. and ascends in the air with the web b. c. . if there be not web more than enough Just to Counterbalance the gravity of the Spider the spider together with the web will hang in equilibrio neither ascending nor Descending otherwise than as the Air moves but if there is so much web that its Greater Rarity Shall more than Equal the Greater Density they will ascend till the Air is so thin that the Spider and web together are Just of an equal weight with so much air. And this very way Sir I have multitudes of times seen Spiders mount away into the Air with a vast train of this silver web before from a stick in my hand and have also shewed it to others, for if the Spider be Disturbed Upon the stick, by Shaking of it he will Presently in this manner leave it. And their way of working may very Distinctly be seen if they are held up in the Sun, against a Dark Door or anything that is black.

Now Sir the Only Remaining Difficulty is, how they first put out the End of the web b. c. Fig 3 out of their tails. If once the web is Out it is Easy to Conceive how the levity of it together with the motion of the Air may Draw it out to a Greater length. but how should they first let out of their tails the End of so fine and even a string. seeing that the web while it is in the Spider, is a certain cloudy liquor with which that Great bottle tail of theirs is filld which immediately upon its being Exposed to the Air turns to A Dry sub-



stance, and Exceedingly Rarifies and extends it self. Now if it be a liquor it is hard to Concieve how they should let out a fine Even thread without Expelling a little Drop at the End of it but none such Can be Discerned, but there is no need of this, for it is only separating that Part of the web b. c. Fig 2. from a. b. And the End of the web is already out. indeed Sir I never Could Distinctly see them Do this, so Small a piece of web, being imperceptible amongst the spiders legs. But I Cannot Doubt but that it is so, because there is a necessity that they should some way or other Separate the web a. b. Figure 3 from their tails before they can let Out the web b. c. and then I know they Do have ways of Dividing their webs by biting them off or some other way, otherwise they could not separate themselves from the web a. b. Fig 4

“And this Sir is the way of spiders Going from one tree to Another at a Great Distance and this is the way of their flying in the Air. and altho I say I am Certain of it, I Dont Desire that the truth of it should be Reciev'd Upon my word tho I Could bring others to testify to it to whom I have Shewn it, and have looked on with admiration to see their Manner of Working but every one[s] eyes that will take the Pains to Observe, will make them as sure of it : Only those that would make Experiment must take notice that it is not Every sort of Spider that is a flying Spider. for those spiders that keep in houses are a quite Different sort, as also those that keep in the Ground, and those that keep in swamps in hollow trees and Rotten logs, but those Spiders that keep on branches of trees and shrubs are the flying spiders, they delight most in walnut trees, and are that sort of spiders that make those Curious net work polygonal webs that are so frequently to be seen in the Latter End of the year there are more of this sort of spiders by far than of any other.

“Coroll.¹

“But yet sir, I am Assured that the Chief End of this faculty that is Given them is not their Recreation but their Destruction, because their Destruction, is unavoidably, the Effect of it, and we shall find nothing, that is the Continual Effect of Nature but what is of the means by which it is brought to Pass. but it is impossible but that the Greatest Part of the spiders Upon the Land should Every Year be Swept into the Ocean. for these spiders never fly except the weather be fair, and the atmosphere Dry because the atmosphere is never Clear and Dry neither in this

¹ The Corollary written at the end of this letter is appropriate here, and explains the word “yet” in the next paragraph.

nor any other Continent, only when the wind blows from the mid land Parts and Consequently towards the sea. as here in New england the fair weather is only when the wind is westerly the Land being on that side and the Ocean on the Easterly. and I never have seen Any of these spiders flying but when they have been hastening Directly towards the sea, and the time of their flying being so long Even from About the middle of August. Every sunshiny Day till About the End of October (tho their chief time as we Observed before, is the Latter End of August and beginning of september). and they never flying from the sea but always towards it must needs Get there at Last. and its unreasonable to think that they have sense to stop themselves when they come near the sea, for then we should have hundreds of times as many spiders upon the sea shore as anywhere else.

"The Same also holds true of other sorts of flying insects, for at those times that I have Viewed the spiders with their webs in the air, there has also appeared vast multitudes of flies, at a Great height and all flying the same way with the spiders and webs Directly to the Ocean, and Even such as butterflies millers and moths, which keep in the grass at this time of Year I have seen vastly higher than the tops of the highest trees all Going the same ways these I have seen towards Evening without; such a screen to Defend my Eye from the sunbeams which I used to think were seeking a warmer Climate

"The Reason of their flying at that time of year I take to be because then the ground, and trees, the Places of their Residence in summer begin to be Chill and uncomfortable therefore when the sun shines pretty warm they leave them and mount up into the Air, and Expand their wings to the Sun, and flying for nothing but their Own Ease and Comfort they suffer them selves to Go that way that they find they Can Go with the Greatest Ease, and so where the wind Pleases, and it being warmth they fly for they find it cold and laborious flying against the wind. They therefore seem to use their wings but Just so much as to bear them up and suffer themself. to Go with the wind, so that without Doubt almost all aerial insects and also spiders which live upon these and Are made up of them Are at the End of the year swept away into the sea and buried in the Ocean and leave nothing behind them, but their Eggs for a new stock the next year.

"Coroll. hence the wisdom of the Creatour in Providing of the Spider with that wonderfull liquor with which their bottle tails are filld, that may Easily be Drawn Out so exceeding fine and will

so immediately in this way exposed to the Air Convert to a Dry substance that shall be very Rare and will so Excellently serve to all their Progress ”

The second Facsimile in the frontispiece to this number of the “Review ” is one side of a slip of paper which has on the other the last part of the letter which has just been reproduced.

Dr. Dwight supposes that the father had become acquainted with his son's written observations, and having a correspondent abroad who had requested information respecting any objects of interest in natural science, he “encouraged ” his son to prepare an account of what he had observed of the habits of spiders, and to preface it with a letter of apology. Apparently, after completing this work so far as to write out the first draft as printed above, the boy sat down to compose this apologetic epistle. It seems to have taxed him more than the observations previously penned, or than their revision for transmission abroad. On the back of the piece of paper on which he completed the revision he began to frame his epistle. The first words were easily penned. “May it Please your honour.” The next sentence, a truly Edwardean one in its logical involutions, seems to flow out readily, there being but three slight erasures: “You Writing to my father *that*¹ to Give Any further wonders of Nature & I *ha*[?] being Able to Give a much more full and *fu* Distinct account than he, he being Obligated by yours, and I by his Commands, Desire to be Pardoned for writing to you.” Then begins, apparently, the stress of the labor. Boy-like, he stops and draws a spider, — rather an improvement on his earlier efforts, — and then proceeds: “forgive if If I thought that it it is a new Discovery would be as *great a* entertaining to the Learnd world as an account of the ”² — followed by a heavy line of obliteration, and an abandonment of the sentence, if the cross marks are to be so taken. Drawing a short line, he starts again, now with a capital: “If you should think it not worthy to the taking notice of, I trust to Your Goodness, to forgive and Cover my forwardness to Communicate it.” Not satisfied with this he draws a longer line and writes: “forgive me Sir, that I Do not Conceal my name and Communicate this to you by a mediator.” Again a short line, and the words: “If you think, *it Childish*, And besides the Rules of Decorum, (and if you think the Observations Childish) with Greatness and Generosity

¹ Words italicized in printing this letter are marked out in the original.

² Now and then I omit to notice where the words or letters marked out are unintelligible or unimportant.

Look Down Pity and Conceal and Goodness *look & overlook* it in a Child & *Pity & Conceal*." Then come a cross, intended, apparently, to cover these last three sentences, a new line, and a new and bolder effort: "now Sir I Dont Give this nearly as an hypothesis, but as the Certain truth which my eyes have seen and which every ones sense *may be* may make them as Certain of as Any Any thing else." On this sentence too rests a cross mark, and after some letters which are not clear appears again the phrase "the Rules of Decorum," as though the boy was reverting to his earlier thought, and the sentence appears: "Pardon me for troubling you with so long a letter," only, however, to be crossed like its predecessors. After a mark we find, erased, the words *silver Strings*, and then, after another line, this sentence, which, with what follows, remains undisturbed: "Sir although these things appear *very Certain to* for the main very Certain to me, yet Sir I submit it all to your *Judgment, Deeper insight, and* better Judgment & Deeper insight, And I humbly beg to be Pardoned for *troubling you with so prolix an account of that which I am* Running the Venture tho an utter stranger of troubling you with so Prolix an account of that which I am altogether uncertain whether you will esteem *it* worthy of the time and Pains of Reading." After another line the work of composition continues: "Pardon if I thought that it might at least Give *Occasion to you* you Occasion to make better observations on these wondrous animals, that should [be] worthy of Communicating to the Learnd world, from whose Glistening Webs so much of the wisdom of the Creatour shines.

"Pardon Sir

"your most Obedient humble servant"

At this point he seems to have reconsidered his first sentence, and, judging by the cross upon it, substituted the following: "in the Postscript of your letter to my father, you manifest a willingness to Recieve Any thing Else that he has Observed Worthy of Remark, *the Account Given*, what there is an account of in the following lines, by him thought to be such. he *thought me tha* has laid it upon me to Give Write the Account I having *made more full observations* had advantage to make more full observations."

The early manuscripts abound in alterations for the sake of accuracy; the changes in this fragment show no less clearly a charming delicacy of feeling. It is also plainly a very early piece of composition.

Egbert C. Smyth.

THE FULFILLMENT OF PROPHECY.¹

THE writers of the New Testament did not regard themselves as introducing a new religion. They noted the development of the religion which had been revealed to the church and her prophets long before. Our Lord affirmed that He had come not to destroy and reconstruct, but to fulfill the law and the prophets; and the apostles insisted that Christianity was the fulfillment of the covenant made with the fathers. Nor are these claims made simply to avoid offending the conservatives, and to bridge over a transition period from the old to that which is radically new. The idea expressed in them is a regnant and moulding idea of the life of Jesus and of apostolic history. It is this which gives significance to the genealogical tables with which two of the Gospels begin. Whatever our views may be concerning the accuracy or historical value of these tables, their insertion certainly proves that the writers regarded the Davidic origin of Jesus as of great, if not of vital importance. So, when the apostles refer to Jesus as the son of David, they do not simply record an interesting fact in his biography, they mention what they regard as an essential element of condition of his soteric ministry. He came out of the past. The roots of his humanity are traced back to David, to Abraham, to Adam; and God, who dwelt in Him and was revealed through Him, was the same God who of old time had spoken unto the fathers in the prophets.

The same truth is recognized in those expressions in the New Testament which speak of Jesus as coming in the fullness of time. It was quite impossible for Christ to break in upon the established order of providential growth and spiritual evolution. He fitted his own time as He could have fitted no other time, because prophetic revelation in the church and the spiritual life of the church, as well as the more general historical development of the world, had prepared the way for Him and developed the consciousness of the imperative need of Him and of his redemption. There must be first the blade, then the ear, and after that the full corn in the ear.

¹ The first and second articles in this series on the Methods and Results of Biblical Science, under the direction of Professors Hincks, Moore, and Ryder, appeared in the June and October numbers of this *Review*, 1889, under the titles, *The Gospel Miracles and Historical Science*, and *The Minister's Study of the Old Testament*.

The very names and titles which He assumes or accepts are taken from the Old Testament writings, and help to bind Him and his ministry to the earlier revelation of God and of his will. He is the Messiah, the Servant of Jehovah, the Son of God, the Son of Man. These are not simply familiar and convenient terms. They are chosen for a purpose, namely, to show that He came in fulfillment of prophetic hopes, that He is the Saviour whose day the prophets desired to see.

This principle applies also to the more specific doctrinal teaching of the New Testament. Jesus begins his teaching with the very words with which John the Baptist had closed the old dispensation. The Sermon on the Mount is the exposition of the law and the prophets. Christ demonstrates the doctrine of immortality by appealing to ideas which underlie Old Testament expressions. The exegesis of the apostles may sometimes astonish us; but whatever our judgment may be concerning their acquaintance with the principles of exegetical science, one thing is plain, that in all their doctrinal instruction they built upon the foundation of the law and the prophets. They constantly appealed to Scripture and claimed that all evangelical doctrines as well as all the facts of gospel history were but the fulfillment of what God had spoken to Moses and the prophets.

But we must not fail to observe that the facts and doctrines of the New Testament are *developed* out of the Old. They are *fulfilled*. The facts recorded in the Gospels are not the mere verification of predictions found in the prophets. The prophets' words are verified, to be sure. They predicted the fuller revelation of God's mercy and his judgments, — the triumph of virtue and faith, and the defeat of wickedness and the downfall of the wicked. But prediction is but one element of prophecy, and not its most significant or constant element. The fulfillment of a prophecy involves much more than the occurrence of an event which has been foretold. It sometimes involves the expansion of a prophet's conceptions, so that the prophet's words are fulfilled not by the occurrence of that which he thought was to happen, but by the growth of his idea, planted in a prophetic soil, — a growth which follows germinal lines, but which far surpasses what he had in mind. When, for example, Isaiah, impatient and discouraged with Ahaz's unwillingness to be taught of God, exclaims, "The Lord himself shall give you a sign; behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel," it is quite possible that he was not thinking of a miraculous birth;

and when he adds, "Before the Child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good, the land whose two kings thou abhorrest shall be forsaken," it seems quite impossible to believe that the prophet supposed that seven hundred years would pass before the child of his prophecy should be born, and that he was to be the deliverer not of one nation from two hostile kings, — who should be dead and whose kingdoms should have tumbled to pieces long before his birth, — but the Redeemer of the world from the power of Satan and of sin. The course of history for those eventful centuries had given a depth of meaning to the prophet's words which the prophet himself did not apprehend. Under the influence of divine providence the *prophecy* had been in process of fulfillment. It meant more for Matthew than for Isaiah. Still the change in the significance of the prophetic utterance had been simply in the line of growth of its germinal thought. The prophet anticipated the deliverance of the people of God from the power of evil. At least in this fundamental sense his thought was Messianic, whether, in his conception, the Child to be born was the Deliverer or the sign of deliverance.

Now, the evangelist may not have been versed in critical exegesis, but he was a man of spiritual discernment. He laid hold of the great thought of the prophet; he saw that his hope was realized in the birth of Jesus. It was *fulfilled*. It had grown into a larger and more spiritual hope, and, naturally, in this growth, terms in the prophetic utterance which may have signified little to the prophet and his contemporaries had come to have a profound meaning. The maiden, or young woman, who was to conceive and bear a son had borne her son in her virginity, and He who was to be the sign of a great deliverance was now seen to be himself the great Deliverer. This is the kind of fulfillment of prophecy which the New Testament constantly recognizes. Jesus came to fulfill prophecy just as He came to fulfill the law, — to expand it and spiritualize it, to realize its great conceptions in his own life, and to make them permanent in the life of his church. In this fulfillment the form both of the law and of the prophets suffered some mutations, but the spirit of each became freer, more evangelical, and mightier.

It is true, indeed, that the evangelists sometimes lay hold of points in prophetic utterances which seem to be of minor importance. The division of our Lord's garments among his executioners was a small matter of itself, but to the evangelist the words in the Psalm and this act of these men were the hook and

eye by which the anguish of the Lord is fastened to the vision of anguish of the Psalmist. The scene reminds him, not of one isolated expression simply, but of the whole Psalm, — yea, of the whole picture of the suffering Redeemer which the prophets had seen, sometimes, it may be, in dim and confusing outlines, but always with true spiritual discernment of the fundamental conditions of an effective redemption.

Sometimes it seems to matter little whether the words quoted as fulfilled had originally any predictive meaning whatever. A purely historical statement, like that in Hosea, "I called my son out of Egypt," is fulfilled in an incident in Christ's infancy; for there is a prophetic element in history. A divine deliverance is the assurance of subsequent deliverances. Our Lord's return from Egypt to Palestine was the outcome of Israel's return, and, like that earlier return, it was a transfer from one environment to another, which was essential to the development of salvation. History may never exactly repeat itself, but the force which directs and the laws which control historical development are constant, and one deliverance from Egypt prepares the way for and fulfills itself in another.

This characteristic of growth in the significance of prophetic expressions may, perhaps, find illustration in those names and titles applied to our Lord to which reference has already been made. The precise historical meaning of some of these terms is in dispute; but there is nothing involved in the questions under discussion which bears upon the legitimacy of their use in the New Testament. The Servant of Jehovah and the Son of Man may have been, in the prophets' conception, the purified and sanctified Hebrew nation, and the Psalmist may have had little thought of the incarnation when he wrote: "Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee." These terms certainly expressed the conviction that divine grace and truth and salvation would, in some form, be revealed more perfectly than they had been when the prophets wrote. They sustained and purified and developed the faith of pious men who read the prophecies. Jesus appropriated these titles to himself, not as a result of a critical exegesis of the terms which discovered and adopted their precise historical meaning, but because He recognized their underlying ethical and spiritual meaning, and was conscious that in his person and work the hopes of the prophets were being fulfilled. He fulfilled these prophetic hopes and convictions even though He ignored the exact form in which the prophets anticipated their fulfillment. Indeed,

a true fulfillment of prophecy cannot go back to the prophets' times and limit itself to the prophets' interpretation of his own words. All vital terms, like all living ideas, must grow. These significant titles of the divine, saving power which was to operate in the world could not be lodged in the church and remain just what they were, like fossils imbedded in a rock. They had the germ of life in them, they were in a fruitful soil, and they must needs suffer the transformations of growth. Jesus then took them as He found them, and was too wise to occupy himself or to perplex his hearers with historico-critical interpretations.

In all this evolution of prophecy a resistless force is at work. It "must needs be fulfilled." A great idea lodged in human minds and a great hope planted in human hearts must grow and bear fruit. That is the law of divine providence and grace. A significant historical event must work out in human life something greater and more perfect than itself. God is a God of order and of growth. The doctrine of divine decrees is, in some of its aspects, only a more personal and spiritual form of apprehending and stating the doctrine of historical evolution. And this truth must have its darker side. The development of a spiritual religion involves the development of sin and obduracy on the part of those who will not yield to its persuasions. Men of prophetic insight detected this element in sinful human nature, and declared that, with the coming of fuller light and grace, there would appear also greater depravity and increased hardness. They did not see the men who were to develop this obduracy, or the exact time at which it was to appear, but they saw the law, and knew how it must work itself out.

Prophecy is not one thing and fulfillment another which are separated from each other by a chasm of centuries. Their threads are interwoven. Prophecy is, in a measure, its own fulfillment, and the process of its fulfillment becomes itself prophetic. The prophet stands near to God. He discerns the divine character, the divine methods and plans. He sees them working themselves out, and knows, in a large and general sense, what they must develop into. His discoveries may clothe themselves in more or less specific terms, but these are the garments — not the living body of his thought. As the ages pass the fashion of their garments may somewhat change, but the vital idea remains the same. The prophet's words may be translated into another tongue, and may suffer mutation at various points. The man of God who sees them in their fulfillment sees them in their new garb.

and may himself venture to change a point here and there. He, too, looks upon them with a prophet's vision, and discerns their living and eternal principles fulfilled in the operations of divine providence and grace. The student of prophetic utterances and evangelical fulfillments should cultivate the same spirit of freedom, and learn to look beneath the somewhat confusing and perplexing facts which lie upon the surface and to recognize the ever living, ever active Word of God spoken through the prophets, and finding its ever expanding fulfillment in the life of Jesus Christ and in the history of his church.

William H. Ryder.

ENDOWMENTS FOR NEWSPAPERS: A REJOINDER.

ENDOW newspapers? Why?

So that they may have the character and possess the means to secure such men for editors as Woolsey, Lowell, or Schurz, with the result of ideally pure, wholesome, able newspapers, honest in the sanctum and counting-room. Such is the idea which Professor Charles H. Levermore ably advocates in the November number of "The Andover Review."

But why endow a newspaper when such editors, yoked to a business manager of corresponding character and ability, can establish a newspaper, or, better still, buy the Associated Press franchise of an existing paper, and straightway make it successful without a dollar of endowment—provided that they could make it a success at all?

If one were to attempt to answer Professor Levermore's points seriatim, there would be several minor grounds for criticism. His ideal men would not, as a matter of fact, undertake the arduous work of the editorship of a daily newspaper. Mr. Carl Schurz has, within recent years, had a brief and unsatisfactory editorial experience on the New York "Evening Post." Again, these distinguished publicists are already newspaper men after their own choice, by virtue of their frequent contributions to modern monthly magazines, which are in notable instances newspapers with several features, including the news, left out. Or, inasmuch as a genuine newspaper editor lives a public life in seclusion, under the eminently fitting cover of the editorial "We," it might be claimed that the older and more influential men now controlling

the great newspapers, even if not so well known to the public, are as able in their profession as any of the more distinguished men would prove to be. Then, too, it is noticeable that Professor Levermore's portraiture of the American newspaper has an undue amount of Pacific Coast press coloring in it.

But it is not my purpose to engage in detailed controversy; it would not be profitable, and the "Plea for an Endowed Newspaper" has, in its essentials, been made very fairly as well as ably. Besides, details are petty, when, to my mind, there is fundamental error in the notion that the ideal newspaper must be endowed. I shall try to show that this error rests on the following quicksand foundation:—

I. It misconceives a newspaper.

II. It necessarily demands belief that the public will not support an ideal newspaper, and I reject this, so far as our most enlightened communities are concerned.

III. It misconceives the aim and end of endowments.

IV. The admitted evils complained of in newspapers cannot be cured by endowment of money.

Inasmuch as the error springs chiefly from a misconception of what a newspaper is, let us see what it is proposed to endow. A modern great newspaper is not a thing—a fixed property. I knew of an old and widely-known daily being sold a few years ago. When the lawyers came to make the bill of sale they found it difficult to designate what the paper was. The presses and type were not distinctive; the name, even, had not been copyrighted. The most tangible piece of property included in the purchase was the Associated Press franchise; and this could have been used in the publication of an altogether different kind of paper and one having another name. A newspaper is a public institution in the nature of a one-sided partnership between the makers of the paper and the public, which the public can terminate at will—sweet or otherwise. A paper may be endowed, but to what advantage if the public do not form the partnership? The public can always make a newspaper successful; some excellent editors never have done so.

Let us examine closely the functions which a newspaper exercises as a public institution: 1. A newspaper is a mirror of events according to the reflective power of its image glass. In the performance of this prime requirement of the unwritten articles of partnership between the people and the paper, it is an informant. While it derives its name from the exercise of this function, a

newspaper does very much more than merely give the news. 2. A glance at the columns of any leading paper shows fully one third the space devoted to advertising announcements expressive of the whole range of human requirements. Here we find the newspaper a great exchange or clearing-house, as it were, and the publisher playing the part of a broker. 3. Upon analysis of the sixty-seven per cent. of reading matter there appears a totally different function from any named. Here are four or five columns of opinions and explanations of the news, and we see that a newspaper is expected to be an interpreter. 4. But here are several columns not news, nor advertising, nor editorial; they set forth the alleged malfeasance of a New York city judge and cry aloud for his impeachment. I find this exercise of a tribune's office in the columns of a paper whose proprietor¹ recently wrote at the laying of the corner-stone of his new building:—

"God grant that this structure be the enduring home of a newspaper forever unsatisfied with merely printing news, . . . forever aspiring to be a moral force, forever rising to a higher plane of perfection as a Public Institution."

"God grant that THE WORLD may forever strive towards the highest ideals, — be both a daily school-house and a daily forum — both a daily teacher and a daily tribune." . . .

"Let it ever be remembered that this edifice owes its existence to the public; that its architect is popular favor; that its moral corner-stone is love of Liberty and Justice; that its every stone comes from the people and represents public approval for public services rendered."

Mr. Pulitzer has only expressed an ideal which all the best newspapers are following. The London "Times" was exercising this function of tribune in the publication of the articles on Parnellism and Crime; so was the New York "Evening Post" in its apparently successful agitation against the use of Central Park as a site for the World's Fair in 1892; so is the "Boston Advertiser" in its endeavor to have removed the trunk line railroad discrimination against the port of Boston. 5. Turn over one of the too numerous sheets of the modern newspaper and we find a column devoted to the raising of subscriptions: it may be for a world's fair fund, for the American School at Athens, for firemen's widows; but it is something all the time, and the newspapers exercise this function of the solicitor ungrudgingly. 6. Then there are various columns devoted to the function of the enter-

¹ Joseph Pulitzer, in *New York World*, October 11, 1889.

tainer. 7. Finally, we have in most newspapers those columns on the editorial page, and usually, also, in the space allotted to legislative correspondence from the national and state capitols, which perform the function of the partisan advocate. Professor Simeon Baldwin's widely quoted epigram from his recent address before the American Bar Association, that "The newspaper has turned the electric light upon modern civilization," has become lodged in the public mind because it states "What oft was thought but ne'er so well expressed." For it is true, as we see in the exercise of these seven leading functions of the informant, the broker, the interpreter, the tribune, the solicitor, the entertainer, and the advocate, that the newspaper is not merely a mirror of events; it reflects the civilization of a people.

Wherever a newspaper performs these functions acceptably, the public become of necessity identified as partners in the institution to such an extent that it is a source of profit to its managers. The argument that an endowment is necessary must proceed upon the theory that the general public will not read a paper which is properly conducted; that the ideal paper must be a missionary and not a self-supporting publication. The history of journalism furnishes no instances in support of this theory. The newspapers most nearly approaching the ideal are well supported, and unquestionably the newspaper which was ideally honest and clean and able in giving all the news and in performing all its functions would be at least self-supporting in our older and more cultured communities. To deny this is to assert that there is no room at the top. There is no royal road to fortune, and there is no subsidized rose-path to newspaper success. Why should any one set up the theory that true merit will not succeed in newspaper management? It is a denial that any large number of our people are virtuous.

He misconceives the end and aim of endowment who would subsidize a newspaper. Schools and colleges are endowed because those who attend them are, as a rule, at the age, and in the circumstances, of dependents upon society. A newspaper is the cheapest thing in the world for value received. Modern society has no class which cannot afford to come under the influence of newspapers. Whosoever will may come under this influence, and as a matter of fact everybody does. A circulation once gained and the newspaper becomes profitable as an advertising medium. If the public will enter into and continue its partnership, no endowment is needed; if they will not, no endowment can make them.

Endowed virtue in the form of a newspaper can be forced upon an unregenerate public the day that an unwilling horse can be made to drink when led to water.

I am not discussing, of course, that altogether separate question of whether the ideal paper would be more profitable than one which pandered to the uncleanly and sensational instincts. The issue has been raised on the basis of support, not profit.

We come now to the brief consideration of the last-mentioned error in the endowed newspaper theory, namely, that the admitted evils complained of would not be cured by endowment. What are these evils? The influence of political rings and corporations which enchain with patronage, and in general the domination of a sordid publisher over the would-be-virtuous editor. Very well, let us eradicate the root of all evil, — but how? By establishing an endowment fund which the manager will need only to look upon and temptation will flee as Mephistopheles did before Margaret's crucifix. O magic talisman! What wisdom unknown to Solomon! The crowning discovery of this marvelous century, that avarice can be cured by gently feeding it! What a triumph for homœopathy! Let us not meanly confine the application of this tardy discovery to the journalistic profession. If any one must wait, the editor can. Let us endow the legal profession and do away with shyster practice, or the medical profession and see malpractice and quackery cease, or the ministerial profession, so that every clergyman shall be the undaunted advocate and the bright and shining exemplar of the doctrinal truth he professes. Thus we shall prove to the world the beneficence of the new and improved doctrine that honesty, decently endowed, is the best policy. Such is the theory of an endowed newspaper. Apply it broadly: there is not a convict in Charlestown prison who would not swear that his sins against the right of property had not been committed if he had had sufficient money at the time. Yet how the grim old walls mock at this excuse which has been poured into their ears ever since the cell door clanked upon the first convict.

I know that this is a mercenary age, and that there is apparently less appreciation now than at any time since they were written of the satire of the lines in Butler's "*Hudibras*:" —

"For what is worth in anything,
But so much money as 't will bring?"

I recognize that men no longer crown their heroes with laurel, but raise a testimonial fund of \$100,000. It is a current rumor that a millionaire son-in-law in New York has tendered the Sul-

tan of Turkey the offer of \$100,000 cash, if he will embrace Christianity. It is even claimed that the liberal pension allowed by the Brazilian usurpers to the deposed Dom Pedro has caused that worthy emperor to blink at the profane handling of the divine-right-of-kings idea. And yet I still affirm that an endowment of money is not needed to make a newspaper able and honest.

There is much domination of the counting-room over the sanctum. Professor Levermore has sought, it is plain, to draw his indictment fairly, — too fairly many may think, — and yet he has overstated it, I am sure. There are leading newspapers in Boston and New York, and I doubt not in other of our large cities, upon which a conscientious editor may employ his best talents without hypocrisy, from one year's end to another. An issue will occasionally arise whose treatment by others on the same staff, or its entire lack of discussion, he does not approve. But no one on a respectable paper need stultify himself, and surely endowments are not for those who do. The alleged sins of commission and omission complained of in newspapers doubtless often are due to the influence of money, but the influence is usually that of conservatism. After all, it is a matter of opinion in nine cases out of ten whether the grievance against a newspaper is genuine or not. The clamorous, critical public see one side; the managers of the newspaper learn by hard experience to look on all sides. Some day a keen-witted newspaper man will impress his situation upon the public by asking a fair-sized jury of his critics to decide just what they would like changed in the conduct of the paper, and to agree upon and recommend the treatment to be adopted. The result will be a story for public edification like that long ago told of a far Western community which was suffering from drouth. Requests came from all over the county that the newly arrived circuit missionary should pray for a small deluge. That worthy was unwilling to accept the weather bureau test of the efficacy of his prayers, and so said that he could hope to accomplish their desires only upon the condition that the people would agree upon a day of the week which they would give up to the torrents. The drouth was ended without the missionary's interposition.

It must never be forgotten that a daily newspaper of character and influence is expected to be a great conservative force, and must needs be so whether endowed or not. The sagacious manager is constantly putting into practice the virtue of giving the accused the benefit of the doubt, or acting upon that wise motto

of Ben Franklin's, "When in doubt, don't." Those radical papers or journals which have thrown conservatism to the winds may lay claim to having done good chiefly on the ground that they died young. An endowment of money might possibly be a good thing for some journal having an especial mission, or perhaps for some educational magazine of necessarily limited circulation. But what is wanted to make a great daily newspaper clean and able and honest, to cure the evils springing from avarice and many other evils not within the scope of the present discussion, is an endowment of brains and moral courage. One must be able to know what course to take, and, knowing, dare maintain. The crucible of newspaper competition is kept at fervent heat; originality and forcefulness are at a high premium. The gateway to honorable success is clearly to be seen and always wide open; if it be true that "few there be that find it," also it is true that an endowment of money will prove no better guide here than to the strait gate and narrow way proclaimed in the Sermon on the Mount. For him who is properly equipped by virtue of native capacity, ability, and training to conduct a newspaper, there is but one touchstone of success, and it is as far removed from money endowment as honesty is from policy; it is love—love of God, the All-Wise and Beneficent; love of Man, our brother and comrade; love of Truth, the beautiful, the mighty, the enduring, and the shield and buckler which shall make us free.

Frederick H. Page.

WENCHESTER, MASS.

LIFE IN THE MASSACHUSETTS REFORMATORY.

It is five years since the Massachusetts Reformatory began its work at Concord with the buildings and outfit which had been used for a state prison. Five years was the time allowed by some persons well acquainted with prison management for the visionary nature of its plan to become fully apparent. But the plan has developed steadily, and additions and improvements are still being made along the original lines. This reformatory is now probably the most benevolent institution in the world for the detention of criminals.

It is about the same in its methods as the reformatory at Elmira, which preceded it, and the others which have followed.

Like penal institutions of other kinds, it executes the sentence of the court in keeping men prisoners, but, unlike them, it has as an equally important object the education of prisoners in order that they may become fit members of society after their terms are served. Every opportunity of development and reformation that may possibly be offered a man under restraint of the law, it hopes to furnish. This includes as most important of all, moral and religious training. Colonel Gardiner Tufts, the superintendent, says in one of his reports: "(We believe in doing for a criminal just what the best civilization does for other people; that we should deal with the criminal as the gospel deals with a sinner.) Give to a criminal all the physical, social, intellectual, and moral advantages which uncondemned persons have; as nearly as possible bring them in the same way and form to prisoners as such things come to non-criminal persons. Give the criminal the essence of the gospel in all its attractiveness and in all its power as unto any other sinner, and in the same way; by it get into the man that new life whose expulsive power will drive out the old, bad life, and make him a new creature."

This strikes one as a high mission to be officially undertaken within guarded walls and barred windows; but these statements are really working principles. In a month's residence at the reformatory, during which the writer enjoyed every privilege in the way of watching and participating in its work and of associating freely with the prisoners, he saw that such motives give direction to all its various operations.

When a prisoner arrives at the reformatory, he surrenders his effects, to be returned at his release, and passes through the processes of the clothing department, bath-room, and barber shop. A cell — or room, as the word "cell" is avoided — is assigned him, and he receives a manual of the rules of the institution. Then he is examined as to his intelligence and skill, in order that he may be properly placed in the schools and in the shops. The moral instructor calls on him at his room, gives him some encouragement, if possible, and tries to find his religious status. Meanwhile reports of his trial and of his previous history have been sent in by the prison commissioners, and are kept on file with all data concerning him. At first, a man enters the second of the three grades. If he sustains a perfect record for five or six months in deportment and in attention to work and study, he is advanced to the first grade. If he commit some flagrant violation of the rules, he drops into the third grade. The first-grade

men have many privileges ; the third-grade men have none at all. The third-grade men alone have a conspicuous costume. It is of a bright red color. The first and second grade suits are of ordinary business cut, the former of dark blue cloth, the latter of black. The number in the third grade is small, usually not more than twenty. The first and second grades divide the rest of the 640 prisoners about equally.

The plan of the grades, under the system of the indeterminate sentence, is nearly always sufficient for discipline ; solitary confinement is relied upon as a last resort. The indeterminate sentence system went into effect in 1886. Under this arrangement prisoners come to the reformatory under a maximum sentence of either two or five years, according as their offenses are classed as misdemeanors or as felonies. By conducting themselves unobjectionably they may be released on the ticket-of-leave plan, the men under short sentence in eight months, the men under long sentence in eleven months. Before releasing a man on parole, the state commissioners of prisons, who have this matter in charge, visit the reformatory for the purpose of examining his record before and since his committal, and of interviewing him as to his purposes for the future. They inquire of him especially as to whether he has work secured. They then get from outside sources any further information they can gain about his prospects. If the examination is satisfactory, and it seems to be for the good of the man and of society that he be released, he is granted a permit after he has pledged himself to lead a sober and moral life. He still remains under sentence, however, until his full term expires ; if previous to its expiration he neglects to report in writing to the commissioners every two weeks, or if he violates any part of his agreement, he is liable to be at once brought back, without legal process, to serve the rest of his sentence within the wall. For the security of its paroled prisoners, the reformatory trusts to a considerable extent to the expectation that they will be good citizens. Partly for the sake of the men and partly on account of the present impracticability of more comprehensive effort, the watch that is kept of men released on permit cannot be rigid. It is probable that, as the system develops further, there will be improvement in this particular.

The law on this matter in other States where reformatories have been established differs from the Massachusetts law in two points. Men sent to reformatories in the other States are under an indeterminate sentence for the maximum periods allowed by law for the

crimes of which they have been convicted; but after being released on parole, as soon as they show that they are settled in honest and sober living they are finally discharged. Colonel Tufts thinks the Massachusetts law inferior to that of the other States in both points. It does not seem so wise in its treatment of the prisoners, and it puts more strain upon the system.

For the first three years, there was no limit as to the age of men to be sent to the reformatory, nor as to the number of times they might have been convicted. Some men as old as seventy years were received, and some who had been sentenced as many as thirty times. The present law forbids commitment to the reformatory of persons under sixteen or over forty years of age, or who have been convicted more than three times. This change has simplified the work of the institution greatly. The variety of cases to be treated is narrowed enough so that practically all of the inmates of the reformatory are fair subjects for its specific methods.

The average age of the prisoners is twenty-two years. This shows that a large proportion are boys of from sixteen to twenty-one. They are either vicious and unmanageable fellows who are committed by their parents, or boys from the slums who have been in training for becoming habitual criminals, or weak-willed boys with an air of gentility about them, who would have been just as open to good influences if they had met them as to the evil ones which have brought them down. Among this last class, whom it seems so pitiful to find in a prison, was a pleasant-faced boy of sixteen, who was telegraph messenger a few years ago in one of the college towns, and some of us used to see him go swinging along, whistling and chuckling to himself, with all the proverbial freedom from care of a messenger boy. It was the old story with him of a drunken father, deserted, hard-worked mother, cheerless home, and bad companions. The adult prisoners exhibit several rather clearly marked types. Under the Massachusetts laws, common drunkards may be sent to the reformatory on an indeterminate sentence of two years, and these constitute one fourth of the whole number of inmates. There is a small group of young men of good ability and respectable connections, who have been sowing their wild oats, and have resorted to embezzlement, forgery, or theft outright, to sustain their dissipation. Then there is a class of men who might be called accidental criminals, who knew little of criminal life until, under the stress of passion, despair, or laziness, or while intoxicated, they committed the deed for which they were sentenced. From this point, the different stages in

criminality up to some of the less heinous and less developed forms of professional crime are represented. The habitual criminals are so cautious that it is difficult to discover them, except by going to the records. Yet, now and then, one finds the criminal instinct and training evidently present: as in the man who strikes a balance between getting perhaps a thousand dollars at a stroke, and "doing" eight months or a year in the reformatory for board and clothes, as a consequence, — and decides that it is a fairly good business scheme; or in the man sent up for drunkenness, who thinks he came too cheaply and might just as well have had some money for his pains.

Thus, nearly all of the inmates of the reformatory are only beginners in crime; indeed, we have seen that a considerable proportion of them are not accused of what is generally called a crime. Of course, they are all morally diseased and are already hindrances and enemies to society, but they are not by any means, as it is usually supposed law-breaking sinners are, beyond the reach of the common good feelings and interests of human nature. Not many of them are deliberate haters of their kind. It is true that a prisoner puts little confidence in others and is likely in many instances to be himself a hypocrite. But the men in the reformatory almost without exception respond instantly to friendly treatment. As soon as one shows a little sympathy, they are very ready to tell him the whole story of their downfall, and none appreciate encouragement more than they. They are nearly all deeply disappointed men. Even those who give their narratives with a certain pride in the cunning they have displayed or in the publicity that has surrounded their exploits will generally admit that considering their imprisonment the game was hardly worth the candle. In the majority of cases the story is told with shame, at least on account of the open disgrace of its outcome. This shows that there is a sensitive surface upon which the humane reformatory methods can begin to make their impression.

The prescribed treatment begins with healthful and cheerful surroundings. In its rural situation the reformatory has the advantage of quietness and of pure air and water. The hygienic arrangements of the prison and the care exercised for the personal health of the men are as nearly perfect as circumstances will allow. Sometimes weeks pass with no inmates in the hospital. The food is of good quality, and there is a fair range of variety. The writer ate the prison bread through the time of his stay, and he can testify that it was good. Cleanliness and neat-

ness on the part of the men are required. Furniture and decorations may be added to the rooms, and many of them are tastily arranged. In the yard, along the path where the prisoners march to and from the shops twice a day, there is in summer a beautiful flower garden.

Much the larger part of the men's time is taken up with labor. The superintendent says the work is not for revenue but for regeneration. Still, it is managed so as to be successful financially. The work is done on the piece-price plan, — stock is received from different firms and manufactured into goods at a certain price per piece. This has obvious advantages over any system of farming out prison laborers. The principal industries of this kind are the manufacture of shoes and of cane-seat chairs. A number of industries are carried on besides, mainly for the needs of the institution, — tailoring, carpentering, printing, painting, mason work, blacksmithing. In all departments, the most promising men are learning trades or acquiring skill in the use of machinery, and the effort is to raise all unskilled men as high as they may be able to rise in the scale of labor. The work is all carried on busily and with regularity. During working hours, from seven to 11.30 A. M. and from one to 5.30 P. M., except on Saturday, when the work ends at 3.30, every one is supposed to have his attention entirely given to his work. No conversation is allowed in the shops. The principal incentive to work is the negative one of loss of marks, involving delay of release, for lack of application to work or for any misconduct in the shops. But other better influences are nearly always present. Men who are at uninteresting work have the prospect of a better position if they are faithful. Those that are learning trades or are using machinery take a positive interest in what they are doing, and are always pleased to have an opportunity to explain their work to a stranger. The officers in the shops are not placed there principally as watchers, — Colonel Tufts repudiates the idea, — but as skilled directors of the work under way. This relation of the officers to the men is especially pleasant in some of the shops, and tends to relieve the prevalent feeling of being under servitude. As yet, there is no incentive in the way of wages placed before the prisoners. There is no question that some slight money return would greatly advance the main object for which tasks are set in a reformatory, — the development of interest and skill in work. In Minnesota and New York, a partial compensation is given the prisoners, and considerable liberty is allowed them in the use of their

money. This plan will probably be introduced in Massachusetts before long.

Every prisoner, unless he have received a common school education or for some other reason he be excused, is in compulsory attendance at the schools, which are held four evenings in the week, continuing two hours. The total number in the schools is about five hundred. There are nine teachers and a general school officer. Beside the instruction in the common branches, United States Constitution, drawing, and singing are taught. In judging of the success of the schools, one must recognize the great difficulties they have to meet, and must look more at the good results which come than at the tedious process. The prisoners in general like this department of the reformatory's work less than any other. It is difficult and distasteful to them to have to engage in any continuous mental exercise. It is therefore necessary to spur their dormant minds by emphasizing the requirement of close attention to study, in order to early release. The fact that nearly a third of the prisoners are released after but little more than the minimum stay indicates the strength of this incentive in holding the men not only to diligence in work and study, but to obedience to a very exacting set of rules for general conduct.

The numerous meetings of the men are the special independent development of the Concord system. This feature is not found at other reformatories. The programme of a week seems very full of religious and temperance meetings and meetings of societies for general instruction and entertainment. On Sunday, there are the Catholic service, the Sunday-school, and the general service, in the morning, the first-grade meeting in the afternoon, and the meetings of the Y. M. C. A. and the Reform Club in the evening. The first-grade meeting was originated by Colonel Tufts soon after the opening of the reformatory, and is conducted by him. It is not a distinctively religious meeting, though the religious aim is always present. It opens with some general singing. Instrumental or vocal music by some of the men follows. The main event is an address by a speaker who is invited for the purpose, and is asked in a little circular describing the meeting to bring the best thing he has. The address is informal in its nature, and the greatest variety of subjects has been taken. Not long ago, the minister who had preached in the chapel in the morning interested the men greatly in a talk in the afternoon about "Aluminum." Another day, the speaker held the closest attention for an hour and a quarter on the subject, "Physiological Psychology."

Any one watching the faces of the prisoners as the incisive and stirring thought of these addresses penetrates into the sluggish and misused minds and arouses them to healthy, sustained action, would easily see how much this meeting does toward good thinking and living. The men at the reformatory are always an interesting audience, but speakers at the first-grade meeting find them especially responsive. The difference is partly because the meeting is made up of the picked men of the institution, but more largely because, from its variety and informality, they are free from any feeling of being preached to. Visiting ministers often accomplish better results by these talks which are not nominally religious than by their sermons.

The plan of the "early meetings," so-called because they are held before the schools begin on week-day evenings, is a special idea of the moral instructor, Rev. William J. Batt, who always conducts them. A list of about two hundred men is made out, depending on the fitness of the men and their desire to come, and each man attends one of the two weekly meetings. The exercises begin with singing of gospel hymns, into which the prisoners always enter with a great deal of spirit. A short devotional exercise follows. The rest of the time the moral instructor fills with friendly talks, passing freely from one subject to another; he reads letters from ex-prisoners, comments on passing events, and if any stranger be present asks him to speak. These meetings are to a large extent exercises in moral culture. Beside giving all possible encouragement toward seeking the general good ends in life, Mr. Batt takes advantage of every incident that arises in the prisoners' circle, — such as the reward of some faithful service in the shops, or the capture of a runaway, or the success or failure of men out on parole, — to try to get his hearers interested in taking the right moral attitude toward the immediate situation in which they are placed.

There are six societies carried on by the prisoners themselves, ranging in membership from forty to two hundred. Their meetings are all conducted without the presence of officers. The presidents and sergeants-at-arms of the societies, who are practically the free choice of their fellow-members, are very severe on any misconduct. The religious societies have meetings much like those in what the men so solemnly call the "outside world." For lively interest they would surpass many a church prayer-meeting. No one can doubt that a good number of these men are in earnest in trying to live the Christian life. In the literary societies, music

is an important element of the programme. There are three pianos in the institution, and a number of the men play creditably. An ex-prisoner who is a pianist of much ability has general direction of the music, and assists at the meetings. For the rest, there are papers and talks on topics of general interest, distant places which men have visited, different trades, industries, inventions, and commercial operations, with which they have been concerned. From this point, there is a tendency toward literary and scientific discussion in some of the societies, and toward character acting and club swinging in others. But in none of the societies are any breaches of propriety on the part of the participants in the exercises sanctioned. Any one attempting such a thing is likely to be stopped by the president with a stern reprimand. The superintendent usually comes in near the end of each meeting and says a few words under invitation from the chair. The president is responsible for the good conduct of the society, and takes great pride in reporting to him that everything has gone pleasantly.

Beside all the meetings, there is a course of lectures and entertainments every winter, and on holidays there is always an entertainment of some kind. A sixteen-page paper, edited by the superintendent, and printed by the reformatory press, is distributed to all the prisoners every week. As no daily papers of any kind are allowed to pass into the prison, — the object being to cut off the inmates completely from knowledge of criminal affairs, — the paper contains a summary of the week's news, with comment on the more important items. It also has wholesome editorial discussion, reports written by prisoners of all meetings and addresses, local items, and selected material. The library contains more than three thousand volumes, and they have a large circulation. A large number of periodicals, sent in by generous individuals, are distributed among the men. There is a lack at Concord, however, of the excellent method which has been used at Elmira of directing the prisoners' reading and giving them compulsory systematic instruction in English literature, with examinations at intervals.

The plan of the meetings shows that the reformatory idea includes recreation and the development of social life. The latter half of Saturday afternoon is allowed to all but the third-grade men for out-door enjoyment. There is a large play-ground with provision for different kinds of sports. During the season, "Our Boys," the base-ball team, appears, neatly uniformed, against

clubs from the neighborhood, and usually defeats them. The men do not go to and from the schools and meetings in any regular order, but may be seen in congenial and interested groups. Every night, quite a number of men have the freedom of the corridors for the purpose of arranging for the society meetings. They are never held strictly to this business, and many pleasant chats go on between friends on opposite sides of the barred door. But provision cannot be made for any great amount of conversation among the men. Aside from the demands of prison order, the distrust and hypocrisy which is so largely the atmosphere of even the best prison life puts great difficulties in the way of free intercourse. It is found to be much better to have the prisoners' interest in idle and hurtful conversation displaced by labor, good reading, social entertainment, and stimulating and encouraging appeals to the moral nature. Undoubtedly many boys, and men, too, learn while in the reformatory about ways of evil which they had not heard of before; but it is the opinion of Colonel Tufts that, in general, the influence upon the boys of such men as are sent to him is for good, and not for evil. As nearly all of the men are behind the bars for the first time, they are usually sensitive to the disgrace and punishment, and they strongly urge the boys to mend their ways and never to get into such a place again. Really, the boys feel the shame and restraint of being in prison less than the men do. It is a sad comment on general social conditions, and no indication of weakness in the reformatory system, that some boys come to the prison who seem to find life larger and more interesting within the wall than they had ever known it outside.

The civilizing influence upon the prisoners of the way they are being treated may be observed everywhere. It is important, of course, to develop in criminals the regularity which comes from obedience to authority; but the voluntary acceptance of opportunities for improvement means something more. Attendance at the meetings is regarded by the men as a privilege. The general service on Sunday is the only one at which attendance is required. Every Saturday evening four hundred prisoners are in the meetings, under their own control for two hours or more, engaged in the exercises of programmes which they themselves have made out. A place on the programme is counted a thing worth striving for. The honors of the societies are highly appreciated, and candidates begin to run for an office long before it becomes vacant. It does much to raise a man's self-respect to think that he can do

something worthy the attention of his companions ; this makes it a cheering sight to see two prisoners conferring with all the dignity of *virtuosi* over a selection for a harmonica duet. Often men who have never said a word in public find that they have had some experience which is of interest to others ; they are drawn into the narration of it ; and before their terms are out they are able to take their part on a programme in a very creditable way. All the influences of the reformatory are toward the cultivation of the simple refinements of life, and the men are apt to learn them. They take pride in personal neatness. One going among them would be surprised at their uniform gentlemanliness and friendliness. Great care is exercised in the societies to sustain the courtesy of a public meeting.

There is much of the feeling of hope through the institution. The effect of its methods is rather toward making the men forget that they are prisoners than to remind them of the fact. They have none of the marks of the convict upon them. Even their work is not for the purpose of degrading them. As fast as a man proves trustworthy, he is rewarded by being trusted. A number of the prisoners are assigned to duty at the outer entrance, or outside the wall, without being watched by officers. It is a common thing on Sunday afternoon to see a squad of twenty men in charge of the deputy superintendent alone, enjoying a walk along the pleasant country roads. Every part of the experience of a prisoner, till he finally passes out of the front door, clad in a tasteful new suit of clothes, with his car fare and something besides in his pocket, and perhaps still feeling Colonel Tufts' hand on his shoulder, is calculated to stir him to rise to the possibilities of his manhood.

There are no statistical statements as to the result of the reformatory's treatment upon the men whom it has sent out. Nearly all have expressed a purpose to live an upright life. Up to the present, about twelve per cent. of those released have been returned. At any rate, there can be no doubt that nearly every man who has been confined in the reformatory is a somewhat better man for having been there ; and no small part of those who pass out turn completely away from drunken, idle, and criminal ways of living. Cases are constantly being heard of in which the effect of the steadiness and skill acquired at the reformatory, not to speak of the general encouraging influences of the place, can be clearly observed. An interesting part of the work of the institution is what it contrives to do in different ways for its

former prisoners. A number of them are retained in the employ of the prison as clerks, or instructors in the shops and schools. These men seem to be glad to remain where they will be free from temptation. Correspondence is kept up, as far as possible, with those who retain an active interest in reformatory affairs. As men go out they are encouraged to think of the reformatory as being always in sympathy with them in efforts to do right. Ex-prisoners often come back for a visit. They are warmly welcomed, and always exhibit a feeling which somehow suggests the loyalty of a graduate for his college.

Just now, there is no systematic attempt to secure work for the men as they are released. Two or three years ago, a small industry was started in Concord, through the efforts of Mr. Batt, for the purpose of giving temporary employment to discharged prisoners until steady work could be found. The enterprise failed, but only because the right man could not be secured to superintend it. It is probable that the experiment will be tried again. The question of the treatment of the class of men who are released from prison as having become fit to reënter society is a new and unsettled one. Whatever additional organization may be needed, it is certain that this part of the system rests a special responsibility upon individual citizens. The prisoner goes back into the world, borne down with a morbid consciousness of being continually distrusted and shunned. It becomes the duty of the citizen to receive the hesitating man in the spirit in which he has been sent out, taking it for granted, until the contrary is proved, that he is going to be worthy of at least such ordinary confidence as all other men are freely allowed. Still, until good people shall have begun to look upon the paroled prisoner with some of the interest and hope which the reformatory prison sees in him, reformatory administration will feel impelled to reach out after him in helpful ways, notwithstanding he has passed beyond its special province.

The most important feature of the work being done at Concord is its personal quality. One can see there that the development of the reformatory system is only the outward change resulting from the entrance of men of high grade into prison management. At first the skillful and hopeful methods would naturally interest one most; but later on he will find his mind continually running back to the source of things, and he will begin to see that it signifies more than methods that such a man as Colonel Tufts should have come to be in charge of a prison, with practically free power to

act out his strong philanthropic impulses. The spirit of Colonel Tufts is well shown in the fatherly sympathy and counsel he gives in his talks at the close of the society meetings, or in the noble Christian idealism with which he speaks of the "prisoner-man" in his official reports. One of the prisoners told the writer that if after he went out he should fall back into his old ways and get into trouble, the first man to whom he would like to go for help would be Colonel Tufts. Doubtless nearly all his prisoners have a similar feeling toward him. He is not only at the head of the institution; he is all through it, exercising constant intelligent direction of both prisoners and officers. The officers are all appointed by Colonel Tufts, and considering the difficulty of finding men for such work who can enter intelligently into the reformatory idea, his success in this matter is remarkable. Not often would one find a group of forty men from the ordinary walk of life, so agreeable in face, bearing, and conversation as these officers are. Of course, there are complaints among the prisoners of injustice, but the more trustworthy prisoners say that the officers are nearly always fair in their treatment of the men. To a large extent, officers and prisoners are on open and friendly terms, the officers often taking prisoners out with them to their homes.

Mr. Batt came from a suburban church to the reformatory shortly after its opening. Though his official title is "moral instructor," he gives no formal moral instruction, but follows out in broad lines the general work of a chaplain. He has, however, a great advantage over most prison chaplains in having special provision made at many points for the entrance of his work into the operations of the institution. He has the full confidence and co-operation of the superintendent, and they consult together on everything involving his department. Mr. Batt takes entire charge of two meetings, exercises oversight of two others, and encourages by his presence and help many of the rest of the meetings. He is the regular preacher at the chapel service on Sunday. Every prisoner receives a call from Mr. Batt at least twice during his confinement, once shortly after he enters, and again on his birthday. On these rounds Mr. Batt's effort is, in addition to giving kindly sympathy and encouragement, to find where treatment in the way of good reading or of permission to attend meetings may be applied. These are the main features of the work of the moral instructor; but it has no set limits, and as carried out it becomes a comprehensive application of the intelligent Christian motive to all the higher needs of the erring men with whom it deals. The

work is one of great interest, and meets with much encouragement both during its prosecution and in its results.

Well manned as the Massachusetts Reformatory is, it does not go on the theory that the reforming of young criminals has been entirely relegated to its official corps. The institution is regarded rather as the appointed organ through which the reformatory influences of the community shall act. It is a definite part of its plan to be constantly turning into its own channels outside forces which are working, or can be made to work, in the direction of its purpose. Every encouragement is given to efforts to continue or renew any good influences that may come from the prisoners' homes, especially in the hope of preparing a healthful home atmosphere into which the men may go when they are released. The number of visitors is large, and the visits sometimes last through most of a day. The conversation is carried on in sight of officers, but out of their hearing. In alternate weeks there are three hundred and six hundred letters sent. No small part of the reformatory's success has been in the way of restoring husbands to their injured wives, and sons to their injured parents. A young Catholic priest from the church in Concord conducts an early service on Sunday, at which about half the men are present. He has the freedom of the institution, and is much respected by the men in both his public and private relations with them. Nearly every Sunday, a stranger is present to address the first-grade meeting. About half the time, the pulpit is occupied by visiting clergymen. In different ways, an increasing circle of influential people are becoming personally acquainted with the work of the reformatory, and they seem to retain their interest in it. A number of leading ministers come at intervals. Phillips Brooks is always expected once a year. It is a matter suggesting hopeful things that a sermon preached by Dr. Brooks the last time he visited the reformatory, which seemed to have in it even more than his usual power and deeply stirred the prisoners, was preached again, a few weeks later, with the same magnificent impressiveness, at Wellesley College.

The management of the reformatory still look forward to changes for the better in its plan and scope. More decided limits to the action of the courts in committing drunkards to its charge have been called for. Also, objection has been made to the sending of young convicts to other places who rightly belong to the reformatory. In the institution itself, two important improvements are just being introduced. Up to the present, the men

have taken their meals in their rooms. It was recently decided that this plan needlessly deprived them of an opportunity for social intercourse and training, and a large dining-room has been made ready in which they now dine together. Preparations will soon be completed for a manual training school. It is to follow the methods of the best schools of the kind, and in time will include all the common trades. This addition will make the reformatory's facilities for developing industrial skill in its men practically complete.

Robert A. Woods.

ANDOVER.

REVISION OF THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION.¹

THE revision of the Westminster Confession is a theme that is now absorbing the attention and stirring the hearts of Presbyterian churches throughout the world. For revision is no local or temporary movement. It is a product of the evolution of Christian life and thought in our century. It is the swell on the wave of the advancing tide of Christianity that is sweeping on not only the Presbyterian Church, but all denominations of Christians, towards the realization of the grand ideals of Christian truth, unity, and perfection.

The revision movement started in this country without leadership, and it has puzzled the leaders of the church to keep abreast of it. It has been accompanied by changes of attitude and surprises. It was at first a child's cry for relief that excited sympathy all over our land. It was but a spark last April. In May, the General Assembly started the flame that has spread like fire upon a prairie, and now the whole church is ablaze. It is one of those movements that are long in preparing, and that suddenly burst forth with irresistible might and omnipotent energy. We are in the beginnings of a theological reformation that can no more be resisted than the flow of a great river.

I. REVISION AND THE SCRIPTURES.

A venerable divine has recently said that the fundamental question in the revision movement is whether the Confession is in

¹ This article was delivered as an address before the Presbyterian Union of New York. It has the form of an address rather than an article. It has been enlarged, and many notes have been added.

accord with the Scriptures. This is the question that Parliament asked the Westminster divines when they sent up the Confession of Faith, December 4, 1646, after five months' labor. They demanded proof-texts for every statement before they would take it into consideration.¹ Accordingly the divines went to work on the proofs, and labored until April 26, 1647, upon them. The Westminster divines set a bad example to their successors, which they followed too well; for it has been the habit of divines to construct their dogmas by logical deductions, and then seek support for them in the Scriptures. If the Westminster divines had put the Scriptures first, their definitions might have been more Scriptural.

One of the greatest improvements in modern theology has been the development of the discipline of Biblical theology. The theology of the Confession was made, not from teachings of Scripture alone, but also by deductions from Biblical statements that cannot be admitted into a system of Biblical theology. The theology of the Confession is a system of speculative theology based on the Scriptures. If one could change it into a system of Biblical theology, it would be as great a transformation as one sees when he removes from America to Europe.

We assume that the Westminster system is based on the Scriptures, and that its essential and necessary articles are in harmony with the Scriptures. But there are many unessential and unnecessary articles that are not in accord with the Scriptures. There are other important doctrines that are in the Scriptures and are not in the Confession. An advance in the study of the Bible is the nerve of the revision movement.

II. THE CHURCH HAS CHANGED ITS ATTITUDE.

The issue between the friends and foes of revision is fairly and squarely stated when it is said that it depends altogether upon the question whether the Presbyterian Church has changed its attitude toward the Confession or not. I shall endeavor to convince you that the church has changed its attitude, and that this change has been thorough. It is all the more startling that this change has taken place silently, gradually, and unconsciously, so that it was not recognized until it was forced upon our attention. You will

¹ Baillie writes: "Our Assemblie, with much adoe, at last have wrestled through the whole Confession and all is now printed. The House of Commons requires us to put scripture to it before they take it into consideration; and what time that will take up, who knows?" — *Letters and Journals*, ii. 415.

not be surprised that the dogmatic divines have unconsciously led the church away from the Standards when I call your attention to the fact that there are more than eight hundred titles of books and tracts written by the Westminster divines, the authors of the Standards, and, so far as one can tell from the copious indexes of the systems of theology taught in our theological seminaries, the authors have not used a single one of them. The great divines who composed the Confession of Faith, and who are the best guides to its interpretation, have not been considered worthy of mention. It is very remarkable that all their other writings should be laid aside as worthless, and this one product of their brains should be exalted above all other human compositions.

The Westminster Confession was composed by the Westminster Assembly two hundred and forty-three years ago. This Assembly was called by the Parliament of England. It was designed to embrace moderate men of all parties, selected from all the counties of England and Wales. Ireland was represented by its Archbishop and the Professor of Divinity at Dublin. Scotland was represented by its ablest divines. The Episcopal party was represented by one archbishop, two bishops, several masters of colleges, and a number of choice scholars. The Independents were represented by seven of the strongest men of their party. No such fairly representative body of divines was ever before or since convened in Great Britain. It was a splendid plan to unite all parties in the three national churches of Great Britain about common symbols.¹ But, unfortunately, the king would not allow the Episcopal divines to attend, and the Assembly, with the Long Parliament, soon expelled the Episcopal party. The Presbyterian majority were intolerant toward the Congregational minority, so that, while the dissenting brethren struggled heroically for their views in the Assembly, the hostility of the Presbyterian party became so great that John Goodwin and Henry Burton, the only two pastors of London churches who were Independents, were deprived of their charges.² And so the Westminster Symbols be-

¹ Each one solemnly swore that he would "endeavour to bring the churches of God in the three kingdoms to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, confession of faith, form of Church Government, directory for worship, and catechising, that we and our posterity after us, may as brethren live in faith and love, and the Lord may delight to dwell in the midst of us."

² Baillie writes, July 8, 1645: "Blessed be God, all the ministers of London are for us. Burton and Goodwin, the only two that were Independent, are by the Parliament removed from their places. Seven or eight preachers that are against our way are only lecturers in the city, but not ministers." — *Letters and Journals*, ii. 299.

came the banners of the Presbyterian party. What, then, do we see at the present time? The Westminster Confession has been rejected by all of the historical churches of England. It is held only by the Presbyterian Church of England, a small church, composed chiefly of Scottish and Irish families residing in England. In Ireland, it is the symbol only of the Presbyterians of the North. It is a national creed in Scotland alone. It is used only by Presbyterians in America and the colonies. Nine tenths of the Protestants of Great Britain and America do not adhere to the Westminster Confession. It has failed in its design of displacing the Thirty-nine Articles. It has not become the one creed of Great Britain. This is the verdict of history on the Westminster Confession.

The Westminster Confession was completed December 4, 1646. Two hundred and forty-three years have passed, years fraught with change and great movements in philosophy, in science, in art, in commerce, in industry, and in society. Everything has changed since the seventeenth century. And yet there are some who think that theology has not changed. Our Saviour promised his disciples the gift of the divine Spirit to guide them into all truth. Christian history shows that the reigning Christ has fulfilled his promise. The church advanced through the Christian centuries in religion, in doctrine, and in morals, down to the year 1646. The Reformation was a wonderful revival and advance in Christianity. The second Reformation was a still further advance. The Westminster Confession gives us the high-water mark of progress up to the year 1646. Did our Saviour fulfill his promise up to that date and then forget it? Has the Holy Spirit been withdrawn from the world since the seventeenth century? God forbid! I have sometimes thought that our ultra-conservative friends do not believe in the Holy Ghost. They doubtless believe that He is the third person of the Trinity, but they have no practical faith in his presence and power in the church of the day. They doubt his power to assure men of the divine authority of the Scriptures. They have no confidence in his guidance in the evolutions of Christian theology in our century. These brethren are mistaken. The divine Spirit has been more active in the past three centuries than ever before. There never has been a period in which the church has made such rapid strides forward as in the past one hundred years. We are on the march to-day. Swiftly the columns advance. It is the quickness of the movement, the suddenness of the transition, that is making

it clear that we have all departed from the line of battle of 1646; and that our detachments are in movement in different stages of evolution to take up their position in the new line of battle that our Saviour King has assigned for the twentieth Christian century.

The Westminster Assembly prepared six different documents, and fortified them all with proof-texts. What have we done with them? The Synod of New York and Philadelphia, in 1788, swept these proof-texts all away. A committee appointed at a later date added proofs to the doctrinal standards, but in such a slovenly way that their work is not entitled to the slightest consideration or respect.¹ These texts are no part of the Constitution as it was adopted, and published by authority of the Synod.

The Form of Government, Directory of Worship, and Directory of Ordination were all discarded. New documents were composed and adopted in their stead. The American Synod did not venture to add proof-texts to them, for they definitely abandoned the *jure divino* theory of church government and worship, and established themselves on the ground of Christian expediency.

The Confession was revised in three chapters,² and the American doctrine of church and state was substituted for the Westminster doctrine. Such a revision of the Westminster standards was revolutionary. But our Presbyterian fathers had passed through a political revolution, and they did not hesitate to make an ecclesiastical revolution. The only reason that they did not make a doctrinal revolution was because they were not theologians, and doctrines were not in debate.

It is necessary for us to put ourselves in the circumstances of the seventeenth century in order to realize the marvelous change that has taken place in the Presbyterian churches since that time. It would have seemed very strange to Westminster divines that their children in the nineteenth century should think doctrine so much more important than practice. It would have surprised them that later Presbyterians could throw away all their work in church government and worship, and then stand back in horror at the thought of touching the articles of faith. Baillie, a member of the Assembly, tells us: "The hearts of the divines here who are wise, both of the Assemblie and city and elsewhere, are set only on the point of government. We are going on in the

¹ See Historical Note, by S. T. Lowrie, *Presbyterian Review*, July, 1888.

² These chapters are: xx. 4, which was amended by omission of a clause; xxiii. 3, xxxi. 1, which were entirely remodeled.

Assemblie with the Confession, and could if need were shortly end it. We are preparing for the catechise; but we think all is for little purpose till the government be set up.”¹ This was the opinion of the Westminster divines. But in these times it is thought that government and worship are for little purpose till our doctrines are set up. Baillie describes some of the work of Presbyterians in 1644, as follows: “Paul’s and Westminster are purged of their images and organs, and all which gave offence. My Lord Manchester made two fair bonfires of such trinkets at Cambridge.”² He describes a procession of lords and commons, mayor, aldermen, and Westminster Assembly passing along Cheapside in London, where a great bonfire “of many fine pictures of Christ and the saints, of relicts, beads and such trinkets” were blazing at a place “where Christ’s rich cross used to stand.”³ He depicts a Fast service, with three prayers two hours each, two sermons an hour each, besides two short prayers at the beginning and the end, a short address and two psalms, consuming, in all, more than eight hours.⁴ December 2, 1645, he writes: “The Independents here plead for a toleration both for themselves and other sects. . . . We hope God will assist us to remonstrate against the wickedness of such a toleration.”⁵

This was Presbyterianism two hundred and forty-four years ago. The burning of organs and pictures of Jesus Christ, the refusal of toleration to Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and Baptists, fasts frequent and severe, sermons and prayers of intolerable length, psalm-singing the only sacred song, — all these things are an abomination to us. We thank God we do not live in such times, and in the society of such Presbyterians.

¹ *Letters and Journals*, ii. 336. January 15, 1646.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 130. February 18, 1644.

³ *Ibid.*, ii. 134.

⁴ “So we spent nine to five very graciouslie. After Dr. Twisse had begun with a briefe prayer, Mr. Marshall prayed large two houres, most divinellie, confessing the sins of the members of the Assemblie, in a wonderfullie pathetick, and prudent way. After, Mr. Arrowsmith preached one houre, then a psalme; thereafter Mr. Vines prayed near two houres, and Mr. Palmer preached one houre, and Mr. Seaman prayed near two houres, then a psalme. After, Mr. Hendersone brought them to a short sweet conference of the heart confessed in the Assemblie, and other seen faults, to be remedied, and the conveniencie to preach against all sects, especiallie Anabaptists and Antinomians. Dr. Twisse closed with a short prayer and blessing.” — *Ibid.*, ii. 184, 185.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ii. 328.

III. THE SYSTEMS COMPARED.

I shall present to you evidence to show that the Presbyterian churches have changed in doctrine likewise, and that the proportions of the Westminster systems are not held by our divines. The dogmatic divines are excessive in their elaboration of the first eleven chapters of the Confession. They neglect the middle group of eleven chapters; they depart from the chapters on the church and the sacraments, and they are in great perplexity as regards the two closing chapters on Eschatology.¹ I have made a careful comparison of the Westminster Confession, the new Articles of the Presbyterian Church of England, the systems of Dr. Charles Hodge and Dr. Shedd, have reduced them to common factors, and found the proportions of treatment of all the topics of the Confession. (See Table, pp. 52, 53.)

It is evident from this table that the proportions of the faith in the Westminster Confession have entirely changed. New doctrines have come into the field, old doctrines have been discarded; some doctrines have been depressed, other doctrines have been exalted. The systems are different in their structure, in their order of material, in the material itself, in its proportions, and in the structural principles. The essential and necessary articles of about one half of the Westminster system are in these systems, but the other half, with its essential articles, is not there.

IV. DECLINE FROM THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION.

Two of the grandest chapters in the Confession of Faith are the Scriptures, chapter i., and Justification, chapter xi. These express the two great principles of Protestantism, after a long conflict between Romanism and Puritanism from 1517 to 1646. They are the finest statements of the Protestant faith. After the English revolution the conflict with Rome ceased, and the principles of Protestantism sank in relative importance. In the eighteenth century Biblical studies died away in Great Britain,² and the doctrine of Justification was supplanted by the doctrine of Regeneration.³ The current theology is not in accord with the Westminster doctrine of the Scriptures, because it lays stress on extra confessional doctrines, such as verbal inspiration

¹ See Briggs's *Whither*, chap. viii. Charles Scribner's Sons.

² See Briggs's *Biblical Study*, p. 209.

³ Briggs's *American Presbyterianism*, p. 260.

TABLE OF COMPARISONS.

Westminster Confession.	Articles Presbyterian Ch. Eng.	Dr. Hodge.	Dr. Shedd.
1. Holy Scripture 142	82 ^a	128	129
2. <i>a.</i> God 37	55	183	225
<i>b.</i> The Holy Trinity 8	37	68	122
3. God's Eternal Decree 64	—	41	100
4. Creation 22	64	112	255
5. Providence 65	73	45	29
6. Fall of Man, Sin, and Punishment thereof 35	82	115	162
7. God's Covenant with Man 56	64 ^b	22	—
8. Christ the Mediator 92	211 ^c	191	184
9. Free Will 28	—	24	47
10. Effectual Calling 40	220 ^d	96	56
11. Justification 49	46	72	21
12. Adoption 14	46	—	—
13. Sanctification 25	—	34	11
14. Saving Faith 27	—	53 ^e	13
15. Repentance unto Life 38	—	—	—
16. Good Works 70	46	—	—
17. Perseverance 29	92 ^f	—	—
18. Assurance 56	—	—	—
19. Law of God 71	—	151 ^g	—
20. Christian Liberty 60	—	—	—
21. Worship and the Sabbath 82	—	15	—
22. Oaths and Vows 60	—	—	—
23. Civil Magistrate 60	—	—	—
24. Marriage and Divorce 45	—	—	—
25. Church 41	101	—	—
26. Communion of Saints 28		—	—
27. Sacraments 33	128	30	43
28. Baptism 43		62	
29. Lord's Supper 82	92	58	—
30. Church Censures 30		—	—
31. Synods and Councils 38	18	42	71
32. <i>a.</i> State of Man after Death 15		14	17
<i>b.</i> Resurrection of the Dead 11	37	65	146
33. Last Judgment 34	138	—	—
1630	1632	1621	1631 ^h

a These articles place the Scripture between the Church and the Sacraments as Article XIX.

b These articles substitute an article on Saving Grace for the Westminster doctrine of the Covenants.

c These articles greatly enlarge and improve Christology, by giving three articles on the Lord Jesus Christ, the Works of Christ, and the Exaltation of Christ.

d These articles improve the doctrine of Effectual Calling by substituting for the Westminster chapter three articles, on the Gospel, the Holy Spirit, and Regeneration. Dr. Hodge discusses the subject under the heads of Vocation and Regeneration. Dr. Shedd treats it under the head of Regeneration.

e This chapter in Dr. Hodge covers the whole subject of Faith, and is devoted chiefly to justifying faith rather than the matter in the Confession included under Saving Faith. Dr. Shedd treats of Faith under the head of Conversion, but does not go into the specific features of the Westminster definition.

f This article endeavors to sum up Christian life under this head, and embraces material corresponding with several previous and subsequent chapters of the Confession. Drs. Hodge and Shedd treat of Perseverance in connection with other doctrines.

g Dr. Hodge, under this head, expounds the ten commandments somewhat after the manner of the Larger Catechism.

h These figures are not absolutely correct, for fractions have not been considered. Furthermore, the different terms used, and the arrangement of the material in the systems, make it difficult to be exact in the estimation of subordinate matters. It can be relied on for purposes of general survey and comparative estimation. The pages of Drs. Hodge and Shedd and the lines of the Articles of the Presbyterian Church of England have been brought to the measurement of the Westminster Confession.

and inerrancy.¹ It substitutes the authority of tradition and human authors for the authority of the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures to the believers. I agree to every sentence and word of the Westminster doctrine of the Scriptures, but I denounce the current doctrines as contra-confessional, and as changing the base of the Reformation.²

Furthermore, the current theology is not in accord with the Westminster doctrine of Justification, for it pushes aside the forgiveness of sins,³ makes acceptance with God a mere judicial affair, and recognizes that the majority of the redeemed are saved without personal faith. How can the Westminster doctrine of Justification stand when dogmatic divines leave the doctrine of forgiveness of sin in such obscurity in their systems that they themselves think it unnecessary to put the term Forgiveness of Sin in their indexes,⁴ and when they teach that only a small por-

¹ Drs. A. A. Hodge and Warfield go so far as to say that "a proved error in Scripture contradicts not only our doctrine, but the Scripture claims, and therefore its inspiration in making these claims." — *Presbyterian Review*, ii. 245.

² See Briggs's *Whither*, pp. 73 seq.

³ See Simon's *Redemption of Man*, pp. 280, 281.

⁴ Forgiveness of Sin and Pardon of Sin are not found in the indexes of the systems of Dr. Shedd, Dr. Charles Hodge, and Dr. A. A. Hodge.

The Remission of Sins is found in Dr. Shedd's index referring to a single passage, ii. 392. Here the author takes the position that "forgiveness is the non-infliction of suffering upon the transgressor." "The release or non-infliction of penalty is forgiveness in the Biblical representation." . . . Dr. A. A. Hodge says : " God cannot forgive sin in any case ; the sinner may be forgiven,

tion of the saved are really justified by faith?¹ Here is one of the difficulties of the Revision movement. The statements of the Westminster Confession on the principles of the Reformation are a thousandfold better than anything we could get from the dogmatic divines of our day.

The Puritan Reformation was a grand movement in Great Britain, which carried British life and thought beyond the highest point reached by the churches of the continent. The principles of Puritanism are set forth in the middle group of chapters of the Westminster Confession, treating of Adoption, Sanctification, Saving Faith, Repentance unto Life, Good Works, Perseverance of the Saints, Assurance of Grace, Law of God, Liberty of Conscience, Religious Worship, Lawful Oaths and Vows.² These were doctrines of vast importance to our Puritan Fathers. But theology and life in the eighteenth century receded from them, and the church of the nineteenth century has little sympathy with them. This is not only the fault of our dogmatic divines, but it is the common fault of our age. This is clear from the new articles of the English Presbyterian Church. There are but three articles to represent these eleven chapters of the Confession, and these three articles are weak as water when compared with the choice wine of our Confession. We would not consent to abandon these grand chapters of Puritanism, for we are convinced that the church of the twentieth century will rise to them and build upon them in the next great revival and reformation of Christianity.

The Puritan doctrine of the Church and the Sacraments, as

but the sin must be punished, either in the person of the sinner or his substitute." (*Presbyterian Doctrine*, pp. 15, 16.) Dr. Charles Hodge says: "But pardon does not produce peace. It leaves the conscience unsatisfied. A pardoned criminal is not only just as much a criminal as he was before, but his sense of guilt and remorse of conscience are in no degree lessened. Pardon can remove only the outward and arbitrary penalty. The sting of sin remains. There can be no satisfaction to the mind until there is satisfaction of justice." (*System of Theology*, iii. 128.) And thus these dogmaticians destroy the Biblical doctrine, which is expressed also in the Apostles' Creed and in all the symbols of the Reformation, by reducing forgiveness of sins to the removal of the penalty. The forgiveness of *sins* is the Biblical and Confessional doctrine. The conception that forgiveness of sin is simply the removal of the penalty has no warrant in Holy Scripture.

¹ Dr. A. A. Hodge says: "In the justification, therefore, of that majority of the elect which die in infancy, personal faith does not mediate." — *Princeton Review*, 1878, p. 315.

² See Briggs's *Whither*, chap. vi.

contained in five chapters of the Confession, is excellent. The Presbyterian churches in our day have receded from them. The doctrines of the real presence and sacramental grace are commonly denied. We regard these as essential and necessary articles. They are bonds of union with the old historic churches of the world. The doctrine of the Church and the Communion of Saints is in accord with the Apostles' Creed. It recognizes the unity, catholicity, and sanctity of the Christian church, doctrines which are much beyond the scope of the average Presbyterian in our day.

The two chapters on Eschatology are better than anything we could get at the present time. The whole church is in perplexity here. The conflict with premillenarianism has resulted in an undue stress on the millennium, and a neglect of the doctrine of the Second Advent of Christ. The conflict with Universalism resulted in an undue stress upon the so-called private judgment at death and everlasting punishment, to the neglect of the middle state and the ultimate judgment. The relative amount of space given to Eschatology by Dr. Hodge is twice that of the Confession, by the new English articles three times, and by Dr. Shedd four times. There has been a singular neglect of the descent of our Lord into hell for the purpose of redemption. But there has been an amazing dogmatic elaboration of the descent of mankind into hell for eternal punishment, far beyond any warrant in Holy Scripture.¹ This elaboration is a fall from the height of the Westminster theology. The Confession keeps our minds fixed on the second advent of Jesus Christ, the resurrection, the judgment of the Messiah, and the bliss of heaven and

¹ Dr. Shedd, in his *Dogmatic Theology*, represents that the clause of the Apostles' Creed, "He descended into hell," is a "spurious clause," and makes a polemic against the doctrine (ii. 603, 607). He goes against the consensus of modern Biblical scholarship in saying that Sheol in the Old Testament "denotes the grave," whenever the righteous are connected with it (ii. 633). His doctrine of the Intermediate State is virtually confined to this polemic. He then devotes six pages to the Second Advent, twelve to the Resurrection, four to the Final Judgment, four to Heaven, and *eighty-six pages to Hell*. This disproportionate treatment has recently been defended on the ground that the doctrine of Hell is most in debate at present. This is not true, for the doctrine of the Second Advent is more in debate. But if it were true, a system of dogmatic theology should give all doctrines their due proportion and adequate place and importance in the system. If it neglects to do this, and gives disproportionate treatment to certain doctrines in which the author is interested, as an advocate, it ceases to be a system of theology, and becomes a treatise of polemical theology.

communion with God. Here are vast reaches for Christian theology, into which it will be for edification to enter. But at present our theologians think more of hell than of heaven, more of the private judgment at death than the ultimate judgment; more of death than the advent of Christ; more of a magical transformation in the dying hour than the discipline of our Saviour in the middle state.

It is clear that there are twenty chapters of the Confession that are in advance of the present faith of the church. True progress will be in rising up to them. So-called conservatives have quietly laid these twenty chapters on the shelf, or have changed their doctrines, and now are groaning at the heterodoxy of those who desire a few changes in three or four chapters. This is the real situation. No truly progressive man will ever consent to abandon these twenty chapters of the Confession, and descend from them to the miserable malarial swamp of the current dogmatic theology on these subjects. These chapters are the pledges of liberty to the Biblical scholar, the charter of progress to the sons of the Reformation; the banner of hope to the children of the Puritans. It is our determination to take them down from the shelf.

V. THE ADVANCE IN DOCTRINE.

There are several doctrines in which the modern church has advanced beyond the Confession.

The chapter on God and the Holy Trinity is sadly defective. It is a decline from the doctrine of the ancient church; it is a retreat from the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. The reason of this fall was that these doctrines were not in dispute at the time. Such faults always arise in polemic creeds. Such creeds are constructed for the time. They fail in those proportions of faith that are appropriate for all time. Accordingly the doctrine of the Trinity was tacked on as a third section of the chapter on the doctrine of God. It had been received as an inheritance. It was adhered to as an orthodox dogma. But there was no special interest in it. It was not a living question. The doctrine of the Trinity needed unfolding to adapt it to the new faith of the Reformation in the doctrine of Redemption. But the Westminster divines did not attempt it. The Confession was no sooner published than the doctrine of the Trinity became a living issue. John Biddle began his series of assaults on the doctrine of the Trinity. The famous book of Acontius on the Stratagems of Satan was translated into English and attacked by

that erratic Westminster divine, Cheynell.¹ This was but a prelude to the Arian controversy in the eighteenth century. It was introduced by a discussion between Wallis,² a clerk of the Westminster Assembly, and Sherlock,³ an Anglican divine. The one lays undue stress on the unity, the other on the tripersonality of the Godhead. Semi-Arianism began in 1702 with Thomas Emlyn, a Presbyterian pastor of Dublin, who said that he had been unsettled by reading Sherlock. Then Samuel Clark and Whiston came into the field, and these influenced James Pierce, of Exeter, in 1717.⁴ And thus the Presbyterian Church in England was involved in the Arian controversy. The same conflict in Scotland centred about the trial of Professor Simpson, of Glasgow. The result of this struggle was that the Irish Presbyterian Church was divided; the Presbyterian Church in England became entirely Unitarian, the Church of Scotland became saturated with semi-Arianism, and New England Congregationalism gave birth to American Unitarianism. The battle with Arianism and Unitarianism taught Presbyterians many sad lessons. The Westminster divines left their children a troublesome legacy in these controversies, due largely to their neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity.

The Westminster statement of the Being and Attributes of God is also defective. The Church has passed through a long contest with deism, atheism, pantheism, and agnosticism, in which the doctrine of the Being and Attributes of God has been greatly advanced. The Personality of God, the Immanence of God, the doctrine of the Living God, a God of holiness and love, — these doctrines are a power in recent theology. The Presbyterians of this century are demanding that there shall be some better confessional statement than the Westminster Confession gives us of our adoration of the living God and Saviour; our experience of the matchless treasures of his grace and love for all mankind; and our worship of the Holy Trinity.

The doctrine of Creation in the Confession was constructed before the development of modern science began. Wallis, one of

¹ John Biddle's *XII Arguments drawn out of the Scripture: whereon the commonly-received opinion touching the Deity of the Holy Spirit is clearly and fully refuted*, 1647; *Confession of Truth touching the Holy Trinity*, 1648; *A Twofold Catechism*, 1654; Acontius's *De Strategematibus*, 1565; *Satan's Stratagems*, 1648; Francis Cheynell's *The Divine Triunity*, 1650.

² John Wallis's *The Doctrine of the blessed Trinity, briefly explained*, 1690.

³ William Sherlock's *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, 1690.

⁴ Briggs's *American Presbyterianism*, pp. 194 seq.

the scribes of the Assembly, united with Robert Boyle in founding the Philosophical College in London in 1645. The Royal Society was organized in 1663. Then began that series of discoveries that has made modern science such a wonder of our age, and changed the complexion of the globe. Science was a babe in swaddling clothes in 1646. It is a giant, conquering and to conquer, in 1889. The Westminster doctrine of Creation is mere child's play. It is not in accord with the Scriptures. Science and the Scripture are in much better accord. Let any one read Henry B. Smith's chapter on Christian Cosmology,¹ and he will see that the Westminster divines were only on the threshold of the subject. The scientific spirit of our age demands a better recognition of the order and development of nature and of the relation of the Creator to his Kosmos than we can find in any creed of the sixteenth or seventeenth century.

The anthropology of the Confession preceded the rich development of modern philosophy. Bacon was behind the Westminster divines, but one can trace little, if any, of his influence upon them. They were too much under the influence of Aristotle and the scholastic methods. There were Platonists among them, but these were feeling their way cautiously. Hobbes and Descartes were just coming on the stage. The psychology, ethics, and metaphysics of the Westminster divines were sufficiently crude. Soon after the Assembly adjourned, the Cambridge Platonists came into power. Then came the long development that has resulted in our present schools of philosophy. The whole doctrine of God and man has changed in these evolutions of modern philosophy. No one can understand the Westminster standards who does not take this into account. The doctrines of Original Sin and the Freedom of the Will have been the battle-grounds of modern British and American theology, while ethical questions had the field in Germany. The discussions are deeper, broader, richer, and more far-reaching than the Westminster divines could imagine. The student who knows Julius Müller's doctrine [of Sin, and Dr. Shedd's massive contributions to anthropology,² sees that the Westminster divines were sophomores when compared with the theologians of our day.

The Christology of the Confession is also defective. The greatest advance in modern theology has been in its doctrine of the Per-

¹ Henry B. Smith's *System of Christian Theology*, pp. 92 seq.

² Julius Müller's *Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, 1858, translated in Clark's Theological Library; Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology*, ii. 1-168.

son and Work of Christ. The doctrine of the Person of Christ has been the great contribution of modern German theology. Its results summed up in the splendid work of Dorner¹ are worth all the writings of the Westminster divines combined. British and American theology has unfolded the doctrine of the Atonement, so that that doctrine has about the same relative position of prominence in American Presbyterian theology as the doctrine of the Decree had to the Westminster divines. But the recent advance in Christology has been only partially appropriated by our American divines. In some features, the Westminster divines are in advance of our dogmaticians. In the stress laid upon the humiliation of Christ, they have neglected the exaltation; in the stress laid upon the crucifixion, they have neglected the incarnation, the holy life, the resurrection, the ascension, the reign, and the second advent. In the stress laid upon compensation and substitution in the doctrine of the Atonement, and the shedding of the blood on the cross, they have neglected the significance of the Redeemer's blood as applied to the heavenly throne and the believer's heart, and the redemptive influence that issues from his person and his heart of love. The church of our day is rising to the adoration of the risen and reigning Christ, and is beginning to look again for his second advent. We are opening our minds to see that the Redeemer's work upon the cross was the beginning of a larger work in the realm of the dead, and from his heavenly throne whence the exalted Saviour is drawing all men unto himself.

In these great doctrines of our religion, the Being and Attributes of God, the Holy Trinity, Creation, the Nature of Man, the Origin and Development of Sin, the Person and Work of Jesus Christ, the church of our century has advanced far beyond the Westminster Confession. The definitions of these chapters are weak and insufficient. Better statements of the public faith of the church are needed. In some way or other it is necessary that we should testify to the wonderful love of a living God and Saviour to the world; our adoration of the Holy Trinity; our enlarged conceptions of nature and its place in the realm of God; our experience of the riches of divine grace and its ample provision for all mankind; and above all we need a confession in which Jesus Christ, our Saviour, shall reign supreme from centre to circumference, and where every section, sentence, and word shall

¹ I. A. Dorner's *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, 1851, translated in Clark's Library.

pulsate with the heart-beats of our Redeemer, not willing that any should perish, but all should come to repentance and salvation.

Such a revision can be made only in the form of a new creed, that will be born of the life, experience, and worship of our age.

VI. THE CHIEF DIFFICULTIES.

We shall now consider the chapters where we find the greatest difficulties at present.

The third chapter of the Confession, on the Divine Decree, is a splendid chapter. It gives us the result of the long contest of Puritanism with Arminianism. The English Puritan, Perkins, by his extreme statements is largely responsible for the Arminian controversy that broke out in Holland, and spread over the Reformed world. The English Puritans in general stood by Perkins. The battle was complicated by the adoption of Arminianism by the Anglo-Catholic party. The divine decree was the one great doctrinal issue between Archbishop Laud and the Puritans. That is the reason for the strong, burning, piercing sentences of the third chapter. At the same time, Bishop Davenant led an intermediate party, which was represented in the Westminster Assembly by some of the most influential divines. The doctrine of the Decree was framed in view of all these interests. A real consistent Calvinist does not stumble at them. But there are not as many consistent Calvinists as there used to be. Even the most conservative divines have appropriated features of Arminianism. And it is plain that the doctrine of the Decree is excessive in the Westminster Confession. It not only dominates the third chapter, but it controls the doctrine of Providence in the fifth chapter, and reappears wherever it has a chance throughout the Confession. It forces itself upon us, as one determined to have the last word in a controversy. This was a hobby of the Westminster divines, and they rode a high horse with it. The two chapters on the Decree and Providence have nearly twice the space to that given to the Being and Attributes of God, the Trinity, and Creation. No modern theologian gives such excessive treatment to the divine decree. Dr. Charles Hodge gives one fourth of the space to the Decree and Providence that he gives to the other parts of the doctrine of God. Dr. Shedd gives but one fifth the space. If the Decree were in the same proportions of the doctrine of God in the Westminster Confession that it is in these divines, seven sections would be stricken out, and it would be reduced to the first section.

And then it would have equal space to that given to the Holy Trinity. Is the Divine Decree a more important doctrine than the Trinity? The Westminster divines seemed to think so. But modern Presbyterians have advanced to a better conception in that they exalted the Trinity and depressed the Decree.

The chapter on Effectual Calling is the one that gives the greatest difficulty at the present time, because it teaches the damnation of non-elect infants and of the entire heathen world.

Dogmaticians have endeavored to avoid the plain meaning of the passage by teaching that "elect infants" means all infants, or that infants are elect as a class, going over to the Arminian doctrine of election for babes, while they cling to Calvinism for adults.

The Westminster divines did not know what they were about when they framed these definitions. They made logical deductions from other doctrines without Scripture warrant. Logical deductions are of value in theological speculation if indulged in to a moderate extent. They are much easier than the inductive study of the Scriptures and Christian history. There are few dogmaticians who are not tempted to push these deductions until they lodge in absurdities. They forget that they are not dealing with axiomatic truth, but with premises that are only partially and relatively true, and that are ever changing with the progress of human knowledge. The Westminster divines did not escape these faults in their construction of our standards.

We should bear in mind that in the seventeenth century the entire population was in communion with the national churches, and that all children were baptized. The Westminster divines, many of them at least, believe with their assessor, Dr. Burgess, in the baptismal regeneration of elect infants.¹ They did not believe that baptism worked *ex opere operato*, and therefore they held that some of the baptized were not regenerated, and that some were regenerated without baptism. In this respect, they made an advance beyond the common doctrine at that time, that only the baptized infants could be saved. Unbaptized and non-elect infants, to them, simply meant the children of the heathen and a few revolutionary Anabaptists. They did not think that it was any worse to damn heathen babes than to damn their fathers and mothers, and sisters and brothers. In this respect, we confess that many of us agree with them. The modern revolution of opinion that has brought in the new doctrine of the universal

¹ Burgess's *Baptismal Regeneration of Elect Infants*, Oxford, 1629.

salvation of infants is due to the historic change in the dissenting churches. Large numbers of Baptists and Friends in the eighteenth century refused to baptize their children. The Presbyterian and Congregational churches declined to baptize the children of those who were not communicants, and these they limited to those who would subscribe to their covenants and submit to their examinations and discipline. Accordingly, these strict rules for church membership made an entire change in the Protestant world. In the eighteenth century, a large proportion of the people were excluded from communion with the churches, and millions of babes in Christian lands were unbaptized. Were these children to be damned because their parents declined the obligations of church membership in these sectarian churches, and because these churches refused them baptism? So soon as the church squarely faced the problem, it answered it. Infant baptism sank in importance, and infant salvation rose superior to all rites and ceremonies. The church changed its doctrine, and the Westminster statements became repulsive.

But what can we do about it? We have a new doctrine; but we cannot prove it from Scripture; we have not brought it into harmony with other Christian doctrines. We cannot put the new doctrine into the Confession without changing other doctrines of greater importance. The problem is, how are these infants saved? Dr. Hodge saves them without faith, and so undermines the doctrine of Justification by Faith. Dr. Strong thinks that they are regenerated so soon as they see Christ, and believe on Him after death, and thus extends regeneration into the middle state.¹ Many divines, German, English, and American, think they have a probation in the middle state. There are some serious questions to be settled before this new doctrine can go into a public confession of faith.

It is very much the same with the doctrine of the damnation of the heathen. The Westminster divines knew but little of heathenism. The heathen were to them the Turks, the enemies of Christ and his church, and a few negroes on the coast of Africa, and Indians in America whom they were inclined to identify with the lost tribes of Israel. They knew nothing of the countless mil-

¹ "Since there is no evidence that children dying in infancy are regenerated prior to death, either with or without the use of external means, it seems most probable that the work of regeneration may be performed by the Spirit in connection with the infant soul's first view of Christ in the other world." — A. H. Strong's *Systematic Theology*, p. 357. Rochester, 1886.

lions of Asia, Africa, America, and the islands of the sea, as these have been revealed to us by modern travelers and modern commerce. They were not straitened by this doctrine as we are. What man or woman can for a moment contemplate the eternal damnation of these countless millions of heathen, now living, far exceeding the number of Christians, men and women who have never heard the gospel, without crying from the bottom of his soul, God forbid! Our God and Saviour could not do such a thing. Modern divines are seeking earnestly for some way in which to save the heathen. Some would save them by faith in the implicit Christ, that is, in God so far as He reveals himself unto them. This is a new doctrine. Where is the Scripture for any salvation apart from faith in Jesus Christ? A recent speculator gave them a chance for a saving vision of Christ between breath and death. German divines look for relief to a probation in the middle state. There are important problems to be solved before this doctrine of the salvation of the heathen can be put into a public confession of faith.

If we cannot tolerate in the Confession these doctrines of the damnation of the heathen and non-elect infants, now that none of us believe in them, there is no other way than to blot out these sections altogether. We cannot introduce new doctrines where we lack warrant from Scripture, and we are unable to harmonize them with other confessional doctrines.

But even if these awkward doctrines were removed, this chapter would not be satisfactory. The doctrine of Effectual Calling has passed out of the field of modern theology, and Regeneration has taken its place. Regeneration was a term used by the older theologians in connection with infants and baptism. The great movement called Methodism, that arose in the eighteenth century, brought the doctrine of Regeneration into prominence, and the whole attitude of the church to this question has changed. The great question of salvation is no longer justification and effectual calling, but regeneration and the experience of faith.

The Westminster Confession is defective in that it has no chapter on the work of the Holy Spirit. The work of the Holy Spirit is taught in several chapters of the Confession under the heads of other doctrines, but this has been overlooked by the dogmaticians and the ministry who follow them. It is one of the features of modern progressive theology that it lays great stress on the work of the Holy Spirit. The new articles of the Presbyterian Church of England have made an improvement by treating the material

of the tenth chapter in three chapters, one on the Gospel, another on the Holy Spirit, and a third on Regeneration. This is more in accord with the faith of progressive theologians in our day, and shows how far modern Presbyterianism is in advance of the Westminster divines.

The chapter on Marriage and Divorce is not in accord with present views in the church. It has recently been amended by striking out the prohibition of marriage with a deceased wife's sister. But the whole reference to Levitical laws of marriage is wrong. The Levitical law is no longer binding on Christians. The statement that "such as profess the true reformed religion should not marry with infidels, papists, or other idolaters" is not justified by the Word of God, is a slander upon Roman Catholic Christians, and is unworthy of a place in a Christian creed. No one thinks of such limitations of marriage in our times. The marriage law has no rightful place in a confession. Its place there was due to the conflict with John Milton in 1645.

VII. HOW SHALL WE REVISE?

There are several chapters that give real difficulty to the Presbyterian Church, and there is a strong and widespread cry for relief from them. It is not easy to remove the difficulties from these chapters. We have to consider amendment by omission, insertion, and reconstruction. Therefore many have come to the conclusion that the wisest method is to make the revision in the form of a new and simple creed. Who can get up any enthusiasm over patching up an old creed? When the knife is in hand, one thrusts it in here, another there, until the Confession is as full of knives as St. Sebastian with arrows. But a new creed, a simple devotional statement of our faith, — we all need it for the education of our children, for the training of young converts, for the concert of public worship. A creed that will express the faith, life, and devotion of the present time, born of our experience and needs, is a grand ideal, worthy of the effort and enthusiasm of a great church; a plan of campaign about which it is practicable to rally the Presbyterian and Reformed world.

This new creed should not displace the Westminster Confession, but be a supplementary and congregational symbol. As we already have a Confession of Faith and two catechisms, there is no sufficient reason why we should not have a popular congregational creed that will drive into everlasting perdition the thousand and more crude, ill-digested things that are now in use in our congregations.

If we keep the new creed strictly in line with the Confession, insisting that all the essential and necessary articles of the Confession shall have a place therein, we shall avoid those serious omissions that spoil the new articles of the English Presbyterian Church, and at the same time we may insert those new doctrines that constitute such an excellent feature of these new articles. We shall then have several grades of doctrine for all classes of our people, — a maximum and minimum of doctrine. We may then advance into the conflicts of the twentieth century with a new banner expressing the living issues of our times streaming in the midst of the old battle-flags that have come down to us from the seventeenth century.

The revision movement in the American Presbyterian Church began with a call for changes in a few sections. It has already reached a second stage, in which the question of a new creed has become prominent. It is forced by the circumstances of the case to advance to a third stage. The terms of subscription are the real difficulty in the situation. If we are to have a new creed, are we to subscribe to the old or to the new, or to both? This question must be faced before many conservative men will be ready to advocate the new creed. We venture to say that the terms of subscription are the key to the history of the American Presbyterian Church, and in some respects of the history of British Christianity since the Reformation. Party lines are ever drawn here, whatever may be the ostensible lines of division. The battle in the Presbyterian Church since 1729 has been a battle between loose subscription and strict subscription. We cannot solve this great problem of the revision of our standards and ignore this fundamental question. At the root of all our difficulties at the present time lies our indefinite and variously interpreted term of subscription. We are between the advocates of loose subscription and the promoters of rigid subscription. There is a middle way that is safe and honest, — the way of definite subscription.

The present term of subscription is a torture to tender consciences. It is a bar of iron to rigid Calvinists to exclude those who do not agree with them from the church. It is a rope of sand to loose thinkers who are determined to think and do as they please in the church. The term of subscription means one thing in western Pennsylvania, another thing in central New York. It is one thing in Baltimore, another thing in our metropolis. Presbyterianism changes its complexion as we pass from State to State and from city to city. The real test of orthodoxy in the Pres-

byteries is not the Westminster Confession in its historic sense,—is not the term of subscription in its historical meaning. It is the system of doctrine held by the majority of the ministers, and the term of subscription as interpreted by them. It is in general the systems of doctrine of American dogmaticians, with such measure of departure therefrom as the majority of a Presbytery may deem it wise to allow.

The Westminster Confession was framed by divines who had no thought of requiring subscription to it. Antony Tuckney, one of the most influential Westminster divines, tells us: "In the Assemblie I gave my vote with others that the Confession of Faith put out by Authoritie should not be either required to be sworn or subscribed to; we having been burnt in the hand in that kind before, but so as not to be publickly preached or written against."¹

The Westminster Directory of ordination does not require subscription to the Confession. The dissenting brethren representing Congregationalism delayed the organization of the Presbyterian Church of England so long that it became impossible to construct it. If those who dissented from the doctrinal articles had prolonged the debates, the Confession would never have been composed. The Assembly would have been forced to a shorter and simpler creed, or they would have gone to their homes without agreement. Subscription was never used in the Presbyterian Church in England. Subscription was not used in the Presbyterian Church of Ireland at the time when Francis Makemie came to assist New England divines in laying the foundations of the American Presbyterian Church. Subscription was imposed on the Presbyterian Church of Scotland in 1693, by Parliament, in the interest of breadth and toleration. The revolution of 1688 transformed the Episcopal Church of Scotland into a Presbyterian Church of Scotland. The term of subscription was designed to protect those of the Episcopal minority who were willing to conform, and to protect them from the intolerance of the Presbyterian majority. Terms of subscription devised in the interest of comprehension and liberty were afterwards used as means of bondage, torture, and exclusion. The American Presbyterian Church in 1729 adopted the Westminster standards in a catholic spirit.² They adopted not the whole doctrine, but the system of doctrine;

¹ *Eight Letters of Dr. Antony Tuckney and Dr. Benjamin Whichcote*, p. 76. London, 1753.

² Briggs's *American Presbyterianism*, pp. 216 seq.

not all the articles, but the essential and necessary articles. At the time of the adoption of the Confession, they allowed exceptions to the doctrine of two different chapters,¹ showing in concrete cases that they used articles in a broad sense, and that we are justified in rejecting not only clauses, but sections of chapters, so far as these are not essential to the Westminster system. This historical interpretation of the terms of subscription is the law of the American Presbyterian Church, and gives the rule for the action of its Presbyteries.

The term adopted in 1788 is as follows: "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this church as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" This is not so clear as it ought to be. It might be made more definite by inserting into it its historic interpretation. By using the phrases of the Adopting Act, the implicit meaning may be made explicit in some such way as this: "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession, as being in its essential and necessary articles the doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" If the term could be thus amended, young men and elders would know what they were subscribing to. They would know that it was not the system of Turretin, or Charles Hodge, or H. B. Smith, or W. G. T. Shedd, but the Westminster System, and that the essential and necessary articles of that system are the only ones to which they are bound. The terms of subscription and Presbyterian examinations have been too often used as bars of authority to exclude from the church, when they ought to be pledges of liberty to invite men into the church and make them feel at home therein, within the limits of the essential and necessary articles of the Westminster system.

The first step in revision, therefore, should be to revise the terms of subscription, and make them definite, so that the subscriber would know that he was subscribing to the essential and necessary articles of the Westminster system. The second step should then be to define what these essential and necessary articles are. This may be done in the new creed. The new creed should (1) set forth the essential and necessary articles of the Confession, and omit all unessential and unnecessary articles; (2) give adequate expression to those doctrines that have risen into prominence since the Westminster Confession was composed. The new creed would thus be of the nature of a declaratory act in

¹ Chaps. xx. and xxiii.

the form of a devotional and a congregational creed. It would give relief not only at two or three points, as does the Declaratory Act of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, but it would give relief at all points, for it would be as full and explicit as the Presbyterian Church of our day deems it wise to express its faith.

In our opinion it would be best not to touch the Westminster Confession, but to give our strength to the construction of a new creed. It is evident, however, that there are statements in the Confession that are so offensive to many of our best ministers, elders, and people, that there is serious danger of losing them from the church. It is the duty of a Christian church to take stumbling-blocks out of the way. Our Saviour calls those children of Gehenna who strove to put barriers in the way of entering his kingdom.¹ There are other synagogues of Satan than the Church of Rome, there are other Antichrists than the Pope, there are other idolaters than Romanists. There are those who make an idol of the Westminster Confession. There are those in the Presbyterian Church who have the antichristian spirit of intolerance and persecution. Even a Presbyterian church may become a synagogue of Satan by excluding those who belong to Jesus Christ. The Presbyterian Church was not organized for the sake of conserving the Confession. The Confession was made by the church and for the church. It has been revised in the past. It will be revised again and again, if necessary, to relieve tender consciences. God forbid that it should ever be a yoke of bondage and a staff for oppression; therefore remove the offensive statements. This may be done for the most part by excision. Some of us shrink from the work of insertion and reconstruction. But in Christ's name let us go forward and give our young men and elders the relief they demand. We believe that the revision movement is born of God. It will be guided by the Holy Spirit. It is a great step toward a better future. It is a preparation for a new reformation of the church. It is in the direction of Christian harmony, catholicity, and unity. Jesus Christ is at the head of this movement; we shall do well if with open minds and hearts we look for his word and follow faithfully his call.

Charles A. Briggs.

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¹ Matt. xxiii. 13-15.

EDITORIAL.

THE PROSPECT OF THEOLOGICAL UNITY.

THE closing decade of this century is likely to be remembered as a period of creed-changes and efforts after theological agreement among the principal divisions of the Protestant Church. The Presbyterian churches of Great Britain and America are far on the way to important modifications of the Westminster Standards. The Congregational churches of America are abandoning the use of creeds as conditions of membership in the churches, and are returning to the use of a simple covenant, thus restoring the custom which prevailed until the present century. The Anglicans and Nonconformists of England are conferring together with regard to terms of reunion. In the pastoral letter issued by the House of Bishops at the close of the recent Episcopal Convention in New York, there is a warning against that dogmatizing which exceeds the doctrines of the common faith, because such dogmatizing puts a barrier in the way of Christian union. "In a time when the hearts of Christian people seem to be drawing all one way, and mourning, as well they may, over the unhappy divisions of the kingdom of peace, it is the part of a wise and holy charity to place no new barrier in the path of those who are seeking a common home and rest." We append to this article a copy of the resolutions agreed upon by the conference of English churchmen and Nonconformists after twelve meetings held at the residence of one of the members on Langham Street, London. The Nonconformist members wished it to be stated that both the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed have, in some instances, been recited in Congregational chapels, and are recited in the majority of chapels of the Countess of Huntingdon's Connection. The creed-revision movement in the Presbyterian Church in the United States is too well known to require description, and is withal ably discussed in the preceding article by Professor Briggs. The advocates of revision or a new creed express the hope that the result may be a step towards the union not only of Presbyterian, but of all evangelical churches. Dr. Schaff, having advocated a brief, simple, and popular creed, says: "Such a consensus-creed would be a bond of union between the different branches of the Reformed Church in Europe and America, and in distant mission fields, and prepare the way for a wider union with other evangelical churches," and Dr. Briggs expresses a similar hope. In view of these various movements it is natural to forecast the issue, and we therefore raise the distinct inquiry as to the prospect of theological agreement among the religious communions commonly designated Evangelical. Is such agreement practicable, desirable, probable?

As to the advantage of simplifying cumbersome confessions, there can be no doubt. It is a heavy burden for a great religious denomination to

carry a creed which no one would think of adopting if it were now for the first time proposed. Admirable as the Westminster Standards are in many respects, and priceless as they are, considered as an historical development of doctrine, they are no longer suited to express, nor should they be forced into the service of expressing, the theological opinions of the religious communions which retain them. Their very presence as tests imposed in some form on ministers and elders is a hindrance to union with other bodies. A radical revision or an entire displacement of these symbols in America and England would promote unity. The Presbyterians have lived in a sort of brave practical disregard of these doctrinal limitations, at least so far as relations with other evangelical churches are concerned, and yet have not entirely escaped the divisive tendency of the narrow tenets of some portions of the Confession and Catechism. Other denominations are not able entirely to forget the severe Calvinistic creed of the Presbyterian Church. And not only fraternal relations with other communions, but also the welfare of that church itself will be promoted by removing the stumbling-block of harsh doctrine from the consciences of many clergymen, and of young men who are looking towards the ministry. The same beneficent results will be gained, although in less degree, when local creeds are no longer employed by Congregational churches as tests of membership.

But can a creed be formulated which shall be adopted by the various evangelical denominations for the purpose and with the effect of promoting unity? We not only believe that this is impracticable, we also believe it is undesirable; impracticable because agreement could be reached only in respect to doctrines already held with unanimous assent, and by omitting those very doctrines which keep churches apart, and undesirable because no symbol could be composed comparable for purposes of doctrinal unity with one already existing and coming constantly into more general use. A creed, to have any unifying power, must become universally familiar. Mere assent by representative assemblies to a common creed would be a fact of some little interest, but not a real influence. A creed which deepens Christian unity and so far forth promotes organized union must be incorporated into the worship of the churches. Congregations must recite it together on the Lord's Day, and on other Christian festivals, so that its phrases shall become familiar and endeared, so that the essential facts and truths of the gospel shall be devoutly associated with a well-known confession of faith. The Sacraments have preserved the spiritual unity of the church even when it has been almost rent asunder, because the truths they express have thus been held with affection or with reverence as a common possession. The Bible has preserved and promoted spiritual unity because it has never been separated from the worship of the church. Hymns in common use serve the same purpose for the same reason. But it is impossible, we believe, at this late day, to formulate a creed which could gain and hold a place in public worship. Certainly, articles of faith drawn up for the purpose of theological agreement would

be unsuited to devotional uses. And even if the choicest spiritual characters of the several communions of the Christian world should attempt to construct a creed for the express purpose of employment in worship, there is little probability, scarcely a possibility, of success. Such a confession can come only from the period of origins, or very near the time when Christianity was urging its new way through the world. It also must be a growth, not the product, of an agreement. The Sacraments are the original institution of the gospel, the Bible its earliest, freshest literature. Hymns from any century may win a place in worship because they are poetical, clothed in the phrase of spiritual imagination. But it is too late to make a creed that shall have a place in worship, and unless it have a place in worship, it will have little unifying power. The impracticable in this case is also the undesirable. Who wishes to displace the Apostles' Creed, rooted for centuries in the devotional affection of liturgical churches, introduced by Calvin and other reformers into the directory of worship for Presbyterian churches, and coming into familiar use in many religious communions? It expresses belief in the essential facts and results of the gospel. It is clothed in a noble diction, and moves in a lofty strain. If it should be habitually recited in evangelical churches, all would be done that can be done to promote unity by means of a formula of religious faith. Even the Nicene Creed is not suited to this purpose, and has no chance of wide adoption. So far as the interests of Christian unity are concerned, then, we believe that the adoption in worship of the Apostles' Creed is all that is practicable or desirable, and that the denominations must work patiently on in simplifying their confessions until at last they discover that nothing more is requisite for any purpose besides that ancient symbol.

Even if it were agreed to adopt some simple creed, ancient or modern, it would still be necessary to make radical changes in matters not doctrinal, such as the use of sacraments, which is, however, in part, a doctrinal question, the functions and orders and authority of the ministry, and the forms of worship. Thus, in the appended resolutions, it appears that Nonconformists are unable to agree with churchmen only in respect to the Sacraments and the ministry; but these are, and long have been, the principal obstacles to union.

It may even be doubted if the time is ripe for the successful formulation of theological beliefs into a creed designed for assent only. Much progress, it is true, has been made towards agreement. Minor differences of opinion have been laid aside. But further changes may be expected not only by way of reduction, but also by way of enlargement. Historical criticism is a comparatively new science, and may modify some doctrinal theories. The discoveries of physical science are rapidly readjusting opinions as to the origin and history of man, and may require some corresponding readjustment of doctrine. Dr. Briggs says the doctrine of the middle state after death needs to be recovered, that it alone can resolve some dark problems; but will a Pan-Presbyterian

council at present insert that doctrine with any meaning into a creed? The Incarnation in relation to the human race is just emerging in its large significance before small groups of thinkers. Would a creed formed now express that doctrine with any justice or breadth? The facts and spiritual results of the gospel will not change with widening knowledge, but theories about them cannot be final; yet a modern creed would theorize, and would, therefore, after a time, be outgrown. But it could not easily be cast off or amended, if it had once been adopted by all evangelical churches. There must, no doubt, be evolution in creed-making, or rather in creed-unmaking. All that is needed cannot be done at once. This or that denomination is not yet ready to relinquish some of its peculiar beliefs, nor to adopt the larger interpretations of Christianity which will be generally accepted by-and-by. This process, however, will be effectively hastened by the need of union in small communities at home and in mission fields abroad.

We are somewhat apprehensive in view of the growing desire for outward uniformity. It is important that the evils of denominationalism should be removed, that there should be coöperation instead of rivalry, that burdensome creeds should be modified and simplified, that spiritual Christianity should be exalted by all the churches, so that there can be no mistake as to their most cherished objects. And the movement in this direction is unmistakable. There is so great an impatience of sectarianism that the evil cannot long survive. But attempts by compression, by concession, by arrangement, to get visible expressions of this spirit will chiefly tend to retard the very result they would hasten. If there is to be any organized union it will have to be by some great machinery, by a semi-political organization with its dangers, by a federation clothed with delegated powers. Conventions and alliances of the various religious bodies for the purpose of exhibiting the fraternal spirit, and of facilitating coöperation in Christian work, are useful, but would rapidly become mischievous if they should undertake to change the internal methods, customs, and worship of the denominations in order to reduce them all to uniformity. Also, conferences held to discuss the practicability of union are useful in promoting acquaintance and in bringing out the extent of existing agreement, but at present can accomplish little or nothing more.

Toleration is more necessary now than consolidation. Fraternity is more important than identification. Unity is more desirable than uniformity. The Christian name may be kept in common, while the denominational name holds its secondary but legitimate place. "*Christianus mihi nomen, Lutheranus cognomen.*"

Resolutions agreed upon by the Langham Street Conference on Home Reunion:—

The Christian Faith.

"We agree —

"1. In recognizing the Bible as of Divine authority, and as the sole ultimate test of doctrine in matters of faith, as is expressed in the Sixth Article of the Church of England.

"2. In accepting the general teaching of the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed, including of necessity the doctrines of the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement.

"3. In recognizing a substantial connection between the resurrection body and the present 'body of humiliation.'

"4. That saving faith in Christ is that self-surrender to Him which leads a man to believe what He teaches, and to do what He bids, so far as he has opportunities of knowledge."

The Christian Morality.

"We agree —

"1. In the conviction that it is the duty of the Christian society to consider in the light of the principles, motives, and promises of the faith, the problems of domestic, social, and national morality, with a view to concerted action.

"2. That progressive sanctification is essential to the Christian life, so that without it neither professed faith, nor conversion, nor Sacraments, nor worship, can avail for the salvation of the soul."

Christian Discipline.

"We agree —

"1. That the divisions among Christians render the due administration of discipline, in the case of those who openly deny the fundamental truths of Christianity or offend against Christian morality, extremely difficult; and that greater caution should be used in admitting to the privileges of membership those who leave, or are expelled from, the Christian community to which they have belonged.

"2. That, while it is most desirable that this caution should be exercised in all cases of members of one Christian society seeking admission into another, by careful inquiry being made, and adequate testimony being required, as to their Christian character, this is especially important in regard to those who desire to exercise the ministerial office."

Christian Worship.

"We agree —

"1. That Congregationalists can accept and use the treasures of devotion — hymns, collects, liturgies, etc. — accumulated by the Church during the Christian ages; and many Nonconformists think that in certain circumstances it is desirable to do so.

"2. That Churchmen can accept the use of extempore prayer in public worship; and many Churchmen think that in certain circumstances it is desirable to do so.

"3. That rigid uniformity in public worship is undesirable; and that to enforce it by civil penalties is a mistake."

The Christian Sacraments.

"We agree —

"That although it is desirable that every one should seek to know the true

doctrine of the Sacraments, yet their efficacy does not depend upon such knowledge, but lies on the one hand in the due administration of the Sacraments 'in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same,' and on the other in the use of them with a true desire to fulfill the ordinance of Christ."

The Christian Church and Ministry.

"I. We agree —

"1. That the Catholic Church is a society founded by Christ, the members of which are united to Him, and to each other, by spiritual ties, which are over and above those that attach to them simply as men.

"2. That these ties depend upon a special union with the person of the one Mediator, and a special indwelling of the one Spirit.

"The Nonconformist members of the conference are unable to admit —

"1. That the reception of visible Sacraments is essential in ordinary cases to the establishment of these ties.

"2. That through the reception of the visible Sacraments these ties may subsist, though not forever, in those who are not believing and living as Christian people should.

"II. We agree —

"1. That Christ has established a perpetual ministry in the Catholic Church.

"2. That no one can rightly exercise this ministry unless he be ordained to it by Christ Himself.

"3. That there is a Divinely appointed distinction of office in this ministry.

"The Nonconformist members of the conference are unable to admit —

"1. That there is a Divinely appointed threefold distinction of orders in this ministry.

"2. That external ordination by the laying on of Episcopal hands is necessary for its rightful exercise."

NELSON, *Chairman.*

HENRY ALLON.

GEORGE S. BARRETT.

CHARLES GORE.

JOHN GOTT.

P. GOLDSMITH MEDD.¹

JOHN BROWN PATON.

ROBERT A. REDFORD.

HENRY ROBERT REYNOLDS.

JOHN SHELLY.

BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT.

GEORGE GREENWOOD,

J. RADFORD THOMSON, } *Secretaries.*

¹ Canon Medd did not agree with the others concerning Christian discipline. Dr. Paton adds after the words "self-surrender to Him" in the article concerning the Christian faith, these words: "which secures the grace which He bestows, and"

The Conference was held with a view to the removal, as far as practicable, of the present misunderstandings and suspicions which separate Christian communities, and to the establishment of a more than nominal brotherhood in worship and service.

The members of the Conference were not appointed by the churches, but constitute a Committee of the Home Reunion Society, a purely voluntary body.

CAN OUR COURSES OF STUDY BE SHORTENED?

THE whole scheme of education, and especially of liberal education, is under review. For twenty years there has been much thoughtful discussion of the working relations of the colleges to each other, to the public schools, to the professional schools, to the secondary schools, and of all of these to the conditions and requirements of our complex modern life. Questions of administration and of educational policy have been debated with similar earnestness and thoroughness. Theories of the art of education have been of less interest than these practical questions of adjustment, methods, and results.

Along this line attention has been called recently to the possibility of shortening the educational cycle, so that our liberally educated young men can begin their career a year or two earlier than at present.

It is urged that boys, entering college at eighteen or nineteen, graduating at twenty-two or twenty-three, and then spending three or four years in professional study, come too late to their practical life-work, — too late for their own best effectiveness in their chosen calling, and that the long requirement of time and the large burden of expense deter many from undertaking complete and thorough courses of study, thereby robbing the professions of valuable men, or filling up the ranks with men who have not had the advantages of a liberal education. The President of Cornell University says further, by way of odious comparison, that the American young man, educated in our regulation way, “is twenty-six, while his fellow student in Europe, equally well-trained, and even more thoroughly prepared, is able to begin his professional practice at twenty-two.” Thus it is made to appear that the period of education under existing conditions is too long, whether for the man himself, or for the learned professions, and too long also as compared with European precedent.

Relief is sought in three several ways, viz. : by shortening the preparation for college ; by reducing the college course from four years to three ; by making the last of the four college years a pro-professional year, or an accepted equivalent for the first year in the professional school. President Dwight seems to favor the first method, President Adams the third, and President Eliot the combination of the first and third, with tentative leanings toward the second.

It is significant that the strongest protest against the length of the course has been made in notable instances by those who have been most active in raising the standard of admission to college. The favor with which advanced requirements have been received both by the schools and by the community, by the colleges first of all, shows that the movement was a true evolution, and that its time had come. It is true that the preparatory courses require four years now, instead of three as in the fifties, or two as in the twenties. The result, of course, is that boys go up older, but it should also be said that they go up wiser, better informed, better trained, better able to order their life and to profit by college in-

struction. They have better equipment and a better mastery of themselves. They are more mature, and their college work is proportionally larger and worthier. The schools are not willing to become again as elementary as they once were, nor are the colleges willing to take boys younger, certainly not willing to take them less prepared for advanced work. The colleges will never again cumber themselves with rising-bells and English accidence, with "lines" and decimal fractions. This revolution cannot move backward. This is conceded.

It has been thought possible to shorten the time of preparation for college by more skillful teaching, by the omission of parts not essential, by beginning the distinctive preparation at an earlier age. Doubtless there is room for relief here, but whatever time is gained is likely to be used in broadening and deepening the preparatory work, and the boy will get to college no sooner. College instruction and college discipline to-day are not designed for lads, but for young men. Judicious parents are keeping their precocious sons back a year or two, in order that they may enter college at an appropriate age. A class of picked boys, under skillful teaching, and in favorable circumstances, can be put into our best colleges at seventeen, at sixteen, at fifteen, "able to govern themselves" and to do college work with profit to themselves and with satisfaction to their instructors; but the average boy, with the average teaching, in the average circumstances, must be at least seventeen, eighteen, nineteen. Broken time, impaired health, physical injuries, poverty, boyish ignorance of right methods, clumsiness in using the right methods, boyish disinclination to study, want of appreciation, want of models and examples, all conspire to raise the age of boys matriculating. Educational discussion is likely to leave out of account the immaturity of the mind of the average boy and the undisciplined state of his will; in other words, to contemplate the boy simply as a subject for instruction, forgetting that in many cases the love of learning must be created, and steadfastness of purpose, and definiteness of aim, and impelling enthusiasm must be waited for,—that one great reason for sending the boy to school is to incline and invite him to enter paths of culture before unknown to him, or unattractive. The proportion of liberally educated men would be enormously diminished if only those could obtain it who had a set purpose for it as early as twelve or thirteen. It is conclusive against shortening the preparatory course or lowering the college age that thereby the schools would be injured, the colleges would be injured, boys would be sent to college, instead of going of their own free will, and they would go at an age too young for modern methods of college instruction and government. Boys in Germany do not leave home for the university till they are eighteen or nineteen.

There is reason, too, for lengthening rather than shortening the time of professional training. The tendency is in that direction in all the professions. A fourth year in theology is desired by an increasing number of young men preparing for the ministry, and is provided by an increas-

ing number of theological seminaries. The medical courses have been lengthened from two years to three, and a year or two of post-graduate study or hospital service is eagerly sought, at home or abroad, by the more ambitious young physicians. The attendance in the "short course" law schools and law courses is growing smaller every year. One of the most effective arguments for elective studies in the colleges is that by means of them professional training is practically lengthened. The competitions grow sharper as our civilization becomes older and more complex. The more intelligent the lay element becomes in a given community, the more discerning and exacting is the demand made upon the professions, and the less is the chance for charlatanism, incompetency, and inexperience. Academic degrees are more easily obtained in the newer parts of our country only because the demands of the community are less. In the older parts of our country the difficult degrees are considered valuable, and the higher the standard is set and kept, the larger is the patronage. The addition of a year to the course of medical and law schools has, for a short time only, diminished the numbers in attendance. We are already so far along in our ordered civilization that the community demands a high training in those who serve it, and the supply follows and increases the demand. He who fits himself for his work most completely and thoroughly, who becomes in a high degree master of himself and of his specialty, will get on fastest and farthest. The first fruits may be less, but the harvest of a lifetime will be greater. Our young men are thoroughly persuaded of this. It is not uncommon for men who have omitted some of the steps in their education to go back and retrace their course, graduating from college, for example, after they have taken the diploma of the professional school.

President Adams thinks that "no college is willing to reduce the requirements for graduation to the term of three years," and therefore he advocates ceding the last year, or the last two years, of the college course to professional studies. Candidates for the ministry will busy themselves with electives in Hebrew, New Testament Greek, church history; for the practice of medicine, with modern languages, chemistry, physics, microscopy, etc., while law students will pursue history, political economy, and kindred studies.

There is no branch of learning which may not be pursued as a means of liberal culture. The time may not be distant when colleges and universities can give all the professional courses with the same thoroughness and directness with which they are now given in our professional schools; in other words, the time may not be far away when not simply one year, or two years, of our professional schools shall be absorbed into the colleges and universities, but the German method be fully established among us, and our professional schools be extinguished, or adapted expressly to the wants of those who do not go to the colleges at all, yet desire to enter professional life.

But there is a better way. Our three grades of school may be main-

tained, each in its integrity, — schools of preparatory study, colleges of liberal education, and strictly professional schools, — and a year can be saved, out of deference to popular demand or in accordance with a true educational philosophy. The college course may be reduced to three years. There will be no "odium" involved, if it be done by some strong institution as a matter of settled policy, and for the sake of a conviction. This is the radical, the most natural, the most feasible method. It will be a relief to many young men, and will be intelligible to the public. Heretofore the colleges have received students to advanced standing, but have made it difficult for a man to get his degree in three years. The fourth year may be maintained for candidates for the M. A. degree, and it will be thronged, if it be made attractive and be made profitable. Men who do not expect to enter professional schools will avail themselves of it as the crowning year of their education, and not a few candidates for professional degrees will take this fourth year by way of ampler preparation, refusing to be frightened or bribed into an earlier entrance upon their practical life-work.

The proposal to allow men to complete the minimum number of required courses in three years or in four, at their option, need not be discussed, nor the proposal to allow men to enter professional schools after three years of college work with the promise of the B. A. degree at the end of their first year of professional study. The first project invites haste and over-work, dangerous foes to a truly liberal culture, and is open to this objection, that it does not set the full seal of official sanction and dignity upon abridged residence. The second plan confuses the functions of two separate orders of schools, — functions which should be broadly and distinctly marked.

So far as the discussion turns on European practice, it is always to be borne in mind that the comparisons are likely to be misleading. Governmental interference and regulation, which are becoming in some European countries every year more obtrusive and vexatious, give and deny position and promotion in ways quite unknown here, and which to our ideas of free movement and competition would be intolerable. Men do indeed come to their life-work earlier than here, but it takes them much longer to get fairly into it, to win recognition, to earn a living, and build up a competence. The men who begin here at twenty-six are much more valuable to the community at thirty than the university men of Europe who begin at twenty-three. Our education is wider, our men are more versatile, youth is seldom a bar and often a help to employment. Our young men do not need to wait so long, nor are they compelled to wait so long, as their European fellows.

European education is strong, too, in directions which command American admiration; for example, in the fluent use of several modern languages, in the intricacies of modern history and diplomacy, in minute and exhaustive research in some single line of learning. Men like the progressive Professor Paulsen, and like him, too, out of the

heart of the best there is in German pedagogics, maintain that the education secured in an American college is the typical successful preparation for practical life.

American education, while it covers more years, is mingled with the practical to an extent unknown to the systems of the Old World, and hence there is a vigor, robustness, and available directness about it which compensates for the time it costs. Theory and practice go forward together in a large helpfulness, more because of the genius of our home life and of our business and social institutions, than because our schools are equipped for it, or aim directly to secure it. We are a practical people in a practical age, and our education, fragmentary, superficial, unsymmetrical as it is, and too long-drawn out, is after all the product of native forces, and wonderfully suited to our peculiar wants. It may require condensation and concentration; it may be wise to modify it in many particulars; it will always be capable of improvement; but any changes, to commend themselves, must be justified by the conditions which exist among us. If we have prolonged the time given to schools and books beyond reasonable limits, we must revise our programmes. By a very general consent we cannot shorten the time before college, nor the time after. There is a strong and growing feeling that by some wise method the college course can be compassed in three years, thereby increasing the number of liberally educated men, and improving all the professions by increasing the proportion of liberally educated men in them. The conservative spirit will question the wisdom of the change, and sometimes resist it. It will not be easy to find a representative institution to undertake it. But if such a college makes the venture, there is much reason to believe that it will be in twenty years the one method in all the land.

JOSEPH WARD, OF YANKTON.

THE character and work of the men who are near us in space and time, and who have exerted a strong influence through an unusual degree of personal power, give sufficient ground for concentrating upon them a rational admiration. When so good and so able a man as the late Joseph Ward, of Yankton, is consecrated by death, it would be more than an unpardonable indifference to conspicuous Christian service to suffer him to pass away without some recognition that may contribute to keep him in memory; it would be to disregard a moral force of vital and widespread importance in church and state.

The life and service of President Ward receive distinction through his relation to religion, education, and high citizenship as fundamental elements in the building of the New West. His true position is among the moral founders of states. From the day he was graduated from the Theological Seminary at Andover, and entered the Territory of Dakota, in 1868, as a young and entirely unknown home-missionary in the obscure

village of Yankton, until the day of his death, twenty-one years after, he has been actively identified with all that is of greatest moral and material worth in the growth of his own city, and in the rapid progress of the Territory into Statehood.

He found Yankton a mere hamlet, composed of Indians, half-breeds, and a few hundred men and women who had emigrated from the Eastern and Middle States in search of "El Dorado." Social life, if it could have been called such, was crude and chaotic. A little church of fourteen members, which had been organized but a few months before, cordially welcomed the new missionary and his wife, and the united influence of pastor and people soon began to be palpably felt in the community. A church-building was erected in due time by means of funds raised by the pastor in the East, and within a very few years the church became self-supporting. The parsonage and the church were centres from which constantly radiated influences to cheer and to bless. Those influences were also formative in their character. Isolated individual and family life began to feel the common impulse of mutual dependence and mutual helpfulness. Social life was soon shaped into society. The great factors in American civilization — the home, the school, and the church — were brought into harmonious coöperation. The commercial and industrial interests of the town took direction under his guiding hand. Yankton's excellent public school system, which afterwards became that of the Territory, was originated and set in motion by the young pastor. The fame of Yankton as "a town worth living in" spread rapidly; the growth of the place, though not phenomenal amongst its sister communities of the West, has been marked by a steady increase in population, in business enterprise, and in all the sterling and attractive qualities of a prosperous and influential municipality. The noteworthy thing in all this development is the permeating and shaping influence of its foremost citizen, the preacher and pastor, Joseph Ward.

After an active ministry of fifteen years, he resigned the charge of his church of three hundred and seven members to assume exclusively the presidency of Yankton College, an institution that he had organized two years before, in 1881. To the interests of this new and most important enterprise of his life he devoted his versatile and well-trained powers with an energy and zeal that neither difficulties, disappointments, nor encroaching disease could dismay. During the eight years of his administration two fine college buildings have been erected; his carefully chosen and efficient faculty has been increased to eleven; and the roll of students in present attendance numbers over two hundred.

In the exercise of his functions as an educator, his aim was practical rather than literary and scholastic. He never lost sight of the material conditions and the corresponding needs of the rapidly growing society of the great West; and he was equally alive to the necessity of giving a symmetrical development to the powers of each youthful member of that society who might seek the benefit of Yankton's training. His gen-

eral theory of Western collegiate instruction included the co-education of the sexes. In the formation of the curriculum of study, he modeled the Preparatory Department on the leading features of his own fitting-school for college, — Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass.; and for the Collegiate Department he set a standard of scholarship no less high than the standards of the New England colleges as represented in his own Alma Mater, — Brown University.

His ruling ideas of education for the individual were chiefly two, — the training for character, — in nobleness and intelligence of aim; and the training for power, — in the mastery of a self-respecting manhood and womanhood for the service of society and for honorable citizenship in the state. He held that a collegiate education is not an end in itself; it is the fashioning of an instrument and the furnishing of material for subsequent use in wider ranges of activity. Loyal Congregationalist though he was, he avoided the error of making his college sectarian; but his firm and undisguised purpose was to make it positively Christian. His educational motto was that of President Stearns, of Amherst: "The highest culture, and all for Christ." The legend that he chose for the college seal and had cast upon the college bell is, "Christ for the world: the world for Christ." His personal instruction was marked by clearness, simplicity, patience, enthusiasm, and a genial, sympathetic insight into the needs and workings of the youthful mind. Necessarily, much of his time was devoted to the executive functions of his office, and in devising ways and means for the material prosperity of the college. This duty often involved long absences from the class-room; but whenever he was upon the ground his students recognized in his tone and bearing the true man and the true Christian. They became inspired with a fine sympathy with his own high ideals for their development into the healthiest type of efficient Christian manhood.

The growing personal force of President Ward could not be limited to Yankton and its varied local interests. His parish gradually covered the enlarging life of the Territory, and even reached to certain affairs of the national government. He was practically the father of Congregationalism in Dakota; and the planting of new churches throughout the region drew upon his time, sympathies, and strength. With the cordial coöperation of Governor Howard, a General Hospital for the Insane was established in Yankton. Few men surpassed Dr. Ward in knowledge of the Indian Question, and he served several times under appointment of the authorities at Washington on the Indian Commission. It was no unusual sight to find considerable companies of the dusky children of the wilderness enjoying the hospitality of his home. He was in constant demand at the anniversaries of the great benevolent societies of his denomination as speaker and counselor. He was a frequent contributor to the secular and the religious press on the matters of public interest, with which his large experience had made him familiar.

Around him lay the expanding and stirring activities of the political life of the Territory. His patriotic sympathies were deeply enlisted in the discussion of public questions preliminary to the formation of the new state constitution. The last work of weighty import in which he engaged was in assisting to launch the new State of South Dakota. He was cordially invited into the councils of those who were moving for its recognition as a State; his judgment was so highly valued that the call for one of the constitutional conventions waited upon his personal convenience. Christian as he was in every pulse of his being, he believed in the claim of Christianity to pervade with its influence every province of human affairs. In his view, Christian morality was the only stable basis upon which a commonwealth can be reared. All measures that provided for public enlightenment, purity, and righteousness that were deemed advisable to be embodied in the constitution were intrusted to the directing agency of President Ward. To him the State is indebted for its Puritan motto: "Under God the People rule." He greatly helped to save the State to Temperance and Education, and put the imprint of his own broad and far-seeing spirit upon the admirable constitution and the forming life of South Dakota. Without depreciating the influence of other good and able men in the State, it is safe to say that during the last twenty years he has been the strongest moral force in the Territory of Dakota. It was a source of deep gratification to him that he lived to see the State of South Dakota take her equal place in the Union of States, and that he participated in the struggles and triumphs of the first state election. He died when the State counted its life only in months; had he lived in the fullness of health, it is not unlikely that his State would have sought his service, notwithstanding his utter lack of political ambition, as her United States Senator.

This sketch of the main features of Joseph Ward's varied career, though necessarily incomplete, carries its own implication of the sources of his influence, and secret of his power. They are no mystery to those who knew him. He was fortunate in his ancestry, being the descendant of the good old New England stock made up of intelligence, conscience, and hardy self-reliance. He took a quiet satisfaction in knowing that in his veins ran the blood of General Ward, the first commander-in-chief of the American forces in the Revolution of 1776. At the base of President Ward's inherited qualities was robust, roundabout common sense, that amounted almost to genius. His judgment was not brilliant, but it had lucidity, sureness, and solidity. Blended with this massive, manly sense was a thorough-going genuineness of character. Nothing could force or allure him into a dishonorable action or a morally questionable policy. His integrity was "the immediate jewel of his soul." He was a man of ideas; but he made no pretense of being a guide in political or economic theories, or in matters of merely speculative opinion; his thought was preëminently practical and executive thought. It was also constructive and originating thought; wherever he

was placed he instinctively organized. He was a discerner of character, and rarely made mistakes in the choice of his lieutenants. Being full of "mother-wit," he was generally equal to emergencies as they arose, and never seemed to be at his wit's end; he could drive a nail where it was needed, and negotiate a city loan. He had the insight of his clear-headed judgment. He saw the forces that control the present; he had a sense for the tendency of things in the political and religious world. Naturally, he caught and was controlled by the progressive spirit. He believed that it is only by progress that the good in all things is preserved. There must be a certain slowness to secure sureness of progress, but it would never do for the steamer to try to anchor in mid-ocean. Acting as he did upon the principle that improvement is better than preservation, he was more impatient with the indifference and apathy of conservatism than with the noisy agitation of reform. He had great sympathy with the apostle's canon of progress: "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good."

The union of such rare qualities of mind, character, and temperament made it inevitable that he should become the wise counselor and efficient administrator. Had his gifts of public speech equaled his manly sense and moral force, he would have been a man of national fame. The orator's peculiar gifts for ruling popular assemblies by the magnetism of eloquent speech were denied him; but he was always listened to with eager interest because of the freshness of his thought and information, and the practical value of his views and opinions. He spoke "right on" in a modest, simple, manly fashion, but always with the earnest accent of absolute sincerity of conviction. In small deliberative bodies he was at his best in convincing and persuasive speech. As a Congregational minister he was a true Biblical bishop; had he been in a certain other line of Apostolical Succession he would undoubtedly have been a bishop, and of the sort of George Cotton, the good Bishop of India, who "was one of the best of bishops, because he was one of the best of men."

To those who had the privilege and pure satisfaction of being within the range of intimacy with Joseph Ward there was something precious and inspiring in his presence. He possessed the gift of friendship — the rare power of attaching others to himself, and especially the young. This was largely because he was not only a man of sense but of sensibility. His breadth of mind had its roots in the largeness of his heart. Hence his wonderful insight of love; his tact of sympathy. The law of kindness was in his heart. Democratic in feeling, dress, and manner, he put on no airs of condescension with his inferiors. He loved his kind, and his deep sense of responsibility for the welfare of his fellows was a controlling motive in his life. His humanity and excellent sense stimulated the poor and the weak to resolution and self-help. It was but natural that the counselor and administrator should be the wise philanthropist.

Lying close to the deep seriousness of his purposes was a rich fund of

humor. The faults and foibles of men did not irritate him. His was a tolerant spirit, and could discriminate between opinions and the man who held them. He enjoyed a "character," liked a good story, could tell one, and had a good many to tell. He could appreciate what the saintly Father Faber meant when he said that "there is no greater help to a religious life than a keen sense of the ridiculous." His conversation was replete with good sense, and was enriched with the romance, the comedy, and the pathos of home-missionary life. Many a household will miss the charm of his presence. He was a perfect host, and an ever-welcome guest. Children instinctively ran into his arms. He was peculiarly fitted for household joys; there are five children of his own upon whom he lavished the wealth of his affectionate heart. In the death of this kindest and friendliest of men there are those who feel that they have lost their "heart's best brother."

However much we may admire the fine qualities of his head and heart, and appreciate the exercise of his practical force, we must not forget to emphasize what we have already intimated — a certain ideal quality which, for the want of a better name, we call "soul." It was his by natural possession. His unaffected delight in the beautiful — in nature and art, in thought, character, and action — was one of the strongest elements of his nature. But in his case "soul" took on the name of Christian Faith. The potent essence of his activity was "Faith working by love." All his speech, even when he spoke words of rebuke or of noble moral wrath, illustrated that divine rule of criticism and controversy, — "Speaking the truth in love." But the basis was Faith. One could not truly account for his peculiar influence if the central point of power were omitted, — his close, conscious union and friendship with the unseen Christ. It was this that penetrated, multiplied, and enhanced all other talents and faculties, and made him a fountain of spiritual influence. Of this central fellowship he spoke but little. No man was ever freer from cant. But his simplest conversation, his unguarded conduct of life, produced the impression of one living "as seeing Him who is invisible." This was the secret of his serenity of temper amidst engrossing cares; the secret of his remarkable unselfishness. Living or dying, he was the Lord's.

In the full speed of his beneficent career he received a serious check. About three years ago he detected the germs of the malady, induced by overwork and anxiety, which was gradually to undermine his strength. But he had learned long ago "to toil terribly;" the tireless fire of soul still burned intensely; he worked on heroically until his physical force was utterly spent, and in the early morning of the 11th of December, "he fell on sleep."

The veil of sacred sorrow must not be lifted; although to do so would be to reveal the perfect blending of the strongest human affection with the nobility of Christian self-surrender. He was permitted the unspeakable comfort of the tender farewells with the devoted wife who had

walked with him in equal step in every experience and purpose of life and utter unselfishness of spirit, and with every member of the domestic circle, and of dictating his last wishes concerning the prosecution of the cherished objects of his self-sacrificing effort. His fifty-one years were full to overflowing with fructifying usefulness. In a very true sense he could say, "I have lived." It was a successful life, though he died without seeing the consummation of his projects. He leaves his work at a time when it seems as if he could ill be spared to the vastly important interests that depended so much upon his personal direction. But he did not complain; nor should his friends. They can do no better than to join him in his own expression of acquiescence in the divine plan for his life. They can best honor his memory and keep it green by catching his own comprehensive and large-hearted spirit, and by perpetuating his far-reaching schemes of Christian education and philanthropy.

THE BRAZILIAN REVOLUTION.

GOLDWIN SMITH's statement that "monarchy is dead by the roots throughout Europe" has verified itself very easily in that European offshoot, the Brazilian monarchy. However this sudden overthrow may operate, the Brazilian Empire has done a worthy work, and one which it remains to be seen whether the Republic will continue, if the Republic itself continues. Brazil has undoubtedly derived dignity, in her own eyes and before the world, in that, having served a reigning house of Europe as a refuge from Napoleonic tyranny, she has so allured this family that, making over the crown of the mother-country to a female line, it has reserved the vast colony for its permanent seat. The male line of the House of Braganza expires in the second Emperor of Brazil. It matters the less, therefore, if a throne is not provided for Dom Pedro's grandson, who may call himself a Braganza, but who is really an Orleans. If monarchy was to expire in Brazil, it may be as well that it shall pass into another polity by a transition that shall leave behind only worthy remembrances. The first Pedro, though stubborn and impracticable, was sincere and dignified, and the long reign of Pedro the Second has been well summed up by the "Nation" in two words, breadth and humanity.

A timely article in the current "Atlantic Monthly" warns us against identifying our own genuine republicanism with the nominal republicanism of Spanish America, which it describes as government of the many by the few for the few. Lincoln's immortal words at Gettysburg would evoke a very faint echo there. It truly says that England and all her colonies, though they honor a crown which connects the free present with the ages past, are essentially one with us, but that Iberian America is like us in nothing but a hollow form. Bolivar had, it is said, neither dignity in his manners nor humanity in his acts. Sarmiento and Diaz are names that awaken a highly favorable presumption, and it may be

more than that. But the one man of Latin America for whom it could not, within the limits of possibility, too thoroughly resemble *America do Norte* was the man who has just been driven away from the Brazilian throne. When he came with the kindly Empress to grace our Centennial solemnities, it was with no parade of friendship for our nation and our system, but with its undoubted reality. And seeing that an unhappy chance detained our own President away from the nation's very birthday, it seemed not amiss that the first place should be held by the head of our great Southern counterpart, which, so long as he governed it, was steadily advancing to be a counterpart in more vital matters than extent. It is natural that the interest felt in a state of monarchical form should be largely centred in its head. But as respects Brazil, this fact was not only natural, but altogether legitimate. The loving friend of Longfellow and Whittier thereby made himself a domestic friend of every one of us.

Will the not very unwilling foreboding of the "Spectator" be realized, that the vast and thinly peopled regions of Portuguese America, hitherto held together by the magnetic attraction of the historic monarchy, seated among themselves, now fall apart, and, like the regions of Spanish America, cherish towards each other no other fraternity than that of Cain to Abel? Doubtless it is the House of Braganza that has kept them together through two generations. The local jealousies are still so great that there is no reason why at the beginning Rio de Janeiro might not have made itself the capital of one conglomeration of anarchy called a Republic, and Bahia of another, and other towns still of others. From this disintegration, historic remembrances, personal loyalty, pride of acknowledged superiority to Portugal herself, the uniqueness of their polity, and the encompassing ring of Spanish states have thus far preserved them. And as in the rest of Latin America the impulses to disunion seem to have come to a stay more than a generation ago, and are even beginning to yield in some parts to the instinct of reunion, it seems probable that Brazil has gained, by this time, a national distinctiveness that will endure. Some time, doubtless, the hollow shell of hereditary monarchy must drop off from all Christendom. But, as Lotze says, a declining institution, that does not impede the growth of a newer order (as assuredly the Brazilian monarchy did not), has a right to be regarded with reverence, and to be reckoned with as an element of value, until it dies a natural death. The ease with which the monarchy has seemed to give way in Brazil certainly looks as if it may be said, with a little allowance, to have died a natural death. The fact that its immediate overthrow is due merely to a military conspiracy will signify little if the new government, however instituted, unfolds a civic sense. At present it seems to exhibit this. And, as republicans, we may be permitted to indulge so much of a sympathy with a polity kindred at least in form as to hope that, as it has fallen heir to Dom Pedro's place, so it will fall heir to his aims and the purity of his means. Perhaps he would have conducted his government to its end in peace had his imperial stature been

accompanied by a fuller touch of the imperial temper. Even the administrative and military greatness of Julian cannot remove a certain sense of incongruity in seeing a professor on a throne. And in Dom Pedro the professor was as prominent as in Julian, and the emperor less so. Marcus Aurelius thought that his people would be glad "that the school-master was gone." We will draw no dismal augury of a Commodus to succeed. Many such a one has there been in the Spanish states around, but their days seem to be wearing towards a close.

This revolution is the work of a handful. But the vital part of the Brazilian nation is as yet but a handful. Even those that can read and write, it appears, are less than a fiftieth of the whole. And these few, doubtless, would have been well content to let the Emperor die in his place, had they not feared that the reign of Donna Isabel would reverse all the wheels of progress. The great reform which, as Regent in her father's absence, she pushed resolutely forward, and which will give her an honored place among the liberators of the world, was perhaps the only thing in which, as a fervid Catholic, she was at one with her liberal antagonists. Freemasonry and Roman Catholicism in Brazil can hardly be said to be at deadly feud, for deadliness is hardly a note of the somewhat slack-twisted Portuguese fibre; but they are not at all amiable towards each other. The Roman Catholic Church is there sumptuous in her manifestations and exceedingly degraded in her character. The Jesuits were the original fountains of civilization, religion, education, and national manliness to Brazil. But their resolute championship of aboriginal rights against European cruelties was fatal to them, and their present influence is commonly supposed to work for little else than ecclesiastical exorbitancies, while the secular clergy are singularly worthless, are both ignorant and immoral. The faithful Italian Capuchins are described by Mr. Fletcher as shaming them by their pure devotedness, but not as reforming them. Over against this Freemasonry may perhaps be regarded as an awkward attempt of the laity to secure for themselves that freedom of action which the Roman Church denies them. It is hard to distribute sympathies in such complications. Catholicism in Brazil represents the nobler ideals wretchedly traversed by extravagant superstition and hierarchical control; Freemasonry, perhaps, the more enlightened methods, beclouded by tendencies to atheism. This is only an example of that *ἀνομία ἐθνῶν* which, prevailing everywhere in Christendom, prevails most of all in Roman Catholic Christendom. Only "the lightning flash," of which Boehme speaks, and a Greater than Boehme, will resolve it. Were the husband of Donna Isabel, to whom, except in the matter of her devotion to the priesthood, she is said to be conjugally submissive, not the Comte d'Eu, but his able and enlightened cousin, the Count of Paris, we might regret that he had not an opportunity to follow his father-in-law in the administration. But as the only Orleans trait which is popularly attributed to him is an extreme care of his pecuniary interests, it is perhaps as well for his wife's fame if she is

only to be known in history as the emancipatrix of the Brazilian slaves, whose freedom she carried through with self-sacrificing courage, though she was advised that she was hazarding the reversion of her father's crown. Perhaps the church will some time reward this self-abnegation with the halo of canonization.

THE FIRST CASE BEFORE THE AMERICAN BOARD ON THE NEW YORK PLATFORM.

THE outcome of the annual meeting of the American Board at New York was the adoption of Dr. Storrs's letter of acceptance of the Presidency as the working platform of the Board for the year, and the election of the President and Vice-President as members of the Prudential Committee. Except for the election of Dr. Storrs upon the Prudential Committee, where he might interpret his own letter, many would have refused to vote for the letter as a platform, for it had been made sufficiently clear what construction the majority of the Committee would put upon its language. It was the decisive utterance of Dr. Storrs just before the vote was taken, that "this Board has two wings, and it is perfectly legitimate that it should have," and that "we have the right, all of us, to our opinion, and we are to deal rightly and fairly with one another," which led the liberal members of the Board to accept the somewhat unusual method of making an official letter the platform of a corporate body.

The first case involving any test of the practicability and sincerity of the understanding thus reached was presented through the application of Mr. A. J. Covell, a member of the senior class in Andover Theological Seminary. Mr. Covell is a graduate of Michigan University, and had taken two years of his theological course at Chicago Theological Seminary. He had just entered upon his senior year at Andover, having transferred his seminary relation from Chicago, when he made application for appointment under the Board.

The correspondence, which we publish elsewhere, will show his theological position. We have no comments to make upon the position brought out in this correspondence, for that is not the particular question now at issue. The issue now before the constituency of the Board is involved in the attitude of the Prudential Committee toward the appointment of Mr. Covell on the basis of Dr. Storrs's letter, and as interpreted by himself. The fact appears that the President of the Board, after reading the correspondence, and after a personal interview with Mr. Covell, interpreted the case as coming fairly within the limits proposed in his letter, and urged his appointment; that a delay of two weeks was arranged with a view to unanimity in the action of the Committee; that at the date to which the case was adjourned, it was found that the Committee stood six to six upon the question of immediate appointment, the President, the Vice-President (Mr. Blatchford), and four other members

of the Committee favoring, and the senior Foreign Secretary advising, and six members, under the lead of the Home Secretary, opposing. Of the six opposed to immediate appointment, it is understood that a part were entirely opposed to Mr. Covell's appointment so long as he held his present position, and that in this opinion two of the Secretaries coincided; while the remaining part were unprepared to vote for rejection or appointment.

It is in the light of this situation within the Committee that the minute, giving the result for postponement, must be read. The preamble of the minute was prepared after the interview of Dr. Storrs with Mr. Covell, in the expectation of his appointment, and as a prelude to the announcement of the fact. The closing portion allowing postponement was prepared, when it was found that nothing better than postponement could be secured, the apparent unanimity of the minute meaning nothing more than a refusal to express dissent.¹

In view of these facts, we ask the conservative members of the Board, what was the intended significance of the action taken at New York? Was it intended to have any significance? Did the adoption of the letter of Dr. Storrs as a working platform differ in any sense in their minds from previous action of the Board? Was it the same as the reiteration of the Des Moines and Springfield resolutions would have been? If not, what was the difference? Was it intended to cover a case like that of Mr. Covell? If not, how much less a case than that was it supposed the liberals would care to consider, or to come to any understanding about? And further, if the interpretation of Dr. Storrs is not to be accepted, what was the meaning of intrusting him with the official responsibilities and the moral power which were conferred upon him? We confess that it seems to us ominous of the future, so far as the unity of the Board is concerned, that the first interpretative act of the President should be met by obstruction and opposition on the part of some of the conservative members of the Prudential Committee, and by hesitation and delay on the part of the remainder. It is a very suggestive fact that *not one of the conservative members* of the Prudential Committee put himself with the President in the case of Mr. Covell, and that in the effort of Dr. Storrs, seconded by Mr. Blatchford, to keep in good faith the spirit of the New York agreement, he should have encountered reluctance and organized dissent, where he ought to have expected willing consent and hearty coöperation.

But it may be said that this is taking too serious a view of a matter which, after all, is only a postponement, and not a rejection. We have

¹ We learn, since writing, that some members of the Prudential Committee supposed that they were voting simply for the part of the minute allowing postponement, and not for that part preceding, and that they have put themselves on record to this effect. This grave misunderstanding shows the confusion in which the minute must have been prepared and acted upon.

good reason to believe that in the intention of those who necessitated this action, postponement was secured with a view to final rejection. We believe, also, that we are warranted in saying that there are those upon the Committee, and officially associated with it, who will never favor the appointment of Mr. Covell or any one belonging to the class which he represents; and we think that those upon the Committee who, in all honesty and hopefulness, voted for postponement will find it increasingly difficult to retrace their steps whenever a decisive vote must be taken.

Still it will be asked, was there not a satisfactory reason for postponement in the fact that Mr. Covell, owing to a change in his seminary course, had not fully completed his studies in eschatology. We certainly ought not to overlook the expression of confidence on the part of the Committee in the teachings at Andover, contained in the desire that Mr. Covell should continue his studies there a year before reaching a complete opinion, but we cannot make very much account of the implied loss in a change from the curriculum of one seminary to that of another. It has been for a long time the habit of the Committee to appoint men from all the seminaries at the close of the middle or at the beginning of the senior year. But this must have involved the appointment of men from many of the seminaries, from Chicago, for example, before they had studied eschatology at all in the regular curriculum. And this means that men have been appointed in their ignorance of the subject, or in their premature commitment of themselves to some opinion which they might change upon investigation and study. We think that the correspondence of Mr. Covell will show an intelligence upon the subject of eschatology quite equal to that of the average missionary candidate about whose appointment no question has been raised.

The general effect of postponement cannot be too greatly deprecated. It will stop at once the flow from the liberal seminaries toward the Board. Young men will wait and watch the issue, and meanwhile many will doubtless form other plans, and enter upon other than foreign missionary work. The splendid enthusiasm kindled by the call from Japan will be dampened. It is too much to expect that young men will force their way through an unwilling organization to serve "the cause of Christ in heathen lands," when the way is open and the demand urgent for the service of Christ in America.

And postponement necessarily renews the suspense and discontent of the churches. According to the "Missionary Herald," the receipts of the Board for the two months following the meeting at New York were \$23,000 in excess of the receipts for the same months of last year. The prospect was in every way most encouraging. Now, the enthusiasm for missions must give place for the time to the contention for justice. It was Dr. Quint, we think, who said at New York, "When the stream flows again from the Congregational seminaries into the Board the question is settled: it is not settled till then." The stream had begun to flow. Young men were taking heart, and were renewing their allegiance to the

Board. Contributions were increasing. It seemed as if the crisis had been safely and completely passed. We believe that it has been passed. We believe that the large constituency of the Board, whenever it can be reached, will reaffirm and enforce the action taken at New York. But meanwhile public discussion must go on. The old questions under new forms must be reopened and resettled. And the result which had already been reached in spirit and, as we are confident, in reality, but which was allowed to go unformulated, must be recorded in some definite, tangible, and unmistakable expression, either through a clear precedent established under the interpretation of Dr. Storrs, or through the action of the Board itself at its next annual meeting.

The most serious aspect of the present case, as of those which have preceded, is its relation to the candidate himself. Of course, the decisions of the Committee are announced in kindly words, but we submit that the act which leaves Mr. Covell in suspense, through a mere technicality in regard to courses of study, is neither generous nor respectful. Mr. Covell has shown himself to be a man of singular candor, straightforwardness, and honor. There has been nothing ambiguous or evasive in his conduct. He has not been dogmatic or controversial or unduly positive in his opinions, but open-minded, modest, and sincere in his whole intellectual habit. These qualities are entitled to an appropriate response. It is perhaps too much to ask that institutionalism in general will be considerate of the rights of individuals. But it is to be expected, it may be demanded of an institution which exists for one object, that it shall have supreme regard to that object, and to the personal interests which it conserves.

The primary object of the American Board is not to maintain or denounce any theological dogma. Its primary object is to send young men to "serve the cause of Christ in heathen lands." For the past few years these objects have been exchanged in the management of the American Board. At last the opportunity came, not logically, as we admit, but none the less providentially, as nearly all at New York believed, to recover the Board to its original function. Hence the motive for the acceptance of Dr. Storrs's letter as a platform by the liberals, and we think by not a few of the conservatives. It was not asked, just what does the letter mean theologically. It was assumed that it meant a passageway for young men representing the "faith commonly held by the churches" into the mission fields, and that was enough. We see no reason to doubt, but every reason to hold, that Dr. Storrs so regards it, and would so use it. We see much reason to doubt a like acceptance and use of it by the Home Secretary and by certain of the conservative members of the Prudential Committee. This action, so far as it goes, is a return to the old way, the reassertion of institutionalism above the individual, of dogma above life. And the man to suffer under this treatment is the man, whoever he may be, who presents himself as a

candidate for missionary service, *representing the state of mind of one half, if not three fourths, of the young men in the Congregational seminaries of the country.* At present, Mr. Covell is the sufferer. Others had preceded him, holding very likely different opinions, but meeting with the same kind of reception. Nothing has been more painful in the intellectual and spiritual life of young men during these last years than the history of the rejected candidates of the American Board. Not because they have been rejected, but because of the method employed in their examination, in the postponement of their cases, and in their rejection. The earlier part of the correspondence with Mr. Covell bears the well-known marks of a familiar hand — the persistent use of the “little memorandum,” the peculiar misplacement of Mr. Covell according to the classification of Dr. Storrs’s letter, the manner of the “candid” heathen inquirer, and the like. The *method* which has thus far proved fatal to any attempt at conciliation is still in operation, and if further allowed will prove fatal to the present attempt at conciliation. The policy of the President of the Board and the method of the Home Secretary cannot go on at one and the same time. At the end of the year it will be found that one has displaced the other. And the result in the case of Mr. Covell, whatever it may be, will give the decisive answer.

THE CORRESPONDENCE IN THE CASE OF MR. A. J. COVELL.

MR. COVELL is a member of the Congregational Church in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and has received licensure to preach. In applying for appointment by the Board he answered, as is customary, the questions in the “Manual.” In so doing, he affirmed his acceptance of the Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds, and that of the Congregational Commission.

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.
CONGREGATIONAL HOUSE, 1 SOMERSET ST.,
BOSTON, Nov. 7, 1889.

MY DEAR MR. COVELL, — Your favor of the 5th inst., with Chancellor Payne’s testimonial, was duly received, also Dr. Richards’s testimonial of 2d inst. I have received a pleasant testimonial from Mr. Moore, but none from the Chicago professors as yet, to whom I have written, including Professor Boardman.

In your reply to the second question in the Manual, “Have you doubts,” etc., I understand you as including the doctrines mentioned in the little memorandum as expressed in the “note” at its conclusion — a copy of which I believe I placed in your hands. [I inclose another copy if I omitted to do this.] If I am mistaken, will you kindly inform me in accompanying envelope? ¹

¹ MEMORANDUM. *By the Home Secretary.* — A perusal of the following brief outline of doctrine may perhaps be helpful to candidates in stating their doctrinal views:

Outline of Doctrine. (I.) The existence of one God, infinite in all perfections, revealed as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. (II.) The Divine authority and inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. (III.) The Divine purposes and providence extending to all

I understood you also in our recent conversation as accepting heartily the statement so admirably presented in Dr. Storrs's letter, that "the theory of a probation after death offering opportunities beyond the grave to attain by repentance eternal life," you do "not find sustained by the Bible," and that "the fact that the Master said nothing about any future opportunities, with the intensity of his appeals for immediate repentance, and the solemn urgency of his imperative command for instantaneous missionary effort will make the theory of such future opportunities appear quite incredible."

I infer the same from the warm commendation in this direction from your friend and room-mate, Mr. Moore, all of which will be well-pleasing, I am sure, to our Committee, as it is to

Yours truly,

E. K. ALDEN.

MR. ARTHUR J. COVELL.

ANDOVER, MASS., Nov. 11, 1880.

Rev. E. K. Alden, Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIR, — I have received your letter of November 7, with its questions.

When I answered the second question in the Manual, I had not seen the memorandum you have since given me, but I supposed the "doctrines commonly held by the churches" were those embodied in the ecumenical creeds, the Congregational creed issued in 1884, and those doctrines made tests of ordination by Congregational councils. I understood you to say, when you gave me the memorandum at the Congregational House, that it was of no special consequence. I would prefer neither to affirm nor deny the particular statement of doctrine set forth in it. I would repeat the statement made in my application that I accept fully and heartily those doctrinal standards rec-

persons and all events, yet so that individual human freedom and responsibility abide unimpaired. (iv.) The universal sinfulness of man, by nature destitute of holiness and alienated from God, and so exposed to righteous Divine condemnation except through redeeming and regenerating grace. (v.) The Incarnation of the Son of God, and His propitiatory sacrifice upon the cross, the just for the unjust, as the only ground of forgiveness of sin. (vi.) The Resurrection and mediatorial intercession and reign of the glorified Lord and Saviour. (vii.) Salvation provided for all men on condition of repentance toward God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. (viii.) The work of the Holy Spirit in the regeneration and sanctification of men. (ix.) The Institution of the visible church, whose sealing ordinances are baptism, to be administered to believers and their infant children, and the Lord's Supper. (x.) The observance of the Lord's day, the Christian Sabbath, as a day of holy rest and worship. (xi.) The immortality of the soul, the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, the resurrection of the dead, both of the just and the unjust, and the final judgment, the issues of which will be determined by the deeds done in the body; so that the wicked will go into punishment, and the righteous into life, both of which states will be without end.

NOTE. — Should there be doubts in relation to any of these doctrines, will the candidate please mention the fact in replying to the second question of the Manual ["Have you doubts respecting any of the doctrines commonly held by the churches sustaining the missions under the care of the Board?"], in order that opportunity may be given, should it seem desirable, for further correspondence or conference upon the matter?

E. K. ALDEN, *Home Secretary.*

Rooms of A. B. C. F. M., 1 Somerset St., Boston.

ognized as Congregational, such as the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Congregational Creed, issued in 1884.

I do not understand that Dr. Storrs, in his letter, puts forth as a theological test the words you quoted to me, viz., "the fact that the Master said nothing about any future opportunities, with the intensity of his appeals for immediate repentance, and the solemn urgency of his imperative command for instantaneous missionary effort, will make the theory of such future opportunities appear quite incredible." I understand that Dr. Storrs is dividing the constituency of the Board into two classes, one of which would accept the above statement, while the other would not. I belong to the second class, to which Dr. Storrs immediately refers after the above quotation, the class which would not consider such a view "incredible." Dr. Storrs recognizes the fact that appointments may properly be made from this second class. You will notice, by reference to his letter, that the paragraph from which you quote begins as follows: "No doubt the shadings of thought at this point will be delicate and intricate in some minds; while in most, the fact that the Master said nothing about any future opportunities will make the theory of such future opportunities appear quite incredible." Then follow the words, "In the other and smaller class of cases, I am sure that the majority would wish, as I should, that great pains should be taken to disentangle feeling from conviction," etc. I do not think that Dr. Storrs's letter excludes me from appointment.

In regard to the questions you ask, I would recall our conversation which took place in the presence of Secretary Smith. You will remember that I held to the divine inspiration of the Scriptures, and asserted my belief that the Bible was our infallible guide for faith and practice; that I accepted the substitutionary view of the atonement, provided the idea of substitution be not pushed too far and made all-inclusive; that I did not consider the drift of the Bible to be against such a view as that of future probation, but maintained that the Bible does not touch that subject directly, expressed the belief that such passages as 2 Cor. v. 10, and Heb. ix. 27 had no direct bearing upon the question, cited the two passages in Peter, 1 Peter iii. 18-20, and iv. 5, 6, as favoring the idea of future probation, but based no positive argument upon them, and admitted that the revelation of Christ here referred to might have been limited to those of Noah's time. After you were called out of the room, Secretary Smith asked if I had any reason for favoring the future probation hypothesis besides that of these two passages in Peter. I replied that the doctrine of a universal atonement *might* favor it. Then I added: I believe that Christ tasted death for every man both potentially and actually; I hold that every man will have an *opportunity*, in *some* way, at *some* time, to receive the blessings of the atonement; how this will come about, I do not know; this *may* come, because men will be judged according to the essential Christ idea; or it may come through a presentation of the historic Christ; or it may come in some other way; I have no knowledge as to the method; I have no *doctrine* at this point; the only *doctrine* which I do hold bearing on the question is that the atonement is universal, *i. e.*, that every man will have an *opportunity* to receive its blessings. Secretary Smith asked me if I had any difficulty in regard to the nature of God why He should condemn an impenitent man before he had heard of Christ. I answered that I preferred to reason from the *revealed fact* of the universality of the atonement. Secretary Smith and I both admitted that it was very unsafe for a man to argue from the *a priori* ground.

Secretary Smith and yourself will recall the above as the substance of our conversation. I think you have my full view in that conversation. The Bible has no explicit revelation on the question of a future probation for the heathen. The Bible I conceive to be a practical book, which does not concern itself with speculations. I do not believe, however, that such a view is precluded by the Bible. The easy and natural inference from the two passages in Peter is that a future probation is possible. At best, the idea could not rise to the dignity of a *doctrine*, but could only be held as a probable *inference*.

In the conversation with Secretary Smith, please notice that the only *doctrine* that I hold bearing on the question of future probation is that of a universal atonement. I do not know how this atonement is to be made universal. I have a preference for the view that the historic Christ is presented. The essential Christ idea seems to me to be dangerous and rationalistic. The view that the historic Christ is in some way presented seems more orthodox because it magnifies Christ's work by bringing him into more vital connection with mankind, and is more in harmony with Scripture, especially its doctrine of justification by faith.

I have been perfectly frank and open with you in this letter. If I have misrepresented my views by undue enlargement upon a single point, it has been because of your questions in our interview. May I ask that this letter be presented in full to the Prudential Committee, to whom I apply, assuming that they will stand on the tolerant ground laid down in Dr. Storrs's letter, and trusting that they will favor my appointment.

Sincerely yours,

A. J. COVELL.

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.
CONGREGATIONAL HOUSE, 1 SOMERSET ST.,
BOSTON, Nov. 12, 1889.

MY DEAR MR. COVELL, — Your favor of 11th inst. is received. May I trouble you at your convenience to give me in substance, in inclosed envelope, your method of interpreting to a candid inquirer, such as you would find without doubt in missionary work abroad, the word of our Lord in John v. 28, 29, particularly as related to what many regard the plain instruction, that those who come forth from their graves in the final resurrection will receive a different sentence, according to their character when on earth, having been good or evil? Is there an intimation here that if men go into their graves when the earthly opportunity closes, good or evil, just or unjust, righteous or wicked, — as these two opposite characters are presented in Scripture, — they will come forth from their graves with the same character? How would you explain the instruction of our Lord in Matt. xxv. 31–46 as related to the same idea? Do not the words used, referring to various acts among the sick and needy, etc., naturally imply that these were acts done in the body and with earthly surroundings, and that the character thus formed determined the sentence at the final judgment?

One of the questions asked by one of our missionaries to the young men under his training in Japan is the following: "Does character at death determine the condition of the soul between death and the general judgment?" I should be glad to know how you would reply to this question as you regard the bearing of our Lord's instructions in the passages given above, upon the subject. It is the practical Scriptural side of the subject, as it would come up

often in Bible-class instruction, which I would be glad to have you briefly unfold. It may be asked in various ways, *e. g.*, when mention is made of the "resurrection of the just and of the unjust," is not the natural inference in harmony with the general teachings of the Scripture, that reference is made to two diverse classes of men on earth, who die and who rise from the dead unchanged in character — one "just," the other "unjust"? When allusion is made to those who "awake" from the sleep of death, "some to everlasting life and some to shame," is it not the natural interpretation that reference is made to two classes of persons different in character when they die or sleep in death, and possessed of the same different characters with different destinies when they awake?

My object in these inquiries, gathering about one serious practical subject, is, as you perceive, a practical one, to know how you would deal with inquirers as related to the interpretation of Scripture, particularly our Lord's instructions upon the subject. I do not doubt that you will be happy to reply to me, as far as your time allows, briefly in the same spirit in which I make the inquiry.

Yours most truly,

E. K. ALDEN.

MR. A. J. COVELL.

ANDOVER, MASS., Nov. 13, 1889.

Rev. E. K. Alden, Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIR, — Your letter of November 12 is received. I had hoped that you fully understood my position. In our interview, and in a *full and frank* statement in my last letter, I gave you my thought and feeling upon the questions you have presented. Upon one of the two passages to which you refer I gave my opinion in our interview. The same answer would apply to the other passage. Neither of them, to my mind, bears directly upon the question of the intermediate state of those who have not heard of Christ. While holding to the *possibility* of a *future* probation for those who have not heard of Christ, I would repudiate the idea of a *second* probation.

In dealing with inquirers, I should treat each case by itself. I can give no general answer. Circumstances, the character of the inquirer, etc., would make my method in each case distinct from that in all others.

I would not suppose that a "candid" heathen, coming to the Bible to learn what Christianity is, and to find out his own duty, would ask just the questions raised by you. If, however, the passages suggested to him inquiry, it would be in a more concrete form. It would be a question so often raised in heathendom when confronted by Christianity, how a universal religion is related to those to whom it was never made known. If the supposed inquirer should have drawn from the passages in question, or been taught by others to draw the so-called doctrine of the universal decisiveness of this life, he would probably be in perplexity and distress. It would be a question to him of the condition of those he had known, his relatives, ancestors, and countrymen. As a Christian missionary, I should need to minister to such a state of mind. You would not suppose such passages to be inconsistent with the hope that in some way He who tasted death for every man, and is judge of all "*because He is the Son of man,*" has a relation as Redeemer to all for whom He died.

The question you state as put by a missionary was asked, I believe, by one who has expressed a personal wish that men of the class to which I belong may come to Japan. I know of nothing in my explanation of Scripture which interferes with my coöperation with him and others with like views.

I trust that there may be no unnecessary delay in the presentation of my case to the Prudential Committee.

Sincerely yours,

A. J. COVELL.

[Postal Card.]

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.

1 SOMERSET ST., BOSTON, Nov. 18, 1889.

Yours was duly received. The matter will be brought, as you desire, as soon as possible to the P. C. I hope by the 26th inst. you shall receive immediate information.

E. K. A.

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.

CONGREGATIONAL HOUSE, 1 SOMERSET ST.,

BOSTON, Nov. 21, 1889.

MY DEAR MR. COVELL, — As your personal interview a few days ago with Secretary Smith and myself was interrupted by other callers, which we regretted, could you, without special inconvenience, call again to-morrow about two P. M., or between two and four (Friday)? I put it so soon because I am obliged to be out of town Saturday and Monday. Please reply by telegram at our expense. Of course we will meet your traveling expenses also.

Hoping you will be able thus to meet us, I remain,

Most truly,

E. K. ALDEN.

MR. A. J. COVELL.

ANDOVER, MASS., Nov. 23, 1889.

Rev. E. K. Alden, Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIR, — After leaving the Congregational House yesterday and thinking over our conversation, I concluded from your closing remarks that my case might be delayed in order that I might have an opportunity to change my views. Perhaps my views will change. At any rate, I shall always strive to entertain a hospitable feeling for new truth. I have not solved all the deep problems of God, but hope and expect that I shall see His ways more clearly ten years hence than now. But I have no reason to anticipate any change of view, on the matters we discussed, within the next few weeks or few months. If such a change took place so suddenly I should fear that it was not lasting. I may have, a few years hence, substantially the same view of eschatology that I now have, or I may have a different view; I cannot forecast my future views. My statements have been so full, both by letter and in our conversations, that I think there can be no misunderstanding as to my position. Whatever my views may be in the future, I should at least want to have the *liberty* of holding the same doctrines and hypotheses that I now hold. It is somewhat trying, too, to be kept in suspense. And so my desire is that the case be presented to the Prudential Committee *on its present basis*. If at all convenient may I not expect a decision by the Prudential Committee next Tuesday afternoon (November 26), or at the *very latest*, cannot the decision be made the following Tuesday (December 3)?

Sincerely yours,

A. J. COVELL.

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.
CONGREGATIONAL HOUSE, 1 SOMERSET ST.,
BOSTON, *November 23, 1889.*

MY DEAR MR. COVELL, — We were much interested both in your statements and in yourself in our pleasant interview yesterday afternoon. After you left it was suggested that in view of the fact that the subject under consideration is, as you state, one which you have not studied in regular course, and to which you are to give further thought as to the Scriptural teachings and practical bearings, it might be that you would prefer yourself to take a little time for this further inquiry before *your papers* were presented to our Committee. We do not ourselves propose this course, as you have previously requested that the application may be presented as soon as possible, with which request we shall cheerfully comply, unless you yourself should prefer to postpone for a short time with the hope of a little clearer view upon some points suggested in our interview. If you think otherwise, all right, and we will endeavor to arrange to present the case to the Committee probably December 3. Should you, however, yourself, on the whole, prefer to take a little more time for thought and Scriptural study upon the subject before action is taken here we heartily assent. Please reply in inclosed envelope, and oblige

Yours truly,

E. K. ALDEN.

MR. A. J. COVELL.

ANDOVER, MASS., *Nov. 25, 1889.*

Rev. E. K. Alden, Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIR, — Your favor of November 23 received.

If my application were withheld from Prudential Committee until I had studied questions of eschatology more thoroughly, I might feel a constant tendency to intellectual dishonesty. The circumstances would not be conducive to that poise of judgment which one should have in the search for truth. So I would urge that my application be presented to the committee as soon as possible. I hope the matter may be decided as soon as December 3.

Sincerely yours,

A. J. COVELL.

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.
CONGREGATIONAL HOUSE, 1 SOMERSET ST.,
BOSTON, *Nov. 26, 1889.*

MY DEAR MR. COVELL, — Your favors of 23d and 25th were duly received.

I have received a letter from the President of our Board, Dr. Storrs, requesting that your papers may not be presented to the Committee to-day, but postponed to the meeting of next week, Tuesday, December 3, when he hopes to be able to be present. He also desires to meet you personally upon the morning of that day at ten o'clock, at his hotel in this city, "The Brunswick," on Boylston Street, on the Back Bay, beyond Berkeley Street, and wishes me to arrange with you for such an interview. Will you indicate upon the inclosed postal by writing "Yes" if you will thus meet him, or naming another hour in the A. M. if more convenient for you, and mailing to me. We will, of course, meet your traveling expenses.

Yours truly,

E. K. ALDEN.

MR. A. J. COVELL.

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.
1 SOMERSET ST., BOSTON, Dec. 4, 1889.

MY DEAR MR. COVELL, — Will you be so kind as to send me the amount of your expenses in responding to the two invitations to visit Boston, that I may send you a check for the same?

Dr. Storrs and Mr. Blatchford reported to the Committee this morning the result of their personal interview with you, and final action upon the case was postponed until Tuesday, the 17th instant, when the President hopes to be able to be present at the meeting of the Committee.

Yours most truly,
E. K. ALDEN,
Clerk of Committee.

MR. A. J. COVELL.
(Envelope inclosed for reply.)

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.
CONGREGATIONAL HOUSE, 1 SOMERSET ST.,
BOSTON, Dec. 18, 1889.

Mr. A. J. Covell, Andover.

MY DEAR MR. COVELL, — The Prudential Committee considered the question of your immediate appointment fully and sympathetically at their meeting yesterday afternoon, and came to the conclusion, without dissenting vote, expressed in a minute, a copy of which I transmit to you with this note.

I need not assure you how heartily interested all the members of the Committee and all the executive officers are in yourself personally, and their earnest desire that the way may become clear during the coming months for the gratification of your own cherished desire to enter upon the great work abroad under the care of the American Board. Most happy shall we be to hear from you or confer with you at any time upon the important matters involved in your inquiries.

I remain, most truly yours,
E. K. ALDEN,
Clerk of Committee.

P. S. The minute referred to in the note upon the preceding page is delayed in its final preparation and copy, so that I fear I may not receive it and be able to send it to you by to-day's mail. I send you, therefore, the letter without the minute, which I will forward as soon as it is furnished me. Its purport is that the further consideration of the case be postponed until you have completed your present theological studies for the year, time being thus afforded for additional thought and inquiry, and the earnest hope being expressed that at that time the way may be clear for your appointment with the hearty unanimity of the Committee.

The minute referred to in this letter was forwarded to Mr. Covell by the next mail. It was also given to the religious press.

MINUTE ADOPTED BY THE PRUDENTIAL COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 17, 1889.

In conformity with the instructions of the Board, given after discussion at the annual meeting at Des Moines in 1886, and repeated a year later by an overwhelming majority at the annual meeting in Springfield, the Prudential Committee is under the weightiest obligation to carefully guard the Board from any committal to the doctrine of a probation after death, offering oppor-

tunities beyond the grave to attain by repentance eternal life. Nothing at all inconsistent with this was contained or implied in the more recent action of the Board at New York, approving, by a nearly unanimous vote, the letter of acceptance of the President as a practical basis of united action. In that letter, however, it is distinctly contemplated that cases may come before the Committee in which there is more or less doubt on the subject referred to, in the mind of the applicant, while still the theory repeatedly characterized by the Board as perverse and dangerous is not affirmatively maintained by him, either as being sustained by the Bible or as forming part of an accepted speculative scheme. In such cases the Committee is now particularly instructed, while exercising unabated caution against sanctioning a doctrine which the Board disallows, "to consider each case by itself, and, in the few instances likely to arise where there is any uncertainty on the subject, to form its judgment with kindness and candor as to the amount and the spiritual force of any tendency which may appear toward the opinion which it must not indorse." It is enjoined to exercise considerate care in discriminating between the want of an opinion and the presence of one which implies or favors the objectionable theory, and to have always a due regard to the probable influence of an earnest missionary zeal, and the educational force of missionary work pursued in a temper of loyalty to Christ, upon the formation of future opinion in one whose impressions are still tentative and unfixd.

In performing the critical and sometimes, no doubt, the difficult duty devolved upon it in connection with such occasional cases, the Committee of course is liable to err, but it hopes not to err on the side of rashness, or of any forgetfulness of its duty to the Board, nor, on the other hand, on the side of harshness or intemperate suspicion toward one who has not yet reached conclusions on the matter referred to, but whose mind is honestly set toward the truth, whose hold is firm on the Inspiration of the Bible, whose spirit is submissive and loyal toward Christ, and who is eagerly intent on preaching at once the Gospel of Atonement and of Regeneration. It will weigh with particular care the testimonials presented by such a candidate from experienced, prudent, and candid men, setting forth his general soundness of mind and conservative habits and tendencies of thought, his practical and devout Christian temper, and the proofs which he has given of a thorough consecration to the work of the Master; and it will seek to assure itself, by free and repeated personal conferences, in addition to what may sometimes be the less sufficient means of written communications, of his exact attitude of mind on the subject concerning which the Board has enjoined such unabated and particular caution. No one case will probably present altogether the same moral elements combined in another. No one may constitute a complete precedent for any other. In each case, separately considered, the Committee will use its best endeavors to ascertain the state of intermingled and incomplete thought and feeling with which it has to deal, and to deal with it sympathetically, in patience, and in hope, while taking no action to contravene or depart from the express and repeated instructions of the Board. It recognizes itself as absolutely inhibited, by the action at New York, no less than by that which had preceded, from giving any approval to the doctrine of a future probation.

In the case of Mr. A. J. Covell, whose application for appointment is now before it, the Committee finds itself earnestly desiring to open the way to him to preach the gospel among the unevangelized nations through this Board. This feeling is especially strong with its members, in view of the number and

just weight of the recommendations which he brings from those in whom they have affectionate confidence, who have known Mr. Covell long and well in the University and at the Seminary ; in view, also, of the unreserved and conscientious presentation of his opinions, made not only in his primary letter of October 28th, but in subsequent, repeated, personal conferences with secretaries and members of the Committee ; in view, also, of the strong impression of frank, manly, and Christian sincerity, and of earnest desire to know the truth and to proclaim it, which has been made by him on all who have met him in connection with his present application.

Some of the members of the Committee would probably be ready to appoint him at once, although regretting that his mind is not wholly clear on the important subject above referred to ; other members, however, doubt their right, as at present informed, to do this under the instructions of the Board ; while all agree in the strong desire and hope that if the appointment is to be made it may be made with entire unanimity. It appears from Mr. Covell's personal statement that in consequence of his removal from one institution to another, the courses in which are differently arranged, he has not yet studied the subject of eschatology, nor thoroughly considered some of the most important portions and truths of the Scriptures bearing on the subject of future probation. His present views are therefore essentially immature, and may take wholly different form and character in the months to come.

The Committee are by no means prepared to reject the application of Mr. Covell ; neither, on the other hand, are they now wholly satisfied to appoint him. They therefore postpone the further consideration of the case until he shall have completed his present seminary course. In this present conclusion, reached after full and candid consideration by all the members of the Committee, they cordially unite.

The Committee and the executive officers desire to assure Mr. Covell of their sincere and warm regard, and of the earnest desire felt by all of them that after his studies shall have been further pursued, as now indicated, the way may be open for them, without hesitation and without dissent, to grant him a commission.

A true copy from the minutes.

Attest : E. K. ALDEN,
Clerk of Committee.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS. SECOND SERIES.

VI. PERSIA.

It will be remembered that the field of missionary labor in this great kingdom of Mohammedan heretics has, as in Turkey, not mainly lain among the Moslems themselves. Although the Shiite Persians, divided from the orthodox Sunnites on a certain question of apostolic succession, and of the authority of tradition, are abhorred by the great bulk of Mohammedans as little better, or not at all better, than unbelievers, yet they are no less devoted to their creed than the Sunnites. Indeed, the Hon. S. G. W. Benjamin, late American Minister to Persia, declares that it would be certain death to a Christian of any rank whatever if he

were known to have entered a mosque, whereas in Turkey Christians may find admission to almost any mosque. Yet the quick, apprehensive, subtle, pantheizing Persian mind, which betrays its Aryan flexibility and inborn predisposition to identify good and evil, God and the world, religion and atheism, at every turn, above all through its poets and mystics, cannot possibly be at bottom so heavily intolerant as the dull Mongolian Turk, or the essentially unspeculative Arabian, who in his own home has never been touched by philosophy, and to whom Islam is a native growth. In Persia there are some signs that the policy of antichristian severity is breaking away. Yet thus far the opportunities of the American missionaries have lain almost wholly in the direction of reanimating evangelical life within the remains of the ancient Nestorian Church.

This church, the fruit of the rationalizing temper of the ancient school of Antioch, which, in opposition to the mysticism of Alexandria, emphasized the distinction between the divinity and the humanity of our Lord to such an extent as, in the judgment of the church at large, to destroy the unity of his personality, separated itself from the Catholic Church of the Empire after the Council of Ephesus, and was not reconciled to it by the subsequent victory of the Antiochian habit of thought at the Council of Chalcedon. The patriarchate of Alexandria was permanently alienated by the action of Chalcedon; but the patriarchate of Antioch had already been incurably alienated at Ephesus. Especially was this true of its Aramæan population, which in 489 definitively constituted the Syrian Church, pronouncing the patriarch Nestorius, and his seeming division of Christ's personality, orthodox, heartily maintaining the authority of the Councils of Nicæa and Constantinople, anathematizing equally the rejected and the accepted Council of Ephesus, and scorning the Council of Chalcedon as a worthless compromise. This church long maintained its high reputation for theological and Biblical learning.

Theological animosity and national feeling acted and reacted on each other to alienate the Syrian Church from the Empire. Persia, therefore, then in the pride of her recovery from Parthian domination, and intensely hostile to Rome, gladly received the disaffected communion within her bounds, where it long flourished and spread widely, until crushed by the reviving fanaticism of the Zoroastrian religion. When Zoroastrianism was crushed in its turn by the irruption of Islam, Nestorianism recovered itself in a measure, and till far on in the Middle Ages sent its missionaries throughout Tartary and China, where they met with brilliant successes. At last the overthrow of the friendly Mongols and the revival of Chinese nationality exterminated the Christian churches of the far East, and drove Nestorianism back into a languishing existence, a slow decline, in western Asia. In the sixteenth century Rome secured the adhesion of the larger half of the remaining fragment. These are now known as the Chaldæan Christians. There are about 90,000 of them. They seem, however, scarcely to differ at all, in rite, discipline, or even in doctrine, from those who have maintained their independence. The latter, numbering from 70,000 to 100,000, live in northwestern Persia, and the adjoining parts of Turkey. They have become very rude and ignorant, and of course can manifest very little Christian life. Their doctrine, however, is simple, and though devoted to their ancient church and creed, their circumstances have rendered them comparatively humble and teachable.

The American Board began a mission among them in 1833. The laws of Persia, however, were rigorous against the attempt to form a new church. Fortunately various bishops and priests were very friendly to evangelical teaching, so that there was the less occasion. As the missionaries, however, had the right to celebrate the communion for themselves, and to admit any one they would to participation in it, large numbers of the more enlightened, clustering around them, soon formed congregations which lacked nothing of church character but the name. Thus a church has grown up within the shell of the old church. The government, having been indifferent to the beginnings of this new formation, has continued its indifference as the organization has become more definite, until now it seems essentially complete. There may still be some slight film of distinction which the Persians judge to satisfy the law.

In 1871, the Mission, most of whose members were Presbyterians, was transferred by the American Board to the Presbyterian Board, which, after the happy reunion of the two Assemblies, so largely promoted by the efforts of Dr. Henry B. Smith, found itself in a condition to undertake a more vigorous foreign work. This is not, indeed, in Persia any longer absolutely confined to the Nestorians, for there is an American chapel in Teheran itself, and notwithstanding the penalty of death, Mohammedans have been baptized in Tabriz, and attend Christian worship without molestation. A country, one of whose favorite topics of discussion, as Mr. Benjamin attests, is whether it is to be swallowed by Christian England or Christian Russia, can hardly be as stern towards a Christian convert from Islam as in the days when a convert of Henry Martyn was publicly beheaded.

"The Church at Home and Abroad" for August, 1887, has the following:—

"The 'Echo de Perse,' a French paper published at Teheran, contains an article of which the following is the translation sent. . . . 'We learn with great pleasure that by imperial firman his majesty the *shahinshah* has authorized the American missionaries to establish at Teheran a hospital, where, without regard to religion or nationality, all seeking relief shall be received for treatment. Dr. Torrence, physician to the mission, has been appointed director of this establishment, which is destined to render great service to our cosmopolitan population. His imperial majesty, desiring at the same time to reward the zeal and devotion of Dr. Torrence, who for long years past has been gratuitously relieving so much suffering and distress, has named him Grand Officer of the Lion and Sun of Persia. Dr. Torrence's many friends will be gratified to hear of this high mark of distinction having been accorded him.'"

This decoration, it seems, is in grade the second of the order.

The magazine — whose unwieldy name will not accommodate itself to frequent repetition — says, October, 1887:—

"There are now 1,932 members of the churches in West Persia, as against 713 fifteen years ago. In the same time the churches have increased from nine to twenty. Following the week of prayer last January, a revival began and extended to seventeen congregations, until the number of inquirers was over 500. 'One interesting feature of this work of grace was that it was conducted wholly by the native pastors with little aid from the missionaries, and the especial blessing which accompanied the labors of the two native evangelists. Wherever they went the spirit of the Lord seemed present with peculiar power. Many of the converts were men in middle life and early manhood.'"

The fall previous there had been a revival in the college of such power that Dr. Shedd wrote of it:—

"There has been nothing like it since the memorable revivals of old times at Seir. Of the 79 in college, 70, including all in the second and highest college classes, are counted as followers of Christ."—"The mission has 94 village schools, with 2,050 scholars, a gain of 269 over the previous year. The whole number of scholars in all the schools was 2,266. Fifteen years ago it was only 873. In East Persia, where the mission is new, there are only three churches, Teheran, Hamadan, and Resht, and only 120 members. In the whole mission there are over 5,000 Sunday scholars. The press, in the year 1886-87, had issued 768,000 pages. The medical force, Drs. Cochran, Holmes, Torrence, and Alexander, with Mrs. and Miss Cochran and the assistants whom they have trained, have cared for nearly 15,000 patients, and are instructing some of the brightest of the native Christian youth in practical medicine. In the hospital, at Oroomiah Christ is daily preached through his word, both in the chapel and in the wards."

A young Koordish shepherd, who was under treatment, was greatly moved by the gospel, but could not, with his hot Koordish blood, understand how God could forgive without first taking revenge. The missionaries tried to explain, but to no purpose. At last, leaving theologies, and coming to the gospel, they read him Christ's parable of the Lost Sheep. At once, to the shepherd-heart, all became clear. He went home, and for months confessed Christ in word and life before his fierce Moslem kindred. He has since returned to solicit baptism. "In other parts of the mountains of Koordistan, difficult of access, missionaries and native helpers on recent tours have found old hospital patients giving them a hearty welcome, and ready to promote their mission of gospel light." Besides the new hospital under the care of Dr. Torrence at Teheran, "dispensaries and private practice and the instruction of private classes fill the hands of Dr. Holmes at Tabriz and Dr. Alexander at Hamadan full of work. In Tabriz Dr. Holmes has been appointed consulting physician to his royal highness the heir apparent of the throne of Persia, having won his confidence and gratitude in caring for his children during an outbreak of diphtheria. The prince summoned him to the palace, invested him with a robe of honor, and regards him with a measure of favor, enabling him to exert no small influence in behalf of the rights of the missionaries. Rev. Mr. Hawkes, of Hamadan, writes that 'almost a continuous stream of patients visit the dispensary.'"

The reverence of the Mohammedans for the Scriptures, the reading of which is enjoined by the Koran (though Mohammed ultimately became rather afraid of it), gives point to Dr. Döllinger's remark, that Islam is really a Christian heresy. Manichæism is always treated as such, and Islam, as Döllinger remarks, is doctrinally much nearer to Christianity than this early Perso-Babylonian system. Bible colporteurs, therefore, have a better accredited position in Persia than missionaries, though still a perilous one. The revived Christianity of the kingdom is beginning to work throughout the people in this form. One Nestorian colporteur named Shimoon, or Simon, "was a very poor boy, who gained his livelihood by tending the village herd. The missionary riding over the grazing lands of that village was pretty sure to have a visit with Shimoon. He had learned to read in the mission village school, and his New Testament was his constant companion as he tended his cattle. He usually had a question to ask upon some verse or passage. His memory was a remarkable one. It was almost impossible to mention a verse or sentence of which he could not tell the chapter and verse. *He was a living concordance.* He ultimately graduated from herding cattle, took a short

course of study, and entered the colporteur service. I believe he is in it still. In this capacity he has traveled much in Persia and in Russia, and has been the agent of circulating very many copies of God's word among all classes. His wonderful knowledge of the Scriptures has been a recommendation for him among aliens and enemies, greatly increasing his opportunities for good."

After mentioning a second successful Bible colporteur, Deacon Tomna, Mr. Labaree says:—

"The third man has been for a long time in the service of Dr. Bruce, of Ispahan, as one of the British and Foreign Bible Society's colporteurs. He has probably sold in Persia more copies of the Christian Scriptures, in whole or in part, than any man living. Rather short in stature, thick set and well-built, his head large and firmly placed upon his shoulders, his face full of resolution and his eye twinkling with good nature, you read at once the lion-hearted, enterprising, genial colporteur which his remarkable record proves him to be. Dr. Bruce seldom omits to express his profound obligation to the American missionaries for this noble Christian colleague. The annual reports of the British Bible Society contain large extracts from his most interesting journals. His travels take him long distances into the interior, away from all ordinary protection; now a month to the west; to Bagdad, to Bushire on the Persian Gulf, and even into the kingdom of Muscat, among wild and fanatical populations. But he knows no fear. He has suffered great indignities at the hands of mullahs and fanatics; has been bastinadoed; his life has been in danger; but he finds his way back to these places of greatest peril another time."

One thing that facilitates the diffusion of the Scriptures in Persia is the wide prevalence there of the sect of the Babees, one of those which bear witness to the underlying Aryan disposition of the race to emphasize the truth that a consummate revelation of God can only be given in an Incarnation of God, a personal union of God with humanity. This seems to be the import of the doctrine of the Twelve Imaums, as remodeled in Persia. The Persians, indeed, like their near kinsmen the Brahmins, push the doctrine of Incarnation into such an exaggeration that it defeats itself, and becomes a mere flux of docetic Avatars, each succeeding one going near to expunge all its predecessors. The Babees (or Babis) extend the number of Incarnations from twelve to nineteen, the latest of which is believed to have taken place in Ali Mohammed of Shiraz, who, after an unsuccessful revolt against the Shah, was executed in 1849. The still numerous sect has been reduced into an outward conformity to Islam, but by no means extinguished. It is notable by its dislike to despotism, its reverence for woman, and its consequent aversion to polygamy and divorce, attributes all of which bring it nearer to the gospel. Therefore its disposition to favor the circulation of the New Testament is easily explicable. This offers itself, and will not always offer itself in vain, as the mean of reconciliation between the Semitic apprehension that God is eternally distinct from his creation, an apprehension stiffened beyond all intellectual movement in the Koran, and the Aryan apprehension that God is not only congruous with his rational creation, but capable of entering into personal union with it. The Babis, a sect originating on Aryan soil, cannot fix themselves in the centre; the Koran, arising in the depths of the Semitic desert, has no command of the circumference.

The Presbyterian Church feels much aggrieved at the recent establishment of an Anglican mission among the Nestorians under the patron-

age of the Archbishop of Canterbury. If they regarded as in itself a grievance that such a mission should be established, they would be plainly in the wrong. The lowest estimate of the numbers of that section of the Nestorians that has not submitted to Rome is 70,000, while the Presbyterians appear to put it as high as 100,000. Allowing, then, that the American mission has five times as many adherents as communicants, it is established as the prevailing religious power over ten or twelve thousand Nestorians. There is no reason to suppose that it is going to Presbyterianize the Nestorian Church at large, any more than that the American missionaries in Turkey are going to Congregationalize the whole Armenian Church. The American Board has no expectation of the one, nor does it appear that the Presbyterian Board has of the other. A missionary of the American Board, Mr. W. N. Chambers, of Erzurum quoted by us last March, expresses in the "Missionary Herald" a willingness to hope that the result of our American work in Turkey may possibly be a fusion of Anglicanism and Gregorianism, a consummation which he believes might be an ineffable benefit to the Armenian Church. In like manner a really effective union between the Nestorian and the English Church, which should actually give Canterbury the power to infuse into this survival of a once glorious church (even though adjudged heretical) the strong currents of English spiritual life, would likewise be a blessing untold. That of which the Presbyterian Board complains is, not that an Anglican mission has been established, but that it has been established in a locality which necessarily makes its operations embarrassing and intrusive. It has settled itself in Oroomiah, in the immediate neighborhood of the American mission premises. Canon McLean and his associates are courteous English gentlemen, and are not slow to acknowledge the good work of their American brethren. But they wear a garb and follow usages so much like those of the Roman Catholics as to disquiet and confuse the Nestorians, especially as they deem it their duty to emphasize their own possession and what they esteem the Presbyterian defect of apostolic powers, a matter about which the natives do not seem ever to have troubled themselves, and about which the New Testament alone, assuredly, would never lead them to trouble themselves.

The "Church at Home and Abroad" remarks:—

"Had these missionaries in their zeal to reform this ancient church of heresies established themselves in the Koordish mountains, at one of the centres of ecclesiastical influence, as, for instance, near the Nestorian Patriarch himself, we could have made no valid objection. The field was open to them and calls loudly for missionary culture. Our missionaries have not had large success in it. But avoiding these strongholds of the church, they plant themselves on its outskirts. Passing by the more respectable and influential ecclesiastics, they ally themselves with two of the most debased and sordid bishops in the whole Nestorian episcopate. Moreover, they come and plant themselves by the very side of our missionaries and their long-established work, making antagonism to them practically the foremost article in their creed. They become the cause of strifes and collisions where peace and good feeling existed before. They are an encouragement to base and corrupt ecclesiastics to trample on privileges our congregations have enjoyed for many years. They open rival schools where educational institutions already abound. We could cite specific instances where their presence has developed just these evils, but we forbear."

So far, we must thoroughly sympathize with the Presbyterians. We should not like to make ourselves responsible that they are right in going

on to say: "Were their teaching of a character to reform men's lives and save their souls, we might be silent. But since it is supremely in the interest of an ecclesiasticism that only flatters the consciences of the wicked and depraved, we must utter our earnest protest."

Persia comes out in this little bit of description by Miss Bassett, of Teheran, as what it is, the land of aridity, always waiting to be turned into verdure, and always ready to lapse into aridity again:—

"Perhaps you know that owing to the buildings not being finished when our lease expired in April, there was nothing for us to do but to find some garden and move to it with our girls. This garden, which is called Sarossaob, is nearly nine miles from the city up the mountain side, and is sufficiently large to accommodate the three families, besides ourselves and our girls. It was quite cold when we moved up, but perfectly lovely; the fresh green grass and the trees were charming; then past our place rushed a mountain streamlet, which rippled and gurgled among the great rocks in its channel like a rollick-some child. Frequent showers fell, and the strangeness of it all was a delight to us. Day by day it became warmer and the streamlet dwindled and became smaller and smaller, until now, when we would like to have it to cool the heated air, it has vanished altogether, leaving only the sandy bed and great rocks to show us where it was. The regular school duties were carried on just as if we were in the city, and last week we finished up with examinations, to which the friends and relatives of the pupils were invited. Nearly sixty were present, and carpets were spread under the trees. The girls did very nicely and the friends were delighted. We were especially proud of the Bible classes. My little girls have been studying the Gospel of Luke during the winter and spring, and were able to answer all questions upon it and recite from memory large portions of it."

The Rev. Benjamin Labaree, confirming what has been said above as to the Shiite sect to which the Persians belong, adds that these Sheahs (as he writes the name) despise the Christians as of an unclean race, but that their hearts are big with resentment toward the Turks, who, as they charge, heap insults upon the family of the prophet, the legitimate succession of whose grandchildren, and of their father Ali, it appears they deny. Yet "as a schismatic offshoot from the regular Mohammedan faith, the Persian creed is extremely vulnerable. It is in the awkward position of accepting the Koran as collated and compiled by Mohammed's successor, Osman, whom it denounces as a base usurper. This is a weak joint in the armor of the Sheah apologist. The heresy in the Persian creed, moreover, furnishes a soil in which dissent and liberalism flourish."

Persian Mohammedanism, moreover, as Mr. Labaree goes on to remark, has not the advantage of that concentrated unity which it enjoys in Turkey, where the chief of the state is also, as Caliph, the chief of religion. In Persia the king has no religious authority. The chief pontiff of the Sheah creed does not even reside in Persia, but in Turkey, under the civil authority of his great Sunnee (or Soonee) rival. This of course leaves the Persian priesthood (which is more distinctly a priesthood than appears to exist in Turkey) less powerful than it would be if the Shah were himself at once Prince and Pontiff. He is less interested to maintain the sacerdotal prerogatives, which in some parts of Persia, notably in the ancient capital of Ispahan, are almost or quite disregarded. I have called the mullahs priests, although, even in Persia, it would probably be nearer the truth to regard them as a powerful corporation of theologians, a sort of Persian Sorbonne.

Mr. Labaree says further:—

"One cannot come into close relations with the Persian mind on religious subjects without being surprised to find how very extensively it is honey-combed with unbelief. There is the ancient sect of Soofees still existing and pervading all classes in church and state. The old name is largely discarded, but the new one, in which they boast, 'Arifha,' and which is nothing more than the Persian for 'Rationists,' better characterizes their religious methods and opinions. The Ali Illahees is another ancient creed. Its votaries count half a million, perhaps. They conceal their actual beliefs from the Mohammedans, to whom, from fear, they outwardly conform. In reality they are pagans, without book or written creed; but Ali and Christ, with other mythical saints, they regard as incarnations of divinity. They are particularly accessible to the Christians. The Babee secret faith is of quite recent origin. The sect numbers probably three or four hundred thousand. Persecuted by the government for its supposed political tendencies, many of its adherents have suffered martyrdom in their devotion to an absurd creed. They are on very free and friendly terms with Christian missionaries, preachers, and col-porteurs.

"Other minor sects might be enumerated which reveal the wide extent of secret unbelief among the Persians. Even the Mohammedan priests are largely tinctured with it. Mr. Benjamin, late United States Minister at Teheran, describes some of these sects in his valuable book on Persia, and says: 'They prove the Persians to be in a developing and transitional rather than a dormant state, and preparing in due time to receive impressions of the truth in a nobler form than any with which they are now familiar.' It is true the penalty of death for apostasy from Islam remains in force. The spirit of persecution unto death is still rife. There are times of excitement when the Christian population feels as if it were treading upon a slumbering volcano, and yet we believe that a positive degeneracy and disintegration of faith in Islam is in process throughout the land. The barriers to Christianity are subsiding. It is time for the gospel of Christ to push itself forward upon the attention of the Persian religious mind."

Mr. Labaree passes on to a very interesting reflection:—

"It is a fact which the devout believer in divine Providence ruling in the affairs of nations must ponder with deep interest, that of all the foreign kingdoms mentioned in connection with God's 'chosen people' in the sacred records, Persia alone retains an independent existence to the present time. All those nations which set themselves in opposition to the Jews and oppressed them have been blotted out. Persia, the one kingdom of which alone it is recorded that she was an aid and protection to the chosen nation, still has a name and a place among the sovereignties of the world. Is this a mere accident? There are no accidents in God's government of men or nations. We must believe there is a divine purpose in it. Is it not ground for expecting gracious blessings upon that nation in the future? Is it not also a reason for the church's following closely here in the footsteps of the divine Leader?

"Again, since Persia became Mohammedan and so far closed to Christian truth, God has opened special ways of access to the people. His providence has, in the turmoil of the centuries, planted here and there through the land fragments of Christian churches. To relight in these the candlestick of the Spirit's presence, long since extinct, has been an essential step toward illuminating the surrounding mass of Mohammedan darkness. Moslem rule has permitted such missionary effort. . . . Already much has been accomplished. Altogether a new type of Christianity has been set up in the land. Princes and governors, mullahs and laymen, loudly proclaim the higher order of Christian character which now confronts them, inspiring their respect and confidence."

Mr. Labaree remarks, in addition, that a generation ago the Persian Christians were so filled with animosity towards the Moslem, alien in

race as well as religion, that (like the Welsh when solicited by the Romans and the Irish to coöperate for the conversion of the English), they were ill-disposed to any missionary effort among them.

"Now there is great readiness to engage in such labor, and God has some chosen enthusiastic spirits engaged in it.

"Further evidence of God's gracious purposes toward this land are traceable in the striking providences with which He has shielded missionary work in Persia since its establishment. The times of Nehemiah and Esther furnish no more signal instances of his protecting care over his servants than have been experienced by Christian missionaries in this empire during the last fifty years. Many have been the plots of Satan to put the missionaries out of the country or to hedge in their work. They have one and all met with conspicuous failure. One determined foe, breathing out threats of destruction when he should return from an urgent military expedition, came back a corpse, having fallen by the hand of an assassin. Another official, under detailed instructions to root us out if possible, began wilily a system of persecutions against the mission, but by his high-handed conduct in other directions provoked the Russian government to demand his removal. In the dark days that followed the Koordish war of 1880, when our enemies held their heads high and boasted of our speedy expulsion, a telegram from the English government, at the request of Secretary Evarts at Washington, warned the Persian authorities amply to protect us. Then were the Sanballats and Tobiahs, who had sought our destruction, 'much cast down in their own eyes; for they perceived that this work was wrought of our God.' It has come to be a common belief among Persians, especially in Oroomiah, that no weapon formed against this cause will prosper. God favors it. His sovereign providence protects it. To the missionaries these providences are but the pillar of cloud and fire showing the way in which we are to follow on."

Mr. Labaree remarks that the increasing circulation of the Scriptures has rendered the Mullahs uneasy, and induced attempts at restriction, which, however, he is convinced will amount to little, and soon be forgotten. The current of interest is too deep to be checked by mandates which have the additional disadvantage of being in contravention of the Koran.

This profoundly interesting letter of Mr. Labaree makes distinctly, and for the most of us suddenly, evident, that the American Mission, which for so many years was cooped up in a corner of northwestern Persia, and was confined in its labor to the reanimation of life in one little church of 100,000, has now found opportunity and courage to "expect great things from God, and attempt great things for God," throughout the whole nation. Mr. Labaree remarks, as to the conversions from among the Mohammedans:—

"The first fruits of redeemed Moslems have been gathered into the church. The company of such is yet small. Some of these may be only imitations of the real. But the experience of some of these converts, to human view, has been deep and thorough. Their reception of Christ not as a teacher and leader alone, but as a personal friend and spiritual possession, has been beautiful to witness. Christ formed in them is recorded in aspect of countenance and tone of voice. Their sensitiveness to sin, their thirst for deeper spiritual instruction, their efforts to lead others to Christ, their apprehension of the privilege of prayer, their new conception of domestic duties and joys, their patience under trial, all bear rich testimony to their new birth into the kingdom of God. . . .

"While it has been thought best that too much publicity should not be given to their change of faith, so inflammable is the Persian populace, yet these converts are marked men in the community. Their names are bandied about as

renegades. They have had to endure much bitter treatment from their nearest friends. Some have been beaten and in sharp peril of their lives. They have gone in and out in momentary fear of the assassin's dagger. Yet they hold on, 'rejoicing that they are counted worthy to suffer shame for his name.' And they are quietly winning others also to 'this way.'

"Can we mistake these leadings of divine Providence in regard to this Mohammedan population in Persia? Are not the facts adduced voices from heaven to the church of Christ to go forward? We have not space to dwell on the sad, hopeless condition of these souls without the gospel of Christ. It is pitiable to see them groping, stumbling after entrance into their sensual paradise through senseless rites. It is deeply moving to an awakened Christian soul to note the nobler but fruitless efforts of some to cast off the yoke of sin, without a saving knowledge of the only Redeemer. It is a thrilling joy to see how precious is this Redeemer to such as have renounced the 'false prophet' to be saved by Him 'without money and without price.' Shall we not with a mightier faith, more fervent prayer and reliance on God, and a loftier courage, push forward to the evangelization of these benighted millions? The problem is a difficult one, but not insurmountable. The resources at the command of the church for its solution are simply infinite."

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

THE opening of Mansfield College, Oxford, to which sympathetic and worthy reference was made in the editorial of this "Review" for October last, was celebrated with high ceremony when the Oxford term commenced in the middle of October. The countenance given on the occasion by heads of colleges and eminent Church of England divines augurs well for the position which Mansfield College should hold towards the university, and, indeed, for the future of religion in England. When what might have been regarded as an invasion of the ground of the Anglican Church by Free Churchmen becomes the opportunity for mutual congratulations between Churchmen and Nonconformists, what may we not hope for the future of Christian union in England? The opening sermon by Dr. R. W. Dale, of Birmingham, was a fine vindication of theological freedom, the need of intellectual integrity in theologians, and the close connection between the theology and the life and progress of a people.

But the opening of Mansfield College had hardly been accomplished when all those who sympathized with its aim and knew anything of its working were shocked to hear of the death of Dr. Edwin Hatch, whose teaching formed part of the curriculum of the Mansfield College students. Dr. Hatch had passed a remarkably full and busy life, six years of which had been spent in America, teaching classics in a college at Toronto. Although he was only Reader of Ecclesiastical History, not Professor, in the University of Oxford, he was, perhaps, the most remarkable theologian of his day in the Church of England; not, indeed, the most powerful in the wide-reaching effects of his teaching, but certainly the most famous if measured by the notoriety and discussion of his views at home and by the continental reputation which his works gained for him abroad. His Bampton Lectures on the Organization of the Early Christian Church remain his great work, though his articles in the

dictionaries of Christian Antiquities and Christian Biography represent equal learning and perhaps greater labor. Dr. Hatch was preparing for the press at the time of his death his Hibbert Lectures on the Influence of Hellenic Culture on Christian Doctrine, and his Concordance to the Septuagint, both works of the very first importance, which it is to be hoped will soon appear: they will form his most worthy memorial. He was only fifty-one years of age, and his death was hardly a surprise to those who knew what a severe strain had been placed for years by a number of arduous duties upon a constitution far from robust.

Nor is Dr. Hatch the only man whose loss the liberal Evangelicals of England are now deploring. Two other prominent and able workers have lately been taken away, both men of quite unique usefulness, and both men whose lives have been prematurely closed, perhaps owing to the over-work to which the untiring energy of each impelled him. William G. Elmslie, the Hebrew professor at the London Presbyterian College, was known to a large number from his frequent ministrations at the Sunday services of many Congregationalist and Baptist as well as Presbyterian churches in London, and as a most assiduous writer in several papers and reviews. Professor Elmslie has a wonderfully subtle power of moral and spiritual analysis, which gave to his preaching a peculiar power and attractiveness. Dr. Macfadyen, the minister of a very large church in Manchester, had shown in a quite extraordinary degree the success which a methodically ministered and highly organized church can attain in ministering to the social, educational, and other wants of the people, while continuing to be a centre of the most earnest religious life. Though not a great preacher, Dr. Macfadyen was a model to all preachers, in that no one was showing so well as he that the Christian ministry is a work, not only of exhortation, but of spending and being spent in the service of man.

The great strike of Dockers in the East End of London has proved to be only part of a large movement, which has affected almost all trades and employments, a movement among laborers to combine in favor of shorter hours and larger pay. An outward sign of this may be seen in any daily paper, which is almost sure to contain a column, headed *Labor Movements*, in which one reads accounts of meetings of workmen, conferences between employers and employed, strikes, concessions of higher wages or new tariffs, or the formation of new trades unions. The present "boom" in our trade and manufactures enables the workers in most cases to gain their demands, as the masters can better afford to give what is asked than suffer the losses of delay or idleness. At the same time these social movements have a political aspect, and certain advanced politicians are agitating for an eight hours' bill, to be binding on all trades. The Liberal party are at the present moment being asked to declare in favor of an eight hours day for all Government Offices and works, but it is hardly likely that such a proposal will become a legislative enactment. Perhaps more practicable and beneficial would be a change in the system of government contracts to prevent the sub-letting of contracts, which causes the work to be done by inferior and ill-paid workers. The popular power behind elected municipal and administrative bodies is making itself felt wholesomely and moderately in demanding that all contracts entered into by public bodies shall contain

clauses insuring proper wages for employees, and guarding against the sub-letting of work done under contracts. This policy, which has been adopted by some County and Town Councils, might well be extended to all public works. It would probably insure better quality of work and materials, and would be a financial saving in the long run, though, of course, it has been urged that work for which the public has to pay should be done at as small an expenditure of public money as possible.

In the world of literature there is not much to record. The publishing season, now in full swing, has not yet produced any very remarkable books. The talk of the literary men has been largely about the great publishing firms, which have been reorganized as joint stock companies. Hitherto the only eminent publishing firm not under private management has been that of "Cassell and Company, Limited;" this company has managed a very lucrative business, and the public owes much to the excellence of its large editions of standard works and to its illustrated books. Recently, the house of Kegan Paul and Company, publishers of high-class literature, has been turned into a public company, amalgamating with itself at the same time two other high class publishing-houses; and the firm of Routledge, publishers especially well known for their cheap editions and popular "libraries," has followed in the same direction. But it may be doubted whether these changes will in any case have any serious effect on the literature or on the readers of the country.

The beginning of the year 1890 is to see a new high-class weekly newspaper in London, which is to be called "The Speaker." It will take as its model "The Nation" of New York, and will appeal especially to the educated classes. Its editor is Mr. Wemyss Reid, a journalist and author of high ability and independent character. Its politics will be Liberal, and it will make a special feature of literary articles and reviews, and also of its foreign correspondence: it has procured leading men as correspondents in all the foreign capitals, and will keep its readers acquainted with the literary, scientific, and political movements in other lands.

Joseph King.

HAMPSTEAD, LONDON.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE HARMONIZED AND ITS RATIONALITY VINDICATED. By JOHN STEINFORT KEDNEY, D. D., Professor of Divinity in the Seabury (Episcopal) Divinity School, Faribault, Minnesota, author of "The Beautiful and Sublime," "Hegel's *Æsthetics*," etc. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

This book is a remarkable specimen of mental athleticism. It is a theological discussion in which the appeal is made directly to the reason. Its test for every proposition is harmony with universal truth. Its interpretation of Sacred Scripture is not solely, or even mainly, the result of philological criticism. The right reason of man is honored, equally with the inspired words, as containing, to quote the language of the Andover Seminary creed, "an infallible revelation made by God in his works of creation, providence, and redemption." It is claimed that when the ex-

act truth is posited, these two will be found coinciding in the formulation. When this coincidence does not appear, it is certain that the exact truth has not been found.

Professor Kedney says, "The present author proposes so to treat dogmatic results as to show their harmony with all other known truth." He admits that there is such a science as *dogmatic* theology, since there is a verbal revelation made by divine authority in the form of personal testimony. But while the fact of such a dogmatic revelation may be established "by the scrutiny of criticism and the laws of testimony," its best evidence is that its contents are seen *noumenally* on *a priori* grounds, to be both possible and probable. "The explication of these three grounds for holding true constitutes the science of apologetics." The authority of a formula in inspired words, the testimony of right reason, and the coherence of every part of the system so obtained with the whole of truth are the three grounds of certitude in the case.

The author states that he thought of naming his book "Christian Doctrine viewed from the Speculative Standpoint." Another title suggested was "The Logic of Christianity." The title chosen indicates with equal clearness the author's intention to unfold "a system of doctrine in harmony with all other known truth, and having no necessary conflict with any other certain science."

That the science of method, which is substantially the science of cognition, has as yet, even in the hands of the best thinkers, reached such a comprehensiveness and definiteness that a result of absolute harmony can be secured is not claimed by the author. Even though a good degree of success in avoiding contradictions should be demanded of theology, it should not be expected that it would present all the positive correspondences of a perfect science with other perfect sciences. The imperfections of the sciences with which theology is to be brought into harmony have left unexplored regions between their lines of discovery and the boundaries of a science belonging to another sphere of thought. Dr. Kedney therefore holds to the progressiveness of theology, as other sciences shall furnish it with new material, and as more perfect knowledge on both sides shall make possible more perfect statements. But in all this process of adjustment harmony is the unfailing test by which the presence of truth is to be known in every proposition. While discord, whether it appear in the form of contradictions in terms, or absurdities in logic, or impossibilities in the nature of things, is the sure indication of error.

The method here proposed, though not novel, has hardly ever before been so boldly and lucidly avowed. As to Professor Kedney's success in executing the plan thus satisfactorily laid down, I should speak precisely and in detail if I speak at all. Forbidden by the limits of this notice to indulge in a minute criticism, I will only express the opinion that the execution accords with the promise of the title and introduction. Thinking men will find refreshment and stimulation on every page. The author's method is that of the eagle. He sweeps down upon every special doctrine from the regions of general truth. His aim, like the eagle's, is determined by broad perspectives. He neither nibbles his way through grammars and dictionaries, nor does he creep up stealthily to a doctrine through the underbrush of creeds and catechisms. He may be depended on to come down from the skies upon his quarry with a majestic swoop and balanced wings. His interpretations of Scripture are made in the

same style. I do not remember a single quotation of a proof-text, after the manner of citing precedents in the courts, although a dissertation in the appendix concerning the descent of Christ into Hades shows critical ability of a high order. His method is first to find the starting-point of the revelation in the system of universal truth. He then seeks to follow in the line chosen by the revealing Spirit as the revelation is brought and laid, in the forms of human speech, among the thoughts of men. His principle is that the relations and design of a revelation are even a surer guide in its interpretation than the verbal form of it.

A brief notice of the method of this profound and robust treatise is all that present limits will allow. Enough has been said to induce those to receive it to whom it is sent.

John Putnam Gulliver.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD ; or Christ's teaching according to the synoptic Gospels.

By A. B. BRUCE, D. D. New York: Scribner & Welford.

Dr. Bruce is well known as a broad-minded scholar, a leader in the theological advance in the Free Church of Scotland. Students are familiar with his valuable works on the Training of the Twelve, the Parables, and the Miracles of the Gospels. "The Kingdom of God" aims to present the theology of Jesus according to the three synoptic Gospels. This volume is the first of a group of four. The second is to give the theology of the Pauline epistles under the head of "the Righteousness of God." The third will give the theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews under the title of "Free Access to God." The fourth is the theology of John, which is to bear the title "Eternal Life." We miss the theology of Peter and James. This classification is quite different from that usually given in works on the theology of the New Testament. It is a fresh presentation of the subject that will call renewed attention to its study.

Dr. Bruce briefly sketches his view of the higher criticism of the Gospels. He expresses his agreement with the results of recent criticism, that the two writings, the Mark and Matthew of Papias, are the chief sources of the three synoptic Gospels, the former being the basis of the canonical Mark, the latter the basis of the canonical Matthew; "the one (Matthew) being predominantly a collection of sayings, the other (Mark) chiefly a collection of narratives." He thinks that the comparative originality of Matthew's report of the sayings is established, and endeavors to account for Luke's variations under the three heads, "modifications, omissions, and additions."

Dr. Bruce says that "The third evangelist, having supreme regard to the religious edification of his readers, omitted matter which appeared comparatively useless, unprofitable, or liable to be misunderstood, to make room for matter tending to exhibit Christ in the fullness of his grace as the friend of sinners, publicans, Samaritans, and even Gentiles."

Dr. Bruce finds that the leading idea of the theology of Jesus, according to these synoptists, was the kingdom of God. Jesus's idea of the kingdom was "a kingdom of grace in order to be a kingdom of holiness." In the second chapter Christ's attitude to the Mosaic law is considered, with the result that "His way was not that of reform, but of regeneration, not of judgment but of mercy, not of impatience and intolerance and rupture, but of quiet, silent influence, leading slowly but

surely to the new creation, bringing it in noiselessly, gradually, like the dawn of day." The third chapter considers the conditions of entrance into the kingdom, and it is said that "Reciprocity is the sole requirement. External conditions can have no place in reference to the Highest Good. Existing restrictions are only economical and temporary, and a sign that the era of spiritual reality is not yet come."

Chapters now follow on the doctrine of God and the doctrine of man that are full of fresh suggestions and thoughts for the times. "His doctrine of Divine Fatherhood did come from the heart; it was as far as possible from being the dry scientific utterance of a scholastic theologian, and scholastic theology has shown its consciousness of the fact by treating the doctrine with neglect." "Christ's way of speaking concerning human depravity was in important respects unlike that of scholastic theology. The way of this theology is to take all Bible terms as used with scientific strictness, and thereon to build the edifice of dogma; forgetful that the Bible to a large extent is literature, not dogma, and that its words are fluid and poetic, not forced and prosaic." "I am even disposed to think that a great and steadily increasing portion of the moral worth of society lies outside the church, separated from it, not by godlessness, but rather by exceptionally intense moral earnestness. Many, in fact, have left the church in order to be Christians." These are pregnant thoughts for us all.

The Messianic idea of Jesus is discussed in several chapters. Dr. Bruce thinks that the Messianic consciousness of Jesus had its origin in the "charism of love." "The Messianic manhood was associated with the spirit of self-sacrifice" and "Messiahship appeared not as an honour, but as a service." "The title Son of Man expressed the Messianic consciousness of Jesus in three distinct directions. It announced a Messiah appointed to suffer, richly endowed with human sympathy, and destined to pass through suffering to glory." He admits that "there are no texts in the synoptical Gospels in which divine sonship in a metaphysical sense is ascribed to Jesus in a perfectly clear, indisputable manner."

The righteousness of the kingdom is carefully considered in two chapters. Then the significance of the death of Jesus prepares the way for a further unfolding of his Messianic idea of his kingdom and of his second advent. In connection with the death of Jesus, Dr. Bruce makes the profound remark, "Christ's sacrifice is Himself. Here the virtue lies not in the blood, though that is formally mentioned, but in the offering of a perfect will through the eternal spirit of holy love. In this offering God can take pleasure, not because of the pain and the blood-shedding, but in spite of these. . . . We are accepted in the Beloved, the Messianic King and His subjects being an organic unity in God's sight."

Dr. Bruce's discussion of the kingdom and the church is full of seeds of thought. "Lacking Christianity, an ecclesiastical society, whether acknowledging Peter's primacy or repudiating it, is a community against which the gates of hell shall prevail, nay, have already prevailed." "The identity of church and kingdom is not absolute, but relative only. . . . the kingdom is the larger category. It embraces all who, by the key of a true knowledge of the historical Christ, are admitted within its portals; but also many more, the children of the Father in every land, who have unconsciously loved the Christ in the person of His representatives, the poor, the suffering, the sorrowful. For such no apostle or

church officer opens the door; the Son of Man Himself admits them into the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world." The difficulties of the Parousia are carefully discussed. Dr. Bruce seems to agree with many recent scholars in recognizing three distinct comings: (1) an *apocalyptic* at the end of the world; (2) a *historical*, as in the destruction of Jerusalem; and (3) a *dynamic* in the hearts of believers. "The three senses are all intelligible and important, and it is *a priori* perfectly credible that they were all present to the mind of Jesus. Such a free plastic manner of conceiving the Parousia is quite in accordance with His ideal poetic habit of thought."

As to the questions that arise respecting the condition of men after death, Dr. Bruce says: "Whether the end for the individual be the hour of death, or whether development of character may go on beyond that crisis is a question for the determination of which few materials are to be found in the Gospels." . . . "The doctrine of Christ appears to be that final, eternal damnation awaits those, and those only, who have become diabolized through moral perversity and inhuman selfishness."

This interesting book concludes with a chapter on the Christianity of Christ, in which he truly says that "the ecclesiastical Christ is to a large extent not the Christ of the Gospels, but a creation of scholastic theology. . . . Men are not permitted to see Jesus with open face, but only through the thick veil of a dogmatic system." He looks forward to a better age of the world in which Christ and his theology will be much better known.

With this work of Dr. Bruce I am in entire sympathy, taking it as a whole. I think that he makes too much of the kingdom of God as the organic principle of the theology of Jesus, and that he does not sufficiently distinguish the difference of type in the synoptic Gospels themselves. He does not give sufficient attention to the underlying influence of the Messianic ideas of the Old Testament. But we thank the author for a book that breathes the spirit of Jesus Christ, and that comes to us with a fresh message from the Gospels themselves.

C. A. Briggs.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Religionsphilosophie, von Dr. L. W. E. Rauwenhoff, weil. Professor in Leiden. Uebersetzt und herausgegeben von Lic. Dr. J. R. Hanne. Pp. xv, 607. Braunschweig: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn. Mrk. 12. — The few words which we are able to give to this important work must be commendatory. Already O. Pfleiderer and Lipsius have expressed a high appreciation of its merits in its original language. By an able translation and a judicious condensation the work is now given to a larger circle of readers. Those who have studied the excellent work of Pfleiderer should now attend to that of Rauwenhoff, who from his different standpoint becomes in an important respect a critic and commentator. There are many negatives in the work. For instance, the author maintains that in the universal consciousness of duty we do not have the intuitive knowledge of a Holy Omnipotence, but simply the postulate of a moral government. But, as has been remarked by Dr. Van Manen, in spite of

the many negatives, his philosophy of religion is a strong apology for religious faith against the present day naturalism. In constructing his philosophy of religion, the author puts more stress on the side of the history of religion than on the dogmatic, and succeeds in avoiding this confusion. We will indicate briefly the scope and method of the work. The first main division, pp. 21-159, treats of the origin and development of religion and religious faith, giving special attention to the factors and forms of development. The chief motive power is regarded as the ethical, but it is very difficult to frame any law of its activity. Tiele's laws, though the best yet furnished, are not quite satisfactory. The psychological forms are the intellectual, the mystical, and the moral. These show certain functional differences in the constitution of the human soul. The theological forms, according to Theistic concepts, are polytheism, pantheism, and monotheism. The beginnings of faith were henotheistic. In the second part, which treats of the character and law, religion and faith, pp. 161-333, Pfleiderer's objective method is set aside and Belief is interrogated for what it postulates. Here are considered the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of religion, the clearing of which shows religious belief as a postulate of moral consciousness, and faith in a moral government the essence of religious belief. Refuge is taken in teleology, which is found to be an impregnable fortress. From this stronghold, the author sweeps the field of all manner of objections and objectors to *causa finalis*. The manifestation of religion and belief is the leading thought of the third and final section. Here are discussed the leading answers to the questions, What is faith or religious belief, and What is man's relation to God? This part of the work shows more critical speculation, and draws into view the more prominent writers on the philosophy of religion. It also presents at length the concept of faith as a result of poetic fantasy. The expression of religious belief in worship and in the religious community depends largely on æsthetical considerations. The desideratum is a pure moral idealism. We notice now and then reflections that are strictly local with the author, as when he remarks: "Die Kirche hat ausgedient."

Das Buch von der Erkenntniss der Wahrheit oder der Ursache aller Ursachen. Nach den syrischen Handschriften zu Berlin, Rom, Paris, und Oxford, herausgegeben von C. Kayser, Lic. d. Theol. Pp. vi, 271. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung. Mrk. 25. *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur.* vi. Band. Heft 2. *Der Paulinismus des Irenæus.* Von Lic. Dr. Johannes Werner. Pp. iv, 218. Leipzig: J. C. Henrich'sche Buchhandlung. Mrk. 7. — The text of the first volume is based upon a MS. of the Schaus collection in the Royal Library in Berlin. This MS. was probably the work of a Nestorian in the seventeenth century, and was made from an old copy belonging to the Church of the Holy Shamuni, mother of the Maccabees, at Ashike, a village northeast from Mosul. Dr. Kayser's recension is a magnificent folio with excellent text and broad margins. He supposes the MSS. at Rome, Paris, and Oxford to have been made from the same originals. Dr. Werner shows the relation of Irenæus to the letters and theology of Paul. In his polemic against heresy Irenæus makes frequent citations from the letters of Paul, and supports himself upon the authority of the Apostle. His theology also is full of Pauline expressions, and its contents are vitalized by the Pauline spirit. These facts are of great importance in the history of the Canon and of Theology,

inasmuch as Irenæus was the first church writer who asserted the canonicity of Paul's letters. What is the nature of the authority which is attributed to Paul and his writings, and what are the thoughts dwelt upon; how are they interpreted, and for what purposes are they used? — these are questions, among many others, which Dr. Werner attempts to answer. The results which are obtained are not those which seem to be suggested by a superficial view of the writings of Irenæus. He quoted Paul, he appeals to Paul, he bears some of the marks of Paul, but he is not Pauline. Irenæus was not a speculative or systematic character, but simply a practical churchman. He lived in a stormy time. He looked for unity and peace. He would win peace with God through peace with the world. His was not the spirit of Paul. "His objective point was not Golgotha, but Rome." The work is done in two parts, the historical and the dogmatic. In the former is introduced a valuable excursus on the supposed genesis of the canonization of the Pauline epistles. We regard the work as one of the most excellent in an invaluable series of studies.

Fr. Kreyssigs Vorlesungen über Goethe's Faust, Zweite Auflage. Neu herausgegeben von Franz Kern. Pp. 271. Berlin: Nicolaische Verlags-Buchhandlung (R. Stricker). Mrk. 4. — Students of Goethe will welcome a new edition of these lectures, which have been too long out of the market. The special object of the lectures is to show the inner unity of Goethe's Faust by following step by step its development. The first lecture considers questions relating to the origin of the Faust. The second, third, and fourth lectures are given to the first part, while in the fifth and sixth chapters the five acts of the second part are considered. The editor has brought the work to the present time by some emendations of the text and by twenty pages of notes. The publishers have given us a neat and well-made volume.

Die Kant-Herbartsche Ethik. Kritische Studie, von F. W. D. Krause. Pp. iv, 158. Gotha: E. F. Thienemanns Hofbuchhandlung. Mrk. 3. — We are told that Herbart based his doctrine of education upon ethics and psychology; that his system of ethics, though characteristically his own, is bolstered by Kantian foundations, and that Kant, anticipated by many, particularly by the Stoics, was really "the Columbus" of philosophical ethics. A short sketch prepares the way to a consideration of Kant's ethics and an estimate of them in the light of Herbartian views. The most instructive part of the author's work, pp. 53-129, is his exposition and criticism of Herbart's ethics, and his view of Herbart as a critic of Kant and a founder of a new *Ethik*. The last chapter is an effort to find a new answer to the question: "What is a good will?" The author agrees with Kant and Herbart that a good will is in itself the sole basis of ethics, and holds that the only possible advance for ethics lies in a satisfactory answer to the above question. An effort is made to show that the good will must be free and rational, and that the free and rational will is in itself good, and constitutes not only the basis of ethics, but also of education and religion. The study is of a high order in point of clearness and analysis.

Idealismus, von Prof. Dr. Chr. Muff. Pp. vi, 182. Halle: Richards Mühlmann's Verlagshandlung (Max Grosse). Mrk. 3. — Idealism is as old as human kind, but the substantive "Ideal" seems to have been the invention of the Jesuit Lana in the seventeenth century. The term was taken up by the German Aufklärung of the eighteenth century and made

the shifting centre of a philosophy already in existence through Leibnitz and Berkeley. Realism and idealism are the two motive powers in every spiritual process. There is a natural association of the two forces. Eliminate the one and we have fantasy; eliminate the other and materialism is the result. "Men should be neither fantastic nor materialistic, but real idealists, idealists with real grounds, realists with ideal aims." The first chapter is a general exposition of the idea of idealism. The second chapter shows the relations of idealism to religion, science, life, and art. Dr. Muff has given a broad, scholarly, historical view of this phase of philosophy.

Einleitung in das Alte Testament, von Eduard Riehm, weil. Professor der Theologie zu Halle. Bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Dr. Alexander Brandt. Erster Teil: Die Thorah und die vorderen Propheten. Pp. vii, 480. Halle: Verlag von Eugen Strien. Mrk. 9. — This introduction, which excited interest in the university, and was intended for publication, is now being presented in its completeness under the able management of Dr. Brandt. The most distinguishing feature of the work is its thoroughness in establishing critical results. In accomplishing this, the older and more current views, as well as the more recent hypotheses, are taken into account, separated, weighed, and estimated. We observe the process, we behold the results. The prevailing view seems to be that all Scripture is Theanthropic, the divine and human elements are blended. In this sense the Old Testament is Christocentric. The character of the Bible as a whole is Theanthropic. The present volume is chiefly concerned with the Pentateuchal question. After the introduction the Thorah is made the subject of an elaborate investigation, pp. 67–366. The second chapter of this division, which speaks of the foundations of a critical investigation of the origin of the Pentateuch, will illustrate the method of inquiry. Here we have examined: the witness of the Pentateuch to its authorship, traces of the Mosaic period in the Pentateuch, traces of the post-Mosaic composition of the Pentateuch, and the evidences furnished by different parts of the Pentateuch for its early existence. The special treatment of the origin of the Pentateuch is prefaced by a valuable historical view of the various opinions that have been held from Ptolemaeus in the second century to our own time. Pentateuchal laws and history are discussed in order, and in a fourth chapter the results are viewed under "The Pentateuch as History and Revelation." The present volume also contains the introductions to the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and the Kings. The work upon the Pentateuch, for its fullness and clearness and judicious criticism, will rank among the very best expositions.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

J. G. Cupples Co., Boston. Hiero-Salem: The Vision of Peace. By E. L. Mason. Illustrated. Pp. 508. 1889. \$2.00.

George H. Ellis, Boston. Problems in American Society. Some Social Studies. By Joseph Henry Crooker. Pp. 293. 1889. \$1.25.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. Asolando: Fancies and Facts. By Robert Browning. Author's Edition. Pp. 114. 1890. \$1.25;—

The Lily among Thorns. A Study of the Biblical Drama entitled *The Song of Songs*. By William Elliot Griffis, D. D., Pastor of the Shawmut Congregational Church, Boston, Mass., and author of "*The Mikado's Empire*." Pp. viii, 274. 1890. \$1.25; — *Three Dramas of Euripides*. By William Cranston Lawton. Pp. vii, 261. 1889. \$1.50; — *American Religious Leaders*. Wilbur Fisk. By George Prentice, D. D., Professor in Wesleyan University. Pp. iv, 289. 1890. \$1.25; — *Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe*. Compiled from her Letters and Journals. By her son, Charles Edward Stowe. Pp. xii, 530. 1889. \$3.50.

Hunt & Eaton, New York; Cranston & Stowe, Cincinnati. *The Gospel in the Book of Numbers*. By Lewis R. Duun, D. D., author of "*The Mission of the Spirit*," etc. Pp. 268. 1889. \$1.00; — *The Lesson Commentary on the International Sunday-school Lessons for 1890*. By Rev. Jesse L. Hurlbut, D. D. Pp. 340. 1889. \$1.25; — *Supplemental Lessons for the Sunday-school*. By Rev. Jesse L. Hurlbut, D. D. Pp. 87. 1889. 25 cents.

Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., New York. *Supernatural Revelation: An Essay concerning the Basis of the Christian Faith*. By C. M. Mead, Ph. D., D. D., lately Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Pp. vii, 469. 1889. \$2.50.

Scribner & Welford, New York. Kant, Lotze, and Ritschl. A Critical Examination. By Leonhard Stählin, Bayreuth. Translated by D. W. Simon, Ph. D. (Tüb.), Professor of Theology in the Congregational Theological Hall, Edinburgh. Pp. xxxii, 327. 1889. \$3.00; — *The Lord's Prayer: A Practical Meditation*. By Newman Hall, L.L. B. With an Introduction by Theodore Cuyler, D. D., Brooklyn. Second Edition. Pp. xiv, 391. 1889. \$2.00.

PAMPHLETS. — *The Christian Literature Company, New York.* Dialogue between a Christian and a Jew. The Greek Text, edited with Introduction and Notes, together with a Discussion of Christian Polemics against the Jews. By Arthur Cushman McGiffert. Pp. iv, 94. 1889. — *Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago.* Religion and Science as Allies; or Similarities of Physical and Religious Knowledge. By James Thompson Bixby. Pp. 226. 1889. 30 cents. — *Leonard Scott Publication Co., New York.* Shakespeariana for November. 20 cents. — *Alexander P. Watt, London.* Board-School Laryngitis. By Greville Macdonald, M. D. Pp. 31. 1889. One Shilling. — *Religio-Philosophical Publishing House, Chicago.* Signs of the Times: from the Standpoint of a Scientist. By Prof. Elliott Coues, M. D. Pp. 44. 1889. 15 cents. — *Sir Joseph Causton & Sons, London.* The Hippodrome of Constantinople and its still Existing Monuments. By Edwin A. Grosvenor, Professor of History in Robert College, Constantinople. — *R. Meiklejohn & Co., Printers, Yokohama.* Calendar of the Meiji Gakuin: Tōkyō, April, 1889. — *N. Murray, Publication Agent Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.* Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Economy. Seventh Series. V.-VI. English Culture in Virginia. A Study of the Gilmer Letters, and an Account of the English Professors obtained by Jefferson for the University of Virginia. By William P. Trent, M. A., Professor of History in the University of the South. Pp. 141. 1889. \$1.00. — *Andrus & Church, Ithaca, N. Y.* The Problem of Personality. By Eliza Ritchie. Pp. 42. 1889. — *From the New Englander and Yale Review for July, 1889.* Science and Miracle. By Professor A. Jay Dubois. — *The Swedenborg Publishing Company, Philadelphia.* Robert Elsmere, and the Christian Faith. By Rev. Julian K. Smyth. Pp. 24. 1889. — Constitution of the Historical Society of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed (Dutch) Church at New Brunswick, New Jersey, together with a Paper on the Principle, the Object, and the Plan of a Museum of Christian History. By W. Armitage Beardslee Curator. Pp. 14. Printed for the Society, New Brunswick, New Jersey. — Inauguration of Ethelbert D. Warfield, A. M., L.L. B., as President of Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. Published by the University. — *Gilliss Brothers & Turnure, Art Age Press, New York.* The Old Calvinism in Modern Thought. By Norman Fox, D. D. Pp. 8.

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
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THE

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WHAT IS REALITY?

PART VI. MECHANISM TRANSFORMED.

WHEN we were trying to establish the propriety of extending our knowledge of living organisms to the interpretation of the universe, we took the ground that the limits of organic being are not necessarily coincident with the limits of protoplasm. It is legitimate, we argued, and in accordance with scientific procedure, to assume that other forms of matter *may be* the vehicle and expression of other forms of being, organized on a far more extended scale than anything in the protoplasmic order. We therefore made the hypothesis that the universe is the manifestation of a Being; and that every part of it bears something the same relations to this Being that the various members of a human body bear to the ego that they serve and represent.

Now, before we venture on the justification of this particular hypothesis, it may be well for us to consider, as widely as possible, the bearings of our principle. What other equally legitimate application may it have? And do any of these applications involve absurdities? I think there can be no question that it is equally open to us, when once we have broken through the protoplasmic order, to extend our analogy on a descending as well as on an ascending scale. If we may believe that a soul, at the centre of the universe, is the efficient reality of the great sum of things, why may we not believe that a soul is also the essential reality of a compound molecule? And why, when we reach the simple atom, the ultimate unit of science, should we not postulate an atomic soul as the inner *elementary* reality of the world of things? It might,

indeed, be alleged that the two cases stand on an entirely different footing, in that one presents us with an infinite complexity of adjustments, which everywhere suggests an organism; while the other, the ultimate unit, is assumed to be absolutely simple.

But let us ask ourselves, what do we know about the simplicity of elementary atoms? All we can say of them is that they are the least complex things of the world. They are assumed to be ultimate only as *indivisible*. They are units; but their unity may involve an inner complexity,—a complexity of nature. And, in fact, the phenomena of chemistry oblige us to affirm such a complexity. For how can absolutely simple elements, when brought together, give rise to a great variety of responses or reactions? Every hypothetical unit of chemistry has unmeasured possibilities of operation, according to its environment. If, therefore, complexity of behavior is any indication of complexity of constitution, we have the most abundant evidence that the simplest elements of the world are only relatively simple; that they are, in fact, of many different kinds, endowed with radically different natures.

There is, indeed, a dream of chemistry, in which all the differences of things are imagined as arising from differences of position and form and grouping, brought about by a varied play of forces among the atoms of one homogeneous substance. But this is really a dream of physics and not of chemistry. The phenomena of isometric compounds, it is true, show that the very same atoms may give rise to molecules of different substances having wholly different qualities, when they are arranged in different relations of position to each other. But unless there were an inner response of such atoms, their differences of position could not, in any case, give rise to chemical phenomena; that is, to that mysterious union in which different atoms merge all their distinctive characteristics in the formation of a new substance having no resemblance whatever to its constituents. As Professor Cooke has expressed it, "If nature were made out of a single substance, there would be no chemistry, even if there could be intelligences to study science at all. Chemistry deals exclusively with the relations of different substances."¹

So far as natural phenomena are concerned, therefore, I think we may affirm that it is just as legitimate to entertain the hypothesis that the elementary realities of the world are atomic souls, as it is to assume that there is one all-embracing, supreme Being at

¹ *The New Chemistry*, p. 14.

the head or centre of the universe. And, in what follows, I shall endeavor to show that both these hypotheses are not simply legitimate, but that the progress of thought, in science as well as in philosophy, has rendered them indispensable.

Are we, then, about to abandon one side of reality, and to deny that there is any such thing as matter? On the contrary, having with much pains laid the foundation of an all-comprehensive realism, we mean to build squarely upon it; and we unequivocally affirm the *reality* of that which has been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, called matter. But we wish, at the same time, to persuade the reader that the quality of an atom which we may call its materiality is only one aspect of its reality, and not the most essential or vital one. It is no part of our endeavor to displace the concept *material atom*. That concept has had, and must continue to have, its legitimate and indispensable uses, even though we fully recognize its inadequacy.

Let us look, for a moment, at the origin of the word "matter." I do not mean its formal etymology, but the necessity of thought that called it into existence. Things naturally fall, in our experience, into two great classes. On the one hand are ranged those that seem to be centres of spontaneous activity and originating power, and on the other those that appear to be absolutely passive. This distinction runs all through our thinking. We cannot do without it. Always it is the *man* who works and effects the changes, it is the *material* that is worked upon and changed. We cannot abandon this way of regarding things, because clearness of thought is attained only by making sharp distinctions. The inertness of matter is a palpable fact as related to many of our dealings with it; and this fact we must express by some word, even though we know that this word does not embody the exact truth. We pursue identically the same method when we have to express some of the most familiar relations of space. For instance, before the days of science, men accustomed themselves to call certain portions of space *empty*, to distinguish them from certain other portions that were occupied by tangible objects. But now it has been demonstrated that what we call emptiness is, in reality, only a somewhat modified form of what we call fullness. None the less, however, do we continue to speak of empty spaces. The scientific truth is an all-important one in its place, but it is quite out of relation to the special distinction that the requirements of living make it necessary for us to express when we use the word *empty*.

So it is with regard to the word *matter*. Even though we should succeed in demonstrating that matter is not the absolutely passive, inanimate thing that it appears to be, this would have no bearing upon the popular or even upon the purely scientific use of the word in its old signification. For however clearly science may recognize the fact that its solid, impenetrable, inelastic atom is only a symbol derived from a crude and one-sided conception of the true nature of matter, it may nevertheless be useful for a long time to come, to treat it, in some connections, as if it were the very thing that it is assumed to be.

The position here taken, let it be observed, is in advance of that contended for in the last number of this series. There it was said to be legitimate to use a single aspect of a thing, in certain connections, as the representative of its full reality. Now we have to recognize that different aspects of one and the same thing, different abstractions from a given reality, may be continued in use at the same time for the exploration of different fields of thought. The attainment of a higher point of view, the discovery of a concept lying nearer to the heart of things, does not necessitate the abandonment of the lower point of view, or the cruder concept. I have called particular attention to this, because we have now to exhibit the relation that the concept *mechanism*, retained in popular thought and in the science of physics, sustains to the concept *atomic-soul*, made use of in the higher ranges of science and in philosophy. Or, to put it in other words, we have to show why it is necessary to think of the universe as a living organism, every atom of which has a spiritual nature, while at the same time we continue to treat it, in other relations, as a vast machine.

The justification of the concept mechanism is to be found in the history of its experimental use. It has been practically tested, first in ordinary life, and then in the combinations of science. By its aid, the science of physics has sprung into being. It has been to the explorer of nature's instrumentalities what vessels have been to navigators. We may say that without it we should never have had an organized science. And, further, we have to say that now it is just as useful, just as indispensable, and just as intolerant of the intrusion of other views as it ever was.

Even though our hypothesis of a universally animated nature should be established beyond a doubt, the physicist would have no occasion to take account of it. While prosecuting his particular quest, he not only has no need to avail himself of the analogies

derived from the relations which spiritual beings sustain to each other, but he is debarred from paying any attention to such relations by the requirements of his work. The inventor of machinery, whose mind is teeming with mechanical details that are constantly changing their forms and their relations to each other, would not advance his work by turning his attention to that other aspect of the same process that is represented by nerve-cell combinations; and the compositor who should neglect his type-setting to criticise the treatise that he has to set up for printing would not be a valuable man in his place. Just so, the student of physics who does not adhere closely to the external aspects of the phenomena that he is investigating betrays the trust for which he is specially responsible.

The very same is true of that familiar form of anthropomorphism that concentrates attention upon the *external* aspects of the relations that the Supreme Being sustains to the universe. In the symbolism of this view, the world is divided into mind and mechanism, and the action of the former upon the latter is construed after the analogy of man's relations to the machines that he invents and superintends. Such a conception has its legitimate place. It represents clearly and forcibly one very important aspect of reality. It makes the thought of God, as the designer, creator, and protector of the world, one that may be easily grasped. And, furthermore, in so far as the world is rightly conceived of as a mechanism, such a symbolism represents the truth. All the actual machinery of our experience, from which the idea of the world as a mechanism is derived, is the product of mind. Every machine appears, externally, to be a complex of relations between inanimate things; but before it took this form, it was a complex of relations between nerve-cells and fibres, the living instruments of man's inventive spirit. When, therefore, we look upon an elaborate piece of mechanism, we may affirm that it *is* human mind expressing itself in outwardly embodied forms.

Metal and wood and belting do not constitute a machine, any more than printer's ink and paper constitute a treatise. All the relations of materials and of parts that really *are* the machine have had their beginning in the mind of some man; and, having once existed there, they are made to express themselves in external forms, just as the ideas that make a treatise assume, for useful ends, the guise of ink and paper. In short, the idea of a machine that is not the product or expression of mind is a pure abstraction. And the mechanical aspect of nature, taken by

itself, is unintelligible. It is like part of an inscription found on a broken slab: it has no meaning till we supplement it with the idea of mind; then the meaningless becomes intelligible. We know that we have found the other half of the slab, because this justifies its relation to the first half by making sense out of nonsense.

But valuable as the symbolism thus derived is, I have now to show that the mechanical explanation of nature is as inadequate to serve the necessities of science, as the thought of a God external to things is to meet the requirements of theism; that the one, as the other, demands a symbolism that shall express more comprehensive relations.

We will consider the case of science first; and then we shall be able to see whether the wider concept that meets its wants can be successfully applied to those of philosophy and theology. The insufficiency of the mechanical theory to which I shall first direct attention grows out of the logical development of that theory itself. It grows out of it through the application of that general principle of science known as *the law of continuity*. This law is the assumption that the order that *has been* is the order that *will be*, — that the relations known to exist within the range of our experience exist, in some more or less modified form, under similar circumstances, beyond our experience. It is, in fact, another name for the principle of the uniformity of nature. All the great generalizations of science are based upon it. That pan-mechanical idea of the universe that we have already considered is a product of it. So, also, is the doctrine of the persistence of force, and that of the transmutation of forces. These theories have been gradually established by a long succession of discoveries, each one of which has enlarged the field of a principle once thought to be limited in its application. Each new discovery has lessened the probability that the principle in question has any limit at all. And so the mind has been gradually coerced into the belief of its universality.

It was easy, as we have seen, to confuse this idea of universality — of all-extensiveness — with the closely related idea of all-comprehensiveness. But the falseness of this inference was soon made apparent by the fact that mind was thus excluded from the world. Mind was excluded, not because it appeared to be unnecessary for the explanation of the world, but because there was no longer any room for it. In the mechanical sequence, the energy of each physical change was seen to be taken up in producing its physical

effects; there was none left over, at any point, to account for mental phenomena. But mental facts could not be altogether ignored. Hence the hypothesis that there are two parallel sets of phenomena, intimately associated, but not connected as cause and effect. The physical facts, it was said, go along absolutely sufficient to themselves; and the mental facts, with a like independence, go along by themselves.

This conception, which strongly suggests the old one of a "pre-established harmony," has taken on many forms under modern philosophical treatment. Professor Bain and Mr. Herbert Spencer are essentially agreed in their representation of the twin series as *one*, that presents to our apprehension two aspects. Mr. Spencer calls feeling and nervous action "the inner and outer faces of the same change." But Professor Bain further calls attention to the fact that this two-sidedness is limited, in our experience, to a special class of physical sequences. "If," he says, "all mental facts are at the same time physical facts, some one will ask, what is the meaning of a proper mental fact? Is there any difference at all between mental agents and physical agents? There is a very broad difference, which may be easily illustrated. When any one is pleased, stimulated, cheered by food, wine, or bracing air, we call the influence physical; it operates on the viscera, and through these upon the nerves, by a chain of sequence purely physical. When one is cheered by good news, by a pleasing spectacle, or by a stroke of success, the influence is mental; sensation, thought, and consciousness are part of the chain, although these cannot be sustained without their physical basis. The proper physical fact is a single, one-sided, objective fact; the mental fact is a two-sided fact, one of its sides being a train of feelings, thoughts, or other subjective elements. We do not fully represent the mental fact unless we take account of both the sides."¹

In both these cases, it will be observed, mental phenomena are produced, but in the one case they are the result of *antecedents* that have no mental side. But how shall we account for the difference? If there is but one fact, why should it have two sides in certain special cases and only one in all the rest? The special case points to some special cause, but under the purely mechanical view there is no such cause; for mental phenomena are nothing more than the concomitants of physical changes.

This consideration led Professor Clifford to make the very hypothesis that we are advocating. To avoid the assumption that

¹ *Mind and Body*, p. 133.

acts of consciousness, occurring only here and there in connection with physical changes, are creations out of nothing, he supposes that consciousness, in some rudimentary form, is a necessary characteristic of all matter in motion; and that this, in organisms of great complexity, gives rise to that which we call mind. He says: "The only thing that we can come to, if we accept the doctrine of evolution at all, is that even in the very lowest organisms, even in the amœba which swims about in our own blood, there is something or other, inconceivably simple to us, which is of the same nature with our own consciousness, although not of the same complexity. That is to say (for we cannot stop at organic matter, knowing as we do that it must have arisen by continuous physical processes out of inorganic matter), we are obliged to assume, in order to save continuity in our belief, that along with every motion of matter, whether organic or inorganic, there is some fact which corresponds to the mental fact in ourselves."¹

To one who has not considered attentively the phenomena of nature as an indefinitely extended series of gradations, such a conclusion as this will seem a simple absurdity. Does it not involve the reversal of all our common-sense judgments about things? Are not rocks and earth and metal the antithesis, in every respect, of mind? Is fire made of atomic souls? Is all the dust and corruption of the world to be thought of as alive, or capable of life? A thousand such questions, starting up from as many pre-judgments about the nature of things, press in a motley throng to hustle such a conception out of the companionship of sane ideas. But if the reader to whom it is a novelty will have patience, I think he will confess that there is a good deal more to be said for it than at first sight appears possible.

In the first place, by way of getting such an objection into a receptive mood, I will call attention to the fact that the law of continuity has been justified in a great number of cases, which, at first, seemed quite as unpromising as the one before us. In treating of this law, Dr. Jevons makes the following general remark: "One common result of the progress of science is to show that qualities supposed to be entirely absent from many substances are present, only in so low a degree of intensity that the means of detection were insufficient. . . . We are rapidly learning that there are no substances absolutely opaque, or non-conducting, non-electric, non-elastic, non-viscous, non-compressible, insoluble, in-

¹ "Body and Mind," p. 731, *Contemporary Review*, December, 1874.

fusible, or non-volatile. All tends to become a matter of degree or sometimes of direction.”¹

In illustration of this tendency, the same writer adduces, among other examples, the following: Newton believed that most bodies were quite unaffected by the magnet; Faraday and Tyndall, on the contrary, have rendered it very doubtful whether any substance whatever is wholly devoid of magnetism. So with regard to electricity: the inconceivable rapidity with which an electric current passes through pure copper wire, when compared with the apparently complete manner in which it is stopped by a thin partition of gutta-percha, seems, at first sight, to demonstrate an absolute diversity of nature, as regards electricity, in these two substances. And for a long time it was believed that electrical conductors and insulators formed two opposed classes of substances. But Faraday demonstrated that these were but the extreme cases of a chain of substances varying in all degrees in their powers of conduction. Even the best conductors, such as pure copper or silver, offer some resistance to the electric current, while other metals have considerably higher powers of retardation. And, on the other hand, the best insulators allow of an atomic induction which is the necessary antecedent of conduction. Hence the inference that, whether we can measure the effect or not, all substances discharge electricity more or less. Another very remarkable case of unsuspected continuity was revealed when it was successfully shown that the liquid and gaseous conditions of matter are only remote points in a continuous course of change.

Further illustration would not help us to understand the principle; and as to the number of such unexpected verifications of the law of continuity, it is sufficient to say that they have made it necessary to almost reverse the rule laid down by Newton on the subject. “Those qualities of bodies,” he held, “which are not capable of being heightened and remitted, and which are found in all bodies on which experiment can be made, must be considered as universal qualities of all bodies.” But, in the light of more recent discovery, Dr. Jevons declares the contrary to be more probable; namely, that “qualities variable in degree will be found in every substance in a greater or less degree.”

Another consideration that ought to make us tolerant of seemingly wild hypotheses, in the application of this law, is the fact that, in most of the cases where a given property has been proved to belong to a great number of substances in varying degrees, this

¹ *The Principles of Science*, by W. Stanley Jevons, LL. D., chap. xxvii.

property has first attracted attention by manifesting itself in a conspicuous and intense manner in some particular substance. Owing to this, it has often been the case that such a property on its first appearance has been regarded as the isolated peculiarity of this substance. "Every branch of physical science," says the author above quoted, "has usually been developed from the attention forcibly drawn to some singular substance. Just as the load-stone disclosed magnetism, and amber frictional electricity, so did Iceland spar show the existence of double refraction, and sulphate of quinine the phenomena of fluorescence. When one such startling instance has drawn the attention of the scientific world, numerous less remarkable cases of the phenomenon will be detected, and it will probably prove that the property in question is universal to all matter."

Carrying these general considerations with us, let us now attack the problem in detail. Matter, it is said, has certain characteristics that separate it absolutely from mind. Mind has certain characteristics that make it in all respects the antithesis of matter. Is this true? It may be that mind and matter, though so sharply contrasted in our thought, are not mutually exclusive. It may turn out, as it has in so many other cases, that each shares, only in different degrees, the essential characteristics of the other. The first quality of matter to be questioned shall be its *uniformity of action*. The laws of matter, we say, can be accurately ascertained, so that, when we have discovered how a given combination of substances *has acted* under certain well-defined circumstances, we know exactly how it will always act. The circumstances being the same, there will be no shadow of variability in its behavior. Mind, on the contrary, is characterized by an indeterminate element. It has within it a principle of freedom, or self-determination. Its action cannot be certainly predicted.

Starting from the side of matter, we have little difficulty in showing that the particular characteristic which we have regarded as distinctive of it is shared by mind. The operations of mind are very largely calculable. They are for the most part governed by a routine as rigid as that of operations that we call purely mechanical. Even when we confine our attention to the most complex manifestation of mind, we have to recognize the fact that individual human beings differ very widely as to the predominance of calculable action in their behavior. When we contrast the mental activity of an inventor with that of an unskilled laborer, who plods through almost the same identical round from

day to day, we seem to have fallen almost more than half-way toward a form of mind the action of which might be accurately determined. And if we follow down, step by step, the scale of animated existences, we find ourselves led, by almost imperceptible stages, to a point where it is difficult to say whether what we behold has an indeterminate element or not.

Should we not state the case more exactly, then, if, instead of saying incalculable action is a distinguishing peculiarity of mind, we should say, *incalculable action is a characteristic of the higher forms of mind*? It would certainly be straining the law of continuity to assume, in its name, that the manifestation of a given quality will be the same in every case, no matter what the degree of that quality. On the contrary, to quote Dr. Jevons once more, "we should bear in mind that phenomena which are in reality of a closely similar or even identical nature may present to the senses very different appearances. Without a careful analysis of the changes which take place, we may often be in danger of widely separating facts and processes which are actually instances of the same law. Extreme difference of degree or magnitude is a frequent cause of error."

We are not trying to show that an atom is possessed of *all* the qualities that characterize the most highly developed form of mind, but that it may be possessed of certain fundamental qualities that belong everywhere to mind as such. Incalculable action, we hold, is not a necessary concomitant of mind. It may be only a characteristic of its more complex forms. We are careful to say *may be*, for indeterminateness of mind is known to us only *subjectively*; and what the subjective aspect of the activities of an atom may be, we do not know.

What, then, we may very properly be asked, are the fundamental qualities that everywhere distinguish mind as such? We will venture to say that *spontaneity of action* and *consciousness* are essential attributes of every form of mind. By *spontaneity* I do not mean movement in the absence of an external stimulus, but movement from within in response to an external stimulus; I am thinking, in fact, of that class of movements that are made known to us in the transformations of chemistry. When matter is moved in bulk by an outwardly applied force which does not affect the inward constitution of its molecules, there is nothing, it seems to me, to suggest mental action; but when a compound molecule is broken up, and its constituent atoms seek and enter into new combinations in response to a changed environment, there is something that closely resembles psychical action.

It is certainly significant, in this connection, that eminent physiologists are unable to agree as to where, on the scale of existences, psychical action ends and chemical begins. For instance, M. Charles Richet affirms that "the laws of irritability act in all their simplicity and rigor among simple beings. In fact, in every instance of investigation into the nature of simple organisms, or such as appear simple by the optical instruments at our disposal (a fact that does not always prove their simplicity), as bacteria, for example, we find that chemical irritability is the apparently sole law of movement. What else, indeed, are the movements of these bacteria so thoroughly studied by M. Englemann, if not an affinity for oxygen, — in other words, the simplest and most universal chemical phenomenon in all nature?"¹ To this M. Alfred Binet replies: "We believe that, as yet, no one has demonstrated that the movements of a living being, in moving towards a distant object, however simple they may be, can be explained merely by a chemical affinity acting between that being and that object. It is certainly not chemical affinity that is acting, but much rather a psychological need."

It is clear, I think, that one great point of difference between these two eminent physiologists lies in their different attitudes to the law of continuity. M. Richet holds that simple beings have a simple psychology. He does not mean to affirm that this simple psychology, because it may be expressed in the terms of chemistry, is therefore not psychical. On the contrary, he elsewhere calls it "elementary psychic life." But M. Binet, seeing in chemical affinity something very unlike psychical or physiological need, assumes that there is no community of nature between the two. And in so doing he seems to me to be drawing one of those arbitrary lines, which have been so frequently laid down only to be obliterated by the onward movement of scientific investigation.

The origin of such lines, if I am not mistaken, is to be found in the idea that, at some point on the scale of existences, all complexity of nature ceases; and that there are such things in the world as absolutely simple elements, — an idea which we have found to be the contradiction of experience. The same way of thinking has operated to restrict the recognition of consciousness below a certain line; so that we find the greatest diversity in biological writers as regards the freedom with which they impute this char-

¹ Translated from the *Revue Philosophique* for the *Open Court*, December 27, 1888.

acteristic to the lower orders, and often the greatest pains taken to define the limits within which it may be believed to exist. It is assumed that, until we reach a certain degree of complexity of constitution, there is nothing in the world but mechanical action; and that consciousness supervenes as an absolutely new product.

The simple fact is that consciousness cannot be *proved* to exist at any point. Its recognition is always a matter of analogical inference. And I believe no good reason can be alleged for refusing to extend our analogy to existences that display so great a variety of operation, in response to irritation, as the elementary atoms of chemistry. If consciousness in man is the concomitant of complex chemical changes, is it not reasonable to infer a simple form of consciousness as the attendant of chemical changes that are relatively simple?

We cannot dwell longer on this point, for we have to consider another of the characteristics of what we call inanimate matter. The immobility of many of the materials that surround us seems to render the idea that they have any psychical element too improbable. We hold in the hand a coin that a thousand years ago was just what it is now, and say, is it thinkable that the atoms of which this coin is composed are beings with the possibility of anything like mental responses or consciousness? Ages upon ages before this coin was formed, the molecules of copper of which it is composed laid immovable in the earth. Certainly it does seem almost too heavy a thought for the imagination to lift; and we eagerly search through the psychic life with which we are familiar for all possible analogies that may illustrate these long intervals of inactivity and unconsciousness.

Even in the most complex beings we have the phenomenon of deep, dreamless sleep. We have also the phenomena of coma and catalepsy to remind us that the most highly developed minds may continue long in a state bordering upon absolute inactivity. And when we descend the biological scale, we find, in the hibernating animals, much more remarkable instances of suspended animation. Creatures that are so frozen as to appear to be simple fragments of ice will reassume, on the application of heat, all their functions. The simpler the combinations into which elementary beings enter, the more lasting should we expect these combinations to be, and the longer, therefore, the possible intervals between their active states; for we know that consciousness, and psychic activity of every kind, is the concomitant of chemical change.

But we are apt to deceive ourselves when we picture to the im-

agination the deadness of matter. We forget that civilization is engaged in a hand-to-hand and never-ending conflict with the eternal restlessness of this same dead matter. Unless carefully guarded, very few of the things that we use last long, not simply because they wear out or meet with violent ends, but more especially because the elements of which they are composed are forever changing their alliances. We forget, moreover, how incessant and powerful are the changes that are continually taking place on a vast scale around us; how oxidization and the vicissitudes of cold and heat are keeping the world of apparently inanimate matter in a state that, could we see it as it is, would present a scene of the liveliest animation.

And, finally, we have to remind ourselves that all these analogies are perhaps useful only as illustrating a condition of relative immobility; that there is, probably, no such thing as absolute rest. The molecules of solids are not thought of by science as isolated particles, but are believed to be constantly moving bodies that determine each other's orbits by their mutual attractions. And, further, all solids are convertible into gases, — a form in which their molecules, according to the kinetic theory of gases, resemble "a swarm of innumerable solid particles incessantly moving about with different velocities in rectilinear paths of all conceivable directions."

To get on with our argument, then, let us assume that a hylozoic view of the world is admissible, and proceed to determine its bearings upon the mechanical theory. Does it materially alter the situation as regards that theory? It certainly does. For these two categories, mechanism and mind, if they are coextensive in the universe, cannot dwell together on an equal footing. It is true that the physical realists would have us believe that they can; and Mr. Spencer thinks that he has so presented them to us in his philosophy. It seems to him that he has given both these aspects of reality an impartial treatment and an equal standing when he presents us with the conclusion that there is *one* inscrutable reality, and that this manifests itself to us with *two* faces, that cannot by any effort of the imagination be reconciled with each other. But, as matter of fact, these two aspects do not stand on the same level in the dynamics of his philosophy. All the movement in his system is obtained by treating the objective, mechanical side as the representative of the causative element, and the subjective side as the effect.

His evolution proceeds upon the assumption that force is ante-

cedent to mind, — that force without mind has elaborated a large part of the world as we see it, and then has given birth to mind. It is true that he seems sometimes to state the opposite belief, as when he says: "On tracing up from its low and vague beginnings the intelligence which becomes so marvelous in the highest beings, we find that, under whatever aspect contemplated, it presents a progressive transformation of like nature with the progressive transformation we trace in the universe as a whole." But when he illustrates this thought he goes no further back than the simplest forms of the nervous system; and all through the earlier part of the evolution the physical *aspect* is treated as a physical *reality* that, working by itself, performs wonders, without any assistance from the mental aspect. Mr. Herbert's remark on the use that Mr. Spencer makes of his two *aspects* seems to me a most just one. He says: "It seems fair to describe the objective face (as used in the "Synthetic Philosophy") as *essential*, and the subjective as *non-essential*." ¹

Take away, now, from the realistic philosophy this unwarrantable assumption of the efficient nature of the mechanical side of things, recognize clearly, in accordance with the law of continuity, that it had no precedence of the mental side in the order of time, and the whole view of things elaborated by this philosophy vanishes. If the mental and the mechanical side coexisted from the beginning, we are obliged to assume a subordination of principles of an exactly opposite kind from that implied in physical realism. The two categories cannot stand on an equal footing. The category of mind, as we have elsewhere argued, is the category of causation. It is from our subjective consciousness of the originating power of mind, and from this alone, that we have derived the idea of cause.

If, then, there has been, from the beginning, a psychical element, this must be regarded as the cause; and the mechanical aspect of the world, as the form which that cause assumes when viewed from the outside. There is here no hiatus between mind and mechanism like that which appears in the schemes of physical realism. We do not have to say that there are two faces of reality, having a "difference that transcends all other differences," two manifestations of an inscrutable reality that "no effort enables us to assimilate." On the contrary, we have *the reality*, the *efficient element of the world*, manifesting itself in a character that is perfectly homogeneous with mind as made known in our

¹ *Modern Realism Examined*, by Thomas Martin Herbert, M. A., p. 85.

experience, but having the quality of calculable action in an extreme degree.

Nor is this all that we gain for scientific coherency by doing justice to the principle of continuity. Having cleared our consciences with regard to this law, the prospect brightens, like the path of the just, at every onward step. A difficulty equally fundamental with the one we have been discussing troubles the physical realists in view of the law of evolution. For if we postulate inanimate atoms and forces as the original essential realities of the world, it is not only impossible to evolve mind from them, it is impossible to evolve anything. And this is a fact, although Mr. Spencer's philosophy appeals to us as a system founded upon evolution. Let us see how the mechanical and the evolutionary conceptions of the world stand related to each other historically and logically.

Evolution found the scientific world possessed by the mechanical idea. This in its purity took no note of origins, or of a *process of becoming* in the world. It viewed the world as an independent mechanism, complete in itself, — a mechanism that had been struck out all at once, each part dependent, from the beginning, upon every other part. In opposition to this view, evolution concentrated attention upon the thought of the world as a mechanism that in the beginning was no mechanism, but an aggregate of homogeneous atoms and varying forces. The mechanism had been slowly elaborated by successive modifications that had at length resulted in great complexity. This view was not altogether new. It had held a place, in speculative philosophy, alongside of the mechanical concept, without coming to any definite terms with it. But the prominence and positiveness into which it was brought by the hypothesis of evolution made some sort of an adjustment between it and its rival imperative.

The mechanical view, though not designed or fitted to express this phase of reality, had at the outset the advantage of an old, established priority; and its advocates, insisting upon its all-inclusiveness, could use this advantage with the arbitrariness that unlimited power makes possible. The philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer is a forcible application of the old concept with the intention of bringing all the phenomena of the new absolutely within its limitations. He employs, from the beginning, a method that handicaps all honest investigation of phenomena, by prescribing in advance what their testimony shall be. If it chances not to be thus and so, it must be ruled out as false. The principle is thus stated in the "Synthetic Philosophy:" "The task

before us, then, is that of exhibiting the phenomena of evolution in synthetic order. . . . And it has to be shown that this universality of process results from the same necessity which determines each simplest movement around us, down to the accelerated fall of a stone or the recurrent beat of a harp-string. In other words, the phenomena of evolution *have to be* deduced from the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a rational synthesis *must* build up.”¹

I have ventured to italicise the words *have to be* and *must* in this quotation, because Mr. Spencer's scheme of evolution hangs by its whole weight upon them. If it is true that the doctrine of the persistence of force is an exhaustive expression of the known reality of the world, then we may proceed as he has done. The phenomena of evolution can have nothing to say for themselves. They *must* fit into the grooves prescribed for them. They are like a consignment of emigrants whose indentures of bondage have been signed and sealed in advance. Any apparent protests they may offer are not to be attended to. In fact, they must not be regarded as protests at all, but as expressions of perfect satisfaction in a language which we do not altogether understand.

But if, on the other hand, as we have argued in our earlier chapters, it is *contrary* to reason and experience to assume that the doctrine of force is exhaustive of known reality, then the phenomena of evolution are entitled to a new trial, in which their testimony shall be received without a prejudgment of what it *must* or of what it *must not* be.

But, it may be urged, Mr. Spencer does not mean to affirm that the phenomena of evolution must be *forced* into the terms of his ultimate principle; on the contrary, he claims that they can be *deduced from* it, and that his philosophy is a satisfactory explanation of the genesis of all known reality. True, this *is* his claim. But we have already shown that one half of reality refuses to be so derived, and now it remains for us to show, more particularly, that the other half is equally recalcitrant; in short, that *none* of the phenomena of evolution can be deduced from the doctrine of the persistence of force; that they must all either be perverted and made to appear what they are not, or be stated in terms other than those of mechanism.

There is only one way by which the world-process can be made to appear purely mechanical; that is, by postulating an aggregate of homogeneous atoms as its antecedent. Unless we have this

¹ *First Principles*, sec. 147.

common standard of unity, the problem is not a purely mechanical one. But having it, and nothing else, how are we going to get diversity out of it? With force acting upon homogeneous atoms, we can get no differences other than those of number and position. No matter how unequally the force may be applied, or how variously the atoms may be combined, the results must always remain homogeneous. No differentiation of qualities can be reached through the merely formal variation produced by force, conceived of as acting from without upon homogeneous units. In order to get started on that career of qualitative variation which constitutes evolution, we must assume a difference of original nature to the units. Whether these be regarded as material atoms, or as mere centres of force, they must be intrinsically different.

But having conceded this original, inner nature to the units of combination, the mechanical theory is at once so radically modified as to deprive it of all its power to exclude agencies other than mechanical. This theory may, as we have already said, legitimately ignore, for its own purposes, the existence of this inner nature of things. All it requires for its operation is that each unit shall retain the same nature when not in combination. But we have always to remember that this exclusion of the inner nature of things from the field of reality is only provisional, not absolute. As Lotze has expressed it: "After experience has taught us that the internal states of atoms — if such they have — exert no modifying influence on the regularity of their working, we can leave them out of account as regards phenomena, without having at the same time to banish them from our view of the universe. On the contrary, further considerations would soon bring us back to the idea that forces do not attach themselves to a lifeless inner nature of things, but must arise out of them; and that nothing can take place between the individual elements until something has taken place within them."¹

Grant this conception of an inner nature, with manifold possibilities of response, and evolution moves on apace. In the contact of atoms so endowed, we may have innumerable combinations; and every change may be productive of beings or substances with new characteristics. But already in this conception the mechanical thought is lost sight of. We have unwittingly adopted in place of it an exceedingly attenuated anthropomorphism. The very words *response*, *reaction*, — and we can find no others to express the idea, — betray the origin of our hypothesis. On every

¹ *Microcosmus*, vol. i., p. 49.

side we postulate internal movements called out by contact with other natures. There is here no stagnation, no rigidity of constitution. Each element at the moment of its internal change is conceived of as *acting*. It is, during that moment, radically different from what it was before, and from what it will be afterward.

We cannot yet proceed to make an application of this view to the problems of philosophy or theology; for there are other important considerations that must first be laid before the reader. Up to this point we have reached the following conclusions: We have seen that we must accept mind as a distinctive reality of the world. We have seen, further, that, if mind is *real*, it cannot be an excrescence, an external product of one part of the world-process; but that it must be the inmost essential reality of things, the very spring of the process itself. And, lastly, we have seen that there is the same reason for postulating the continuity and universality of mind that there is for assuming the continuity of force.

F. H. Johnson.

ANDOVER, MASS.

UNFAIR BURDENS ON REAL PRODUCTION.

THE opinion ordinary men have of our legislators is this: they wish to make a "sack." They do nothing for weeks, postponing all business till the last moment. They then rush bills through on the principle of their own individual interest, passing the bills they are paid higher to pass than to kill, killing those they are paid more to kill than to pass. They are mostly men who know nothing about making laws, and who are totally incapable of making laws. I heard two men of the working-class conversing in a restaurant express these opinions. "You do not believe in bribing legislators?" a representative of the capitalist side inquired. "No," I replied. "Well, I do," he continued. "It is the only way we can protect ourselves. Periodically bills destructive to business interests are brought in, and we must prevent their passage by buying the legislature, or suffer heavy losses. What else can we do? In two years the same bills will appear again, and again the law-makers must be purchased." I said, "At least you do not make very much progress by your method, if every session or two the thing has to be done over again."

What supports the whole outlay falling under direct and indirect bribery? Legitimate business must do it, and ultimately real production, wherever that may be found and whatever it is. But the effects of this single item, bribery, on business, are far greater than the mere money outlay. The time and vitality of captains of industry are required by it. It is distinctly one of the prime elements of uncertainty. More capital is needed to conduct every business in consequence of it.

There are many forms of parasitic business. Companies are formed for the purpose of giving a few persons offices and salaries, and often there is no other reason for their existence. Or, they enter a legitimate field, but one in which fewer companies with fewer buildings, offices, officers, and agents could do all the business, and possibly much better. A heavier burden is put upon every other business because of the excessive costliness of what this performs. A body of men are withdrawn from some legitimate activity. Capital is applied to superfluous undertakings, and useful projects cannot obtain it. In the end, real production sustains the pressure.

If these facts are followed out, they indicate that a great many people, apparently productive, are supported by actually productive industry without rendering anything, or, if anything, any fair proportion, in return. Much of the business that is done consists not of production, or of anything that aids production, but is a scheme and device for getting possession of some part of the product. It is a war of brains, and of brains from which the moral element has been dropped. Living by one's wits is characteristic of the American temper, and it obtains among us as much, or nearly as much, respect as legitimate business and hard, solid production. But the two things are wide contraries, and the former is a sucker upon the latter.

Now the great bane of business is uncertainty. Steady application and the greatest foresight do not insure success. The business man cannot look ahead to a point where the spectre of failure does not lurk in his path. Uncertainty is inherent in a system of highly organized competition; but the difficulties and uncertainty are immensely increased by the illegitimate elements just referred to. Every man who enters business with honest aims is the prey of a pack of persons who live by managing the business machinery. Their function is to get away the profits of producers by manipulation. They are the highway robbers and the thieving tricksters of industry. And yet, as I have said, their part is con-

sidered a respectable one. One reason for this is that unreal transactions are so complicated with real, and performed by the same persons, that it is hard to discriminate them.

There can be but one issue of this state of things. The business man will spare no effort to acquire the largest fortune in the briefest time. He will try to amass sufficient wealth to enable him to retire and live on safely invested capital free from care, or he will endeavor through the magnitude of his undertakings or by combination to lift himself above the breakers of competition and uncertainty. Thus, through dread of dangers of business and anxiety to escape them, these very persons multiply the dangers and make the struggle harder. An intelligent business man reasons somewhat in this wise: "The question for me is not simply whether I can meet the heavy expenses of this year and next and ten years from now and make a living, but whether I can sustain my business through twenty-five years in order then to have a living. There are before me many unforeseen difficulties and times of great strain, and I must provide against these while the way is smooth. I must, therefore, be closer in my management than I would otherwise be or than I like to be. I must hire help cheap and get all I can out of my help, and do other things in a similar spirit." This is the genesis and explanation of some of the apparent and real meanness of employers to those who work for them. But the principal thing to notice here is that the life of the average employer in the present reign of uncertainty is very unenviable. The heaviest curse in modern industry is not labor, but uncertainty.

Up to this point, then, the problem as we see it is to lighten the burden on actual production, especially by diminishing the uncertainty.

Let us now turn to a familiar argument and see how what we are saying affects it. Computation, we are told, shows that if all the wealth of the United States were divided equally among the people, each person would have but the equivalent of \$900 in money. Likewise, dividing total income, each individual would have somewhat less than \$394 per annum.¹ In this estimate children and women have been included, so that the property and income of a family may be obtained by simple multiplication. Say there are five persons in a family, the capital will be \$4,500, the yearly income \$1,970.

Far from being a poor showing, as the author of it assumes, it

¹ *Ultimate Finance*, by William Nelson Black, pp. 2, 3.

is extremely encouraging. There are now many families in the country containing five and more than five persons whose income is less than that allotted to each unit in this estimate, namely, \$394. The writer, nevertheless, says:¹ "Men are apt to think that there is privation only because wealth is unequally or unjustly distributed. But they could not take a more erroneous view." "Look upon this subject in any light of which it is capable, and we see that the great want of the world is capital, or the power of producing income. Until this want is supplied there can be no general amendment." His own figures show the possibility of a very remarkable general amendment simply by better distribution of the capital we already have.²

But the point that I wished to make is this. We have seen that a considerable part of what is produced goes to persons who have not only no claim to it, but who actually hamper its production. What would be the effect if these persons in their present capacity were eliminated from the industrial machinery and compelled to become producers?

As already remarked, the strain of business would be greatly relieved, and now, translating this into terms of actual income, the actual wealth of each individual in society would be happily augmented. A single person can live in comfort upon \$350 a year, and save from \$394. If \$25, or \$50, or \$100 were added to this, a man would be opulent.

But one very important class of non-producers has not been taken count of. There are persons who receive an income from society without any pretense of taking active part in production. This class is likewise supported by those engaged in actual production, and they add to their burden. This opens the question of the retired capitalist and the children, children's children, and remote descendants of the retired capitalist, provided they are inactive. They do nothing, but others feed, clothe, and house them, give them carriages, and supply them with funds to travel over the world and buy bricabrac. If they invest their money wisely, and ideas on the subject do not change, their offspring will be thus fed and fondled till the end of the world. What I ask is this: What entitles them to this support?

Is it, as economists say, the reward of saving or abstinence? Then many of us who are now toiling deserve to be supported in the

¹ *Ultimate Finance*, by William Nelson Black, pp. 2, 3.

² Better distribution and equal division, it must be remembered, are not the same thing.

same manner. For there have been many who likewise saved, but who by a poor investment lost what they saved. They forfeited their right to be supported by others through thus losing their savings through a poor investment. Then it is not merely saving that confers upon one this right, but saving coupled with a safe investment. Now this is something unthought of in political economy, and it sets prevalent theories at naught. For, in the first place, if saving has anything at all to do with creating this right to support,—and economic theory, I repeat, says it has everything to do with it,—then the man who saves has still some right to be supported even though he has made a poor investment, and in strictness he has just as much claim to this as before. And the reasonableness of this view is greatly strengthened by a further analysis of the process. The mere saving of wealth is not an economic benefit; it becomes such when this saving is turned to production or is used as capital. It is when the man who has saved applies his wealth to production, or lends it to some one else for that purpose, that he begins to have claims upon society for support other than those which the gradual expenditure of his principal to satisfy his needs would give. He loans his capital as wisely as he can, and herein he has done all that he can. He has made the two important contributions for the economic well-being of his fellows: he has abstained from present employment by saving, and he has turned what he saved over to society to be used by one of its representatives for the general good. Therefore he deserves support, and his posterity after him. If what he loaned is lost, it was not his wish; probably it was lost by an economic accident, a crisis or the like. Nevertheless, if one man who has saved and advanced his money to another for productive purposes is supported, every man who does the same thing should be supported, whatever be the course of what he loans. This not being done, the whole economic theory which treats capital as the result of saving, and this saving as conferring certain rights, is erroneous, and the rights that are assumed for capital on that ground are untenable, or, if valid, must be so for some new reason. But since society does not support those who do these two things,—in the degree, of course, that they do them,—but only supports those who do these and a third thing, that third thing must be the most important. And it will be absolutely proved that this third thing is most important, if society rewards the doing of it alone or in conjunction with only one of the others. Now this third thing is investing the money in a safe

way, that is, apparently, putting the money in the hands of some one who will not waste it; but even this, as we shall see, is not necessarily true. And that society does regard this third thing as the most important is seen from the fact that people who have not themselves saved money, those who have received it as a gift, or obtained it by speculation, or in other ways, or even stolen it, if in accordance with certain legal requirements, are, if they invest this money safely, regarded as entitled to support, and their descendants are likewise supported by society so long as they invest safely.¹

¹ The following speaks for itself. It appeared in the *San Francisco Examiner*, February 22, 1889, upon the death of J. C. Flood:—

“CAPTURING A MINE.

“HOW THE FIRM GAINED CONTROL OF THE HALE AND NORCROSS.

“An interesting story is told of the manner in which Flood, Mackay, Fair, and O’Erien obtained control of the Hale and Norcross mine. At that time the Hale and Norcross, like all the other Comstock properties, was selling by the foot. This mine had 400 feet, and Mr. Flood, believing that there was a large body of ore in it, advised his partners to secure the controlling interest. Sharon and Ralston, who at that time represented the Bank of California and had a controlling interest in nearly all of the Comstock mines, made their plans to break down these new interlopers.

“The contest, naturally, was very vigorous, and under the pressure of the great demand for the stock the price of Hale and Norcross rapidly advanced from \$1,200 a foot to between \$5,000 and \$6,000 a foot. The contest finally got so close that only ten feet had to be secured by either party before the desired control could be gained, but where and who the owner of the ten feet was, was a question that neither side could answer. They, however, did not remain idle, but caused diligent inquiry to be made, and had every nook and corner of the stock market searched.

“A CUNNING OPERATOR.

“Mr. Sharon, while in Virginia City, heard that the ten feet belonged to a man who had died some time before, and who had left them to his widow. She, not knowing how valuable the certificates had become, put them away and bestowed no further thought upon them. All the telegraphic business of mining men was transacted in cipher, and the telegraph operator in the Virginia City office, and through whose hands all these cryptic messages passed, had a loftier ambition than that of remaining a lightning striker all his life. He was also investing his surplus on margins in stocks, and he very naturally and methodically took a great interest in the nature of the cipher used by Sharon and Ralston. He even nursed his curiosity so far as to sit up very late at night studying over these cipher messages, and finally succeeded in deciphering them. He had already translated two or three of Sharon’s messages, and had quietly profited by the acquired knowledge, when Sharon handed him a message urging Ralston to hunt up the widow and buy the ten feet from her at any price. The operator, who was a shrewd and canny Englishman, knew that

It seems at first thought as if that which society intends to promote and reward were preservation of capital, valuable to society itself, from waste, and that for this reason it supports those who select good investments. But this is fallacious. For the borrower may waste and dissipate what he borrows, and yet the right of the lender to support by society is not forfeited, provided the borrower has enough money in other things to cover this loss, that is, to repay the lender. The borrower may be a successful producer in some line, A; he may have invested and lost the borrowed money in a way, B, not affecting this prosperous business, A; but the business, B, will be taken away from him to reimburse the loaner of the lost money, although through loss of its successful head this productive business, A, may fail to the detriment of the community, and the community may thereby deprive itself of the productive ability and energy of this man.

What, then, does society reward the owner of capital for, in granting him support out of the fund of production? In the last

the contest between the two syndicates was for the possession of the Hale and Norcross, and he realized the importance of the message at once.

"He quietly laid it by, and about half an hour or so afterward Mr. Mackay dropped in. He had treated the operator in a very friendly way by carrying stock for him and by doing other kind acts, and the operator was a grateful man. So he told Mr. Mackay about the dispatch that had not been sent.

"Mr. Mackay immediately wired to Mr. Flood, who found the widow, and bought the ten feet for \$8,000 a foot, and after doing so he telegraphed to Sharon to say that it was no use to fight any longer, that he had got the ten feet, and that his firm had secured control of the mine.

"THEY WERE GRATEFUL.

"Mackay and Fair were as grateful as was the operator, for that astute gentleman is now living in San Francisco enjoying the interest on \$500,000, which he realized in stocks by following 'points' given him by those whom he had placed on the right track to get control of the Hale and Norcross. Mr. Mackay introduced him to Mr. Flood, and said: 'This is the man who was so good as to be able to give us that information in the Hale and Norcross matter. Now whenever he wants you to do anything for him in the stock market, you do it.'

"Shortly after that the operator asked Mr. Flood to buy him some Sierra Nevada, and Mr. Flood accordingly bought him 5,000 shares of Union and Sierra Nevada at \$5, \$6, and \$10 a share, and when the price of the stock got up to \$70 a share he sold it, and paid Flood what he owed him. If he had lost, the bonanza firm would have footed the loss without complaining.

"The acquisition of the Hale and Norcross mine was the beginning of the bonanza firm's fortune. Out of that little bonanza alone there was taken three or four millions of dollars, and with this sum to start them they were able to enter into the larger speculations that added to their wealth."

analysis, it appears to be for being the victim of a happy accident. To be sure, shrewdness and foresight enter in usually to some extent, but sometimes they do not enter in at all, and yet the reward is granted. Moreover, the happy combination of circumstances always contains the element of chance,¹ whereas the greatest shrewdness is often thwarted by unfavorable chance, and it then goes unrewarded. And, furthermore, the element of chance is frequently the sole determining factor, for many people without the least shrewdness or foresight make good investments accidentally, and they live upon society from that day on. Very often they have a friend who by chance makes a safe outlay for them, and society supports them and their posterity as a reward for having a friend who did a certain thing accidentally.

We naturally ask if happy chance, which on analysis turns out to be the only element present in all circumstances where this support is conferred, is not rather heavily rewarded when its favorite is made the recipient of public support by the community, sometimes in the most magnificent luxury, and the duty of maintaining those whom he shall designate in the same degree of splendor is imposed upon generations yet unborn.

All this, however, is the reward of continual abstinence, it will be said by the economist. The abstinence of the man does not cease at the moment when his capital is accumulated. He might thereupon begin to spend it for unproductive purposes, for his own support, for food, clothes, parties, etc., instead of reserving it as principal and loaning it for productive uses. Now it is for this continued abstinence that he is supported and his children are supported as long as they leave the principal untouched.

This claim will not stand examination any more than the other; for a second thought shows that this continued abstinence often goes unrewarded. The man who does not make the fortunate loan abstains no less than the one who does, but he is not supported. He has saved, he has abstained, he has had the will to

¹ "Most men of business love a sort of twilight. They have lived all their lives in an atmosphere of probabilities and of doubt, where nothing is very clear, where there are some chances for many events, where there is much to be said for several courses, where, nevertheless, one course must be determinedly chosen and fixedly adhered to. They like to hear arguments suited to this intellectual haze. So far from caution or hesitation in the statement of the argument striking them as an indication of imbecility, it seems to them a sign of practicability. They got rich themselves by transactions of which they could not have stated the argumentative ground." . . . Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, p. 206.

continue to abstain, and according to the unquestioned principle of political economy he deserves support and should receive it. He has done what political economy proves to be the essential things, — the things which, according to political economy, are the basis and justification and reason of the reward. But an extraneous event occurs, one not vitiating the virtue of the essential acts performed, and the reward is withheld. The unfortunate investor does, after he has lost his money, just what he would have done had he not lost his money: he abstains from the use of it, but society refuses to support him longer in idleness. It is therefore not the continued abstinence or the will to abstinence that is rewarded. The element that remains is, as before, the element of fortunate chance.

It must at this point be further emphasized that it is not even the benefit to society through safe investment that is rewarded. Investments that are safe to the individual investing, but not safe to society in the sense of beneficial to it, are rewarded equally with those that are beneficial to society. If this is so, why does society reward with support those who do nothing for it? Let us see if this is so. To take the previous case, I lend to a man who owns and successfully operates a cotton factory enough to start a sugar refinery. The project of the refinery fails, and most of the capital borrowed of me and invested in it is sunk. The cotton factory, however, saves me from loss, and it now passes into my hands. The capital which I saved, and which entitled me to social support, is now blotted out of existence, but I have, nevertheless, not lost my title to support. It will be objected to this reasoning that it is jugglery of language, since what the borrower lost was really his own capital which he had virtually exchanged for mine, or, in any event, it was he who lost mine, and not I myself, and therefore he should sustain the penalty, loss of social support. But I reply that the two cases — the annihilation of my capital by myself and its annihilation by some one else — are not the same. I ran no risk; the other person took the whole risk and failed, and was punished for it by the confiscation and transference of all his own property to me. Had the undertaking succeeded, it would have been beneficial to society; no undertaking of this sort is unattended with risk: for taking the risk to do that which would help society, he was punished; for refusing to take the risk and doing what was sure, whether the undertaking failed or succeeded, to benefit me, I was rewarded.

Nor are the consequences to production always the same in the

two cases. By the assumption, the cotton factory was successfully producing in the hands of the borrower; but it now comes into my possession, who have no experience in the business, nor desire to engage in it, and who therefore dispose of it to a third person. Now, as facts continually prove, it is doubtful whether the new undertaker will succeed, and how far he will succeed. He may be inferior in productive ability to his predecessor, and then the community has lost something, and he may entirely fail, in which event two capitals have been sunk because I delegated the task of experimenting with my capital to some one else. Had I controlled it myself, but one could have been lost, at worst. But still I am uninjured. The second loss falls upon another man, who assumed the risk of supplying society with the things needed for its existence, and with those consumed by persons who, like me, are supported by the production of others. I still have my capital to lend to a third man, and perhaps with the same results. So far from the support furnished me by society being a reward for investments in which capital is saved from destruction, I may loan in such a way as to repeatedly annihilate capitals of equal size with my own.

Take another case. The owner of five hundred acres of agricultural land expends the rent that he receives from it on his own pleasure, but not being content with this, he borrows my capital, securing me with the land, and consumes it in luxurious living. The support provided for me by society is not withdrawn. It is true that I abstained from the consumption of my capital, and that the one who consumed it and enjoyed it is now deprived of social sustenance. But in consequence of the willingness of society to support me in inactivity, provided I invested my money securely, that is (1) where it would be productively used, or (2) where the borrower had its equivalent and gave me a lien upon it, I was enabled to place it within the power of some one else to squander this amount of capital unproductively, and if I enabled another to do a thing that he could not do without my help, or could not so easily do, it is much the same as doing it myself. It will be objected that the landowner could place his land upon the market and sell it outright and accomplish the same dissipation of capital by squandering the money received. This is true only because land is like capital safely invested: the ownership of it enables one to derive support from the labor of others. If this were not so, if the owner of land could not obtain support from it without himself laboring, and if, as we are assuming, the possessors of capital could not live in idleness by letting others use

their capital, those capital holders wishing to live in idleness would not purchase the land, since it would be useless for their purpose. To live in idleness, they would be compelled to withhold their capital from investment and consume it, after which would come labor. The only one to invest in land would be the capitalist wishing to actually work the land. To him the present land-owner wishing to live in idleness would sell. Thus the land would pass into the hands of workers. The value of the land under this arrangement might be squandered once, — by the one who sold it to get capital to dissipate, — but there would be little tendency to squander it a second time, since its possession had passed from the class of squanderers to the class of workers. The squanderers or annihilators of capital are those who have been bred to habits of living without labor, and who are calculating upon a régime where many of those who are best supported, and best supported permanently, do not labor themselves.

The loaning but inactive capitalist would disappear, and with his disappearance the motive to squander would be reduced in force in another way. Most of the squandering is gradual — one loan after another with mortgages which it is hoped to meet. Positive sale is shrunk from. Positive sale would be the only alternative if the loaning capitalist lost the privilege of being supported by society without labor. The loaning capitalist may now lend to one man who will thus squander his wealth, finally taking his mortgaged property as payment; he may then sell this property and advance the same amount to a second person to squander, and so on indefinitely. For doing this society supports him. We started out in our last inquiry to find if it was not for investing capital in such a safe way that it would not be wasted that the reward of society is conferred. We find that it is equally conferred if the capital is used to bring about the repeated destruction of amounts of capital equal to itself.

But the argument will at length meet us that these are necessary evils, inseparable from a greater good, which greater good is inducement to accumulate capital at all. Some, nay much, of this saved wealth goes into production, and but for the reward offered there would be no accumulation. To test the value of this defense, we must consider the magnitude of the reward in comparison with the sacrifice undergone. Consider first the relative pleasure to be derived from spending a capital and from leaving it intact with the outlook of permanent support from it. In the one case, after a period of comfort or luxury, poverty, loss of

social standing, the necessity of labor without the fulcrum of capital, await one with infallible certainty. In the other, anxiety is reduced to a minimum. There need be no thought of the morrow; the children need have no thought of the morrow. The reward is a steady, and in some cases practically endless, income without labor. Such, too, is the theory of the incitement. Among the prizes that men may draw for not consuming their capital are pledges of their fellow-men to support them and their posterity in inactivity so long as human society lasts. And besides making new pledges of this nature, society is fulfilling pledges made last year and last century and centuries ago, and has on its hands whole families who sip the cream of human possessions and toil and spin not.

The objection to this is that the possible prizes are so staggering and tremendous. As to the two outlined courses of spending and saving capital, the advantages are all on the side of saving. To begin to dissipate a principal is to start immediately on a downward road. To see and act upon this, a man does not need the stimulus of a similar blessing to follow his line to remote futurity. To enter upon the downward way of diminishing principal means the perceptible decrease of respect for him by his fellow-men. Instead of the natural inducements to spend being stronger and needing to be offset by remarkable counter considerations, it seems that the natural inducements not to spend are greater, and would be effective were the promised rewards much less than they now are.

To conclude, it is only necessary to call attention to the fact that this huge task of supporting in varying grades of comfort and magnificence many idle persons falls upon the real producers of each day. Besides supporting themselves, they must aid in supporting others, many of whom live infinitely better than themselves. Take this in connection with the uncertainty of modern business, at first considered, reflect also how this weight adds to the uncertainty, and we begin to comprehend why men will do almost anything to get rich quickly. If they cannot themselves live on the level of peace and unselfishness and improving moral sentiment, they may be able to lift their children to this level out of the arena and into the company of unimpassioned spectators.

Morrison I. Swift.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

THE EDUCATION OF THE ROMAN YOUTH.

As far as is known, the Roman State never contributed anything for the support of education until the time of Vespasian. He set aside a definite sum to be paid yearly to the Greek and the Latin rhetoricians. The emperors that followed took a much greater interest in public instruction, and as Rome's military glory decreased, so the government expended more time and money in the establishing of schools and employing of teachers. The standard of education was raised under Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Alexander Severus until mistaken ideas prevailed, and, it may be said, the whole system passed into verbal subtleties, mere superficiality, an imparting of something of everything (which meant not much of anything), in the time of Valentinian I. and Theodosius II. Consequently, the highly educated man of that day was equipped with an encyclopædia of facts, a bundle of philosophic maxims, a countless number of startling paradoxes, and innumerable hair-splitting logical definitions.

During the whole period of Rome's existence antecedent to the reign of Vespasian, the state remained almost inactive in disseminating knowledge. Augustus, it is true, made valuable presents to certain professors of the liberal arts, and Julius Cæsar had already offered citizenship to physicians and teachers that would make their home in Rome. These acts, however, had no special significance, except as precedents for later rulers.

It must not be thought that the civil authorities were wholly indifferent as to the manner and subjects in which, and the persons by whom, the youth was educated, but there was no regular and watchful supervision on their part. We know that they on various occasions interfered, but such interferences had reference to isolated cases, and usually on the ground that they were not in accordance with the customs of their ancestors.

Why did kings and consuls, even emperors, refrain from putting under state control the education of the youth? On the part of the emperors, at least, it was not out of respect for the liberty of their subjects, nor from an unwillingness to regulate their private affairs; for when Rome began to totter, undermined by lust, licentiousness, and excess of every kind, Augustus did not hesitate to prop it up by means of laws against luxury, and by edicts almost forcing the people to marry on account of severe penalties to which a non-compliance exposed them. And yet he never

touched that question, namely, the education of the Roman youth, the regulation of which would have proved far more efficacious than all sumptuary or marriage laws. More than this, it was an established and universally acknowledged principle among the Romans, that the individual existed for the state and not the state for the individual. The citizen could be called upon to make any sacrifice for its safety. The general could command him to ride among the enemy to certain death as a substitutionary offering to the Earth, or to the Gods of the Dead.

This is not a new question. Many answers, not satisfactory, have been given; the true one is, we think, not far to seek. It was on account of a principle that lay at the foundation of the family, namely, the *patria potestas*. The *paterfamilias*, or father of the family, was the oldest ancestor living on the male side. The family included the head, *pater*, the wife, if she was in the hand, *in manu*, of her husband, and all legitimate descendants related through males. A daughter belonged to her father's family, unless she had become a wife *in manu*.¹ The power of the Roman father, *patria potestas*, over his family was, in early times, almost absolute. Theoretically, this was always the case, and it was practically so for centuries. The son had no personal property, no legal right even to his *peculium*. The father could sell the son once, and if his master freed him the father could sell him again, and it was not until he had been sold a third time that he passed wholly from under the possible jurisdiction of his father.² Among the ancient Romans it was easier for a slave to acquire freedom than for a Roman. Now the Roman state was founded on the family. It was nothing but a large family with more numerous branches. Whatever would tend to weaken the power of the father over the children weakened the power of the head of the larger family, that is, the state, over the children, that is, its subjects. Children were not responsible to the state, but to the father, their lawful representative.³ Cæsar, Augustus, and

¹ A woman might be a lawful wife (*matrimonium iustum* or *legitimum*), whether she was *in manu* of her husband or not. If she was not a wife *in manu*, she still belonged to her father's family, although her children would be in her husband's family.

² According to Gaius, *Epit.*, i. 6, and Ulpian, x. 1, a triple sale was only in the case of sons; other descendants, both male and female, were emancipated by one sale.

³ A son when of proper age could vote, hold office, or be a guardian, independent of his father. Any pay or emolument resulting therefrom would go to his father. *Digest*, i. 6^a; xxxvi. 1st.

more arbitrary rulers often hesitated to fly in the face of tradition or the *mores majorum*, preferring to carry out their plans by a seeming deference to the will of the people or of the senate. The politic Augustus did not venture to wrest from the father this authority over his children, lest there follow insubordination toward the natural head, which might be the forerunner of rebellion in the larger family, of which he himself was the political head. This element, the influence of the state, which among other nations would be found powerful, need not be taken into consideration by us while discussing the education of the Roman youth.

The prevailing belief among the Greeks and Romans was that life was not desirable. This crystallized itself into the proverb, that by far the best thing for man was not to be born, and the next best thing, to die as soon as possible. Lucretius, the most gifted of Latin poets, describes the condition of the new-born infant in the following words: "The babe, like a sailor thrown up by the cruel waves, lies naked on the ground, speechless, in need of every aid to life, when first nature by throes of birth has cast him forth upon the shores of light; and he fills the place with his piteous wail, as it befits one for whom it remains to pass through so many ills in life."¹ The words "on the ground" in this passage refer to the practice, in vogue among the Greeks and Romans, of exposing infants. The sight of the helpless and forsaken child in a public place must have excited the pity of many an on-looker and helped to form the proverb, and have suggested to Lucretius the lines quoted. A misshapen or deformed child was put to death without having been given even this chance of life, and a babe that the parents did not desire for any reason to bring up was put down in the street for any fate that might befall it. The poor pleaded poverty in justification for such heartlessness, but those who were wealthy did not shrink from ridding themselves in this way of their offspring. If the child was to be reared, it was laid upon flowers and sacred herbs, and the father, or one appointed by him, lifted up the infant, thus becoming responsible for it thereafter. By means of messengers and the daily bulletins, the event was announced, and nine days afterward in the case of a boy, or eight days if it was a girl, the day of purification was celebrated. The friends assembled, bringing presents. The first, and by far the most important one, was an oval flat disk, sometimes resembling a locket, given by the

¹ V. 222-227.

father. It was called a *bullā*, and was suspended from the neck to ward off the influence of the evil eye. The *bullā* was made of Etruscan gold or of silver. If the father was poor, a knot made of a leathern strap had to suffice.¹ At this ceremony the name was given to the infant.

Even at this early stage in the child's life, its training and education would depend upon the period of Rome's history in which it was born. If this was before the subjugation of the East, or 150 B. C., the strictly Roman system in all probability would be followed; if later, Grecian influence would act upon it at every step. There was no clearly defined line separating these two systems; for some Romans adopted the customs of the Greeks before 150 B. C., and, on the other hand, we know that in certain families the excellent traits of early Roman education were never effaced.

Before foreign elements began to demoralize home life, there were constantly held up before the child integrity, *honestas*, dignity, *gravitas*, and manly virtue, *virtus*. There was added to these refinement, *urbanitas*,² which had about it nothing reprehensible. It was the opposite of rusticity, embracing the results of life in the city as far as pertained to refinement. If a man was praised, he was said to be good, upright, one who was honorable, and an attentive father of his household. These terms show what qualities parents desired their children to possess.

The predominating feature in the education of the young in this early period was the mother's influence. The child was said to be brought up in the mother's lap, *in gremio matris educari*. She was a constant companion, never giving her son or daughter entirely into the charge of others, from the day the *bullā* was hung around the neck until the lad formally passed out of boyhood or the girl wedded. The mother did more than form character. She watched most carefully the child's language, not only that it be free from what was obscene, but that it be pure. Cicero says³ that it makes a great difference whom the child hears daily at home, with whom he speaks, how his father, mother, and instructors speak. He tells us that the Gracchi were brought up not only in the lap, but also in the language, of their mother Cornelia. He mentions other women who, choice in their use of language, fashioned the lisping lips of future statesmen. Curio, who ranked third among the orators of that time, had no knowl-

¹ Juvenal, v. 163 f.

² Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.*, iii. 7^a.

³ *Brutus*, lviii., lix.

edge of poetry, had read no productions of orators, had made no historical collections, was not acquainted with law. He knew, moreover, almost nothing of literature. His reputation was due to his pure and refined phraseology, the result of the correct and polished language used at home.

In the education, the mother was sometimes assisted by a faithful friend, but the children were not given over, as was the case in a later age, to a Grecian underling. Although there were schools, the home instruction was the more common, consisting of little else than reading, writing, and arithmetic. Literature, and especially poetry, was not held in esteem. Cato's words are: "Honor was not shown to the art of poetry. If any one devoted himself to poetry, or frequented banquets, he was called an idler." A slight knowledge of the laws was imparted by the father to the sons, and the mother taught the daughters spinning and weaving. If the father tilled the soil, the sons wrought by his side, and from him they learned also how to swim, ride, and defend themselves with fist and weapons. Although there was but little formal instruction, and no clearly defined principles were followed, nevertheless we can discern definite aims; for example, physical health and strength, fear of God, respect for the laws, modesty, self-control in word and action, propriety of conduct in public, practical activity, confidence in one's self, and a firm belief in the great destiny of the state. For these the daily routine served as a school. Whenever the father sacrificed in the house, or at a shrine of the clan, the sons performed the subordinate offices, and thus there were awakened and quickened in them religious feelings. When the master of the house received his clients early in the morning to discuss matters of business, or when, on festal days, he brought forth the images of ancestors that had conferred glory on the family, or when the table-songs were sung recounting the deeds of heroes, and orations delivered commemorative of former statesmen, the sons were bidden to be present, that, by the examples set before them, they might learn their duties in life and be spurred on to rival their forefathers.

The sons of senators once enjoyed an advantage, especially in the line of statesmanship and judicial life, that did not fall to the lot of others. It was this: each senator had a right to take his son, or sons, with him into the senate chamber. The following incident, recorded in the "*Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius*," i. 23, explains how this privilege was lost. One day, a young man, Papirius, went with his father, as was his custom, into the senate

house. A matter of unusual importance was introduced, and the further consideration of it was postponed to the next day. It was resolved that no one should make any mention of the subject of debate until there had been an official announcement. When young Papirius went home, his mother inquired what the senators had been discussing. The youth replied that secrecy had been enjoined, so that he was not at liberty to tell. This increased the mother's curiosity, and, with great vehemence, she demanded an answer. Papirius, seeing her importunity, determined upon a humorous fiction. He said the senate had seriously considered the question, whether it would be more beneficial to the state for one man to have two wives, or for one wife to have two husbands. The mother was greatly agitated, and went in great trepidation to report the news to her neighbors. On the morrow, the matrons betook themselves, in a body, to the senate, and, with tears and entreaties, implored that one wife might be suffered to have two husbands rather than one husband two wives. The senators were astounded, but Papirius advanced into their midst and explained all. The senators were delighted with his integrity and ingenuity, and yet a law was passed that, thenceforward, no youth, except Papirius Prætextatus, should enter the senate house.

Such was the education of children in the early period of Rome, bearing from first to last the stamp of the parents', and especially of the mother's, influence. One generation following in the footsteps of another gave a wonderful stability to the nation, but shut out all progress in art, science, and culture. The Greeks aimed at the harmonious development of the whole man, something never dreamed of by the Romans. Morally, however, this one-sided and crude education was vastly superior to that of the Greeks, and if the Romans had retained this foundation, and built upon it after the Grecian model, the structure would have been unequaled among the ancients in solidity and beauty.

The youth at about the age of sixteen (although the extremes were twelve and nineteen) passed into man's estate. The *bulla*, which he had worn since his ninth day, was hung up as an offering to the household gods. The toga prætexta, with its broad purple stripe, was laid aside, and the toga of manhood, of pure white, was put on. He went, accompanied by father and relatives, to the forum, where he was enrolled as a citizen; thence to the Capitol, where he sacrificed. Notwithstanding he was now legally a man, and possessed of all the rights of citizenship, it was expected that he remain a passive bystander for one year. He was called a *tiro*, and was said to keep his arm at rest under his mantle.

This year was spent in preparing himself for one of the three careers open to the sons of the best families; the judicial, the military, or that of a state official. This was done by becoming the constant companion of some prominent orator in that special line of jurisprudence to which he wished to devote himself, as Cicero, in later times, accompanied Scævola, or by joining the retinue of some officer, or by going as a subordinate official to one of the provinces.

Passing to the next period, extending from 150 B. C. to the fall of the empire, we shall find radical changes in the system of education followed by unforeseen results. The rage was, on all sides, for what was Grecian. The Greeklings, as Juvenal calls them, penetrated into every department of Roman life. If wealthy and high-born, they were courted and petted. Even to the Greek slaves a certain deference was shown, and they supplanted the home-born slaves in the confidence of the master. As heretofore, the family and friends assembled on the ninth or eighth day, the *bullæ* was hung around the child's neck, a name was given it, and then, instead of being kept under the mother's protection, the infant was consigned to the care of a nurse. Believing that this innovation affected ultimately not only the stability of the family, but also of the state, we shall refer to a passage in the "Dialogue concerning Orators," commonly attributed to Tacitus, in which are described the persons who now took the mother's place. The import of section 28 is, that in former times the infant was not given into the charge of a hireling nurse, but was brought under the close and affectionate supervision of the mother. The chief praise of a woman was to manage her household affairs, and to devote herself to her children. A matron related to the family, and distinguished for purity of life, was set over the young offspring. In her presence, not one disgraceful word was allowed to be spoken, and nothing dishonorable to be done; but now (section 29) the infant is committed to the care of some Greek nurse, and of a slave or two, generally the worst in the household, and not fit for any important service. These fill the tender and untrained minds of the young with their stories and errors. Not a slave in the whole house cares what he says or does in the presence of his young master. Moreover, also, the parents themselves accustom the young children to wantonness and to deriding. Gradually all sense of shame is lost, and likewise respect for self and for others. The minds of the youth seemed to be taken up wholly with actors, gladiators, and horses.

A conclusive proof of the close relationship existing between these nurses and the children is the fact that the word of endearment, *mamma* (literally breast), by which the child formerly addressed its mother, was applied also to the nurse. And, moreover, the common word for mother, *mater*, had become so ambiguous that in Plautus, *Menæchmi* Prologue, l. 19–21, the term designates both the nurse and mother, and yet it is used in such a way that we must come to the conclusion that by the word *mater* the nurse was more commonly understood than the natural parent.

At about seven years of age, when the child could understand intelligently, it came into the keeping of the pedagogue, likewise a Greek or foreign slave. The pedagogues were not teachers. It was their duty to train boys in morals and manners, and to give them a practical knowledge of Greek, as preparatory for entering upon school duties. These pedagogues were polished, had a thorough acquaintance with the world, and knew how to smooth off the corners of their young wards. They have been described, however, as most shameless, self-conceited, without real education, and morally worthless. Their greatest solicitude was about the lad's table manners: that he use the right hand in preference to the left, that he eat fish and meat with two fingers of the right and bread with two fingers of the left hand; and, above all, that he properly throw his cloak around his left shoulder. The pedagogue conducted the boy to the school of the grammarist, *grammatista*, *litterator*, before daylight. Here he was taught reading, writing, and simple arithmetic. The pupil learned the names, order, and pronunciation of the letters, passing then to syllables, words, and sentences. An earnest but unavailing effort was made to introduce the syllabic method, the advocates thereof claiming that the learning of the names and order of the letters was a waste of time. Distinct pronunciation was acquired by practicing difficult combinations of sounds. The text-books were the Laws of the XII Tables, treaties, afterwards the writings of the earliest Latin poets, and, in later times, the productions of the classical and the post-classical period. The materials used in writing were waxen tablets, and an iron stylus sharp at one end and blunt at the other for the purpose of erasure. A good portion of the time was spent on arithmetic. The Romans made use of the duodecimal system, dividing the units into twelfths in measures of length, capacity, weight, and time, and in money. The grammarists were not very kind. They are spoken of as shouting and fond of flogging. One of Martial's epigrams (ix.

69) is as follows: "What have you to do with us, you rascal of a school-teacher, a person hated by boys and girls! The crested cocks have not yet broken the silence, but you are already making a thundering noise with your savage growling and blows." And in xii. 57, he complains that the school-teachers will not let him live in the morning, and the bakers will not at night.

The boy was promoted to the school of the Greek and the Latin grammarian, *grammaticus* or *litteratus*. This literary element was something new in Roman life, since it was far removed from what was practical. Many preferred that the instruction in Greek should precede that in Latin. 1st. Because the pupils would necessarily make progress in Latin on account of their surroundings. 2d. Systematic instruction demanded that the study of Greek, the parent language of Latin (according to their ideas), should be pursued first.¹ The preliminary course, both in the Greek and Latin schools, treated of grammar proper. The scholars now studied theoretically what they had learned practically. There were included the declensions, conjugations, and rules of syntax. Selections from the poets were to be read understandingly, attention being paid to pronunciation, emphasis, and, above all, to enunciation. The way to the second course was thus opened. Here was developed and cultivated a literary and critical taste. In the Greek school, everything revolved around Homer. In the Latin, Livius Adronicus, Plautus, Terence, Vergil, Horace, and later writers were the text-books used. The instruction included a discussion of the author's rank in literature, of his personality and life, of the metre of the production, its philosophy and ethics. References to phenomena in nature were explained, and especially whatever pertained to the rising and the setting of constellations. The only practical aim was the power of ready and correct expression of thought. The fables of Æsop, and similar stories, were recited, and the pupils were obliged to re-write them, varying the style. Compositions and essays were required on such subjects as Homeric verse, The Departure of the Wanderer from Home, The Peasant's Thoughts at the First Sight of a Ship. Once a month a contest was held, which consisted of reading essays and delivering orations in the presence of parents. The contestants were ranked according to the merit of their performances, and kept that rank until the next contest, the thirtieth² day afterwards, came round. In connection with these literary studies, the scholars were taught drawing, higher arithmetic,

¹ Quintilian, i. 1st.

² Quintilian, i. 2nd.

geometry, astronomy, and music. These embraced the liberal arts. Geometry was one of the number, chiefly on account of its disciplinary nature. 1st. In geometry, order is absolutely necessary. It proves what follows from what precedes, what is unknown from what is known. 2d. Geometry teaches close syllogistic reasoning. Although music was included, no prominence was given it, even in the time of Augustus. It could not be proved from his writings that Cicero had a musical education, notwithstanding the contrary assertion is made in Tacitus, *Dial. de Oratoribus*, section 29. Among the Greeks, the study of music was never neglected, and Cicero himself refers to this difference between the Greeks and Romans. Cornelius Nepos deems it necessary (*Pref. to De Excellentibus Ducibus*, etc.) to apologize for Epaminondas, because he was acquainted with the art of music and could dance. Alexander Severus, who excelled both in vocal and instrumental music, would neither sing nor play in the presence even of friends. Quintilian¹ is very guarded in recommending the study of music. He restricts it to the songs of heroes and to a knowledge of the principles. Also dancing, which was part of a Greek youth's training, was not held in good repute. The opinion of the Romans was expressed in the words: "You will scarcely ever see a sober man dance, unless he is insane." We have in mind here music and dancing as forming part of a youth's education, and do not refer to the choral dances and songs for special occasions, nor to those persons who took part in public entertainments.

Many went no farther than this, and if they were of proper age laid aside the insignia of boyhood. Girls often engaged in these studies either under tutors or at school. No youth, however, could say that he had completed his education until he had taken the next step, which was to visit the lecture-room of a rhetorician. This was the nearest approach to a professional school. Not that such was intended, but the instruction prepared, in a great measure, for the forum and the senate. The schools of the rhetoricians were established by the Greeks and conducted in the Greek language. The first rhetoricians from Greece were summarily dismissed by the senate 161 B. C. They returned not long afterwards and were welcomed. Orators of high reputation put themselves under their training. In 92 B. C., Latin rhetoricians made efforts to organize schools in which the language and literature should be Latin, but the Censors issued a decree which forbade

¹ I. 1st.

the continuance of these schools, because : 1st. Latin schools of rhetoric were contrary to the customs of their ancestors.¹ 2d. The Greeks were more systematic in their instruction and had a broader range of knowledge. 3d. The instruction by the Latin rhetoricians resulted only in volubility and shamelessness. After a short time this edict was not heeded. The schools were founded and almost entirely supplanted the Greek institutions. The rhetoricians dictated their system and the students committed it to memory. A partial outline of one of the lectures is as follows : Every oration is (1) demonstrative, that is, laudatory or vituperative ; (2) deliberative, that is, something should or should not happen ; and (3) judicial, either accusing or defending. Every oration must be treated with reference to five things : (1) the matter, (2) arrangement, (3) memorizing, (4) style, and (5) delivery. The matter has the following subdivisions : (1) the introduction, (2) statement of the case, or circumstances, (3) proof, and (4) conclusion. Under proof we have (1) the fact, did or did it not take place, (2) the law in the case, and (3) if it took place (in the case of homicide) was it justifiable — and so on. The themes for essays and debates were *suasoriae* for the younger and *controversiae*² for the older pupils. Some of these subjects were very good ; for example, How far should a lawyer believe his witness ? The credibility of tradition ? Many of them, however, were absurd, presupposing impossible circumstances and involving points in law which would never occur in practice.³ A favorite exercise was to deliver panegyrics of illustrious men. The task the rhetoricians undertook was to enable the orator to speak on any subject convincingly, using the choicest language, delivering the oration in the best manner, in accordance with the dignity of the subject, the relations of time and place, and to the delight of his hearers. This drill, in principle excellent, often produced a mere fluency of language, a juggling with words, so that frequently lawyers would not let their clients tell them the particulars about their case until they had come into the court-room, and some of the lawyers were so vain that when it was their turn to speak they would ask some one near by for an opening sentence as far removed from the subject as possible. They prided themselves on being able to make this sentence a proper introduction to their

¹ This is interesting, because it shows how long a *practice* existed before becoming a *mos majorum*, about seventy-nine years.

² Tacitus, *Dial. de Orat.*, xxxv.

³ See *Declamations* of Quintilian and of Seneca.

oration. The intellectual discipline of the young men was not at an end, unless they went abroad to Athens, Alexandria, or elsewhere.

Thus far we have made no mention of physical training. Neither the exercise of the gymnasium nor of the palaestra, as a part of a youth's education, found favor, until the empire began to decline. The Greeks made it compulsory for lads to take part in systematic physical exercise under the control of masters. There was not a Greek city in which there was not at least one gymnasium. The Romans set value on a strong body, graceful carriage, activity, and agility, but they thought the Greek system was (1) immodest, (2) a waste of time, not preparing at all for military service, and (3) corrupting. So many young men coming together among so many idle and worthless spectators would be demoralized. They assembled, however, in the Field of Mars, and vied with each other in leaping, wrestling, boxing, fencing, throwing the spear, and riding. The only form of exercise they took from the Greeks was hurling the discus, not at a mark, but as far as possible. Swimming, and ball-playing especially, were favorite diversions.

Their greatest activity and regularity in these exercises were during the last year of their rhetorical schooling and the first year of manhood. No laws compelled young men to engage in these athletic sports, but their absence from the Field of Mars for a considerable length of time brought them into disgrace.¹ The pedagogue kept a watchful eye over his charge, and took special delight in seeing him foremost in these contests.

Leaving these details, we shall revert to the general principles, already touched upon, that seemed to underlie this whole system, and shall inquire wherein they were sound and wherein defective.

The first of these was that the education of the youth should be utilitarian; how was he to make his way in life? This was a wise principle, and should never be lost sight of, but the early Romans seemed ignorant of the fact that some things which, at the time, seem non-utilitarian, may in after life greatly further the interests of the man by unexpectedly turning to account his practical training. We find those Roman families in which there was the greatest conservatism in adhering to this utilitarian system did not become the powerful and wealthy families of Rome. They could not successfully cope with the cultured and refined foreigners from

¹ Horace, *Carm.*, i. 8.

Greece and the Orient, nor with those Romans whose education had been liberalized. Even if the object of life were the amassing of wealth, the so-called utilitarian education would not conduce best to this end. Studies that may be carried on at the moment only for culture oftentimes assist and even make practical those that were preëminently regarded as such.

Another and baneful result of this principle among the Romans was the insatiable desire for money. In no other literature do we find the avaricious man mentioned so often. This character and that of the poetaster are the most prominent in the *Satires* of Horace and of Juvenal. Horace describes the young and old as going up and down with their writing materials and counting tablets, wholly absorbed in money calculations. Their song the live-long day was, "Make money honorably, if you can; if you cannot honorably, in any way at all."¹ The race for money was one constant struggle, which nothing could stop, neither the boiling heat of summer, nor winter's intense cold, nor fire, nor sea, nor the sword. Warehouse after warehouse was filled with grain, and sack after sack of gold buried in the earth.² To show how strong was this passion for money and what it led men to do, Juvenal³ says that no vice of the human breast mixed more poisons or oftener attacked one with the knife than the fierce desire for an immoderate income; for "he who wishes to be rich wishes to become so quickly." And in describing one who threw overboard all his valuables to save himself, he exclaims in mock admiration, "Where else in the world in these days, I say, will you find another one who has the daring to prefer his life to silver and his safety to his possessions; for they make fortunes not for the sake of life, but basely blind they live for the sake of making fortunes."⁴ Where avarice was not the motive, it might be vanity or a desire to gain popularity. The love of display and fondness for extravagance were seen in their palaces and villas, gardens, household furniture⁵ and decorations, in their food, drink, and clothing, in the number of slaves, in the spectacles given to the people, and also in the funerals. The richer a man was, the more clients he could have to greet him in the morning and escort him on his rounds. He could be carried through the streets of Rome in his litter with a line of Romans clad in white preceding and follow-

¹ *Ep.*, i. 1, 45-66. ?

² Horace, *Sat.*, i. 1, 35-53.

³ Juvenal, *Sat.*, xiv. 174 f.

⁴ *Sat.*, xii. 48 f.

⁵ Pliny, *N. H.*, viii. 29, mentions a citron-wood table that sold for 1,400,000 sesterces, over \$60,000.

ing. If he had a knight's wealth, he would be allowed, according to the law of Otho, to sit in one of the first fourteen rows of the theatre.

The licentious man would have another motive prompting him to get money, even if he killed his guest-friend sleeping in the very sanctuary of his home before the household gods. In brief, among no people was the god money so worshiped as in Rome,¹ and this was the legitimate result of the utilitarian education.

A second fundamental principle was that the individual existed for the state and not the state for the individual. To a certain extent, this is sound doctrine, but when the state and political head are made identical, it is most pernicious. The manly and sturdy Romans never considered them as identical. Kings might be dethroned, consuls banished, and decemvirs deposed, yet the state still existed, and it was the citizen's duty as much as ever to die in its behalf. Two instances will suffice to prove this. Tarquin the Proud gave great strength to Rome and made it the head of the Latin Confederacy. Nevertheless, for the sake of a woman's honor, imperiled not by the king but by the king's son, he and his family were driven into exile, and the army before Ardea renounced all allegiance to him. Again, when Appius Claudius, the decemvir, was enamored of Virginia and in order to gain possession of her claimed that she was his slave, and when her father appealed to the other decemvirs in vain, and at last in despair stabbed his daughter, saying, "No way but this to keep thee free,"² the people of high birth and low, in city and camp, did not hesitate to rise up against the decemvirs and overthrow their power. These two instances cannot be paralleled in the history of any other nation, where attempted violence to woman twice wrought a revolution. Among these Romans the ruler was but the minister or servant of the state. As cycle after cycle, however, went round, the identity of the state was merged in that of the ruler, so that under Cæsar, Augustus, Nero, Domitian, we find the senate and the aristocracy willing to put up with almost any grievance. The people were nearly always ripe for rebellion, either in the city or in the field. Likewise there were those of the aristocracy that were ready to rise up against tyrants, but this was not the rule. It was sweet and glorious to die for one's country, but the country was embodied in the person of the one that sat upon the throne.

It was, moreover, a good thing to teach self-reliance, and like-

¹ Juvenal, i. 112 f.

² Livy, iii. 48.

wise the great destiny of Rome. The result, however, was pride, haughtiness, and arrogance, both in the individual and in the state.

The last principle was that of home training. The good side was the belief in the necessity of this, the bad side a belief in its all-sufficiency. The heterogeneous elements at first could offer little to the child that would be an improvement on what he might learn from his parents. This exclusively home education was then a necessity, and remained so long enough to become a custom of the ancestors, which gave it almost a religious sanction. Rome was, however, coming out of its isolation. Latium had been brought into subjection, Carthage rendered powerless, and Greece taken captive. The Orient also yielded, and Rome became the metropolis of the world. The staid, conservative Roman matrons began to realize they were uneducated, unrefined, partook of rusticity, and that their nation was classed by the Greeks among the barbarians. Their sons and daughters had not elegant manners, and could not vie, in social life, with the conquered but yet conquering Greeks. A change in the education of the children was imperative, and but two courses lay before them. One of these was for the mother to retain strict supervision over the children and to have home instruction, supplemented by the best teachers, not resigning her authority to a nurse or pedagogue. This course followed Aurelia, the mother of Cæsar, Attia, the mother of Octavianus Augustus, Porcia, the wife of Brutus, and Julia Procilla, the mother of Agricola. In this way, the sterling integrity, nobility of character, and all of the higher qualities of the Romans could be developed, and at the same time the youth be rounded off and polished, so that he need not feel ashamed in the presence of the courtly strangers.

The other course, the one taken by the majority of the matrons, was to surrender everything. The reins of authority were handed over to the Greek or Syrian nurse and then to an immoral pedagogue. The lad must learn those things that make a well-bred gentleman of the times, to wit, Greek and Latin literature and fine manners, but nothing was done for the higher qualities of his nature. This change in education, along with the almost universal prevalence of the looser form of marriage (*sine in manum conventionē*),¹ did more to bring about the downfall of Rome than any other internal cause, for the mother no longer taught the fear of the gods, nor did the father sacrifice in company with his

¹ Ulpian, xxvi. 7.

sons. Every idea of responsibility to a divine power was effaced. The service in the temples became realistic, and was retained only to awe the lower classes. A single sacrifice was repeated thirty times on account of some oversight. Long strains of music would be reproduced again and again if a pause had not been properly observed. Greek philosophy was naught but a skeleton. Greek mythology confused the minds of the people. Temple, shrines, sacred groves, were often neglected. No honor was in reality shown to the gods. As Juvenal tells us in regard to perjury, "it is so easy, and one is so prone to despise the gods as witnesses, provided no mortal knows the sacred oath."¹

From being skeptical the higher classes became superstitious, resorting to enchantments and fortune-telling. This was the *first* result of the mother's abandoning the child to strangers and foreigners, who did not either by example or precept teach it to believe in divine oversight and man's accountability.

The Roman oak still looked fair. It budded and put forth leaves, the admiration of all, but its tap-root had been cut.

The *second* result of this thrusting aside of the child was almost universal immorality. Women at first indulged in luxury, and the steps downward were of easy descent. Clandestine correspondence flourished on every hand. The mother sent love messages and tokens, the little daughter, too, wrote letters to her favorites at the mother's dictation. The lad still in the toga of boyhood was found at the gaming table. "Every vice," says Juvenal, "had reached its climax."² Those who spoke in defense of morality and in behalf of pure patriotism were laughed at as hypocrites.

The oak still stood. The leaves dropped earlier than their wont, here and there a branch was broken off, but still they called it the mighty oak that would last for ages. The tree had, however, rotted at the heart.

The *third* result of this utter neglect of the child by the mother was the breaking up of the family relations. Children did not show outward respect for their parents. The father too long-lived was throttled by the son. Husband left wife and wife husband from mere caprice and without form of law, neither one losing social position.³ The exposing of children on the highways became more common. Marriages were formed only as a matter of convenience; for example, to be able to gain an inheritance, or, on the

¹ *Sat.*, xiii. 75.

² *Sat.*, i. 149.

³ Seneca, *de Beneficiis*, i. 9; iii. 4, 16.

part of women, says Seneca, to give them greater license. The vices practiced as the outcome almost transcend belief. The third result, the breaking up of the family, foreshadowed what was impending over Rome. This was not immediate, for the Roman world was like Homer's hero, who in his failing strength exerts all his power and stands erect, only to fall back into greater weakness. Yet it was not long before there sprang up a breeze on the steppes of the Volga and around the Caspian Sea, where roamed the Huns, and the winds caused a rustling in the woods beyond the Danube, where dwelt the Goths, and a gale swayed to and fro the Black Forest of Germany. These forces warring with each other increased in fury, until at last the storm sweeping southward, blast after blast, struck the Roman oak. It snapped in twain and laid bare its hollowness.

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INFLUENCE AND INDEPENDENCE.¹

Agatha. But why should you wish to bring Miss Norton to your point of view? Why not allow her to arrive at things by a mental process of her own?

Julia. But suppose you believe that life can only come in its fullness from a certain conviction? It seems to me that the independence which most people are so jealous of in friendship is curiously false. They are constantly afraid of infringing upon each other's intellectual rights or feelings, and the result is that friendship, among women at least, is often dwarfed to a mere matter of practical service or personal affection, and deprived of much that is most precious in human intercourse, of the higher sympathy, the free give and take of mental effort or achievement. No, I cannot follow you there, Agatha. I cannot believe in your *laissez-faire* principle in friendship. On the contrary —

Agatha. Will you please explain to me what is the contrary of a *laissez-faire* principle in friendship?

Julia. That is a question which comes with peculiar grace from a young woman who will not allow her friend to sit peacefully

¹ The following discussion of Individualism by two accomplished writers has been cast into a dialogue, to give better expression to both sides of the question, and to carry out the discussion into the details of personal life. — Eds.

on a damp haycock in a thin dress and enjoy the sunset. Your proceeding last night was the contrary of *laissez-faire*, and I may add the reverse of consistent with your indifference as to the attitude of your friends in intellectual matters.

Agatha. That was on what you are pleased to regard as the lower plane of personal affection. But what a terror of consistency would be the young woman who should insist upon her advice being followed on all points.

Julia. I wish she were purely hypothetical instead of being a hard fact and a painful reality of every day. Are we not going on? We sat down on this stone wall to enjoy the view, and we have both forgotten its existence. *En avant!*

They descended from their perch and stood for a moment looking at the neglected view. It was one of those complete bits of composition which one comes upon now and again in the course of a long walk or drive through a broken country, scattered like little vignettes or tail-pieces in a pleasant text. At the foot of the slope before them the river described a wide curve of exquisite grace; its course, above and below, was hidden by foliage, so that it seemed to pause and to find repose like a lake. The curves of low mountains around and beyond it were in harmony with its own; the stream took the color of the banks to its bosom with a fidelity which almost obliterated the distinction between substance and reflection, and the bit of blue sky which it caught between them was the centre and life of the whole, its link with the strong clear firmament above. As the friends walked along the narrow country road, the picture was still before them, but it was soon lost behind an intervening thicket; their eyes returned to the wayside border of hazel bushes, clematis, and tall, straggling flowers, and the thread of their talk was resumed.

Julia. Perhaps you will say that I resemble that "terror of consistency." And I confess that sometimes, seeing the baneful results of the various attempts to "exert an influence," watching the energetic people who want to make puppets of their neighbors and to pull all the wires themselves, the advocates of Christian science who revile you from their couches of nervous prostration for not accepting their theory of the non-existence of disease —

Agatha. A theory, doubtless, in many instances founded upon fact.

Julia. I am half tempted to ask myself whether my ardent desire to help Edith out of perplexities that are painful and

cramping to her, and to bring to her something that her whole nature needs, does not belong to the same category. But one cannot be deterred from a course that one feels to be right because of a merely logical resemblance which it may bear to some false one. There is a distinction between the mere crude effort to convert to an opinion and the longing to share with others the faith that has come to one. And would you not agree with me that the highest thing in friendship is progressive fellowship in truth?

Agatha. If the joys of friendship are measured by degrees. Progress, or motion, is the life of the soul, and fellowship one of those superfluities which are *choses nécessaires*. Yet permit me to say that there is an ethereal quality in your idea of friendship to which the actual thing can hardly be expected to attain.

"Two minds with but a single thought,
Two hearts that beat as one,"

is held up to us as the ideal of love, not of friendship. And is it heresy to suggest that in any relation of life such a state of things might fall upon one? I should prefer, myself, that the other mind should discover a fresh thought and the other heart beat with a degree of variation.

Julia. Yes, entire agreement would be monotonous, and leave little room for conversation. But there can be abundant variety in sympathy, and it is sympathy that we crave in fellowship, that is to say, the removal of barriers, the contact of mind with mind. How can such contact be possible, unless each shares with each wisdom and doubt, hope and achievement?

Agatha. It is hardly possible on any other terms. But if Miss Norton accepts the results of your wisdom and achievement as her own, what becomes of her contributions to those large ends? What is fellowship in truth, when we come to look at it? The association of two minds cannot absolve either from the necessity of seeking and assimilating for itself, for truth cannot be apprehended in any other way. Though it spread over the whole world, it must still remain, like poetry, a message to the individual heart. It is, no doubt, a peculiar joy when the same revelation comes to two friends, as to Augustine and Alypius in the garden, but that cannot always happen, even where the sympathy is unalloyed. It seems to me that we accept the results of friendship as we accept the friend, finding, perhaps, less than we had bargained for, and also more. The tie between two persons, each of whom has had a glimpse of truth in his heart, may

be the stronger for that consciousness, their comprehension of each other more perfect. By the very fact of their friendship each gets an outlook into regions which he might not have been led to investigate alone. One joins one's friend's acres to one's own. To deny all these subtle and lovely and legitimate influences would be like denying the power of thought or love, of truth itself, to move us. But when you talk of influence as a special instinct, or duty, you seem to make it a thing apart from the whole life of a friendship, and to give it, so to speak, an aggressive air.

Julia. I do not mean to make it aggressive. Practically, the people who differ from us are often much more interesting than those who agree with us. I am in accord, too, with what you say about the loneliness of thought. Truth is both a bond and a division. It comes to the individual, and often by the very force of its hold withdraws him, for a time at least, from his fellows. But what does it mean to me when suddenly in this whirl of human life which stirs me, and yet leaves me alone, I find a friend? Is it simply that life is quickened by a subtle, unspoken sympathy? This, indeed, but also more, I think. The solitude of truth is shared by love. It is the invasion of life's loneliness for which I thank my friend, who becomes my friend by the very fact that our natures can drink of the same fountain and our eyes behold the same glory. The highest companionship, I must believe, implies full communion in the highest life, and I feel that friendship must start, if not from the existence, at least from the possibility, of such communion. And believing thus, I must feel the constant though patient desire to bring my friend to the conscious need, and finally to the acceptance of the truth for which I live. I know the fanatical air of such a confession. I acknowledge the superior attractions of a mild and universal tolerance. I know that I am pointing to a state of unrest where one would look for peace. Yet I cannot escape my conclusions.

Agatha. No, to do that you would have to look a little closer into your premises. If we both accepted without reserve your view of the responsibilities of conviction, it would plunge us at once into a discussion as to the relative value of our convictions, and that might prove to be what I heard a popular orator eloquently describe as a "depthless abyss." Do you think, on a day like this, with glorious clouds doing nothing in particular in a whole ocean of blue, that I am going to be tempted into an argument on the ancient theme of authority in matters of belief? It

is worse than our "Infinite" of last year. "Come down, O maid," as the shepherd sang, and let us partake of a few blueberries.

Julia. Now you are trying to exert an influence, but I shall proceed on a course of independence, and follow up this path into the woods. An opening between the pine-trees is an invitation hard to resist. See how perfect the fern shadows are on that rock.

Under the red-columned pine-trees there were large brown spaces of shadow, on which the afternoon light lay in warm glints of auburn. There was little underbrush, but the decayed logs lying about were green with moss and fern; the pipsissewa, or Princess pine, drooped its rosy, waxen blossoms, and bunch-berries grew in set bouquets of coral, circled with dull green leaves. The carpet of pine needles was smooth underfoot, and the whisper of the wind in the boughs overhead seemed only to emphasize the stillness of the woods. They walked more slowly than they had done in the road, gathered the delicate wood flowers and scarlet berries, and might almost have forgotten what they were talking about, if they had not been possessed of so inveterate a pleasure in tracking a subject.

Julia. What is the use of being bored by a question simply because it is old? That is merely a cropping out of Yankee independence on your part. Is not that "ancient theme," as you call it, one which we must all face and grapple with? What else is the meaning of the injunction, "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good"? The seed falls back for renewal into the same ground in which the tree is rooted. Countless generations have lived before us, but we also have to live, and the old problems are given us to solve. The old question is perennially fresh and emphatically real.

Agatha. And forever open. We go back to the primal mystery, but are we forced to return to all the interpretations heaped upon it?

Julia. Shall we accept no gain from those who have lived before us? Is not tradition a means of revelation, as evolution is of creation? If we look simply at history, the interpretation of religion is found to be, as far as we can tell, coexistent with the problem. That of Christianity claims to proceed from, nay, to be identical with, the source of the mystery, being the light set as a guide in the darkness; the answer, what was before the question and gave birth to it. I come back to influence and to the responsibilities of faith. Is not this one of the highest, to help others

to gain that joy and blessedness to which one has been admitted one's self? It is the tolerant who divide thought into "your doxy" and "my doxy." "You be fair to my opinion, I will be fair to yours," is very simple, if it is a mere matter of opinion. But to the Christian it is not, but of a revelation which alone makes the light of life. The wider his sympathies, the deeper his love for those to whom that revelation has not yet come, the stronger will be his craving to bring them to the perception of that higher love. The necessity lies in the very nature of the revelation itself.

Agatha. It seems to me to lie largely in that of the mind that receives it. I cannot but believe that the deepest reverence, the strongest conviction, may feel, in face of the illimitable power and mystery before it, that not one but endless revelations are possible to such a power; nay, that contradiction, denial of any good, is the sole thing impossible to it. Considering the diversity of gifts and diversity of functions among us, I do not see why the fragment of fact or of truth which each one may hold necessarily needs championship or even acknowledgment from everybody else. Neither do I see why my fact should be expected to tally exactly with my neighbor's. Mine is a fragment: if his is complete without it, I congratulate him; if he tells me it is the whole truth, I petition, like Charles Lamb, for a candle to examine his lamps.

Julia. No mind of any insight claims to have the whole truth. The whole in which we believe lies beyond our perception. But if the truth which I cling to were not absolute, of supreme adequacy to the needs of man, it could claim from me no lasting allegiance. If it were fitted to my mind, and had no meaning for the thousands who live and suffer around me, it would leave me perplexed and unsatisfied. The attitude which you are assuming would lead one to stand still in life. You seem to me to leave out the duty and the privilege of living and working for the truth.

Agatha. The way to live for it is to live well. Truth and love are adequate to all needs, though often, alas, unattained, and seemingly unattainable; and no expression of them which can help or elevate any human soul will be thrown away till it has ceased to help, nor has any proved itself universally adequate. The diversity of interpretations may have its origin not alone in the contradictions of human nature and its liability to error, which would soon tend to upset any established unity, but also in a law of adaptation to the manifold needs and workings of life. And the danger of endeavoring to impress our own conviction in its

integrity upon another mind lies first in the possibility of disturbing by our speech any whisper of the still small voice that may be already heard there; and, secondly, in that of imparting as mere form what in our own heart was inherent, vital, and true.

Julia. Do you think that I ignore that danger? It is a source of constant dread to me. Apart from the evil of a purely mechanical or conventional influence, which is to be avoided by keeping one's sources of inspiration alive and fresh, there are more subtle possibilities of wrong in even the most earnest attempt to impress one's faith upon others. Particularly, in intercourse with the young there is the danger of imparting to them ideas and convictions for which they are not ready. Much of the curious unreality of the life of youth comes from this source. How many of us have that to look back to? The great book came to us too soon; we received it with a certain eagerness, but with minds too crude or weak for its deeper teaching; its finer truth was overlooked in excitement, or lost in dullness, and later it had become inert, useless to us. The friendship which might have enlightened our lives came too early, and the result was mere restlessness and misunderstanding. We lead sham lives in our youth, and the sham knowledge deadens for us the reality.

Agatha. Yes, we act life as a play before we come to face it as a fact, and go through a good deal of pasteboard experience before we get to the real. But is not the struggle from false to true the history of the soul? Would you solve the problem by picking the youth up, as the genius did Bedreddin Hassan, and setting him down at the end of the journey?

Julia. That is too often just the effect of teaching or influence over the young; it seeks to impart results to start with, and the outcome may be merely the stimulating of an excited fancy, instead of creating conviction. And then the stimulus is withdrawn; Bedreddin rubs his eyes, and behold it was a dream.

Agatha. Yes, these are snares and pitfalls. But all the same, — you see I am coming round to the side of influence, now that you have deserted it, — we must not forget the inestimable benefits of that power which is in persons. Whole lives and events turn on it. You would not include a teacher like Dr. Arnold among unfortunate examples of influence.

Julia. The two people whom I had most vividly in mind were Dr. Arnold, and Green of Oxford. These men, of beautiful personality and intense conviction, achieved with notable success the kind of power aimed at by all teachers and preachers. They

made their own earnestness alive in others. They forced their own attitude, their own principles of life-interpretation on all the finer minds which came under their sway. And yet, reading in English literature and biography the results of their teaching, noting the subsequent struggles and difficulties of some of their pupils, I cannot but feel that the benefit was a doubtful one.

Agatha. It seems to me that the disciples make a very fair show. But do you think your two examples can be lumped together in that way? Both, perhaps, aroused thoughts which in a normal development might not have come till later, if at all; but this was less the case with Dr. Arnold, who aimed rather to impart a sort of earnestness and enthusiasm along lines already laid out, than with Green, whom the "Saturday Review" accuses, perhaps with some measure of justice, of having made the undergraduate think he could think.

Julia. You have to think you can think before you have the courage to begin thinking. My objection to such work is that it forces natures, whether on old lines or new, into a depth of experience for which they are not ready. The reaction, exaggerated with the crudity of youth, disgusts many of them permanently with the truth which might later have uplifted them.

Agatha. As Mrs. Malaprop appropriately says, "Train up a child and away he do go."

Julia. As far as that goes, the old iron régime of discipline was not so unlike the new methods, for its excellences were apparent, and its chief defect was that it relentlessly imposed the attitude of the mature character upon the undeveloped one.

Agatha. I must confess the densest ignorance of education as a science. But don't you think you exaggerate a little the effects of teaching?

Julia. Of course, in many instances no effect whatever is produced. The union of a soul and a truth is like the fusion of two chemicals; both must reach an exact point of heat before it can take place.

Agatha. Yes, and the rousing of enthusiasm is the heating, the preparation for thought. I do not agree with you that the first condition for thinking is to think that we can think. It is enthusiasm for the thought of others, to take fire from it, to immerse ourselves in it, and get material on which thought may work when it develops.

Julia. Then you hold the function of teacher or preacher to be rather to quicken life than to impart conviction?

Agatha. Emphatically. So far as he aims to persuade, he runs the risk of which we have spoken, of making the experience of his hearers unreal, conventional, or antagonistic. In seeking to arouse, he is acting in harmony with the laws of life.

Julia. I feel you to be right in a measure, although it is a perplexing question; for, granting the waking up of earnestness to be the important matter at a certain stage, still one cannot be indifferent to the exact nature of the result which it may bring about.

Agatha. Can we reasonably expect to determine the exact nature of results?

"Nor knowest thou what argument,
Thy life to thy neighbor's creed has lent."

The effect of influences, and of intercourse, the benefit of friendship, is something incalculable. I need my friends in order to be myself. They heal wounds that they never know of, and do good in ways that they do not suspect. Influences are "unsubstantial, airy things."

Julia. And therefore not to be avoided. In friendship, besides all the intangible benefits, there are definite, tangible ones, and among them this of a real interchange of thought, an actual transference in some instances of faith. Here the dangers which we were speaking of in the intercourse between older and younger minds need not be taken into account. Thought can be imparted without adaptation, and not only its letter but its spirit comprehended, and carried, perhaps, to fuller meaning. In any intercourse where influence can act freely and truly, it must be as wrong to refrain from exercising it as to refuse to be helped by it. Either course is a negation. It seems to me that many people nowadays shut themselves up in a solitude of mind from sheer dread of being influenced, and in their determination to live by their own thought deprive themselves of the opportunity of having any.

Agatha. To do that is to forget that a large part of thought material already exists as thought.

Julia. Let me tell you about Edith Norton. You have often heard me speak of her, and have been struck by some of her verses. You see in her high qualities, and my anxiety to rouse her from a certain attitude which has become more and more the habitual pose of her mind may have seemed to you like restlessness or impatience. But do you realize what that attitude is, and

how common it is? It was not merely my immature enthusiastic friendship, but the general opinion of the most observant people whom she met that assigned to her in her girlhood mental powers of a very high order. I have seldom met with a personality of such subdued force and fire. The bitterness which repelled many I felt to be incidental to a difficult youth; the reserve which sometimes hindered her social success I ascribed to the truthfulness of a nature which sought to comprehend and to gain assurance, and would not allow itself to be led into a too ready or fluent expression. She had then, like most thoughtful young people, no settled convictions; and I honored her subjection of desire to integrity, and waited for the clarifying process of time. But the process has never taken place. In the full maturity of her thought, she stands where she did at the beginning. The years have brought her to no definite achievement, inward or outward. Her life has been dominated by a morbid fear of yielding to influence. This fear of receiving an undue bias has gone so far that she has distrusted all external aids to development. She will not even read. I have urged on her again and again books which I knew would throw light on some corner of her perplexities, but she turns from them reproachfully lest they should injure the integrity of her thought. Three external lines were open to her. She has declined the opportunities offered her in the way of teaching; she criticises the current methods of instruction, yet is distrustful of the value of her own instincts, still more of her right to influence the young. She will not write; her mind, she says, is not direct nor individual, but imitative, reflex. Marriage, she feels, is not for her. She is keenly alive to sympathy, and it has happened to her to find herself strongly moved by another personality; but the feeling has been checked by a question whether it were anything more than the mere force of the masculine will reacting on her own. Better the poise and sincerity of solitude. Thus her life reaches no external fulfillment; not that it is unoccupied, but the occupations are more or less automatic, not, as Swedenborg would say, the expression in ultimates of the law of her nature. Thus she grows into ever deeper silence, but I fear it is no longer the silence of expectation. She distrusts everything that threatens to sway her; not only books and friends, not only the appeal of definite organizations, but even her own desires, which she scrutinizes till they vanish, her own intellect, which is to her the mere echo of inherited illusion. She cannot understand how a sensitive con-

science can commit itself to any religious organization ; for such a course involves the association of heterogeneous elements as well as allegiance to " forms," which are to her mind necessarily the enemies of spontaneous thought. Thus rejecting by instinct all that she does not care for, rejecting by conscience all that she craves, she lives a life of mere endurance, of renunciation, it is true, but needless renunciation ; a life, the attitude of which is shown in some verses which she sent me last winter, and in which, I confess, there is something that haunts me. They are painful to me ; they have no light, no charm, but they recur again and again to my mind : —

Be silent, heart : what if thy pain be great ?
 What if thy sorrow cannot be forgot ?
 Thy questions cannot cease, thy doubtings wait ?
 It matters not.

Think'st thou that in the universal woe
 That holds the world's great heart, thy tiny jot
 Of anguish counts for aught ? I tell thee no ;
 It matters not!

Then silence, O my heart. And if thou be
 Victim of inward flames that burn too hot,
 Die silently. For, if thou live or die,
 It matters not.

Agatha. There is a ring of endurance and of sincerity there, and such qualities form a tough fibre. You talk as if the attitude of your friend were final, but as she is your contemporary, I should hardly look upon her as on the declining side of life, and the state of mind which you describe seems to me peculiarly one of transition.

Julia. Transitional states are more common, perhaps, than the strength to emerge from them. Where can it end? Does not such constant suppression tend to stagnation? What becomes of a body of water which has neither inlet nor outlet?

Agatha. There can be no doubt that it is a grave mistake to shut out from us the stream of life, to deny it access through any medium. It is true that "we receive but what we give," and equally true that we can give only what we have received. For a nature which feels itself to be imitative, it seems to me peculiarly a mistake to avoid reading. What we take for imitation is often receptiveness and a means of growth, not a hindrance ; to lose one's self in another's thought is to enter the region of thought and to acquire its habits.

Julia. People want to be pioneers at all hazards, forgetting that true pioneers have followed the road as far as it led them, and that if there is no virtue in using the highway, there has been none in providing it. Do you not see this individual tendency all about us, in the artists who refuse to be bound by the laws of art, in the writers who will read no other books than their own may be wholly original?

Agatha. Yes; they think the bricks acquire an additional value for being made without straw.

Julia. Imagine a scientific man who should refuse to accept the labor of his predecessors for fear of being biased. As a matter of fact, we cannot have a spontaneous, instinctive sort of art any longer in any line. Wide critical knowledge must lie at the foundation of all creative work, for art must nowadays gather to itself experiences not only direct but reflective. See how our creative artists have begun their work. George Eliot stands to me as the type of the modern artist; years of patient thought, translation, discipleship; years more of laborious critical work, one step nearer to the ultimate right of individuality of attitude; then the whole superb nature, responsive at every point, is turned full upon the world of men and women, and we get an Adam Bede, a *Romola* and a *Middlemarch*.

Agatha. Yes, it is a beautiful prelude, the growth of a mind which was not withdrawn from life by reading and study, but brought into closer sympathy with it and deeper comprehension of its meaning. Turgueneff and Tolstoi have also had at command the highest resources of culture. On the other hand, if Miss Austen were reborn into the life of to-day, a very slight alteration in the turn of her sentences would be all the change needed for depicting it. We must not draw the lines of art rule so narrowly as to exclude the artists. The test is still the same, nearness to the primal truth; and the possibility of a direct perception of that truth is the hope and life of art. Nothing comes amiss in literature that is true. I remember standing once with Edward Strahan before two pictures in a loan exhibition, one a Millet, a rich, sombre twilight, with toil-worn, stunted figures, bowed above the darkening earth; the other a Baldini, painted in his freshest and happiest manner, — little balls of cotton floating audaciously in the blue for clouds, and gayly-dressed figures grouped in bouquets of color on the green sward, the whole full of air and light and life. Mr. Strahan said, "They talk of subjects being exhausted, but Nature is holding out pretty well when two artists can see her so truly and so differently."

Julia. And perhaps both hands have been trained by submission to the same laws.

Agatha. What an artist must avoid is not imitation alone, but conventionality, imagining that he sees a thing when he does n't see it; in another word, cant.

Julia. And that is not to be avoided by turning away from the achievements of others.

Agatha. Of course not; for they also are among the things to be comprehended. The thing is to glance from life to books and back again, and to look at both directly, with the "open heart and eye" insisted upon by Carlyle. Much of the objection to reading, of which you were speaking, seems to me not an assertion of individuality, but rather a concession to the popularity of ignorance.

Julia. I see in it only one example among many of the spirit of self-assertion, the rejection of authority. The people who inveigh against all organizations on the ground that they fetter individuality are influenced by the same ideas. "Our fathers believed it, therefore it is to be revered," was the old formula. "Our fathers believed it, therefore it is superannuated," is that of to-day. You know Alice Carter, with all her pretty ways and whims, as unregulated as an April breeze? We were talking one day of "Looking Backward," and she said, with a little shrug of her shoulders, "I should hate to walk under the same umbrella with the rest of the world. I like my own individual umbrella." I talked of economy of materials, of giving shelter to the shelterless, but it had no effect upon her; and after all, she expressed what is the common objection to Mr. Bellamy's scheme.

Agatha. It is no doubt irritating to see people outside the general umbrella when you are under it yourself; but I confess I share the disinclination to take refuge from the rain under Mr. Bellamy's. Its construction is admirable, but somebody will have to catch the drippings.

Julia. But can it be right for people to stand aloof and refuse to join in the providing of a race-shelter, or to accept the thought which binds man to man? The system of competition, of every man for himself, has been well tried, and a good many people have caught the drippings.

Agatha. Yes, my assertion was a supposition relating to a state of things *in posse*, and yours is an undeniable, painful, and long-existent fact.

Julia. And yet you are grasping the handle of your individ-

ual umbrella as tightly as ever. On artistic lines, you seem to agree with me. You feel that art can find its true life only in subjection to already ascertained law —

Agatha. Applied with individual sincerity.

Julia. But in life you appear to deny this principle. If it is true in art, I hold it to be no less true in the world of action, and even, in some mysterious way, in the world of intellect, that individualism of mind must learn the humility of subjection before it can enter upon its true freedom. Here, too, the joyous acceptance of death leads to the higher life. Growth begins in reverence and in submission.

Agatha. If any of my random remarks are in contradiction to these sentiments, I withdraw them without hesitation. The losing one's self to find one's self, I take to be not alone the foundation of religion, but of that comprehension of things which makes what we call the intellectual life.

“We live by admiration, hope, and love,
And even as these are well and wisely placed,
In dignity of being we ascend.”

Julia. Yes; you too plead for reverence, but for reverence towards individuals. I feel the necessity of reverence towards the great religious or social systems, the recognized bonds which hold society together. Do you remember Sill's lines?

“Do you dare to be
Of the great majority?
To be only like the rest,
With heaven's common mercies blest;
To accept, in humble part,
Truth which shines in every heart;
To be lost except to God,
As the grass-blade in the sod
Under foot by millions trod?
If you dare, come with us, be
Lost in love's great unity.”

We cannot escape from influence, and it is by the conscious surrender to inevitable law that man enters upon the full benefit of the law. Why try to deny this, Agatha?

Agatha. We are all of the great majority. If you prick us, do we not bleed? The susceptibility to influence belongs to us all. But as Nature has in the higher organisms set apart the individual, at the same time providing in the family a bond which unites him to the race, so the individual in society has still the responsibility on his own shoulders, though there are numberless

ways in which he may merge his interests in the lives of others. The main thing is, amid all the influences that surround us, to find our own; then, for the sake of proportion, to take into account the outer world, the not our own. Man cannot escape the responsibility of being his brother's keeper; but he cannot eat, sleep, and think for his brother.

Julia. No, but he may associate with him in these acts.

Agatha. I should hope so. And now as this path of adventure has made a circuit and come back to the road, suppose we take the homeward turn? I confess I feel starved to any degree of acquiescence, and if we must live upon a basis of entire altruism, I will go home and eat your supper, and you shall have *carte blanche* to do the same with mine.

S. K. & V. D. S.

SOME CRITICISMS ON THE ANDOVER MOVEMENT.

WHEN a new train of thought first comes before the public, it is safe to say that the form it wears is not its permanent form; and therefore if judgment is passed on it then, allowance must be made for incompletenesses in expression which will be filled up, exaggerations which will be dropped, distant relations which will be discerned and allowed for, a clearer discrimination between essentials and accidentals, — a whole process of ripening which will take place before the thought stands complete in its identity and ready for the world's judgment. The Andover movement was begun half a dozen years ago, and may now be fairly supposed to have had time enough to pass through this stage of childhood and to have become its mature self. So we may question it without feeling that we are asking questions prematurely, and be confident that it is old enough to answer without embarrassment.

In regard to a movement that has behind it such learning, intellectual power, piety, and broad influence as has the Andover movement, there are very few persons whose opinions are of any importance. Certainly I have not the slightest idea that mine are, or have in themselves any claim to be heard. But I have not the presumption to imagine that I am not typical. Many others must be feeling towards this movement in the way I feel. And, therefore, if I regard myself as a type, when I formulate my own position I shall express not a particular thought, but one that will have more or less of generality.

I have had from the first a very hearty sympathy with Andover's new departure. It has, in my opinion, brought more healthy life into the religious world of New England than any other movement of the century. It has stimulated thought, deepened piety, enlarged the visible horizon of the kingdom of heaven, set a wonderful example of Christian courtesy in polemics, and saved the Congregational body from destruction at the hands of the intellectual deadness and narrow ecclesiasticism of its own High Church party. Its influence is now established. The new theology has reached the stage where men are supposing that they have of course believed all along the views it presents; and it is preached from many a pulpit and editorial chair where it is not at all recognized as Andover theology, but is unconsciously supposed to be Theology itself, the only normal and proper thing. What greater success can any scheme of thought desire than to lose its distinctive name and supersede itself? The history and present position of this movement are a promise that the intelligent thought of the next half century in New England shall find no necessary breach between itself and Congregationalism, and therefore to some degree a promise that the thought of the whole country shall find less of a breach between itself and religion. For as it has been demonstrated that a gain in numbers to one college is not a loss to the other colleges of the country but a gain to them also, so any real growth in one church is a gain to all the other churches.

And yet there are some, and some not only like myself, outsiders, who think they discern in this movement signs of incomplete or arrested development, signs which show that it cannot, without change in its present condition, become the redeeming force it promised. There is, perhaps, no annoyance so annoying as a friend so good that we feel he ought to be better. Andover has seen so clearly, and laid the future under so deep a debt to her, why can she not see a little more clearly and become a power for the world, and not only for Congregationalism? This question of the future of the movement has to some an intensity of interest from the fact that they are members of the church in which the problem is being worked out, and so their own position is more or less affected by it. To others of us, who are not members of the Congregational Church, but who have towards it the kindly feelings that spring from an ancestry, birth, and education surrounded by its influences, the matter has the interest attaching to any movement which concerns the Church Universal, and which, therefore, must ultimately concern every branch of that church. These latter

persons are not affected in their ecclesiastical position, one way or the other, by any view they may take of the movement. Have they, then, have I, no right to speak concerning it? Andover, with her uniform courtesy, would be the first to welcome kindly criticism from every quarter. The criticisms I am about to make are offered solely with the desire that the weak places I seem to see in her armor may be speedily strengthened, so that she may be invincible in the battle she is aiming to fight.

In estimating character, conditions of birth are important. In case of the Andover movement, they are more than usually important, for they have stamped a mark upon it that yet remains. The movement had its origin in two practical exigencies. A candidate for a professor's chair in Andover Theological Seminary was accused of holding the belief that death is not the end of possible change in moral character, which view, it was asserted, was inconsistent with the Seminary's creed. Some of the professors came to the support of the candidate, and maintained that even if this view were held, no inconsistency would exist. They were, of course, at once charged with being guilty of similar views and inconsistencies themselves. During the discussion of the theological and legal questions involved, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions discovered that a missionary about to be sent back to his former station in the foreign field declined to disown the view charged upon the candidate and professors at Andover. The Board refused to allow him to return. Other intending missionaries were found to entertain similar doubts and were rejected. Theological students began to be deterred from offering themselves to the Board. Andover Seminary then came into the field as the champion of a larger missionary policy; and, as the possibility or non-possibility of change after death was the test by which the Board insisted that the orthodoxy of its appointees should be tried, "second probation" came to be the battle-cry of the opposing parties.¹ These two practical ends then constituted Andover's primary aim: to vindicate the qualifications for a seminary professorship, and to send missionaries into the field.

¹ It should be borne in mind, however, that Andover explicitly denies that she holds the belief that after death a second opportunity will be open to all to obtain salvation. "We do not argue," say the Andover Reviewers, "for a second probation, nor for a probation indefinitely prolonged, but for a Christian probation some time and somewhere." *Prog. Orth.*, p. 253. (The articles which at first appeared in the *Andover Review* embodying the positions of the New Theology were afterwards collected in a book with the title *Progressive Orthodoxy*. I refer to it rather than to them, for the sake of convenience.)

There was a great advantage in the practical character of these ends, especially of the latter. They formed an issue which everybody could understand, and in which every one was interested and took a side. Andover might have piped or mourned for a generation, and no one would have thought of dancing or weeping, if it had not been for this readily apprehensible, practical element in the aim which she held up. It got its upholders a hearing. It sifted the spectators into enemies and friends. It stamped Andover as the champion of missions. Even now, when there is a lull in the battle, it is still felt that the sending off of every fresh missionary somehow scores a point for Andover.

But there was a decided disadvantage, too, in all this. In fact, it was, for the permanent influence of the movement, a grave misfortune. Having her attention kept busy with practical interests, Andover had no time to be philosophical. Her positions bore the appearance of having been taken up under fire, with as much order and logic as could be commanded at the moment, but still with the smoke of battle about them. They did not seem to be the quiet, natural, inevitable developments, clearly seen and ordered, of a central thought. At all events, whether her positions were taken hastily or not, they have different characters. Some of them have the invincible basis of necessary thought beneath them, and some have as basis the fragments of one and another system dating anywhere from St. Anselm to Professor Park. The result is, of course, an incongruity, a bit of philosophy side by side with a bit of mediæval scholasticism. Perhaps the most striking examples of this occur in treating those standard bugbears of the theologian whose philosophy is less stalwart than his kindliness, the heathen and the pre-Christian Jews. These are always a test of the philosophic insight of a theological system. If when it approaches these it begins to murmur about exceptions, its character is gone. For to allow exceptions in a philosophical system or in the multiplication table is to betray ignorance of the nature of the thought on which philosophy and mathematics are based. The boy who should put in as plea for the wrong answer to his problem that he knew two and two were four in most cases, but this was an instance where they were not, would probably be marked down in spite of his ingenuity. Exceptions naturally bore a prominent place in the older theological systems, because, as their God was a more or less modified Oriental potentate, the divine will was always more or less an arbitrary one. The thought of the divine will as a divine neces-

sity, and of law as an eternal fact, an aspect of God's character unvarying except in point of view, — this was impossible to an unscientific age. But to-day every theologian must reckon with these data. In scientific theology there can be no exceptions. A systematic principle must be found large enough to embrace them.

And one would expect not to miss such intrepidity in Andover, which has never been charged with hesitancy to apply logic. And yet the writers of the "Review" can say : —

"To these questions we must reply, as we replied before, that the knowledge of God granted to the Jews was different in kind from the knowledge attainable by others, and that we therefore are not justified in arguing from the Jews to the Gentiles. The Jews occupied an exceptional position."¹ "As to Abraham and his descendants, the instance is clearly exceptional. . . . While their salvation proves that knowledge of the historic Christ is not absolutely necessary, still they were recipients of that which was preparatory of the gospel and directly predictive of it. And besides, it has always been believed that for the completeness of their redemption they had clearer knowledge after death of God's love revealed in Christ."²

What is this necessity that is not absolutely necessary? We are familiar with such from the lips of weak parents, but even as children we were bright enough to see that this meant no necessity at all. And it is because this inconvenient case will not come within the system that a little annex must be built on for it, as in the sentence last quoted. The fact is that all the objections to Andover's position in regard to probation hereafter would have vanished, or been transferred to other grounds, if she had but thought out and settled the fate of these ancient Jews. It was the apparent anomalies in the orbit of the planet Uranus that enabled Le Verrier to calculate just where the hitherto unknown planet should be, that would explain them and give unity to the solar system. Well do the Reviewers say in another connection : "We question the advantage or the right of modifying the natural and reasonable conditions of Christianity under the stress of exceptional cases."³

Now if that view of the universe is correct which regards it as a self-consistent whole, — and this is what we mean by philosophy, — every part will be what it is by necessity of this self-consistency. Any fact which cannot show the nature of the case as the ground

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 246.

² Page 85.

³ Page 135.

of its being must be content to pass into the realm of conventionalities, things which may be decided this way or that way by agreement. The existence of God and of the multiplication table we believe to be absolute truths. Forms of divine worship and church-government we believe, most of us, — those of us who do not mistake the "Tracts for the Times" for the Ten Commandments, — to be relative truths, necessary, indeed, in some form, but not necessary as to this or that particular form. Any truth, then, which cannot show as its basis the nature of things cannot demand universal acceptance. Here is the opportunity for the great work of constructive theology the next generation may contribute, to show the same necessary basis which we recognize in mathematics, in case also of the existence and attributes of God, of revelation, sin, redemption, the Incarnation, the Church, a future life, in short, in case of all the main doctrines of the Christian religion.

Now Andover had — or may the present tense still be used? — a unique chance to serve as the prophet of this new dispensation; unique, because the spirit of the age is longing for just such constructive guidance on an absolute basis; because, having been so fortunate as to create a disturbance and gather a crowd about her, a word from her would at once find an audience; and because she had herself appreciated in part this very gospel of inevitableness. For example: —

"Christian thought, having established itself on the intrinsic, absolute right and on the inexorableness of law so firmly that these may be accepted as postulates in all the inquiry, . . . is going forward now to learn if any ethical ends are secured by the revelation of God in Christ."¹ "There is a movement of thought which has gone beneath or has gone back of the thinking which at one time was satisfied to rest in the sovereignty of God. All commands, penalties, favors, blessings, issue, it was once thought, out of the will of God. . . . But the conviction is now clear that the will of God is directed by the reason of God; that instead of saying it is right because God wills it, we should rather say, God wills it because it is right. Right and wrong, goodness and badness, holiness and sin, have their own intrinsic qualities according to what they are. . . . What we are now emphasizing is the marked tendency of thought to recognize the intrinsic, necessary character of law and right, and the inevitableness of the results of conduct."²

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 51.

² Page 47.

This is excellent. There could be no better recognition of the inherent nature of things as the basis of the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the character of God. But then, just as in swimming we sometimes pass suddenly from comparatively warm water into a streak of much lower temperature, why must we here meet a cold streak like this? —

“God does not become propitious because man repents and amends, for that is beyond man’s power. He becomes propitious because Christ, laying down his life, makes the race to its worst individual capable of repenting, obeying, trusting; and He does this in such a way that God’s abhorrence to sin is realized, the majesty of law honored, the sinner and the universe convinced of the righteousness of the divine judgments.”¹

Here are the regular forensic phrases, still in their melodramatic and mediæval dress. No [one who knows the difficulties of expressing abstract thought will quarrel with a theologian for using any algebraic signs he pleases. But we may rightly demand of him either to translate them into the language of the day, or to see at least whether they are capable of such translation, or are anything but counsel-darkeners. It is the scholastic habit of regarding relations as entities apart from the wholes in connection with which alone they can be understood, that gives rise to this forensic method, neither truly historical nor real, of treating eternal processes.

This failure to apply the test of philosophy to its words as well as to its thought has led to a lack of definition of fundamental terms. Surely the series of articles in “Progressive Orthodoxy” should have been saved from this, at least, by the presence of one of its *dramatis personæ*, Socrates, that much-enduring man, who is apt in theological discussions to bear the part of the awful example in a temperance lecture. One would suppose that if nowhere else, yet in the discussion of eschatology, a definition would have been given, or would have been privately arrived at, of salvation. But in the chapter on this subject one looks in vain, not only for such a definition, but for any clear conception of it. There seems to be still the old misty idea of some beatific state to be entered upon only after death. Of salvation as always salvation from sin, not only the pages, but the thought behind them, shows little trace.

The same confusion hides in other phrases covering fundamental needs of thought. “The gospel,” “accepting Christ,” “faith,”

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 58.

"nature," — it is assumed that these have no need of definition. And as two meanings are possible in each of these cases, confusion is inevitable, especially since the real root of the difficulty is that Andover is dissatisfied with one meaning, and has abandoned it in feeling while still holding to it in thought. She has jumped off the boat without having reached the wharf. For example, in regard to the relations of the human and the divine, either of two opposing views may be held. The one is that human and divine are mutually exclusive terms, so that whatever is divine is *ipso facto* not human, and *vice versa*; the other, that the infinite does not exclude the finite, but that every attribute essential to perfect humanity belongs necessarily to divinity also; and of this it holds the Incarnation to be the revelation and complete, crowning instance.

Now it would seem at first sight as if there need be no question which of these positions is held by the Andover Reviewers. They have felt that tendency of our time, which, indeed, has been the primary motive-power of this whole movement, which identifies all that is best in humanity with divinity. They say:—

"We add a single remark upon the general philosophical conception of God and his relation to the universe which underlies these essays. It is a modification of a prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation (in accordance with the highest thought of the Greek fathers) of the divine immanence. Such a doctrine of God, we believe, is more and more approving itself in the best philosophy of our time, and the fact of the Incarnation commends it to the acceptance of the Christian theologian."¹

If this conception had been consistently followed out, there might have been a much greater Andover controversy, but the present one, never.

Other passages show that the Reviewers have apprehended this truth in its relation to the Incarnation, the truth that the human spirit is not different in kind from the divine nor alien to it, but that humanity raised to its highest power is divinity.² In treat-

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 16.

² "It (the human nature of Christ) is finite, and the Word who created it is infinite. But we do not move in our thinking, if we think correctly on this subject, merely on this plane of contrasts. We may not forget them, but they are only parts of the truth. The divine and human natures in Christ are essentially related to each other. The human nature is the divine nature humanly expressed and realized. The one should be as closely connected with the other in our conception as a word with the thought it utters. The relation is

ing the doctrine of revelation, also the inward revelation which comes through the highest exercise of man's powers is claimed as truly divine.¹

Now these positions are corollaries to the proposition that God not only transcends the world and human nature, but is immanent in them. They are logically tenable on no other ground. And it would certainly seem from the above quotations that it is upon this position that the Reviewers desire to take their stand. But we soon come across phrases whose uniform wakes grave suspicion that they belong to the opposite party. We hear of "the light of reason and science without any revelation whatever;"² of "the light of the unaided reason."³ They tell us that repentance and amendment are "beyond man's power;"⁴ and they antithesize "personal attainments in character" and "personal appropriation of the righteousness of Christ."⁵ These and many similar expressions can know no other ancestry than the former of the opposing views just mentioned, and compel us to think that the Reviewers would draw a distinction between the human reason acting by itself and the divine reason imparting a revelation, between the impulse that leads men to turn to God and the promptings of the Holy Spirit, between "Christ in you," and "Christ the hope of glory."

One cannot read "Progressive Orthodoxy" without a growing conviction that the authors have never seen the unity of the two last-mentioned terms. Many of the results of the doctrine that God is immanent in the world and in man they have apprehended. Of the results of the corollary, that Christ is also thus immanent, they have apprehended but few. Now one cannot study the New Testament without discovering in it a growth in the conception of Christ. To the Synoptists, He is Jesus of Nazareth, the historic being whom they or their friends had seen and walked with in Gali-

as intimate as this, but it is of a higher kind. . . . The human nature of Christ is in finite form the personal word of that eternal Word. It is not a foreign nature. . . . The new and fundamental thought in modern Christology is the essential relation of the two natures, so that either can know and realize itself in the other." — *Prog. Orth.*, pp. 28, 29.

¹ "Now if it should please God to produce a book of oracles by sheer and stark miracle, or to dictate the contents of one to a scribe or number of scribes, the teaching would not come more directly from Him than when a soul in vital connection with Him freely utters, under the leading of his spirit, the truth which is the element in which it lives." — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 203.

² *Prog. Orth.*, p. 247.

³ Page 108.

⁴ Page 58.

⁵ Page 134 n.

lee and Judæa, and whose words and deeds they were chronicling. Their conception of personality is that of a unit encased in a body and exclusive of other similar units. When, however, we come to the apostle who had received the best theological education the time afforded, we find a somewhat different conception. St. Paul had little interest in the historic events of the life of Jesus, apart from the final ones. In the résumé of his "gospel" (1 Cor. xv. 1), he mentions only Jesus' death, burial, and resurrection, and interviews with many afterwards. Why he limits his vision to these, since parts at least of the previous life of Jesus were known to him,¹ it would take us here too far to inquire. Now his pages are studded with the name "Christ;" it flashes upon us, directly or indirectly, from almost every thought. But it has passed with him from a title of Jesus of Nazareth to a designation of the ideal man, the embodiment of all that is best in humanity, the expression of the possibilities of the soul of the individual and of the race. "Christ" stands with him for the human side of God, and therefore for the divine side of humanity. Turn to his Epistles almost at random, and the thought meets us. "The fact, which was but vaguely seen by previous generations, that God was leading you Gentiles to salvation," he says to the Colossians (Col. i. 25-27), "is now plain. And this rich, glorious process that has been going on is Christ in you, the hope of glory." St. Paul never stops to define, but a description from him is sometimes a definition. "God's dear Son," he says (Col. i. 15), "who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature." Remembering the Hebrew usage (Gen. xlix. 3), by which the firstborn is regarded as the highest type of its kind, perhaps we shall find no better modern equivalent for this phrase than that which we gave above, "the human side of God, the divine side of humanity." The apostle longs to attain the resurrection of the dead (Phil. iii. 11), which, he says, he has not already attained, a remark which would be superfluous if resurrection meant to him a reëndowment of life in a future state. But he will attain this, or, as he more fully defines it, he will become perfect, if he may know Christ; not merely the facts of his

¹ The only events previous to the Last Supper to which he refers are the Davidic descent of Jesus (Rom. i. 3; ix. 5; xv. 12; Acts xiii. 23; 2 Tim. ii. 8), the preparatory ministry of John (Acts xiii. 24, 25), the lowly condition and poverty of Jesus (Phil. ii. 7; 2 Cor. viii. 9), his unselfishness (Rom. xv. 3), a remark of his not elsewhere preserved (Acts xx. 35), and possibly a part of the first charge to the twelve apostles (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 14 with St. Matt. x. 10).

sufferings, death, and resurrection, which he already knew, but the power of his resurrection and the fellowship of his sufferings and the likeness of his death. If these same processes take place in him, — and of course he thinks of himself only as a type of every man, — they will constitute in him the ideal for the sake of which God seeks him. He will apprehend that for which he is apprehended. He will then be in Christ.

These passages set forth with sufficient plainness St. Paul's conception of Christ as the spiritual expression of humanity. It must not, however, be supposed that in saying that Christ was to him a spiritual being, it is implied that He was not also a historic being. Passages constantly occur in which the word "Christ" has a direct reference to the historic life of Jesus. Now one and now another of the great conceptions which go to make up his idea of Christ is prominent and gives accent to the special thought in hand. Now it is Christ as the Logos, the operative side of God; now as the side in common with man, the human side; now it is that Jesus who was the complete embodiment of God under human conditions; now it is the spiritual processes in himself, in every man, which produce and constitute the lofty ideal of humanity; now Christ is external to the soul, the giver of all its true life; now He is within the soul, the soul's very life and essence. From one to another of these great conceptions his expression hurries, as it is now this now that aspect that he has mainly in view, though he never quite forgets any one of them. They tangle his thought into inextricable sentences. They reveal to us conceptions which are likely to be new, — those ordinary-seeming phrases "in Christ," "to whom coming," "Christ in you," — conceptions as to the inclusiveness of personality. The mystery of the mingling of human and divine in the soul and in the race so overcomes him that he bursts out into poetry and a torrent of prepositions: "For of Him and through Him and to Him are all things; to whom be glory forever. Amen."

The endeavor which we see so prominent in the apostolic age, to demonstrate that Jesus was the Christ, was but a form of the necessity which the thoughtful world is to-day more than ever feeling, the necessity of discovering an essential link between historical and spiritual religion. It was the conviction that this necessary link had been found that made St. John exclaim with passionate eagerness, "Who is a liar, but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ?" We cannot stop to show how this thought

of Christ as the presence of God in the soul permeates St. John's writings. In order not to see it there, one must translate in terms of time and place the expressions which refer to the union of Christ with those who are his, and thus vacate them of value.

Now in the scheme of the Andover Reviewers, this mode of regarding Christ as immanent is conspicuous by its absence. To them the gospel, the knowledge of which is to save the world, is as follows:—

“The gospel is an earthly historical religion, wrought out in the deeds and sacrifices of the man, Christ Jesus, who lived under the conditions of a human earthly life, who dwelt in the cities and villages of Judæa, who walked in the valleys and on the mountains of Galilee, and who died on a hillside of this earth.”¹

In their doctrine of the Atonement, God, Christ, and man are three beings, each external to the others, trying to come to an agreement:—

“Man, left to himself, cannot have a repentance which sets him free from sin and death. . . . If man unaided could become truly repentant, he would become holy and be the child of God. . . . It is not true that repentance without Christ is availing for redemption, for man of himself cannot repent; but, on the other hand, it is not true that Christ's Atonement has value without repentance. Christ's sacrifice avails with God because it is adapted to bring men to repentance. He is one, in with the race, who has the power of bringing it into sympathy with his own feeling towards God and towards sin; and so God looks on the race as having this power in Christ.”²

But it is when they come to the special question at issue, to eschatology, that this non-recognition of Christ as potentially immanent in the soul becomes most apparent. They have been driven to the position they have adopted by this argument: The knowledge of Christ is essential to salvation. The history of Jesus is essential to the knowledge of Christ. That every human being should have a chance to pass upon the claims of Jesus Christ is essential to the justice of God. Since many men do not have such chance in this life, they must have it hereafter.³

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 76.

² *Prog. Orth.*, p. 55. The omissions in quotation are made solely for the sake of brevity, not with the attempt to force any difference of shading from that which presumably the authors intended.

³ “Whoever will not believe on Christ is incorrigibly and hopelessly impenitent. . . . Wherever the gospel is proclaimed, Christ is already testing men.” — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 74.

Now here is a plentiful lack of definitions. Apart from those we have mentioned — what is meant by Christ? and what is meant by salvation? — here are others: What constitutes a sufficient “knowledge of Christ”? What determines whether the opportunity for getting that knowledge was sufficient? What is “passing upon the claims of Christ”? Or, to put these in concrete form: suppose I am one of the Masai of the Soudan; the “Andover Review” would work out my personal equation, — we trust we are not misconceiving its decision, — that I have indisputably never passed upon the claims of Christ because I have never had the knowledge of Him, and never having had a sufficient opportunity for getting that knowledge here, I shall therefore have these matters presented to me for my decision hereafter. Now suppose, again, I am a street Arab in New York. I am, alas! but too familiar with the name of Jesus; I have been once or twice to a Mission Sunday-school, and heard that Christ lived and died centuries ago. Have I knowledge enough to pass upon the claims of Christ? Is my chance hereafter to be taken away because I have already had my opportunity of hearing the gospel? How unfortunate that I let myself be enticed into that Mission School! Or again, suppose I am one of that not small number of men who scorn a lie, and value honor as life, and are generous, even lavishly generous, in helping a fellow-man who is in need, but one whose parents have taught him that religion, meaning thereby the system of which the various churches are the exponents, is an anachronism; who regards the Bible with esteem, like the Odyssey, and the history of Jesus, with which he is perfectly familiar, as having somewhat more value for a modern student than that of Julius Cæsar. What is to be done with this most inconvenient person?

Of course, the readiest way of getting rid of him is to leave him

“The gospel is an earthly, historical religion, wrought out in the deeds and sacrifices of the man Christ Jesus.” — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 76.

“The personal appropriation of Christ in his life and death constitutes a sinner a Christian.” — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 143.

“A natural inference from these premises is that every one will know God as He is revealed in the love and sacrifice of Jesus Christ. If Christ was given for the whole world, and if no one can be saved except by faith in Christ, we are almost driven to the conclusion that Christ will be made known to every individual of the human race in all the generations, past, present, and future, and that everlasting destiny is determined for every person by his acceptance or rejection of Christ. . . . We frankly admit that it seems to us probable that those who in this life have no knowledge of Christ will not be denied that knowledge, with its corresponding opportunity, after death.” — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 242.

to what the Reviewers call, with a proper touch of sarcasm in condemning this proceeding in others, "the ambiguity of the uncovenanted mercies" of God.¹ But they would not themselves be guilty of such indolent agnosticism. They would recognize the obligation of their system to provide a place for such a one hereafter. And yet, what that place would be it is a little difficult to discover. He knows of the life of Jesus, and yet he — whatever the Reviewers might be kind enough to do for him — would not call himself a Christian. On the other hand, if lofty character is the aim of religion for man, our friend has many elements of the loftiest moral, nay more, Christian character. Is he, with such traits, to be lost? Some of us would be as reluctant to consent to this as are the Reviewers to consent to the loss of the African savage who has never had his opportunity of "passing upon the claims of Christ." And yet it would seem as if they were only deterred from saying "Yes" to the appeal for condemnation, through a feeling that it would not be quite courteous; for they say in rejecting a similar case: —

"This is more like salvation by merit, or moral character, a kind of salvation perfectly plain and intelligible, but not, as we had supposed, a kind accepted and advocated by the rest of the church. The church-doctrine of salvation we had assumed to be that of justification by faith. Paul and Luther evidently did not rely upon personal attainments in character, but upon the personal appropriation of the righteousness of Christ."²

Certainly the Reviewers should know that any system which holds that the attainment of lofty moral character here is no warrant for salvation hereafter, has committed suicide. Certainly they should have read their time carefully enough to be aware that there are thousands of men who have drifted away from religion because its terms in regard to the next life are unreal when transferred to this, — men who are saying to the churches, "If your salvation that you talk about is other than the perfection of personal character, keep it; we want nothing to do with it. Salvation by character is, as you say, a kind of salvation perfectly plain and intelligible, and it is good enough for us." Certainly the Reviewers should have theological insight enough to see that in this men are but clamoring for that very doctrine of the Incarnation which they themselves profess to hold, which makes all religion centre in Christ, and Christ to be the ideal of perfected humanity. And yet the only answer the Reviewers have for cases like this is: —

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 92.

² Page 134 n.

"But were there not pious Jews before the time of Christ who were saved, and who at death entered immediately into blessedness? . . . The Jews occupied an exceptional position."¹

The Andover theology most emphatically and truly says: "The decisive fact for every man is his relation to Christ."² This is his "judgment," his *κρίσις*. What needs explanation is whether it regards this relation as one of the intellect to certain opinions and historic facts, or as one of man's spirit, his will and affections, to the spirit of Christ. The questions, what were the facts of the life of Jesus? what was the metaphysical nature of the being they show, and what his relations to God and man? — these are questions of deep importance. But they are questions which demand a high degree of intelligence and trained judgment to answer, and they are not therefore for each man the questions of first importance. Those questions are, what is the attitude of my spirit to the spirit of God? do I love what He loves and hate what He hates? It is these questions that decide moral character. Of course, to the majority of men these questions never come in conscious form. Unquestionably, it is of great advantage that they should come in conscious form and should receive a deliberate answer; but unquestionably it is not essential to their receiving a right answer. Is the man, that is, the character, in conformity with God, so far as man can be, that is, with the human side of God, with Christ? It is this that, making no exceptions, decides the moral character of infant and adult, Jew and Christian, heathen and ecclesiastic. Here, as in so many cases, the Reviewers take back with one hand what they give with the other. They would maintain that men are saved through Christ vicariously. But what is vicarious salvation? It is that salvation from sin which comes to a man not through his intelligent perception and choice of Christ, but through such a portion of Christ's spirit as has filtered into him through inheritance, society, custom, law. The community having been moulded in these respects by those who have a conscious knowledge of Christ, his saving power is thus mediately transferred to thousands in whose case conscious contact is wanting. It is only in this sense that men are saved by the merits of Christ. For if by this phrase is meant Christ's merits in relation to God, a forensic substitutionalism results, which is degrading to both God and man. But Christ's merits in relation to the religious community are a source of vicarious salvation wide as the community's influence, for they may permeate

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 245.

² Page 241.

every man within that influence, be appropriated by him, and therefore imputed to him. And yet the Andover theology does not recognize this as salvation, partial or complete, nor make use of it in solving its eschatological problem. "Progressive Orthodoxy" would perhaps demur to its right to be called salvation at all. But while the opposing sides are wrangling as to whether such spiritual motion is possible, "*Solvitur ambulando*," we may exclaim, and, following the example of our Lord, take a little child and set him in the midst of them. Surely, even an ardent Paysonian, if such could now be found, would hardly maintain that the salvation of this little being was contingent on its apprehension of the intellectual aspects of religion and its conscious choice of Christ as Christ.¹ That there is here a salvation, that is, deliverance from sin, is plain. How it comes, is a question which has made many a theory of the Atonement totter, and puzzled many a theologian whose heart was more imperative than his logic. According to the Reviewers, infants and heathen are shut up in together in the pen of invincible ignorance, and are only let out one by one in this world or the next, through the gate of intellectual apprehension and conscious choice.²

To repeat again for clearness' sake. The test of salvation, we must believe, is whether the man, the character, the soul, is like that of Christ. This harmony with Christ may be clearly apprehended by its possessor in its relation on the one hand to Jesus, the incarnate Son of God, and on the other to himself, through understanding and choice; or it may be unrecognized and unnamed; but in either form it may be genuine. And that in its latter form it can be efficacious is demonstrable from those many cases where there is to a great degree deliverance from sin and likeness to Christ, and yet no clear apprehension of a scheme of

¹ "From the first development of his moral powers, his mind was more or less affected by his condition and prospects as a sinner. It is among the accredited traditions of his family that he was often known to weep under the preaching of the gospel when he was only three years old. That these were not mere transient impressions seems probable from the fact that in subsequent years his mother was inclined to the belief that he was converted in childhood. The evidences of his piety, however, were at this period far from being conclusive." — Cummings's *Memoir of Edw. Payson, D. D.*, vol. i. p. 18.

² "We think it more reverent, as it is certainly more reasonable, to believe of infants and heathen alike, that according to the development of moral agency they are brought into conscious relations to Christ, and that according to their needs they are enabled to personally appropriate his redemption." — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 135.

salvation. It is this latter, we suppose, which has been called harmony with the essential or spiritual Christ.

The objections which the Reviewers apparently have to this term, and to what it seems to them to involve, have blinded them to what it aims to express. Their main objections, in the somewhat curt allusions which they make to it, are that it takes away the personality of the Holy Spirit and the significance of historic Christianity,¹ and that it is "perilously akin in its postulates to the Deism of the last century."² Now the cause of the failure of Deism was not that it identified the human reason with the divine, but precisely that it did not. It, as well as the Apologists, took for granted that human and divine were different and opposed. The alternative then arose, is religion divine or human, which? supernatural or natural? The Apologists said the former, the Deists the latter. The thought of the time was not yet ripe for any one to say, "Both." It is a matter for thankfulness that the church, as a whole, sided with the Apologists; for if either horn of the harmful dilemma were to be chosen to the exclusion of the other, the former was far more potent and beneficent for its day, and offered more of spiritual promise for the future. But we and the Andover Reviewers believe we have arrived at "a modification of the prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation of the divine immanence;" and this enables us to see the Deistic dilemma shaking its horns at us without feeling obliged to impale ourselves on either of them. The thought of our day need not be frightened out of its path by any such creature.

It is perhaps no wonder that a recognition of a likeness to Christ in the spirit of men as in very truth the presence of Christ himself should seem to the Reviewers to take away the significance of historic Christianity. For here again the two lines of Christian thought have persistently tended to get themselves into a dilemma, and to challenge on-comers with a *which*. "Which do you hold to, the Christ without or the Christ within? If the former, you run the risk of being a Jesuit or an Evangelical, worshipping the memory of a historic being, and reducing eternal processes to *opera operata*. If the latter, you are a Mystic, a Quaker, who have no use for the first century, and are given over to the tyranny of individual fancies. Now which?"

This venerable dilemma has so far succeeded in imposing the belief that there is a necessary opposition between historical alle-

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 124.

² Page 89.

giance to the Christ of the gospels and ethical allegiance to the claims of spiritual life, that it is, as has been previously said, one of the most serious questions of our day, pressing upon the intelligent, unprofessional mind, to settle the relations between historical and ethical religion; and it is largely this motive that is impelling those many intelligent men and women, earnestly devoted to the cause of right and truth, who are turning away from the churches, because they seem to them to be hopelessly wedded to the worship of ceremony and history. It is, then, perhaps no wonder that the Andover Reviewers should suppose, with others, that a recognition of what has been called the essential Christ must take away the significance of historic Christianity.

Now the position of the Incarnation in the divine plan of revelation is well stated by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by a son" (Heb. i. 1, 2). Thus the Incarnation is not the sole act of revelation, but is its climax, characterized above all other acts, as the author goes on to say, by the unique nature of its attractiveness and definiteness. Historic Christianity, then, has as its province not to create spiritual life in the race *de novo*, but to be its inspirer, its guide, the revealer to it of heights hitherto unknown. If to-morrow the Gospels were discovered to be false, the spiritual life of man would remain, but it would be infinitely poorer — weaker in motive-power, narrower in range, with fewer questions answered, with fewer questions which it cared to ask. And this we find to be in general the condition of those who have little or no hold on historic Christianity. Their spiritual life may be real, but it is thin, saving them from much of evil, but with a narrow horizon and feeble, not calling upon the strongest of the directive powers, a clear purpose intelligently and consciously held. The value of historic Christianity, then, is not diminished by the Pauline doctrine of the immanence of Christ, for by it this historic element is held necessary to the completeness of the spiritual life of the race. Of course, the more the spiritual life of the individual holds in it, absorbed from the community, elements which are the direct inheritance of historic Christianity, the more will it approximate to that completeness which is possible only to those who know in whom they have trusted. But that one who has an eager love for whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, just, pure, lovely, — that he has, *ipso facto*, salvation, cannot be denied by any one who holds salvation to be

deliverance from sin. And if he is so saved, it must be either that he is saved without the knowledge of Christ, or that in these very things he has the knowledge of Christ. For ourselves, we prefer the latter alternative.

This objection, however, runs deeper. There is a feeling that to allow devotion to that which is true, honest, just, to be essentially the same as devotion to Christ would be subversive of his personality. And it is a form of this objection which "Progressive Orthodoxy" expresses in saying that this view takes away the personality of the Holy Spirit. Love for a person is concrete, we are apt to say; devotion to a principle is abstract. Earnestness for truth, justice, goodness, is indeed desirable, but it is not the same as love for Jesus. To ascribe to one person, say the Reviewers, what belongs to another is an infringement of personal rights, at least a confusion of personality. Now this is true, if our idea of personality is still dominated by the thought of separate embodiments. We ordinarily think of personality as necessarily exclusive, mine of yours and his and every one's. But in order to understand man's relation to God, and all the higher human mutual relations, we must recognize that personality is inclusive. The more truly it is personality, the more does it comprehend all true persons; "I in them and thou in me." This conception is needed to explain the participation by man in the life of God, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the presence of Christ in the church, all true friendship and marriage, the mutual life of the living with the dead. Any one who has exclaimed triumphantly in the face of separation by distance or death, —

"We are wed,
For we shall carry each the pressure deep
Of the other's soul,"

will feel it intrusive emptiness to be told that the power that ministers spiritual comfort to him is not the presence of Christ with him, because it is the presence of the Holy Spirit. If our Lord could declare, "All mine are thine, and thine are mine;" if He could say of one and the same event, "The Father shall give you another comforter, even the spirit of truth. I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you;" we are compelled to believe that this was no "confusion of personality," nor a mere agreement of mutual courtesies on the part of the different members of the Trinity, but that it was because our Lord dwelt in a region where the difference between mine and thine had vanished, where the words had ceased to have distinctive meaning.

Let us sum up, then, the objections to the Andover system we have been endeavoring to express. The conviction forces itself upon us that the system, as at present developed, can never be a permanent power in the world, nor meet the great opportunity before it. It has no universal philosophic basis for its thought. It has not freed itself from the old opposition of finite to infinite, nor from the method of regarding revelation as consisting of facts superimposed on the human mind from without. Its belief in the immanence of God has not been absorbed into its teachings, while of the immanence of Christ it has hardly a conception. It has glimpses of the truths corrective of all these defects, but it has never seen them systematically. Owing to its materialistic view of the finding of Christ by the soul, it is compelled to assert for each soul an occasion when it shall settle its eternal destiny by consciously passing upon the claims of Christ; and owing to its desire to save the justice of God, it is compelled to posit such an occasion in the next life for those to whom it has not come in this. This assumption of a future opportunity of the kind it postulates, we cannot but think to have not the slightest warrant in the nature of things, nor in Scripture, because neither reason nor Scripture asserts that such an opportunity is in this life the gate of salvation; and to maintain that the conditions of salvation hereafter are other than they are here would be contrary to our belief in the continuity of life and law, and therefore suicidal. Its Christology vacillates between the old forensic view of Christ's work, caused by the attempt to drag a historic event bodily into the domain of the spiritual and make it do duty as part of an eternal process, and a perception of St. Paul's use of the term "Christ," as not only the title of Jesus, but the elucidative name of those eternal processes which were taking place in his soul, and in the soul of humanity, of which the historic Jesus of Nazareth was the climactic and complete revelation. The exigencies attending the birth of the Andover movement have unfortunately prevented it from developing itself calmly and harmoniously, and have given its utterances a tone now apologetic and adaptive, now aggressively polemic. The reader of "Progressive Orthodoxy" cannot fail to see that it is largely local difficulties that the scheme is designed to meet, cannot fail to hear an exculpatory tone, and almost to feel embarrassment at finding himself present at the family quarrel of some well-bred household. One may both be proud and may smile to note that some of its chapters could not have been written outside of New England. This gives the book

a certain provincial air. Local polemics there must be, but Andover's time for this ought now to be past. She ought to have produced not an *Apologia*, but an *Institutio*.

Philosophy and science are to-day making to theology a contribution of preëminent value, and this contribution is a question. Theology has had no such precious opportunity for being questioned for three and a half centuries. The question is, "Does the infinite exclude or include the finite?" The answer which any school of thought gives to this is the test of its depth and the prophecy as to its permanent existence and influence. We may arrange side by side the two opposing hypotheses with their corollaries, so that a glance will show us the genealogy of ideas. If the infinite excludes the finite, all knowledge is relative, real knowledge of God impossible, and the union of divine and human in Christ becomes a mechanical, uninformative one. Certain conceptions become opposites; for example, supernatural and natural, grace and nature, revealed and natural religion, will and law, conversion and education, the church and the world, the priest and the man, faith and reason, the claims of the next life and those of this. If, on the other hand, the infinite necessarily includes the finite, real knowledge is possible; knowledge of God is absolute, though not complete; the union of divine and human in Christ is essential and typical; the opposites just mentioned become different aspects of a common unity. According as we hold the one position or the other, revelation is a process outside the mind of man or within it; faith is a body of truth or an attitude of spirit; the Atonement is satisfaction to God or harmony with Him; the Incarnation was an exhibition of humiliation or of life in its highest development, full and glorious.

On which of these two sides is Andover to take her stand? At present she stands on neither.

Frederic Palmer.

ANDOVER, MASS.

EDITORIAL.

DR. VON DÖLLINGER.

HERMANN GRIMM has remarked that from the Italian point of view all the Germans are heretics alike, the Roman Catholic Germans being simply heretics a few degrees lighter than the rest. An Italian Catholic, he says, simply asks: Are you a heretic? If you are, he wants nothing more to do with you. A German Catholic asks: Why are you a heretic? But this very question has in it a germ of heresy. It implies that a Catholic is under obligation to weigh the grounds of a dissenting opinion, which cannot be conceded without implying a possible obligation of accepting it. This is exemplified in the history of the illustrious man who has been called away from earth on the eve of his completing the ninety-first year of a life which continued in full activity up to the close.

We are apt to imagine, in view of Dr. Döllinger's later position, that he had always belonged to one of the Protestantizing schools, or, at least, to the Gallican school of Catholicism, whereas, until he was fifty years old, he was known as a peculiarly intense Ultramontane, and a peculiarly bitter antagonist of Protestantism. In view of the fact that the Reformation in Germany had so long had *de facto* historical rights, it might have been expected that when in Bavaria Protestant soldiers protested against being required to kneel to the host, so enlightened a man as Döllinger, however intense a Roman Catholic, would have given his voice on their side. Even such an Italian pope as Benedict XIV. would hardly have urged the abstract rights of the church against them. But Dr. Döllinger spoke for coercion and against the rights of conscience. And as to the claims of the church generally in face of the state, notably as respected education and mixed marriages, he appears to have supported the most arrogant pretensions of the priesthood. But he was a German, one of the greatest of scholars, and a Christian after the German pattern, that is, one whose religion rested primarily on personal conviction and experience. And the more stanchly such a one champions the theories of a Boniface VIII., the more danger there is, in some unexpected crisis, that these will suddenly collapse under his hand. And so it happened to Dr. von Döllinger. There seems to have been all along a preparation for this in a latent but deep dislike of Jesuitism, and a deep sense of all the unspeakable mischief it had wrought to his country, as well as to the world. Many years before his breach with Rome, he has used language in remarking upon the Jewish scribes, and their substitution of perverting casuistries for a living faith, of which his late work, in conjunction with Professor Reusch, in development of the history of Jesuit influence in the field of morality, might be called an amplification. Indeed, as he himself has since said, in describing the ordinary experi-

ence of a German Catholic, it is hard for such a one to realize that he and the people of Calabria, with their idolatry and magic, profess the same religion, while on the other hand, a German married couple, Protestant and Catholic, will easily maintain family worship for twenty years together without the consciousness of a jar. Indeed, those many German priests who preach justification by faith with greater zeal than their Protestant neighbors often exhibit appear to do so quite independently of the particular opinions which they may hold respecting papal infallibility or the rights of the church.

The change which transformed Dr. Döllinger from an Ultramontane into the great antagonist of Ultramontaniam appears to have been mainly a silent ripening in his own mind, in the ten years between 1848 and 1858. It might have been expected that the great convulsions of the former year would only have confirmed him in his inordinate ecclesiasticism. But they seem to have wrought (for we can hardly suppose them to have remained inoperative) exactly the other way. He doubtless saw in them the judgment of God on institutions that were outworn. The divulsion between him and his old associates began when the latter, and Pius at their head, clung with such insensate fury, virtually treating it as a point of the faith, to the Pope's regal rights in Middle Italy. Döllinger's graduated doctrinal and historical sense must have been shocked beyond measure at this confusion of Christianity with one of its mere accidents. The hysterical Pope and he knew thenceforth that they "were of a different spirit."

It is a sad pity that he had not given more decisive expression to his mental attitude until his long concurrence in the evil domination of Rome had ripened its most evil fruits. When he presided over a gathering of German Catholic scholars, at which the rights of investigation over against mere authority were energetically maintained, and consented at last to quiet the fears of the agitated Pope by sending him a message that the meeting confessed knowledge to be unconditionally subject to authority, he helped to betray German Catholicism by leading it over the edge of an inclined plane, on whose slope, as a Bavarian Catholic bitterly remarked after 1870, it was impossible to stop before it landed in the pitiable collapse of the German episcopate at the council. At the last, Döllinger himself escaped, and a noble band of the Catholic scholarship of his country, few by count, but many by weight. He himself (Hefele apart) easily outweighed all the bishops together. But possibly an earlier courage might have done much more than to rescue a fragment from mental prostration, precious as that fragment is in itself.

We must not, however, judge of the effects of von Döllinger's late protest, and that of his companions, merely by the number of those who have formally constituted themselves into a distinct organization. Only within these three years, a German nobleman has written a book in which he declares that though many, himself among them, have been socially

precluded from giving a formal adhesion to the Old Catholic movement, yet they recognize in it a pledge of the ultimate deliverance of German Catholicism from Rome. It is usual to smile pityingly at Father Hyacinthe's isolated endeavors in France. Yet a bishop in full communion with Rome has privately written to him that his courageous action has brought nearer the day of his brethren's release by a hundred years. "What do these feeble Jews?" is a taunt dear to the hearts of the Sanballats and Tobiahs of all ages, but for which the children of God have small occasion to care. Dollinger himself never took anything but a reluctant and discontented part in a movement to which, nevertheless, his eminent personality gave its strongest impulse.

One of the best effects of the Old Catholic movement is likely to be produced upon the Church of England. It is evident that she is coming into an organic relation with those many continental Catholics who are becoming tired of Roman repression that will ultimately convert them into outlying adherents of Anglicanism. And as their Catholicism is of a more certainly authentic stamp than hers, and the validity of their priesthood confessed even by their enemies, their influence must react upon England for a higher appreciation of the Reformation than a great many Anglo-Catholics seem now to entertain. No tribute to Luther that we know of has been quite so grand as that rendered, in his lectures on the Reunion of the Churches, by Dr. von Dollinger. Once emancipated from Italy, it is simply impossible that German Catholicism should not prove a healing and mediating influence. It can never—as Anglo-Saxon movements can only too easily—find a central interest in mere matters of organization and rite.

It cannot, of course, be pretended that Ignatius von Dollinger was a great creative personality. But neither was he a mere student. His vast stores of knowledge were not accumulated but absorbed, worn lightly, and turned to living ends. And therefore he will remain a living memory for Christian mankind.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF MR. COVELL; WITH CORRESPONDENCE.

THE correspondence in the case of Mr. Covell, published in our last issue, closed, as our readers will recall, with the minute of the Prudential Committee postponing further action till after the completion of Mr. Covell's Seminary course. This minute was adopted, as we are informed in Dr. Storrs's recent letter in the "*Independent*," because of the impossibility of securing Mr. Covell's immediate appointment, though this was advised and urged by the President and Vice-President of the Board. It had been stated in the minute that there was a disagreement of opinion among the members of the Committee; still it had been also there stated that the action was taken "in the strong desire and hope that if the appointment is to be made it may be made with entire unanimity." Just

how an appointment which at that time could not secure a majority vote was to be made six months after with "entire unanimity" did not at first appear very clear to Mr. Covell. But from personal letters from the rooms, which followed the minute, similar in purport to Dr. Thompson's open letter to the "Congregationalist," it became evident, as there avowed, that "the change hoped for was not in the Committee but in the candidate." And when this fact was manifest to Mr. Covell, namely, that his appointment was practically conditioned upon further study in eschatology with a view to a change in his opinion, it seemed to him that the only honorable course for him to take was to withdraw his application. As he very clearly shows in his letter, he could not reopen the question of eschatology in the spirit of honest search after the truth, when his appointment seemed to be made dependent upon his reaching a given conclusion; and he would not allow himself to appear to be doing what he could not do; to trifle with a matter of so serious concern. This, as we know, was Mr. Covell's immediate and unalterable conviction. And however much we may have wished, in common with many of his friends, that the situation had allowed a different interpretation, we can see no course equally honorable with that which Mr. Covell determined to pursue. It was in entire consistency with the candor and honesty which had marked his whole course from the hour of his application for appointment as a missionary of the American Board. We do not wonder that the Committee in their reply are moved to express their "heartly appreciation of his evident conscientiousness both in presenting and withdrawing his application." And we may add that we think the Prudential Committee may well thank Mr. Covell for having by his straightforwardness relieved them of the immediate embarrassment of their singular action. We do not know that Dr. Storrs calculated the rebound of his words in the following sarcasm which he aimed at Andover, but he could hardly have done more execution in the rear by a direct shot at the Prudential Committee. "About the last thing," he says, "which I should do for a young man of ardent and receptive mind, in this dubious state, of whom I wanted to make a missionary, would be to discourage his missionary impulse, and send him back to Andover, with a more or less keen sense of repulse, to get further light on eschatology. . . . With all respect for the accomplished and industrious teachers who occupy its chairs, I would far sooner send one to Zululand or Japan, on a mission for Christ, than to send him to them, as an inquiring student, to get correct views of what some of them regard as 'the larger hope.'" Very well. This was precisely what the Prudential Committee did, and in so doing were guilty of the absurdity here held up to derision, or were guilty of the insincerity of sending Mr. Covell back to Andover for further study in the expectation that his opinions would be so confirmed and established that his rejection might be secured. Mr. Covell would not be a party to the action which Dr. Storrs has characterized after this fash-

ion. Young men may not always show the wisdom of Mr. Worldly Wiseman, but when they are true to their instincts and convictions, they not infrequently show that higher wisdom which compels admiration and in the end acceptance.

The reply of the Prudential Committee to Mr. Covell's letter of withdrawal suggests at once the proverb, "Blessings brighten as they take their flight." Mr. Covell is assured that "on account of all that it has heard about and seen of him, it would rejoice to put him in the missionary field if the way should hereafter open for so doing;" he is informed that "it has had no thought of requiring any other majority for his appointment than is required for all such appointments;" and he is told that "the way will always be open to him to renew his application, if at any time he shall be moved to do so, with the assurance of the most careful and candid consideration of it by the Committee." We are reminded, as we read this language, of the clerk, who having been discharged by his employer received so fulsome a recommendation that he at once presented it for reemployment. If all this could be said of Mr. Covell and to him, why did not the Committee refuse to accept his withdrawal; why at least did they not explicitly remove the condition which made his withdrawal necessary? Reference to the official letter accompanying the minute will show that the same insistence is placed upon further thought and study upon the questions under consideration.

The withdrawal of Mr. Covell serves to expose the method of the Prudential Committee in passing upon the theological qualifications of candidates for missionary service. The method is that of protracted correspondence or of frequent interviews, in the endeavor not to ascertain what the candidate believes, but what he can be made to believe or unbelieve. We submit that no method could be devised more unsuited to times of controversy or of discussion in the church. More than this, we believe the method to be absolutely pernicious in its effects. It is in danger of becoming a school of sophistry and deceit. Not every man will be able to carry himself with the simplicity, the candor, and the consistency of Mr. Covell. More frequently we fear that candidates will take refuge in silence or in ambiguous statements or in unworthy compromises. At best, the method leads to fine distinctions in words, rather than to the clear, frank, and honest statement of the actual belief. If the Prudential Committee is a theological board (an assumption which we are not prepared to accept), if it has the functions of an ordaining council, let it use its powers like a council. Let the candidate present his statement of faith before the Committee, and, as with councils, let it be in public; then let him be examined as fully as may be necessary; and then let him be accepted or rejected, so far as his theological views are concerned. We are sure that no other method will give the Committee, working upon the basis of a theological committee, what they are

supposed to desire to know, namely, the mind and heart of the candidate, and we are sure that no other way can protect the candidate from the moral perils of ambiguity and sophistry, or the outward danger of misrepresentation and public distrust. Better by far that every candidate who cannot accept theological tests of the Committee be rejected on the spot, than that the convictions or even the doubts and questionings of young men be subjected to such a process. Who can tell the difference between a theory or hope which is without the *support* of the Scriptures, but which is "probably, but not certainly, indicated by the famous passages in Peter;" or between a theory or hope which is not a part of a *speculative* scheme, but which is "possibly, but not certainly, involved in the universality of the Atonement"? In all these things, it is a mere matter of definition, not of fact. What any one can distinguish in his own mind and make clear to others is the difference between a gospel and a hope, the message to be delivered, the glad tidings to be declared, and the hope which has its origin in the intimations of Scripture, or which attaches to the believer's apprehension of the spirit and scope of Christianity. The last man whom we should wish to see sent into the foreign field would be the man in danger of making a hobby of the hope of the Christian opportunity for all men, or who held it in polemic or controversial attitude toward his fellow-workers. But if the entertainment of a hope in this direction is to be excluded on the ground of its effect upon the "spirit of missions," there are other hopes or theories with which the spirit of missions must have a reckoning. If we are to change the ground from what may be true, Biblically or theologically, to what seems to be practically expedient or inexpedient for missions in the holding of truth, the discussion must take a much wider range than it has yet assumed. But in the examination of candidates, whether the end aimed at be theological truth or missionary expediency, let the examination be after the general method of a council, and let the decision be immediate and final. A candidate might be rejected, but he would not lose his self-respect. And the Committee might save by this method the time which it now loses in discussing the meaning of correspondence, or the form of minutes.

We do not concede the underlying conception of the Board as a theological body in urging the analogy of a council in the examination of candidates. It was the stout contention of Dr. Hopkins that the American Board was not a theological body, but a missionary organization, and that its executive committee was not a theological committee but a prudential committee. And until this primary and fundamental question of the real function of the Board is settled, there can evidently be no agreement about the routine methods of the Prudential Committee in determining the theological qualifications of missionary candidates. But under the present assumption of power by the Committee, it is fair to claim that there must be some restrictions upon the method, above all

things that the method must be open in its workings. If the choice must be, for the present, between the process now in use and the method of a council, by all means let the Prudential Committee resolve itself into a council, and conduct its examinations and make its decisions, according to well-established Congregational usage.

The withdrawal of Mr. Covell has this further significance, that it is the protest of a young man against the use of missionary candidates for opening the doors of the American Board. "Had I not supposed," Mr. Covell says in the conclusion of his letter, "that the New York meeting was intended to open the way for young men holding the position which I occupy, I should not have made my application." The Springfield meeting left the doors of the Board shut and bolted against young men from the liberal seminaries. It was so understood and accepted by these young men and by their friends. The Prudential Committee will bear witness that no applications from these sources disturbed the quiet transaction of their duties from Springfield to New York, except possibly in the case of Mr. Noyes, who appeared before them at their request, in accordance with the advice of the Ordaining Council to the Berkeley Street Church. From the Prudential Committee point of view, everything was proceeding in a satisfactory manner. But the churches were becoming restive. The signs of discontent in the denomination were increasing. The chief organ of the denomination raised the alarm as the time for the annual meeting of the Board approached. At the meeting there was a constant undertone of dissatisfaction, unrest, and discontent. At last the gathering feeling found expression in ways which the most unyielding conservative did not dare to ignore. No one can tell what the result at New York would have been, whether a division of the Board, or, a modification of previous action, or a change of administration, had not Dr. Storrs offered himself as a peacemaker, standing on the platform of his letter of acceptance and affirming upon his reelection to the Presidency the recognition of the two wings of the Board and their respective rights. The offer was accepted, and by none more gladly, as it seemed at the time, than by the extreme conservatives. And in the spirit of mutual concession and of working fellowship the meeting adjourned. Then came in its natural time the application of Mr. Covell, with the result which is now before the public. We need not say that we, in common with all liberal friends of the Board, were surprised and pained at the refusal of the conservative members of the Prudential Committee to accept the President's interpretation of the case before them, or to give him in the three meetings at which he was present their willing or unwilling support. And it is only because of this action that we are now not surprised at the attitude of the "Advance," the organ of conservatism in the West, toward Dr. Storrs's last letter, and at the open dissent or singularly guarded assent

which characterizes so many of the letters of the conservatives called out by the questions of the "Independent." The point to be remembered in recalling the New York meeting is that the settlement there reached was not a theological or even a logical settlement, but of the nature of a personal agreement, and so requiring practical unanimity in the after action of all concerned to make it permanent and effective. Officers may be chosen and resolutions carried by a majority vote, *but a policy of peace calls for unanimity* in the consenting vote, and then for prompt and hearty good will in the action necessary to support it. When unanimity is wanting either in the vote or in the action which may follow, *the policy fails as a policy of peace*. And this is precisely what has happened to Dr. Storrs's policy. The policy itself may yet succeed, and we withdraw nothing in spirit or in word from the support which we have given it, but it is evident that it cannot succeed through the coöperation hoped for and to have been expected. It must now succeed, if at all, through the earnest, persistent, and definite purpose to secure its accomplishment. Something must be *done* to give effect to the statement and restatement of the policy in question.

The fact is now apparent that the New York meeting did not open the door for young men from the liberal seminaries of the denomination. And the question is, who shall open it? Shall it be the young men themselves? The withdrawal of Mr. Covell is a respectful answer declining the task. And in his declination he interprets, we think, the feelings of the young men who may be in agreement with him in his missionary purpose and in his theological opinions. "We are willing and eager," they are saying, "to serve the cause of Christ in heathen lands, we are not afraid to undertake the work or to endure the privations for which it may call, but we have yet to see why we should force ourselves through an unwilling organization." And in this conclusion we think that the young men are right. Those of us who believe in opening the Board have no right to transfer our responsibilities to those who would go in our behalf among the heathen. There are appropriate methods and appointed means for accomplishing the desired end. There is the President of the Board, who accepted his reelection upon the platform of an open door. There is the Committee of fifteen chosen to bring the Board into working harmony with the churches. There is the Committee of nine, nominated for the express purpose of considering the management of the Prudential Committee in regard to this particular matter. And there is the corporation itself, available for direct action in its annual meetings. The agencies for effecting a change in the methods or management of the Board in its relation to missionary candidates are not wanting to those who have the desire and the purpose to use them. The responsibility for the present situation rests altogether upon those who refuse to support in good faith the platform of the New York meeting. The responsibility for its continuance rests upon those who, believing in a

more liberal policy, are content to leave young men to make their way through the Board, or to find their way outside the Board into foreign fields.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ANDOVER, MASS., Jan. 7, 1890.

To the Prudential Committee of the A. B. C. F. M., Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIRS, — I have received official notice of the action of the Prudential Committee taken on December 17th; also a copy of the minute then passed.

In accordance with the instructions in your "Manual for Missionary Candidates" I applied for appointment in October, 1889, "near the commencement of the senior year." I applied to you with the sincere desire that I might be sent as a foreign missionary. There had been very serious obstacles in the way, obstacles known only to myself and a few intimate friends, but these obstacles I determined to overcome, and in that determination made my application.

My request for immediate appointment, repeated in several letters, has been refused on the ground that my views on eschatology are "essentially immature, and may take wholly different form and character in the months to come." I do not wish to discuss the question of my immaturity, but you will recall the fact that Dr. Storrs presented to the Committee a written report of a conversation in which I stated that I had held my present views for more than two years. You also doubtless remember that I gave you, through Dr. Storrs, my *pledge* that if appointed, and any important change took place in my views before leaving the country, I would notify you of such change. And I may add that I have been led to believe that if I would modify my statements, the question of my immaturity would disappear, and I would receive immediate appointment.

After careful study of the minute, I can reach no other conclusion than that the end sought by the postponement of my case is the unanimity of the Prudential Committee, and from letters since received in explanation of the minute, I am also forced to the conclusion that the desired unanimity can be reached only by a change of my views. I think you will see that I cannot reopen the question of eschatology and study it with the spirit of truth when my appointment seems to depend upon a change of my opinion. In my letter of November 25th I said, "If my application were withheld from the Prudential Committee until I had studied questions of eschatology more thoroughly, I might feel a constant tendency to intellectual dishonesty. The circumstances would not be conducive to that poise of judgment which one should have in the search for truth." And again in my letter of November 23d I said, "Whatever my views may be in the future, I should at least want to have the *liberty* of holding the same doctrines and hypotheses that I now hold." I have given careful consideration to the matter, and the difficulty of reopening the question of eschatology increases with time and thought. The passages quoted above from my letters I should emphasize even more strongly now than when I first wrote them. I feel that it is morally impossible for me to make any special study of eschatology under the present pressure, and therefore I prefer to withdraw my application for appointment. Had I not supposed that the New York meeting was intended to open the way for young men holding the position which I occupy, I should not have made my application.

Yours truly,

A. J. COVELL.

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.
 CONGREGATIONAL HOUSE, 1 SOMERSET ST.,
 BOSTON, Jan. 15, 1890.

Mr. A. J. Covell, Andover.

DEAR MR. COVELL, — Your letter of the 7th inst., which was received here upon the 8th and was acknowledged to you upon the same day, was presented to the Prudential Committee at their next meeting, held yesterday afternoon, and the following minute was unanimously adopted, as given in the inclosed copy.

There is but one feeling on the part of all connected with these rooms toward yourself, a warm personal interest with the desire that further thought and study may make all clear as to the important practical truths under consideration.

I remain, yours truly,

E. K. ALDEN,
Clerk of Committee.

[Minute adopted unanimously January 14, 1890.]

The Prudential Committee hereby acknowledges the reception of the letter of Mr. Covell of the 7th instant, delivered at the Missionary rooms upon the 8th, withdrawing his application for missionary appointment, and desires to express to him its hearty appreciation of his evident conscientiousness both in presenting and in withdrawing his application. The Committee desires also to state distinctly to Mr. Covell that its own action, as communicated in its previous minute of December 17th, in no sense prejudged his case, but only postponed decision upon it; that it has a most sincere and cordial regard for him, on account of all that it has heard about and seen of him, and would rejoice to put him in the missionary field if the way should hereafter open for doing so; that while it has earnestly desired to be unanimous in any favorable action taken in his case, it has had no thought of requiring any other majority for his appointment than is required for all such appointments; and that the way will always be open to him to renew his application, if at any time he shall be moved to do so, with the assurance of the most careful and candid consideration of it by the Committee.

A true copy.

Attest : E. K. ALDEN,
Clerk of Committee.

Boston, Jan. 15, 1890.

COMMISSIONER ROBINSON'S REPORT.

WE published in 1886¹ such documents as were important to a correct understanding of the prosecution then begun against several professors in Andover Seminary. We have also given the text of the judgments rendered by the Board of Visitors and the Board of Trustees;² and the substance — mainly in his own words — of Mr. Justice Allen's Report and findings upon questions pertaining to the correctness of the Record, filed by the Visitors, of their proceedings in the trial of Professor Smyth.³ Following our custom of publishing important texts and

¹ *Andover Review*, vol. vi., pp. 523-534 (November, 1886).

² *Ibid.*, vol. viii., pp. 71-80 (July, 1887).

³ *Ibid.*, vol. x., pp. 404-412 (October, 1888).

findings, while abstaining from discussion of questions still before the appointed tribunals, we now give in full a Report recently filed at Salem, Mass., by Hon. George D. Robinson, formerly Governor of this Commonwealth. The document is so explicit as to the nature and scope of the inquiry submitted to its Commissioner by the Court before which Professor Smyth's Appeal is pending, that little needs to be said by way of introduction; and it is so clear in its findings as to make comment, for the most part, superfluous. A few points may, however, be particularly adverted to, since in certain quarters they seem to have escaped the attention they deserve; also a few facts may profitably be recalled from previous stages of the prosecution.

Towards the middle of February, 1888, the Trustees of Andover Seminary filed a bill in which it was charged that during the pendency of the prosecution of Professor Smyth before the Visitors, and prior to judgment, Dr. Eustis "knowingly allowed himself to be submitted to, and was submitted to, undue and improper influences; and that said Eustis formed and repeatedly expressed to many persons an opinion upon the case of the said defendant Smyth before hearing the same: all of which was contrary to his judicial duty and rendered him incapable of sitting in judgment upon the said defendant Smyth." On the 28th of the same month, Professor Smyth, who eight months earlier had appealed from the Visitors to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, signed a document entitled "Additional Causes of Appeal" (filed May 15, 1888, and amended November 23, 1888), which charged Dr. Eustis with "partiality and prejudice against the appellant," and set this accusation forth in eight articles or specifications. Upon petition, the Court decided to appoint a Commissioner to report the evidence in the case, and selected for this service a gentleman widely known and highly esteemed for his conscientious and able discharge of high public trusts. The order of appointment reads:—

"*Ordered*, That the additional causes of appeal, together with the additional specifications made thereunder, filed by the appellant, be referred to George D. Robinson, Esquire, of Chicopee, as Commissioner, to hear the parties and their evidence, to find the facts and report the same to the Court, together with such portions of the evidence before him as either party may desire."

The Commissioner has understood this order, as no doubt it was intended, to restrict his function to that of sifting and reporting the evidence offered to prove the charge of prejudice and partiality. In his report he follows the specifications. He finds no proof of submission to undue influence, nor of personal prejudice against Professor Smyth, nor of any intentional perversion of justice. Dr. Eustis "gave to all the evidence and arguments that were offered in the appellant's case intelligent and honest consideration, with the purpose and desire of making a fair and just decision." If the question at issue turned on proof of personal animosity toward the appellant, of intentional dishonesty in dealing

with evidence, or the like, the Commissioner's report would be a virtual acquittal of Dr. Eustis. The charge, however, as preferred, and as understood by the appellant's counsel, is something quite different. "We submit," remarks Professor Baldwin in his printed brief, "that no honest man, no Christian man (and Dr. Eustis was both), could have fallen into such an error, on a point so vital, unless blinded by a preconceived opinion."¹ The bias charged was one that made it morally impossible for him in the case before him to administer justice impartially. The charge of "partiality and prejudice" is thus set forth in Article 2 of the "Additional Causes of Appeal:"—

"During the pendency of said prosecution against this appellant before said corporation, and before the final hearing thereon, said Dr. Eustis formed and repeatedly expressed to divers persons the opinion that this appellant was guilty of the matters charged against him in said proceedings by the complainants therein."

The Commissioner's finding on this specification is as clear and emphatic as his acquittal of Dr. Eustis of corruption or personal animosity. He certifies, in substance, that Dr. Eustis, before he heard the accused professors, repeatedly pronounced them to be guilty as alleged, and that he characterized their conduct as lacking in conscientiousness, as to him irreconcilable with honesty, as insincere and unscrupulous.

The significance of all this as respects the question of "partiality and prejudice" is brought out by a further fact reported by the Commissioner, namely, that Dr. Eustis affirmed:—

"The Board of Visitors are called upon in the case of Professor Smyth to examine and decide whether his views published and declared accord with the Seminary creed thus interpreted and therefore with the intent of the founders. *This is the sole question before them for adjudication.*" [Italics ours.]

Knowing this to be "the sole question," Dr. Eustis affirmed, before hearing the accused professors, of whom Professor Smyth was one, that they "were fundamentally heretical, judged by the Andover creed," etc., etc. The Commissioner fixes definitely the time of these utterances. It was after the charges were filed and before the hearing of the cases. He makes equally definite that the judgment expressed was not simply upon the meaning of the Seminary creed, but upon the persons accused; that it was in every respect upon the precise issue concerning them which he was to try. An eminent judge is reported to have said that he would talk law with any man, a case before him with no man. Dr. Eustis violated this rule of judicial conduct. And he not only discussed the cases before him, but prejudged them; and not only prejudged them, but argued for his prejudgment; and this not only privately, but so as to make a record of his prejudgment in the community where he was a pastor, and in the denomination in which he "occupied a leading position as a thinker

¹ Brief of appellant, p. 28.

and preacher." This record was for a time not widely known. But Dr. Eustis was well aware of its existence when he went up to Boston from Springfield to sit as a Visitor in a "judicial capacity," charged with the duty, as the Commissioner reports, of "administering justice impartially." His own self-consistency had already been put by himself into the scales of justice, and he knew that this was so. If he acquitted the accused Professor, he had a record to face when he returned, a record of his own creation in the precise matter of which he was to judge. He sat, therefore, with his associates and heard the accused professor and his counsel not only with an opinion in his hand, but one already, as it were, delivered; an opinion to which he had, in a way which must inevitably become known to the public, fully committed himself.

The Commissioner refers to the Court the question whether such pre-judgment of a case is consistent with judicial impartiality, and what bearing the decision of this question should have on the ultimate issue of the legality of the Visitors' judgment removing Professor Smyth from his office. These are the questions which will now come before the Court to whom the Commissioner has made his report of the facts. His finding, it will be observed, does not decide either question. It is a Report, — not a decision, even upon the charge of "partiality and prejudice," but a determination of the facts by which the Court will decide whether this charge is sustained or not.

One other remark seems also to be called for. As the history of the case shows, the issue respecting Dr. Eustis's disqualification as a judge is not a part of the Appeal as originally made. If the "Additional Causes of Appeal" had proved to be groundless, those on which it was first made would remain to be heard. The decision of the Commissioner supplies further reasons; it withdraws none which lie outside of the scope of his commission. As he himself intimates, it remains for the Court, either upon the facts he reports, "taken alone, or in connection with what shall appear of record before the Court," to decide upon Dr. Eustis's judicial conduct. It also remains for it, after argument, to pass upon the validity of the judgment of the Visitors in view of a great variety of considerations wholly independent of the question of Dr. Eustis's partiality. These considerations constitute the original grounds of appeal, and are also, in other and appropriate relations, set forth in the Trustees' Bill of Complaint, and in their application to be made parties to the Appeal. The Commissioner's Report, we hope, will open the way to a speedy hearing of all these causes on their merits, and to such decisions as the supreme tribunal before which they will be presented shall see to be competent and just.

The following is the Commissioner's report: —

*Commonwealth of Massachusetts.**Essex ss. Supreme Judicial Court.*

EGBERT C. SMYTH, APPELLANT, *vs.* THE VISITORS OF THE THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION IN PHILLIPS ACADEMY IN ANDOVER.

COMMISSIONER'S REPORT.

THE undersigned, to whom, as Commissioner appointed by the Court in the above entitled cause, the additional causes of appeal together with the additional specifications made thereunder were referred, with authority to hear the parties and their evidence, to find the facts and report the same to the Court, together with such portions of the evidence before him as either party may desire, having fully heard the parties and their evidence, respectfully submits his report.

First. The appellant charged that the decree of the appellee corporation, from which he appealed, was procured and made by reason of undue influence used by third parties toward and upon the Rev. William T. Eustis, D. D., a member of said appellee corporation, and, specifically propounded in his third article as amended, by Rev. Dr. Edwards A. Park, Rev. Dr. J. W. Wellman, and Rev. Dr. John M. Greene and others whose names were unknown to the appellant, were in communication with Dr. Eustis at sundry times before the final hearing on the charges against the appellant, and before the final arguments had been made, and that by reason of such communication Dr. Eustis allowed himself to be, and was, submitted to undue and improper influence in favor of convicting the appellant of the said charges. The appellant failed to offer evidence, either in direct testimony or by just and proper inference, to sustain this charge as to the persons specifically named or as to any other persons whatever. I therefore find that Dr. Eustis was not in communication with persons as alleged touching the truth and sufficiency of the charges or any of them, and the conduct of the prosecution, and the evidence in support thereof, in such manner that he thereby allowed himself to be and was submitted to undue and improper influence in favor of convicting the appellant of the charges made against him, and that he was not unduly influenced by any persons whatever, and that the decree appealed from was not procured and made by reason of undue influence exerted upon or over said Dr. Eustis.

Second. The appellant further charged that said decree was procured and made by reason of the partiality and prejudice of Dr. Eustis against the appellant. The appellant particularly set out the grounds of this cause of appeal in his articles of specification other than the third.

As charged in the first article it was shown, and I find, that Dr. Eustis voted to sustain the charges against the appellant and for his removal from office. The Court having decided it to be immaterial how the other members of the appellee corporation voted, I make no finding as to them.

It was shown in the evidence and stood unquestioned that Dr. Eustis was during the years 1886 and 1887, and for many years prior thereto had been, the pastor of one of the largest churches in the City of Springfield; that he occupied a leading position as a preacher and thinker in the denomination to which he belonged; that he was outspoken and earnest in the utterance of his views on any question; that he held and declared decided opinions on the theological questions which were then under general discussion, as the doctrine of

future probation, the inspiration of the Scriptures, and the atonement ; and that his position in the church, and his views and teachings as a Christian minister were well understood by all who knew him or read his writings ; and that he was openly and strongly opposed to the "New Theology" and to the teachings of "Progressive Orthodoxy," believing them contrary to Scripture and reason.

Further it was proved, and I find as facts, that for a considerable period prior to the date when the formal prosecution against Dr. Smyth and the other professors was begun Dr. Eustis was greatly interested in the subjects involved in the subsequent prosecution, and expressed his views thereon with great vigor and earnestness ; that after the charges were filed and before the final hearing he discussed with several different persons the "Andover question," as it was generally called, talking it over with some at great length ; that he expressed the opinion that the professors were fundamentally heretical, judged by the Andover creed, and their views were unsound and could not by any fair construction be reconciled with any avowed belief in the Andover creed ; that he opened conversation on this subject with a prominent clergyman in a bookstore, while the charges were pending and before final hearing, speaking with great earnestness and with quite an excited voice, and declaring that in his opinion the Andover professors could not conscientiously sign the creed, and he considered they were acting in a very insincere way in reference to it, characterizing their action as unscrupulous ; that to another person, a lawyer, during the same period, he showed a printed brief in the case (though, it did not appear which side the brief supported), and asked for an explanation of certain abbreviations, and, in reply to a question from the lawyer as to what the Andover controversy was, said the Andover Seminary was founded for the teaching of certain religious doctrines, and that the then professors were holding and promulgating views at variance with the foundation, and were being prosecuted for it ; that on August 12, 1886, he had a conversation, reference being made to the particular charges filed against the professors, with Professor Woodruff concerning the views of Dr. Smyth and other professors at Andover, saying, he did not see how men holding such views, specially referring to those on future probation and the authority of the Scriptures, could honestly retain their positions ; that between the filing of the charges and the final hearing he had a conversation with a book-seller at New Haven in which he expressed himself strongly against the doctrine held by the Andover professors, and expressed his opinion that they were unfit by reason of their theological opinions to hold their positions ; that by those who were acquainted with him it was well known through his public discourses and his conversations that he declared the views given in "Progressive Orthodoxy" and the doctrine of future probation were in conflict with the Andover creed, and not in harmony with the Scriptures ; but I find that he did not make the "Andover questions" so called, or the position and views of the Andover professors, the subject of his pulpit discussion or comment during the time between the filing of charges and the final hearing, although he did treat upon these questions before his congregation before the charges were filed, and after the hearing was closed.

Touching the substance of articles 4 and 5, I find and report that at the commencement of the prosecution complaints were filed jointly against all the professors, but that upon objection by the counsel for the professors the Board

of Visitors directed the charges to be made separately, and they were so made. The trial of Professor Smyth was begun December 28, 1886, and was concluded December 31, 1886. At the conclusion of the hearing of the charges against Professor Smyth, on December 31st, it was agreed that all the evidence and arguments then in as to his case should be considered as in as to the other professors, and they could present supplementary evidence and arguments. January 3, 1887, the trial of the other professors was taken up, but Dr. Eustis was not present, having been detained at Springfield to attend a funeral. He notified by letter and telegram his associates that he could not attend the meeting, and further stated that if the hearing was adjourned till the evening of that day or to the next day, and he was notified, he would be present.

He made arrangements at his home to proceed to Boston immediately after the close of the funeral services, but was stopped by a telegram from his associates announcing, much to his annoyance, that the hearing was going on without him. In consequence of the absence of Dr. Eustis, it was understood and agreed by his associates and by all parties interested, and so announced then, to wit, January 3, 1887, that the hearing against the professors (Dr. Smyth's trial having been concluded at a former day) might proceed in the absence of Dr. Eustis; that the statements and arguments of the professors presented in their defense should be submitted afterwards in print or writing, and that Dr. Eustis might act with his associates in the cases of these professors in the same manner and to the same effect as if he was present at the hearing. The hearing thereupon was continued and concluded, and the statements and arguments of the professors were afterwards submitted to Dr. Eustis in ample time for consideration before June 4, 1887. Dr. Eustis did not assent to this agreement, but stated after he became aware that the hearing had gone on in his absence that if he had been present he would have asked certain questions to the professors and that their answers thereto would have determined his course with reference to their cases.

In reference to the specifications made in article 6, I find and report that after January 3, 1887, the Visitors met from time to time until and including the 4th of June following, when, all the Visitors being present, the decree of removal of the appellant was passed, Dr. Eustis voting in favor of it, and upon the cases of all the other professors Dr. Eustis did not vote at all.

At the several meetings after January 3, 1887, and prior to June 4, 1887, the Visitors considered the cases of Dr. Smyth and the other professors together, and there was no separate oral discussion of Dr. Smyth's case, nor any intimation from Dr. Eustis that he would decline to vote in any of the cases. At one of these meetings of conference in May, 1887, Dr. Eustis presented a paper of great length showing his views upon the case of Professor Smyth. It opens with "The respondent is charged in sundry complaints and citations, etc., etc.," and after some argument continues, "The Board of Visitors are called upon in the case of Professor Smyth to examine and decide whether his views published and declared accord with the Seminary creed thus interpreted and therefore with the intent of the founders. This is the sole question before them for adjudication." In several other places Professor Smyth is mentioned in the paper, and nowhere is any reference made to any other professor. The closing paragraph of this paper is as follows; "The Visitors decide that to maintain or inculcate such a doctrine is not justified in any of

the doctrinal statements of the Andover creed, but is inconsistent with its direct affirmations, and was repudiated expressly by the Framers of the creed." It appeared to Dr. Seelye upon reading this paper that the Visitors were not likely to reach a unanimous verdict, and that these conclusions, if adopted, would cause the removal of the entire faculty at Andover; thereupon Dr. Seelye intimated, informally, that the consequent reorganization of the faculty would impose too severe labor upon him in his state of health, and that he would feel compelled to resign, but nothing more was afterwards said or done about his resignation, nor was there any connection between Dr. Seelye's intimation and Dr. Eustis's subsequent action. Until this paper was presented by Dr. Eustis he had expressed to his associates no opinion as to any of the professors, nor had he intimated how he would vote as to any of them, and he did not June 4, 1887, indicate how he would vote (unless it could be inferred from said paper) as to any professor except Dr. Smyth.

Subsequent to the last hearing on January 3, 1887, Dr. Eustis consulted with an eminent counselor as to his duty in the cases of the professors other than Dr. Smyth in view of his absence from the last hearing. He stated to his counselor that he had failed to attend without fault on his part; that if present he would have asked certain questions, and thought his mind would have been influenced thereby. He was thereupon advised that under the circumstances he would be entirely justified in declining to act.

Third. So far as the main statements made in the various articles of specifications have been found by me to be facts, I report that they first came to the knowledge of the appellant after June 4, 1887.

Fourth. I further find that Dr. Eustis was not actuated by personal hostility or animosity toward the appellant; that he did not act corruptly; that he was not swayed or influenced by any personal bias or prejudice against him; that until the paper was presented in May, 1887, no one knew how he would vote on any of the cases; and that he gave to all the evidence and arguments that were offered in the appellant's case intelligent and honest consideration with the purpose and desire of making a fair and just decision.

Upon the specifications under article 8 I find that the statutes of the Founders of the Institution require, among many other matters stated therein fully and particularly, the Visitors always to administer justice impartially; and further provide that in case of an equi-vote on any matter before said corporation, the question shall determine on that side on which the presiding member shall have voted. I specially report to the Court said statutes in full as submitted to me in evidence.

The foregoing are all the facts found by me within the scope of the inquiry authorized by my commission bearing upon the appellant's additional causes of appeal and specifications thereunder, and they are the only facts established within the limits prescribed to me upon which it may be determined by the Court whether, upon these facts taken alone or in connection with what shall appear of record before the court though not committed to the consideration of the commissioner, Rev. Dr. William T. Eustis was incapacitated to sit as a member of the Board of Visitors during the trial of the appellant, and whether the decree against the appellant was invalidated because of his vote in favor of its adoption.

With leave of the Court I will defer reporting the evidence until the parties in interest have indicated, after examining the contents of this report, what portions of the evidence they desire to have reported.

GEORGE D. ROBINSON, *Commissioner*.

January 15, 1890.

Filed Jan. 20, 1890.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL NOTES.

THE Eighth International Congress of Orientalists was opened September 2, 1889, in Stockholm by the scholarly king of Sweden and Norway in person. It closed with a banquet, in which each guest found beside his plate each course poetized in some Eastern language. Such were Chinese, Sanscrit, Hieroglyphic, and Japanese, not to mention the grace in Persian by a poet of Ispahan. The boundless hospitality of court and people was the feature of the gathering. King Oscar awarded two gold medals. The first was to Professor Noeldeke, of Strasbourg, in the History of Semitic Literature. The second was to Dr. Goldziher, of Buda-pesth, for work in the field of Arab Civilization before Mohammed. Dr. Hildebrandt gave an interesting account of the Oriental coins discovered in Sweden, some 50,000 of which have come to light, dating from the age of Abd-el-Malik to the end of the tenth century. Dr. Zehnpfund described with success the exact form of the stylus used by the Babylonian scribes. It was a cube with a pointed end, wooden, not metallic. With such a pen he was able to write the cuneiform characters on the clay as swiftly as German on paper. Dr. Haupt, of Johns Hopkins, Professor Lanman, of Harvard, and Professor Harper, of Yale, were among the American members present at this body for the concentration and dissemination of light from the East. The former took advantage of a "short but incisive communication on the death of Sargon" to express the hope that the next meeting but one of the congress would be in America. The proposal strikes us as a good one. Why might not New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore be ready in 1895 to welcome the stars of Oriental learning with no less warmth and to much more work than even Scandinavia?

North of the Black Sea was the primeval home of the Norsemen. South of the Black Sea we touch the track of the Hittites. Dr. Wright has shown us how rapidly our knowledge of this peculiar people has advanced. Less than twenty years has elapsed since European scholars derided the notion that the inscriptions of Hamath were Hittite remains. Now Winckler, of Berlin, and Sayce, of Oxford, agree that the letter of the king of Arzapi to Amenophis III. is probably Hittite. *Mi* is made out to be "mine," and *bibbi* to be "chariot." Iron and silver were their currency. The king of Assyria received 250 talents of the first, and the pieces of silver found among the calcined ruins of Troy were evidences of the second, even to their weight. The Bible speaks of the Hittites as inhabiting towns. Conder has identified Kadesh, the capital on the Orontes, and Skene Carchemish on the Euphrates, whose maneh survived the conquest of Sargon in 717 B. C. Hittite art seems to Professor Ramsay to have left its imprint on the art of Phrygia with its flat

figures and cut-away background. Call their government a confederacy or an empire, their monuments are multiplying toward the north and northeast of Palestine and in Asia Minor's central plateau. They are the people whose feet were encased in snowshoes, and whose weapon was the double battle-axe. Perrot has figured for us their bronzes, Ward their sculptures, fringed and moving like the Assyrian; and Conder has sketched their faces without moustache, whose outline is like the Accadians of Tel-lo. We see their yellow complexions and Mongoloid features. There is more of Uriah's strength than Bathsheba's beauty. What shall we say of their deities standing on mountains, on priests, on panthers? The new Berlin Museum will answer, possibly, for it contains the Hittite reliefs of Boghaz-Keui with their perplexing problems. With them are arranged the Hittite sculptures of Sindjirli, which constitute the fortunate and famous find of Herr Humann in a mound of Northern Syria. We may be on the eve of the decipherment of the speech of Lycaonia, and about to grasp the secret of the Lions of Mykenæ.

There is always peril in a specialty. Professor Sayce, in his capital book on the Hittites, errs, perhaps, in claiming too much for the Northern origin of Greek culture. Dr. Amelia B. Edwards would be thought by many to err in deriving the same culture too largely from the South. That accomplished lady has none the less put the public of Boston and vicinity in her debt by her six lectures on "Egyptology and Art," begun on the 13th of November last and ending Thanksgiving week. It was fitting that she should be introduced by the president of the Museum of Fine Arts, to which she had assigned the serene Hathor-Head. It was a merited honor that she should have a reception and breakfast at the hands of the New England Women's Press Association, with the Pyramids and Sphinx painted on her menu, for she has been a tireless and fascinating popularizer of Egyptian archæology in England. Her paper on Bubastis, in the January "Century," continues the work in America. To crowded aisles at last she explained the derivation of *ebony*, *cocoa*, and *chemist* from the language of the Nile. In Egypt was the germ of Æsop's Fables. Modern artists paint for the living, the Egyptian for the dead. The patterns on the Egyptian potteries preceded and colored the Greek. The Ionic capital was the outcurving calyx of the lily of the Nile. The harpy of the Greek mythology was but a perverted echo and reproduction of the Egyptian bird, Ba, — the soul. Miss Edwards was, however, more sprightly than judicial when she flung upon the screen the early struggles of the proto-Hellenic pencil to prove there was nothing in Egyptian art so ludicrously feeble as the prehistoric Greek vases. Yet Egyptian art was then in its decadence!

More of the Bible would have enriched the course of the authoress who has done so much to identify Rameses the Great with the Pharaoh of the oppression. Dr. Lysander Dickerman's lectures on "The Ancient Egyptians" before Boston University had this merit also. We are pleased that by a rising vote the audience should have indorsed the memorandum read by President Warren on behalf of the trustees at the end of the fifth lecture. It is in part as follows: "Whether viewed with respect to variety and freshness of matter, or to appropriateness of style, or to beauty of illustration, each lecture has been worthy of high praise." The apathy of the public to the needs of the Egypt Exploration Fund has sometimes seemed colossal. We congratulate Dr. Winslow that he can count on the sustained enthusiasm of an American to second the

eloquent English ally who is so fast melting the snows of indifference to the land of the Pharaohs!

The Book of Nehemiah furnishes the champions of a southeastern Zion, instead of a southwestern one, with their strongest arguments. Mr. George St. Clair uses thus the third chapter and fourteenth verse: "But the gate of the fountain repaired Shallum; . . . he built it, and covered it, and set up the doors thereof, . . . and the wall of the pool of Siloah by the king's garden and unto the stairs that go down from the city of David." *So the city of David includes Ophel, and the stairs descend the Ophel slope westward to the Tyropæan.* His sketch plan is published in the April Quarterly Report of the Palestine Exploration Fund. It is based on the rock contours of the survey, and on the outlines of ancient structures ascertained by Sir C. Warren. Solomon's Palace thus stands on the southern brow of the Temple Mount, much where Stade puts it. The south wall makes for him, as for Lewin, a bay up the Tyropæan valley, the Fountain gate standing at its left or western entrance. The Sepulchres of David are located on the Ophel or eastern side of the Tyropæan, southwest of Solomon's Palace. On his map the house of Eliashib is just south of the armory, and west of the Temple courts. The houses of the priests are on the eastern side of the Temple, precisely opposite. We do not agree with Mr. St. Clair in all his identifications. All the more we are bound to praise his discrimination of the reentrant and projecting angles, according to the Hebrew text, as scholarly and helpful. We think less of his suggestion why David's house should be called the House of Millo. "Millo was at first the northern boundary of the roughly-quadrangular suburb, but it would, perhaps, in course of time, give its name to the whole of the inclosed space, or the whole of the four walls; and then, because David's house adjoined the eastern wall of the four, it was called the House of Millo."

Last winter M. Golénisheff purchased a remarkable seal in Cairo, which it is thought may have come from Tahpanhes. "The back is flat and plain; on the middle of the obverse are two blundered Egyptian cartouches; and above and below them are two more cartouches, drawn horizontally, however, and not perpendicularly. In the upper cartouche is the following inscription in Phœnician letters: L-SH-L-M. In the lower is another in Phœnician letters: Y-R-M-Y-H-U. The two together read, *Leshalom Yirmeyahu*: "To the prosperity of Jeremiah." The forms of the letters correspond with those of the Hebrew alphabet of the seventh century. It is not impossible that this may prove an actual relic of the great weeping prophet of the downfall of Jerusalem.

Nothing, indeed, is impossible after the Tel-el-Amarna tablets. This extraordinary find of the winter of 1887-88 is worthy of the attention it has received from Schrader, Erman, Winckler, and Budge. That Babylonian was the language of diplomacy and society in the fifteenth century B. C., all over the civilized East, is the greatest of archæological surprises. Sayce fills nearly a hundred pages of the June Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology with the transcription and translation of the tablets now in the Boulaq Museum, which he well-nigh lost his life to translate. He thinks the primary foundation of much Pentateuchal criticism has been overthrown. Lehmann emphasizes the "commercium" and "conubium" between Egypt and Babylonia at this early date. He says: "Of special interest it is that Burraburias of Kara-Dunias sends to Amenophis IV. five span of horses." Notoriously the horse was imported into

Egypt from Asia originally. We do not find him in the papyri or on the monuments before the opening of the eighteenth dynasty to which Amenophis IV. belonged. The period of the Tel-el-Amarna tablets is apparently the period of the introduction of the horse to the land which in Solomon's day was to export the same animal in droves for the Hittites. It was suspected that gold in rings and ingots was early guaranteed in weight and purity. In the clay letter of the Egyptian to the Babylonian king, requesting him to test and to stamp his invoice of gold, this interesting usage is first proved.

To be sure, the higher criticism in the person of M. Renan has expressed doubts regarding the genuineness of the Tel-el-Amarna tablets. Mr. Evetts replies by appealing to the internal evidence of the documents themselves. The cuneiform script, though unlike any other yet found, is in the line of development from the archaic to the modern. This the "Comparative Table" of the brilliant and lamented Amiaud shows plainly. In the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, the characters have reached the stage of decay, normal for the fifteenth century, yet not that which in the twelfth century can be seen on the cylinder of Tiglath-Pileser I. Hieratic dockets give the letters an official stamp. The very mistakes in writing are such as would be natural in using a foreign tongue,—like the Babylonian by a Phœnician or Canaanite scribe in days anterior to the Hebrew Exodus. What is said to this point is corroborated by the Kappadokian cuneiform tablets of M. Golénisheff, which were "Assyrian, but Assyrian displaying the same peculiarities as the tablets of Tel-el-Amarna."

The expedition to Babylonia of the university of Pennsylvania has not been idle the past year. Dr. Peters's indefatigable activity in Philadelphia and in Constantinople has been ably seconded by his lieutenants. Professor Hilprecht went from perils of waters to perils of robbers to examine the Nebuchadnezzar inscriptions of Wady Brissa. He found the same old characters so familiar on the bricks of Hillah, and the well-known title, "Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, decorator of the temples Esagila and Ezida, the illustrious son of Nabopolassar, King of Babylon, am I." Dr. Robert Harper rode amid cold and storm to Carchemish and inspected and described the Hittite inscription in large characters, and the lion of the shaggy mane remaining with other relics on the mound of Jerablus. The main objective point of the expedition was Niffer. This was the ancient seat of the worship of the elder Bel. Systematic excavations began February 29, 1889. Naram-Sin's name has been found. He must have been builder or restorer of the great temple of Bel. Pinches figures and translates a brick with a queen's name dedicated to the same deity. See the October "Hebraica." From Niffer, we may note two important fruits of the expedition: (1) a letter from Professor R. F. Harper, in the "Zeitschrift für Assyriologie" for April, 1889. This describes the large library of three collections of Babylonian antiquities acquired by the University of Pennsylvania. Here are nearly 2,000 contract, memoranda, and case tablets. They relate principally to the Hammurabi dynasty, and are invaluable for the study of this early age. (2) A letter from Professor Hilprecht concerning two tablets shows that in the fourth year of Assur-etil-ilani Babylonia was not considered as a lost province by the successor of Assurbanipal. It had been supposed that Babylonia broke away from Assyria in the year of the accession of Assurbanipal's successor, or immediately after Assurbanipal's

death, or perhaps in the closing year of Assurbanipal's reign. The newly acquired documents, attested by witnesses and priests in Nippur, prove the contrary. Here is a gleam of light on the dark period preceding Nineveh's fall.

In less than a hundred years came the Persian conquest, and Persia, in the person of the Shah, has been protesting against the ignorance of his own language he found in London. In the smaller city of Pesth, Professor Vámbéry made a speech to him in Persian at the Academy. At the Guildhall Banquet of London, the Shah and his suite of forty persons were left to their own intuitions to know what was going on. How easy to have assigned to each Persian guest some companion from the Indian service familiar with the language of the Teheran! Next to Constantinople, London is the European city containing the largest number of Persian speakers and scholars. Why were these not summoned from the Asiatic Society, the British Museum, and the Oriental College, to do honor to the tongue of the monarch whom England is counseling to introduce English into his schools? This is of a piece with the curriculum of the proposed Oriental school which Professor Leitner so forcibly condemns in the "*Athenæum*" of August 3d. On the continent, he says, there is a broad theoretical basis of Oriental classical learning for the superstructure of conversational attainments in modern Oriental languages. Why not in London? "The collocation of subjects is logical in the French school, thorough in the German school, political in the Russian school, and hap-hazard in the English school." How does the four hours a week of two professors in Persian on the Thames compare with the ten hours a week of two professors on the Spree, or three professors thirteen hours a week at the university and sixteen at the school on the Neva?

These withering criticisms could not have been directed at the last meeting of the American Oriental Society. This was held at Columbia College, New York, October 30th. There Dr. Jackson, a brilliant young Iranian scholar, gave an admirable analysis of color-sense in the Avesta. It was preceded by the modest and masterly paper of Dr. Allan Marquand on the Influence of the Egyptian on the Greek Temple. From *temenos* to capital, the relation of the two sacred structures was traced with a caution, a clearness, and a conclusiveness meriting the highest praise. Nothing less can be said of Mr. Williams's study of Arabic dialects, the fruit of his recent visit to Morocco, which was as original in its inception as charming in its execution to all interested in the sons of Ishmael.

We have only space to name the valuable papers of Dr. Adler on the Shofar, Dr. Wendel on the History of Egyptian Grammar, Professor Jastrow on the Text-books of the Babylonians, and Professor Lanman on Indian Philology in India. Thanks to Dr. Gottheil, an essay was heard from Brugsch on the Land Mitani in the Egyptian Monuments.

The marvelous researches of Dr. Glaser in Arabia were brought to the attention of the readers of "*Hebraica*" in the October number of that excellent magazine. Dr. Hommel therein draws out some of the historical results of the three journeys from 1883 to 1887. Not only has the intrepid explorer, traveling at his own cost, more than doubled the number of inscriptions, he has fixed their date. Before Glaser, three great periods of history had been accepted regarding South Arabia: (1) that of the Makārib or priest kings; (2) that of the real kings of

Saba; and (3) that of the kings of Saba and Dhû-Raidan, or Himyarites, on and after 100 A. D. A fourth great period now comes to view, that is, that of the Minnæans before Saba. This terminated about 900, and began toward 2,000 B. C. To remember that from Arab sources everything pre-Mohammedan comes from the dim traditions of the last century before Mohammed, is to conceive the vast tract of history here unveiled. The visit of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon need no longer startle the skeptic. It had been conjectured that Rahmânân, in the inscriptions, pointed to Monotheism, and perhaps Judaism. Glaser has proved it, for the inscriptions read now, besides "the merciful," "the [one] God, Lord of the Heaven [and the earth]" or "of the Heavens and Israel." There was a tradition that the South Arabian king, Dhû Nu'âs, killed in 515 A. D., was a Jew. Now this tradition shines in its true historical light.

Such revelations are astounding. They may well be submitted to Dr. Robertson Smith in connection with his Lectures on the Religion of the Semites. The question has been asked pointedly, "How about the Arabic books on which Dr. Smith builds so much, of which the oldest is the 'Kitab-al-Aghani,' which contains passages of poets, and references to persons who lived not more than a century before Mohammed?" Are they original and not exotic? This is hardly credible in view of the contact with traders from afar, and the sojourn of their caravans in Arabia. Why may not, nay must not, the Minnæans of Dr. Glaser and the Sabæans have had intercourse thus with India and Persia, not to say China? If we investigate the religion of the Semites on the Arabian side, ought not such investigation to start much nearer the source? We think such queries more legitimate than the alliterative comment that the book seems based on three t's, — the tribe, the totem, and the taboo.

Nevertheless, one must be struck by the religious emphasis Totemism has received of late from Smith and Sayce, and now from Miss Amelia B. Edwards. "The living solution of some of the most pressing questions of the Egyptian religion," she tells us, "is to be sought in Western America in the animal worship common to the Indian tribes." This is an offset to the rudimentary condition and meagre achievement of the Red Man. Whatever in the savage leads upward is nobly and pathetically akin to what is highest in more civilized races. Amid much that is unscientific in method and extravagant in assumption, aboriginal archæology has a vast value. We deem worthy of notice and thanks, therefore, the paper on "The Distribution of American Totems" in the "American Antiquarian" of November last. It is interesting to know that the totems of the Iroquois were the wolf, bear, turtle, deer, beaver, snipe, hawk, eel, porcupine, heron, bird, and snake. Those of the Northwest coast tribes were the wolf, bear, eagle, crow, or raven, whale, porcupine, owl, goose. In such facts is the key to many a migration and myth, and the relation of the soul to things unseen and eternal.

The affiliation between the archæology of the New World and the Old suggests the name of Dr. D. G. Brinton. There are few greater mysteries than the Etruscans. On a late visit to Tunis and Italy, the Philadelphia professor reached the following conclusions: —

1. The uniform testimony from the ancient writers, and of their own traditions, asserts that the Etruscans came across the sea from the south, and established their first settlement near Tarquinii. Archæology thus far corroborates these traditions.

2. Physically, the Etruscans were a people of lofty stature, of the

blonde type, with dolichocephalic heads. In these traits they correspond with the blonde type of the ancient Lybians represented by the modern Berbers and Guanches, the only blonde people to the south.

3. In the position assigned to woman, and in the system of federal government, the Etruscans were totally different from the Greeks, Orientals, and Turanians, but were in entire accord with the Libyans.

4. The phonetics, grammatical plan, vocabulary, numerals, and proper names of the Etruscan tongue present many and close analogies with the Libyan dialects, ancient and modern.

Libya adjoins the Fayum. The word calls up what has been well termed Mr. Petrie's revolutionary discoveries in that quarter. True, he did not find the mummy of King Amenemhat III. in the pyramid of Hawara. Robbers had preceded him. But he did find a set of golden amulets in another tomb, which stands to ordinary amulets as Aah-hoteps jewelry to ordinary bracelets and rings. At Iahun, at the entrance of the Fayum, he found the temple of Usertesen II., with beads in its deposit that once passed, it may be, for currency, like Indian wampum. Adjoining the temple was a town laid out by the architect for the workmen, their chambers in long lines like bath-houses, their tools of wood, flint and bronze, as abandoned 2000 B. C. Less than ten miles away was Tell Gurob, whose ruined homes of the XVIII dynasty were rich in pottery and bronze, and whose Ptolemaic cemetery abounded in papyri enswathing the dead. Mr. Petrie became sure of the falsity of the theory that supposes the Fayum basin and the Wady Rayan depression to have formed one connected sheet of water, constituting the Lake Mœris of the ancients; for the ground rose 100 feet above the level of the Nile between the two depressions. Very interesting was a household account of fourteen hundred years ago, ruled and dotted with the accuracy of a bookkeeper, of which the entry for the sixth day is appended:—

"Sixth day: birds 4 drachmæ; meat 1 dr. 1 obol; salt 3 ob; a sheep's head 1 ob; seasoning 3 ob; fuel 2 ob; bread 1 ob; eggs 1½ ob; lentils 3 ob; oil 3 ob; a pet dog 3 ob; the man with it 3 ob; an ass 1 ob." Observe the comparative cheapness of vegetables and dogs, and dearness of salt.

Last of all must be named the great Homer Papyrus of the fifth century, "abounding in diacritical marks and enriched with marginal notes." Mr. Petrie himself was staggered most by the presence of an alphabet seemingly Kypriote, in use before 2000 B. C. He found these letters with Phœnician and Greek in connection with non-Egyptian weights and the graves of light-haired foreigners of the XIX dynasty. The archaic Greek of Thera, ninth century B. C., is the oldest hitherto known. The inscriptions under the walls of the Fayum are at least four centuries earlier. Six centuries before Psammetichus, a Greco-Phœnician tongue was spoken by foreigners on the black soil of the exclusive Egyptians.

Where did the Phœnicians come from? Herodotus, Strabo, and Pliny point to the Persian Gulf. So do the excavations in the Bahrein Islands of Mr. Bent, reported in the "*Athenæum*" of July 6th. As in Amrit and in Sardinia, the tombs had an upper and lower chamber. The bones of a large animal, perhaps of a horse, were found in the first. With these were ivories resembling those of Kameiros and those of Nimrod, now in the British Museum, by Phœnician artists. Ostrich shells also abounded. These were stratified and colored with Naukratis bands. The second chamber was not rough, but cemented. It was obviously for

the reception of the corpse. The ground was covered with fibrous earth like "snuff in its consistency." It was a foot in depth; the remains of the drapery hung on poles, and of the shrouds in which, anterior to the use of coffins, the Phœnicians wrapped their dead. Fragments of human bones were found here. Everything told of the sepulture of the race which carried their wares to every isle and shore of the Mediterranean before Greece and Rome were born.

A year ago I referred to the Roman art in Hadrian's day in Mr. Petrie's now famous series of Hawara funerary portraits. Roman numismatics confront us through M. Ernest Babelon. Where modern nations have one mint, Rome had many. Each new issue registered a new conquest. From B. C. 269 a double classification is adopted, — the chronological and the family. Now comes the first silver money of the Eternal City. On the obverse was the head of Roma; on the reverse the Dioscuri on horseback, with the inscription, ROMA. A distinguishing mark of value was stamped on denarius and sestertius alike. This was the charge of a printing-official named *Monetarius*, who held office for one year, and was responsible for the purity of the coins he issued. Suppose he debased them. His mark on the coin of his year — a fly, a spear, a prow, or the like — would identify the culprit. About B. C. 90 the head of Roma disappears. A historical, traditional, or divine personage succeeds. Not before the triumvirate of Antony, Lepidus, and Octavius does a portrait of a living man occur. The reverse changes earlier. From 160 B. C. on, each official selects some new type, either illustrating the national annals, or some event connected with his family. This medallion character of the Roman currency, already discussed by Cohen in 1857 and Mommsen in 1860, is, in 1889, made more minutely and lucidly useful to student, archæologist, and historian.

The "*Revue Archéologique*" of March, 1889, tells us, not of Rome, but of Carthage, and the excavations of Father Delattre in Carthaginian necropoli. The site was the famous Byrsa. Calcined bones were discovered, as if to attest the story of Dido's funeral pyre. Inhumation and cremation both had left unmistakable traces. The tomb was a massive cube with a gable roof, like those of Sardinia. It proved by an authentic monument from the city of Hannibal that Phœnician art was the same wherever the spirit of commerce drove the galleys of Tyre.

The cedar coffins and bronze arms, with the rude red amphoræ and Phœnician letters of one tomb, were those of the first chiefs of Rome's great rival. Nearer the surface came layers of pulverized Greek vases and exquisite Egyptian jewelry, which were the winding sheet and ornaments of the higher classes of the citizens in the heroic age. The vast cemetery north of Carthage is conclusively demonstrated to be not Phœnician, but Jewish, like the Talmudic dimensions of its cells. Father Garucci had described the Jewish necropolis at the gates of Rome with Pagan symbolism of animals and genii. Father Delattre shows us a Jewish necropolis adjoining Carthage with winged genii and scenes from the vintage, in which the seven-branched chandelier was the national glory of upwards of 4,000 of the sons of Abraham.

Did it seem two years ago as if the sons of Javan had dug for themselves a sadder grave? The Greek museums threatened to bury the Greek honor. To the regret of native and foreigner at the scandalous thefts of a few succeeds corresponding satisfaction at the probity of the many. Reorganization and excavation have never been more active.

Near Sparta has been opened a tomb with golden ornaments, recalling Mykenæ. The *bulls* are spirited, the men wear a loin-cloth. New fragments of the Cyclopean wall have come to light, following the conformations of the Acropolis. The head of the Iris has been added to the Parthenon frieze, first recognized by Dr. Waldstein, of the American school. A beautiful relief of Athena leaning on her spear and looking down, as if in sadness over the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, has been exhumed. We do not know its occasion or significance. A curious inscription informs us, however, of the gold and ivory bought for the great statue of the Virgin Goddess in a single year. The gold weighed 6 talents, 1,518 drachmas, worth in silver 87 talents, 4,652 drachmas. The ivory cost 2 talents, 743 drachmas. It follows that the ratio of silver to gold must have been 1 : 14.037, and the value of the gold in the statue, which weighed forty talents, according to Thucydides, could not have been far from \$775,000. The French have searched Mt. Helicon and found the Hieron of the Muses. Yet they still claim to have incontestable rights on the site of Delphi, and protest against their discourteous supplanting by the Americans. This was apropos of the intelligence that Professor Norton had appealed to wealthy citizens of New York to raise the sum necessary to purchase the sacred shrine. We rejoice to be assured that one quarter of the price asked by the Hellenic government has been subscribed by Chicago. We may be on the eve of surprises in Delphi not less notable than the surprises of the Cave of Zeus in Crete. Certain it is that in the American School of Athens we have enthusiastic and skillful explorers, and in the "American Journal of Archæology" a competent and delightful organ of publication.

"The Land of the Four Rivers" is the third paper on the early history of Northern India published by Commissioner J. F. Hewitt in the July number of the "Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society." It is a learned and ingenious attempt to trace the Dravidian civilization to the Sumerians and Accadians of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Their social organization was based on the tribe, not on the family. Woman was mother, ruler, educator. Their exogamy brought in its train confederacy. The chief of the central camp governed at last from a central city. Allied cities were united by the bonds of trade. Every member of the community had his civil and military duties to render for the common weal under the severest penalties for dereliction. Their calendar embodied their science and theology. The year was the manifestation of the great generating power which directed the multiplication of the race. Ten months were months of conception, gestation, and birth, three months of generation. Again, the year was the measurer of times and seasons. And thirdly, the year was the cycle within which the sequence of natural changes was evolved, and over each of the three seasons of which presided eleven Gods. The first Dravidian immigrants were the Accadian moon and snake worshippers, that is, the Lunar Rajputs; the second were the Semite-Accad trading and warrior tribes, that is, Solar Rajputs. The Rig-Veda Triad Dyaus, heaven; Agni, fire; Prithivi, earth, the home of the serpent, is compared with the Accadian Triad, Anu Bel, or Mul-lil and Ea, who was worshipped as a snake, that bound the world, and with the Greek Triad in which Zeus is heaven, Kronos is the old moon god, and Poseidon the god of the fertilizing waters. Eridu was the great port of Assyria at the mouth of the Euphrates, sacred to the great snake Ea, and the earliest home of the moon-god (sic) Bel-Merodach, and it was

"doubtless from thence that the emigrants went forth to India on the east, and Egypt on the west." Our readers will see that from such doubtful premises the writer can scarcely arrive at solid conclusions. They hang in the air, like his identification of the Eden rivers Gihon and Pishon with the Indus and the Nile.

Last year, a cry for excavation in Palestine was raised in connection with Sayce's paper before the Victoria Institute on the Tel-el-Amarna tablets. "Kirjath-Sepher, or Book-town, must have been the seat of a famous library consisting mainly or altogether of clay tablets inscribed with cuneiform characters." The fact that terra-cotta is not injured by moisture is certainly a reason for supposing that, wherever such strange records may have been, there they still are beneath the holy soil. Dr. Selah Merrill thinks the mummies of the patriarchs in the cave of Macpelah cannot now be in existence. If not robbers, then water must have long since destroyed them. He has an article in the "Sunday School Times" of December 14th, which we take pleasure in commending as the description of the visit to Hebron of the first American Christian who has stood beside the green cenotaph of Abraham.

Dr. Merrill's museum of Palestinian Antiquities has become the property of Andover Theological Seminary. The editor of the "Boston Daily Advertiser" called it, on March 2, 1889, the most extensive collection of its kind in the world. It began with a vacation trip to Jerusalem of the German student of twenty years ago. It was completed in 1886, after five years of consular life in the Holy City, by the author and explorer beyond the Jordan, during which he kept Arabs scouring mountain and plain in quest of visible illustrations of the Bible. He thus secured the jackal associated with Samson's sport, the fox of the desert to whom the prophets are likened, and the wild boar that is the symbol of Israel's Assyrian foe. In all he named "more than 300 species and 1600 specimens of birds and eggs, from the sparrow of which two were sold for a farthing to the ostrich which lays her eggs in the sand and goes her way unmindful, though the foot of the passer-by may crush it." The coins of the Herods constitute a short course on New Testament History. In the department of dress one ranges from the rude cradle of Bethlehem to the crown of thorns, never to be thought of apart from our Redeemer. Our Lord loved to use examples drawn from the farmer's life. There are countless agricultural implements in the Museum eloquent of Christ. "One may see the plough from which no man having once put his hand to it must look back; the pruning hook perhaps beaten out from a spear; the yoke for oxen, touching reminder of those wonderful words about the yoke which is easy and the burden which is light; sickles to be thrust in when the harvest is ripe; the mill for corn at which two women shall be grinding, one taken and the other left," at the last great day. When to the generosity of friends, purchasing for Andover this valuable collection of Palestinian antiquities, shall be added a donation of \$50,000 from new friends enlarging our Library Building, Dr. Merrill's curiosities can be properly housed and fruitfully studied.

John Phelps Taylor.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.

PART II.¹ THE TREATMENT OF CRIME AND OF THE CRIMINAL CLASSES,

Involving the consideration of the duty of society to those who have forfeited their social rights.

THE forfeiture of social rights finds its chief expression in disfranchisement. By the constitution of most of the States no person convicted of infamous crime can vote, while in some of the States the constitution further specifies that no one convicted of larceny, or of forgery, or of treason, can vote. The graduates of states prisons are thus practically disfranchised. How many these number cannot be determined for want, as yet, of complete and accurate statistics. But the number may be inferred from the present prison population of the United States, which, according to the census of 1880, was 58,609, divided between 53,604 male prisoners and 5,005 female prisoners, and distributed as follows: 30,659 in penitentiaries; 7,865 in workhouses and houses of correction; 12,691 in county jails; 1,666 in city prisons; 499 in military prisons; 350 in hospitals for the insane; and 4,879 leased out to private parties.

The social disabilities which follow conviction for crime are evident: the loss of social emoluments and rewards, the loss of public confidence and trust, and in some respects, greatest of all, the loss of earning power. The most serious drawback to the recovery of the discharged convict is his practical exclusion from ordinary employments. Enforced idleness, when work is abundant, is the price which society has set, even to its own cost, upon crime.

In studying the relation of society to crime and to the criminal classes, the inquiry will be partly historical and partly critical in respect to present means of progress. Full consideration must be given to the advance already made. Nothing in the future seems possible which is at all comparable in moral effect with the organization of justice, the development of criminal law, or the growth of humane principles of punishment. All present reform starts from the basis of law which is upon the whole just and equal. It is everything to the criminal that he is reasonably sure of receiving justice. Something remains to be accomplished in bettering the administration of justice or in preventing corruption; but the chief occasions of reform are moral rather than legal. The reformation of the criminal and the prevention of crime are the present aims of reformatory movements.

The order of the advance of society in its treatment of crime and of the criminal classes will be indicated through the following subjects which will form the topics of investigation and discussion. These topics will be presented in *alternate* numbers of the "Review" for the current year,

¹ PART I. treated of THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF LABOR.

PART III. will treat of PAUPERISM AND THE DEPENDENT CLASSES.

For the full outline of the course, see the January number of the *Review* for 1889.

and the authorities for reference in study will be given in connection with each topic.

TOPIC 1. THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE MEANS OF JUSTICE.

Here the advance to be noted is that from the *method of private revenge to a well-ordered system of justice*. Private revenge, which had its own method as among the Hebrews, is not to be confounded with the wild and lawless expression of it in the midst of a modern community. But the advance from this earlier and cruder method to the present system of maintaining and enforcing justice is incalculable.

TOPIC 2. THE DEFINITION OF CRIME.

The gain at this point has been brought about through such careful discrimination in respect to crime as to secure *the support of morality in the enforcement of law*. An interesting chapter in the history of crime is the record of the elimination of political and religious offenses from the list of common crimes. So long as the heretic and the agitator are on the same footing with the thief and murderer there can be only confusion or rebellion in the public mind.

TOPIC 3. GRADATION IN PUNISHMENT.

The history of punishment is not to be studied as a history of horrors. There is a philosophy in the infliction of punishment even when the form seems most arbitrary. The various attempts to adapt punishment to crime have been at once terrible and ludicrous, but they had a meaning to society. It will be of advantage to inquire into *the philosophy of punishment*, as we note the very gradual humanizing process in the use of penalty. We are not far removed from the use of capital punishment for common offenses.

TOPIC 4. THE REFORMATION OF THE CRIMINAL.

Of the ends of punishment, the expression of justice, the protection of society, and the reformation of the criminal, the last end has found tardy recognition. *The conception of punishment as in any sense disciplinary and reformatory is altogether a modern conception*. In following out this thought we pass at once into the critical study of present methods. And our investigations will cover such subjects as the history of the prison system, the principles and methods of reformatory prisons, and the discharge of the convict and his recovery to society.

TOPIC 5. THE PREVENTION OF CRIME.

At this point we pass beyond even the experimental stage *into questions of inheritance and environment*.

What are the practical workings of heredity in the perpetuation of the criminal classes?

What are the constant external sources and causes of crime?

What is the relation of crime to poverty?

What is the criminal significance of the residuum of a great city?

These subjects prepare the way for the discussion under PART III. of PAUPERISM.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE STUDIES. Numbers 1 and 2. Published by the Faculty of Haverford College.

One of the promising signs in university life at present is the multiplication of journals for the publication of articles on distinctly scholarly topics. Some of these publications, to be sure, are devoted to the class-work of students in the preparatory stage of study, and consequently contribute little to the advancement of knowledge. Undoubtedly some, also, are projected mainly in order to advertise the institutions that print them; verily they have their reward. But the series represented by the two pamphlets named above evidently aspires to belong to a higher order. These pamphlets are printed, it appears, in England, at the Cambridge University Press. It is greatly to be desired that the attention of wealthy friends of learning should be directed to the immense service they can render by establishing, at a few literary centres, foundations akin to those of the Clarendon and other University Presses of Great Britain: establishments which may meet, in part at least, the cost of giving to the world results of scholarly research which, because unlikely to be remunerative to the commercial publisher, now often fail to see the light.

The first of the five articles contained in Number 1, and almost the whole of pamphlet Number 2, are from the pen of Professor J. Rendel Harris. The first-named article comprises notes made by him early in 1889, during a six weeks' examination of the three great collections of ancient manuscripts and books recently brought together at Jerusalem, and now known as the Library of the Holy Sepulchre. This library contains between fourteen and fifteen hundred Greek manuscripts alone; and among them the little volume in which is found the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," a tract which, since it was given to the world by Bryennios in 1883, has created a small literature of its own. Professor Harris supplements the fragmentary accounts of these treasures previously given by such explorers as Scholz, Tischendorf, and especially Coxe; he characterizes the collection as a whole by the epithets "non-classical," "orthodox," "monastic;" reproduces in uncial type two or three brief patristic and Biblical fragments; prepares the reader to welcome the full catalogue by Papadopoulos Kerameus soon to be published; and concludes with a hint at intended later disclosures respecting some of the Library's inedited rarities.

The second pamphlet, with the exception of two facsimiles of brief Esarhaddon inscriptions (one never before published) with a few prefatory comments on the same by Robert W. Rogers, is devoted to "The Rest of the Words of Baruch" or the "Paraleipomena of Jeremiah,"—for the authorship of the document, as in the case of the Fathers' references to our Apocryphal Book of Baruch, is ascribed indifferently now to one of these two friends and companions, now to the other. Professor Harris has reëdited the Greek text of this Christian Apocalypse with great care and skill, by the aid of hitherto unused MSS. belonging to the library of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. In an interesting and suggestive introduction of some forty-six pages, the tangled problems of the Apocalyptic literature are adverted to, and the relations of this Christianized Baruch to its predecessors discussed. Of especial interest is Professor Harris's ingenious and plausible attempt to fix the date of the composition at or

about the year 136 A. D. For besides other slight apparent reminiscences in the document of our Gospel of John, it uses the expression τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν τὸ φωτίζον με, language which can hardly have been derived from any other source. If this inference be correct, we have here a new and noteworthy accession to the early testimonies for the Fourth Gospel.

The whole tract exhibits the acuteness and learning which its author has taught the public to expect in the products of his pen, and will at once secure the attention of Biblical students.

J. H. Thayer.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

ASOLANDO; Fancies and Facts. BY ROBERT BROWNING. Author's Edition. With Portrait. 12mo, pp. 114. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1890. \$1.25.

It is difficult for us to realize that this last book of Robert Browning's is indeed his last in a melancholy and double sense. Even the verbal conceit of its title — from "*Asolare* — 'to disport in the open air, amuse one's self at random,' " as we learn from the dedication — suggests that magnificent vitality, that masculine delight in the good things of the sunshine, which we associate with the poet even in his latter years. Yet this book, born as it is of Venice and of open air, crammed as it is with life, youth's love songs, and age's philosophy, closes the long message of a great poet.

While, as a whole, it cannot compete with the work of the poet's prime, that wonderful series from 1845 to 1870, which includes the incomparable *Men and Women*, it contains single pieces which take rank among the best of his shorter poems. Browning has given us few daintier or more musical love songs than *Summum Bonum*, *A Pearl A Girl*, or *Poetics*; few more finished gems than the first of *Bad Dreams*. As is usual with this most impetuous and unconventional of recent English poets, the stronger and harsher notes are not wanting. In such pieces as *Ponte dell' Angelo*, *Venice*, and *Muckle-mouth Meg*, he has, as he expresses it, "hitched into verse the thing," with his customary indifference to the code of polite letters. Yet it is with pleasure that we encounter in Browning's last book examples of so many of his varied styles, even the more rugged ones. To us who love the old faces, sundry reminiscences of an earlier manner have the charms of association. Many of the old strings are here touched for the last time. A poem is added to the group of those on painting, and one to that on music. The *Bean-Feast*, an admirable poem, recalls the *Dramatic Idylls*. In apprehensiveness, different as it is in manner, it may be set as a contrast study with *By the Fireside*. "*Imperante Augusto Natus Est*," with its superb free sketch of imperial Rome and the glories of Augustus, is in Browning's strongest blank verse, and fully worthy of a place beside such earlier masterpieces as the *Epistle of Karshish* and *Andrea del Sarto*. But perhaps one's greatest satisfaction is in the book's final reaffirmation of those deep truths on which the whole edifice of Browning's poetry is built. Fragrant as certain of its poems are with the bloom of life, touched as are some of them, as the *Prologue*, with an autumnal sadness, above all there rings out the triumphant note of a life-long and unwavering faith. That invincible hopefulness of one who believes with the full-

ness of a great nature that there is a God, and that God is good, Browning has kept undiminished to the end. In Rephan and Reverie there is the unchanged confidence not in God only, but in man; the faith that the soul shall see —

“By the means of Evil that Good is best.”

that —

“Earth at end

Wrong will prove right? Who made shall mend —
In the higher sphere to which yearnings tend?”

As we close the book, and with it the great volume of the poet's earthly work, we realize that nineteenth century England has had no loftier teacher, that English literature has produced no poet who has so fully expressed the spirit of the religion of Christ. Browning, who hoped and worked in the faith that Love was stronger than Power, has left us in the Epilogue his own best epitaph: —

“One who never turned his back but marched breast forward,
Never doubted clouds would break,
Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph,
Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better,
Sleep to wake.

Henry S. Pancoast.

PHILADELPHIA, PENN.

PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY. Volume I. Report and Papers of the First Annual Meeting, held in the city of Washington, December 28, 1888. Edited by Rev. SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON, M. A., Secretary. Pp. xxx, 271. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1889.

This volume gives the opening proceedings of the Society, with various papers presented. The first is Dr. Schaff's paper on “The Progress of Religious Freedom,” which we have already noticed. Accompanying are translations of the Edict of Nantes, and of the Revocation, also the text of William and Mary's Act of Toleration. The second paper is from Mr. Henry C. Lea, on “Indulgences in Spain.” It shows that in Spain, almost unaffected by the Reformation, and therefore scarcely touched by the Counter-reformation, the mediæval venality in the Sale of Indulgences survived in full force, if not rather systematized and aggravated. All the strenuous efforts and denunciations of the high-minded and resolute Pius V., most relentless of Inquisitors, availed naught against it. When he refused to continue Indulgences for the Crusade, supposed to be always imminent in Spain, the bishops, in their own name, coolly issued Indulgences good for a hundred years. The doctrine of the Church was monstrously distorted in their favor, and Pius V. pointed out that they were so handled as to become virtually licenses to sin. Succeeding popes gave up the contest with Spain, and under the name of alms have become accomplices in the traffic. As Mr. Lea shows, the Counter-reformation has vastly diminished the abuse, but can never really uproot it, so long as the coarse claim is preferred that the Church has a legal jurisdiction over the unseen world.

The third paper, a very fine one, is by Dr. James Clement Moffatt, of Princeton, and is called, “A Crisis in the Middle Ages.” It brings out with great distinctness the contrast between Gregory VII. and Urban II.

Hildebrand had high aims of reformation, but made force his great instrument. He was "obtrusive of his own impulses to the last extreme." His intolerable insult to Henry IV., Dr. Moffat remarks, was the pure monastic temper, an abbot trying to coerce a refractory monk. Urban II. was "a man who, without violence, knew the path to success." Of the First Crusade, with which Urban's fame is so thoroughly linked, Dr. Moffat says that it was, "in its way, a real Christian revival over against Mohammedanism, and the thousands who returned from the crusade returned with greater interest in the cause of Christ. Fourteen days later Pope Urban II. died,—too soon for him to know the depth and breadth of the influence he had wrought, or the nature of which it was. But he had left the Christian world in a better frame of mind, a more direct and practical Christian zeal." "The tenth and eleventh centuries, with their shameless immoralities, were never brought back to the Christian world again. New days dawned in brighter hopes." "The fourteenth century never surrendered her intellectual gains. Improving reformation declared itself as time went on." From 1100 to 1300 "was the period of the greatest scholastics. It was that which created the universities. It laid the foundations of our scientific theology, and created our science of the material world and our modern systems of education." The paper is a rewarding one to read.

The next paper is by Professor F. H. Foster, of Oberlin, on Melancthon's "Synergism." The author remarks that Augustine's philosophy left room for a true doctrine of the Will, but that Luther, being simply theologian, had none. To him, God's act in conversion is omnipotent, mechanical. At first, Melancthon holds the same, and owns only Intellect and Appetite. Gradually a conception of Will as distinct from either emerges, and with it a modification of Predestination, and finally a conversion of the divine activity in regeneration from a mechanical to an ethical, persuasive one, a Synergism. The author, however, remarks that Melancthon has firmly anchored Lutheran theology to the sense that invariably there is a divine initiative in conversion.

The next paper, by Professor Hugh McDonald Scott, D. D., of Chicago Theological Seminary, is entitled "Some Notes on Syncretism in the Christian Theology of the Second and Third Centuries." It is a somewhat confusing paper, because it turns on a confusing subject. The author, agreeing with Ritschl (and Rothe), allows that the Pauline converts took in very little of the Pauline depth of view, and, not being rooted in the apprehensions of sin and grace (which were not closely congruous to the Greek mind), slid into a shallower moralistic tendency, which beat about somewhat uncertainly for a basis of thought, although, in the Apostolic Fathers, always resting immovably on the Rule of Faith. Then came the Apologists, more heavily freighted with Greek philosophy than with the deep experimental theology of Paul, which fact necessarily brought in a strong Syncretistic commixture. Yet "even in the making of creeds by philosophic theologians, the common sense of the Churches was always strong enough to keep the philosophers from leaving the broad ground of the gospel. Barriers against Greek thought were (1) these Rules of Faith, (2) the New Testament Canon, (3) the rising Episcopal System considered Apostolic from A. D. 150 on." Dr. Scott rejects as too extreme, though having truth, Harnack's description of Gnosticism as a premature and acute endeavor for the secularization of Christianity.

The next paper, by Rev. E. C. Richardson, of Hartford Seminary, turns on "The Influence of the Golden Legend, on Pre-Reformation Culture History." The author of the "Golden Legend," Jacobus de Voragine, a Premonstratensian monk, afterwards Archbishop of Genoa, wrote the book about 1273. It continued in unabated popularity, in numberless exemplars, for 250 years. "The work consists, as its average name suggests, of legends of the saints, attached to a brief History of Lombardy like a dog to his tail — barring the vital connection. Here one finds the great bulk of the stories so familiar to us in art and poetry, for the author collected with the utmost assiduity everything improbable which had ever appeared in hagiologic literature. His principles of criticism were aggregation and the elimination of the probable." "It is on the temptation of men that the author chiefly loves to dwell." The author shows how it has influenced mediæval thought (and not that only) in every direction of popular belief, but chiefly in the weird region of "compacts with Satan."

The last paper, by Rev. Arthur M. McGiffert, of Lane, is entitled "Notes on the New Testament Canon of Eusebius." Mr. McGiffert remarks that Eusebius is not here criticising, but simply recording; not trying to form a canon, but merely trying to show how the Canon stood. How do the *vóthoi* stand with him? Much nearer even to the *ὁμολογούμενα* than to the *ἀναπλάσματα αἱρετικῶν ἀνδρῶν*. The author distinguishes thus: The *antilegomena* are accepted in the East as canonical, but have been sometimes disputed, or are even yet disputed. But the *vóthoi*, though quoted by some of the Fathers as canonical, had fallen out of that rank. They are *vóthoi*, not necessarily in themselves, but as to their canonicity. Mr. McGiffert explains thus why Eusebius puts the Apocalypse among the *homologoumena*, with an *εἶπε φανεῖν*, and among the *vóthoi*, with an *εἰ φανεῖν*. He could not, he thinks, put it among the *antilegomena*, because he recognizes the doubts as recent, not original. Should they subside, it would become a *homologoumenon*; should they prevail, it would fall off among the *vóthoi*, like the Pastor, the Apocalypse of Peter, and other such books.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Macmillan & Co., London and New York. The Epistle to the Hebrews: The Greek Text with Notes and Essays. By Brooke Foss Westcott, D. D., D. C. L., Canon of Westminster, Regius Professor of Divinity and Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Pp. lxxxiv, 504. 1889. \$4.00; — The Permanent Elements of Religion. Eight Lectures Preached before the University of Oxford, in the Year 1887, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Brampton, M. A., Canon of Salisbury. By W. Boyd Carpenter, D. D., D. C. L., Bishop of Ripon, Honorary Fellow of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge. Pp. lxiv, 423. 1889.

American Unitarian Association, Boston. Unitarianism: Its Origin and History. A Course of Sixteen Lectures delivered in Channing Hall, Boston, 1888-89. Pp. xxviii, 394. 1890. \$1.00.

James H. West, Boston. Evolution: Popular Lectures and Discussions before the Brooklyn Ethical Association. Pp. 408. 1889. \$2.00.

Universalist Publishing House, Boston. Essays Doctrinal and Practical. By Fifteen Clergymen. With an Introduction by H. W. Thomas, D. D. Edited by Orello Cone, D. D., President of Buchtel College. Pp. vi, 328. 1889. \$1.00; — Waiting on Destiny. A Story for Girls. By Hattie Tyng Griawold. Pp. 314. 1889. \$1.00; — The Bible and Modern Thought. By George H. Emerson, D. D. Pp. iv, 165. 1890. 50 cents.

Silver, Burdett & Co., Boston. Musicians' Calendar. Compiled by Frank E. Morse.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. The Sermon Bible. Psalm lxxvii. to Song of Solomon. Pp. 476. 1889. \$1.50. — The Unknown God; or Inspiration among Pre-Christian Races. By C. Loring Brace. Pp. ix, 336. 1890. \$2.50. For sale by DeWolfe, Fisk & Co., Boston.

A. S. Barnes & Co., New York. The Three Germanys. Glimpses into their History. By Theodore S. Fay. Two volumes. Pp. 650, 631. 1889; — Bible Studies from the New Testament covering the International Sunday-School Lessons for 1890. By George F. Pentecost, D. D. Pp. 903. 1889. 60 cents.

Thomas Whitaker, New York. New Points to Old Texts. By James Morris Whiton, Ph. D. Pp. 255. 1890. \$1.25.

American Baptist Publication Society, Philadelphia. Saturday Afternoon; or Conversations for the Culture of the Christian Life. By Wayland Hoyt, D. D. Pp. 302. 1889; — Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. By A. C. Kendrick, D. D. Pp. 207. 1889.

Nims & Knight, Troy, N. Y. Aryan Sun Myths. The Origin of Religions. With an Introduction, by Charles Morris. Pp. 192. 1889. For sale by Damrell & Upham, Boston.

C. R. Barns Publishing Co., St. Louis. New Light from Old Eclipses; or Chronology corrected and the Four Gospels harmonized by the Rectification of Errors in the Received Astronomical Tables. By William M. Page. With an Introduction by Rev. James H. Brookes, D. D. Pp. xv, 590. 1890. \$2.50.

Roberts Brothers, Boston. A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life. By William Rounseville Alger. Fourteenth Edition, with a new Supplementary Chapter. Pp. xii, 832. 1889.

The John L. Murphy Publishing Co., State Printers, Trenton, N. J. Eleventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries of New Jersey for the Year ending October 31, 1889. Pp. xxi, 648. 1889.

A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago. The Poetry of Job. By George H. Gilbert, Ph. D., Professor of New Testament Literature and Interpretation in the Chicago Theological Seminary. Pp. xi, 224. 1889. \$1.00.

Woodman and Tiernan Printing Company, St. Louis. Democracy in the Church. By Robert A. Holland. Pp. 123. 1889.



OUR NEW BOOKS ON RELIGIOUS TOPICS BY JULIUS H. WARD, WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS, MYRON ADAMS, AND ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS (MRS. WARD).

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THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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MARCH, 1890

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
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THE

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CREEDS AS TESTS OF CHURCH MEMBERSHIP.

THE creeds of our Congregational churches: shall they continue to be used as tests in the admission of members? This question ought not to be obscured by any other. Shall creeds be dispensed with altogether, or shall they be enlarged and strengthened for testimony and fellowship? Shall no subscription be required, or shall ministers and missionaries assent to prescribed articles at their ordination and appointment? You may take conservative or radical grounds on these issues, but do not throw them as firebrands into the present discussion. They have nothing to do with the question before us: Shall the practice continue of requiring private members of our churches to give assent to the Articles of Faith, and to subscribe to them in writing at the first convenient moment after receiving the sacraments?¹ And shall all those who refuse this assent be excluded from the church for this reason only, although they are believed to be regenerate persons? If they are excluded because evidences of vital piety are wanting, no other test is needed. If they do believe all the articles, the creed does not apply as a test. The test comes only in the case where a person of undoubted piety refuses, on conscientious grounds, assent to some article which is not essential to his salvation. Should such a person be excluded? This is the only question before us.

There is one good reason for this practice: it has the right of way. It has been in vogue ever since we can remember. It is undoubtedly the present Congregational way. You are out of

¹ Dexter's *Congregationalism*, 1865, p. 185.

order in proposing any other until you make good your reasons for discarding this way.

One reason alone is sufficient : the use of creeds as tests in the admission of members is unwarranted and positively forbidden by the Scriptures.

"We believe that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only divine authority, and our only binding rule of faith and practice." Some such statement as this is certainly one article in the creed of every orthodox Congregational church. The creed itself forbids its use as a test for the admission of members, if such a test is not warranted by Scripture.

The Scriptural test of true conversion is heart-belief of true doctrine. There is ample authority to admonish, and if need be to exclude from fellowship, not only brethren who walk disorderly, but also heretics who do not adhere to the true doctrine. But the plain reason for such withdrawal is that they are not true Christians. To see how absurd is the application of such texts to this question, we have only to state them thus : "Withdraw yourself from a brother whom you believe to be a sincere Christian, because he is not orderly in his doctrinal opinions." "A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject, although you believe he has a regenerate heart." "If there come any to you and bring not the precise articles of faith which you have printed in your creed, receive him not, neither bid him Godspeed, though you believe that he is a true disciple of Christ." The Scriptures have no form of admission, but they certainly do not warrant this form of rejection. "All who received the word of the apostles, and believed on the Lord Jesus Christ, and were baptized, were then added together." ¹

Where shall we look for any requirement of assent to a formal creed, as a condition of church-membership ? "If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." ² This verse is not found in the Sinai, nor in the Alexandrian, nor in the Vatican MSS., and it has been rejected from the Revised Version. And it would prove nothing if it were genuine. Our church covenants, which we all desire to retain, include such a confession of personal faith in Christ. No candid reader of the Scriptures will deny that repentance of sin and faith in Christ, the only conditions of salvation, were also the only conditions of admission to the sacraments of the apostolic churches.

¹ Acts ii. 41, 47.

² Acts viii. 37.

The creed-test is unwarranted and also positively forbidden by the Scriptures. The qualifications for church membership have been laid down by divine authority. If we add another, which is admitted to be out of the power of some true Christians to furnish, then we are making it impossible for them to obey Christ. We are laying stumbling-blocks in the way of his little ones. We are forbidding those to come unto Him to whom the kingdom of heaven belongs.¹

But it has been often said that these spiritual qualifications sufficed at that time, when only one question was raised, whether Jesus be the Messiah; while in these days the purity and harmony of the church require that some should be excluded who are true Christians, because they hold opinions which would destroy the integrity of the church.

This very case has been anticipated and decided by Paul in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of Romans. The question at issue there was a great deal more serious than any controversy in our evangelical churches. It was really the burning question, still dividing Protestants from Roman Catholics, of the necessity and efficacy of ceremonial ordinances.

And Paul does not dodge the question. He gives his decision more briefly than in his letter to the Corinthians, but not less positively: the ritualists are wrong; the ceremonies are not binding; the non-conformists must not be excluded from the church. But this is not all; the ritualists must also be cordially received and cherished in the church. This difference of doctrinal belief is no ground of separation. It is a good ground for remaining together in the same church. The conservatives will be safeguards for the liberals. The liberals will strengthen the weak faith of the ritualists. The exact point of Paul's decision is that Christians of opposite opinions and tendencies ought to remain in the same church, in hearty and vigorous coöperation.

"Receive ye one another, as Christ also received you." How did Christ receive you? Did He wait until you could understand and indorse thirty-nine articles, more or less? He received you by the short and simple way of repentance and faith, and we must receive you in the same way, "for the glory of God." It may be the glory of a club to pick and choose those who agree in opinion. But it was the glory of God that these Roman Christians, some of them scrupulously observing the ceremonial law,

¹ See Dale's *Manual of Congregational Principles*, London, 1884, pp. 41-50, 165-177, 183-187.

and the rest discarding it completely, could hold together in mutual charity; the strong tenderly regarding the scruples of the weak, bearing with their infirmities, and never laying a stumbling-block in their way; the weak confiding in the strong, and never suspecting their fidelity nor retrenching their liberty. And if we would not tarnish the glory of redeeming love, we also must receive one another in the same church, with full toleration for all differences of opinion which do not affect genuineness of Christian character. To exclude from any church in our denomination one whom you would not exclude from the communion table is to turn the church of the blessed God into a Congregational club. "Him that is weak in faith, receive." Do not send him to churches that will make him weaker still. Do not keep him outside till he gets strong. "Receive him, but not for decisions of his doubts." Let his doubts remain, if they be conscientious; or let them melt away under your fervent sympathy, wholesome instructions, and vigorous exercise in doing good.

Another reason for giving up this test of church membership is that it is not evangelical. It is against the theory and the practice of all the evangelical churches since the Reformation. It is a step backward towards the Roman Catholic doctrine of the church against which all the Reformers from Wiclif to John Knox protested. It is a return to the very principle of conformity which exiled our New England fathers.

What is the church? It must be the same anywhere that it is everywhere on earth and in heaven: "they that are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called of God, true saints."¹ "Alle that shullen be savyd in blisse of hevene ben membris of holy chirche, and ne moo."² "The communion not of prophane personnes, bot of sainets, quha have the fruitionn of the maist inestimable benefites of ane God, ane Lord Jesus, ane faith and ane baptisme; out of quilk kirk, there is neither lyfe nor eternall felicitie."³ "The church is the congregation of saints in which the gospel is rightly taught and the sacraments rightly administered;⁴ the whole body of men throughout the world, who believe in Christ, professing the faith of the gospel and obedience unto God by Christ according to it, not destroying their own profession by any error everting the foundation or unholiness of conversation."⁵

¹ 1 Cor. i. 2.

² Wiclif, *Select English Works*, ed. Arnold, iii. 447.

³ John Knox's Scotch Confession of 1560, Art. I.

⁴ Augsburg Confession of 1530, VII.

⁵ Savoy Declaration of 1658, XXVI. 2, 3.

This is the evangelical definition of the church, invisible and visible ; invisible to those who have not faith to discern spiritual things, but visible to those who can recognize one another in Christ Jesus. And it was the aim of the Reformers to make the outward organization of the saints in every place to correspond as nearly as possible to the spiritual verity. If we are true to the Protestant ideal when we covenant together in a church state, we shall have this in view, and nothing else in view, that the truly regenerate only, and all truly regenerate persons who desire to join us, shall be admitted. To demand in addition to this qualification obedience to a hierarchy is the essence of popery ; to demand conformity to a rubric is the essence of ritualism ; to demand subscription to a creed is the essence of bigotry. To receive all whom Christ receives, and exactly as Christ receives them, is the essence of evangelical church polity.

And this was the original practice of all Evangelical churches, and is still the practice of nearly all except our American Congregational churches. The Episcopal churches have always made use of catechisms and the Apostles' Creed in their instructions for confirmation, but require subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles from ministers only. Presbyterian churches make the Westminster Confession a test of ordination for ministers and elders, but the preamble to the Constitution and the Directory expressly provide for the admission to "sealing ordinances" of all who have a competent knowledge to discern the Lord's body, and are godly in life. It is true that many new school Presbyterian churches followed our bad example, and demanded public assent to short articles of faith. But this is admitted to be against their principles, and is rapidly disappearing.

If we adhere rigidly to the creed-test of membership, we stand alone among evangelical churches, and we stand in antagonism to our own principles. We protest against close communion for a mere form of baptism, and then enforce close communion for doctrinal opinions. We invite to the sacrament, even on the most restricted terms ever employed, "members in good and regular standing in other Evangelical churches ;" and yet, if we are consistent, we will not admit some of them to good and regular standing in our own.

But it is alleged that the polity of Congregational churches imposes an absolute necessity that all the members should subscribe to the creed. In other churches, the power to govern is lodged with bishops or elders, who receive, discipline, and dismiss

members, are responsible for the purity and piety of the church, and maintain its position and doctrines. It is sufficient that the persons with whom all governing power is lodged should subscribe to the doctrinal standards of the church. But in Congregational churches, since all power of receiving and disciplining members, of choosing and ordaining ministers, of defining and maintaining the doctrinal standards of the church, and of every action on which its purity and peace depend, is exercised directly or indirectly by vote of all the members, it is absolutely necessary that every member on his entrance into the church should be required to subscribe to its creed.¹

If this be true, and if it be also true that the Scriptures forbid the imposition of this test, then there ought not to be any Congregational churches in the world! This demolishes at one stroke all arguments for our polity. If we cannot keep our vineyard without bristling hedges which will exclude the weak in faith whom Christ receives, we ought to give place to other husbandmen. But all the facts are against this theory. The Congregational polity, which we believe to be in substance the polity of the apostolic and primitive churches, was restored in opposition to the practice of the Church of England, which was also followed in some measure by the established Church of Scotland. They departed from the true evangelical principles, and "confirmed" or "received to sealing ordinances" baptized persons who were instructed in Christian doctrine and were not scandalous in life, without insisting upon evidences of the new birth as a condition. They expected gradual conversions within the church. The Congregational reform, both among Pilgrims and among Puritans, was a strenuous movement to make credible evidences of regeneration the final test of church-membership. It was nowhere more vigorous than in New England. In 1637 Mr. Stansby, and in 1642 Thomas Lechford, made it a reproach of the churches of Massachusetts that they were so strict in the admission of members that "half of their congregations, and three parts of the people of the country" were out of the churches.² John Cotton's reply, admitting the facts, makes it clear that they repudiated the English way of confirmation, and that only those were admitted who were believed to be subjects of experimental religion.³ It has never been denied that the Puritan way of

¹ Rev. E. B. Webb, D. D., *Congregationalist*, December 26, 1889.

² *Mass. Hist. Coll.*, vii. 1. *Plain Dealing*, 150.

³ *Way of Cong. Churches*, 1648, p. 71.

maintaining the purity and the doctrinal soundness of the churches is to secure a soundly converted membership.

There is one denomination of Puritans which has never deviated a hair's breadth from this way. The Baptists have always insisted that regenerate persons only ought to receive the sacraments of the church. And they have depended absolutely upon this provision for the purity and doctrinal soundness of their churches. They are strictly Congregational in polity. But they have never imposed a creed-test of membership. It is true that they have adopted in general conventions various standards—a recension of the Westminster Confession,¹ and the New Hampshire Confession;² and some churches have confessions of their own. But they expressly repudiate the imposition of any formal creed upon a church or upon any member. “If several churches understand the Scriptures in the same way, and all unite in the same confession, then this expresses the belief of those who profess it. But we cannot acknowledge the authority of any tribunal to impose such interpretations upon them. We have no right to delegate such an authority to any man, or to any body of men. It is our essential belief that the Scriptures were given to every individual man that he might understand them for himself, and the word that was given him will judge him in the great day. It is hence evident that we can have no standards which claim to be of any authority over us.”³

And have they failed to maintain sound doctrine? “I suppose there is not a denomination,—I speak in no fulsome praise, but literally,—I think there is not a denomination of Evangelical Christians that is throughout as sound theologically as the Baptist denomination. I believe it. After carefully considering it, I believe I speak the truth. Sound as my own denomination is, sound as some others are, and I do not cast unfriendly reflections upon any particular denomination, I do say, in my humble judgment there is not an Evangelical denomination in America to-day that is as true to the simple, plain gospel of God, as it is recorded in the Word, as the Baptist denomination.”⁴

English Congregationalists also expressly repudiate the use of formal creeds as tests in the admission of members. They remain true to principles which were originally common to them and to us. “Confessions of the faith that is in us, when justly

¹ Philadelphia, 1742.

² In 1833.

³ Dr. F. Wayland, *Principles and Practices of Baptist Churches*, pp. 13, 14.

⁴ Dr. J. L. Withrow.

called for, are indispensable, . . . as a fit medium to express our common faith and salvation, and in no way to be made use of as an imposition upon any. Whatever is of force or constraint in matters of this nature, causeth them to degenerate from the name and nature of Confessions, and turns them from being Confessions of Faith, into Exactions and Impositions of Faith."¹ "Our rules of admission are such as would take in any member of Christ. We take measure of no man's holiness by his opinions, whether concurring with us, or adverse to us."² "We cannot refuse to be members, nor censure when members, for any errors which are not fundamental and maintained against knowledge."³ "We will never deny the communion to any person whose duty it is to desire it."⁴

These principles have been often reaffirmed in modern times. "Protesting against subscription to any human formularies as a term of communion, Congregationalists are yet willing to declare, for general information, what is commonly believed among them, reserving to every one the most perfect liberty of conscience."⁵ "It is not asserted that English Congregationalists have never made acceptance of an unwritten creed one of the conditions of church membership. But in England the Congregational tradition has been sufficiently strong, even where Congregational principles have not been clearly understood, to prevent Congregational churches from drawing up a formal creed and enforcing its acceptance as a condition of communion. It is not consistent with Congregational principles for a particular church to draw up a creed and to require its acceptance by candidates for membership."⁶

And the original churches of New England expressly repudiated the use of formal creeds as tests in the admission of members.⁷ They made vital piety only the condition of church membership.

¹ Savoy Declaration, Preface.

² Narrative of the Independents in the Westminster Assembly.

³ Thomas Goodwin.

⁴ John Owen.

⁵ Declaration of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, 1833, Preliminary Notes.

⁶ Dale's *Congregational Manual*, pp. 186, 187. Some Congregational churches in England adopt a creed, or approve the common symbol of the Union, in order to secure their property. A clause in the Trust Deed provides that the building shall never be alienated from a church holding these doctrines.

⁷ This is shown at length in Cumming's *Congregational Dictionary*, p. 125; in the *Congregational Quarterly*, iv. p. 179; in Mead's *Address to the Council of 1880*; in the *Christian Spectator*, 1831; in Dr. Bacon's *Way-Marks*, 1853.

It is true this must be taken in their sense, which made sound doctrine an important evidence of vital piety. They doubted the true conversion of those who were infected with corrupt opinions; and their examinations may have been a severer theological test than the creeds we impose. But the difference in principle is radical. We admit that our test excludes some whom we believe to be truly converted. They never intended to exclude any whom they believed to be subjects of experimental religion; and as a rule they did not impose upon candidates formal creeds as tests of their religious experience. "For the circumstantial manner of joining the church, it was ordered according to the wisdom and faithfulness of the elders, together with the liberty and ability of any person. Hence some were admitted by expressing their consent to a written confession of faith and covenant; others did answer questions about the principles of religion that were publicly propounded to them; some did present their confessions in writing, which was read for them; and some that were able, did make their own confession, in their own words and way."¹ "Hereby" (that is, "by hearing candidates speak concerning the gift and grace of justifying faith in their souls, and the manner of God with them in working it in their hearts, and what they do believe concerning the doctrine of faith"), "we would prevent the creeping in of any into the church which may be infected with corrupt opinions. As for a platform of doctrine, to be imposed upon all to the very letter, without the least shade of difference among them, we doubt whether it be lawful or expedient."²

A little later, they had no doubt that it was both unlawful and inexpedient: —

"The things which are requisite to be found in all church members are: repentance from sin, and faith in Jesus Christ; and therefore these are the things whereof men are to be examined at their admission into the church, and which then they must profess and hold forth in such sort, as may satisfy rational charity that the things are there indeed. . . . The weakest measure of faith is to be accepted in those that desire to be admitted into the church, because weak Christians, if sincere, have the substance of that faith, repentance, and holiness, which is required in church members; and such have most need of the ordinances for their confirmation and growth in grace. . . . Such charity and tenderness is to be used, as the weakest Christian, if sincere, may not

¹ Morton's *New Eng. Mem.*, p. 146.

² Felt's *Ecclesiastical Hist.*, i. 381, 348.

be excluded nor discouraged. Severity of examination is to be avoided. . . . In case any through excessive fear, or other infirmity, be unable to make their personal relation of their spiritual estate in public, it is sufficient that the elders having received private satisfaction, make relation thereof before the church, they testifying their assent thereunto; this being the way that tendeth most to edification. But where persons are of greater abilities, there it is most expedient that they make their relations and confessions personally with their own mouth. . . . We must be able and ready, upon any occasion, to declare and show our repentance for sin, faith unfeigned, and effectual calling, because these are the reasons of a well-grounded hope. . . . This profession of faith and repentance, as it must be made by such at their admission that were never in church society before; so nothing hindereth but the same may also be performed by such as have formerly been members of some other church, and the church to which they now join themselves may lawfully require the same. . . . The like trial is to be required from such . . . as were baptized in their infancy or minority; . . . it is requisite that these should manifest their faith and repentance by an open profession thereof, before they are received to the Lord's Supper."¹

In adopting the Westminster Confession along with this platform in 1648, and in reaffirming the same principles at Boston in 1680, at Saybrook in 1708, and on Burial Hill in 1865, Congregationalists have always proclaimed that: "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are in anything contrary to his word, or not contained in it; so that to believe such doctrines or to obey such commands out of conscience, is to betray true liberty of conscience, and the requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, is to destroy liberty of conscience and reason also."²

The Confession was adopted as a testimony "That in the doctrinal part of religion they have agreed entirely with the Reformed Churches of Europe," as Cotton Mather always maintained.³ It was modified, of course, to substitute Congregational for Presbyterian government, and some doubts were expressed about "vocation" in chapter x. But no objection was made to the articles which Presbyterians are now seeking to discard, implying that infants and others who are incapable of receiving the ministry of

¹ Cambridge Platform, XII.

² Chap. xxi.

³ *Magnalia*, v. 3.

the word are lost unless they are "elect persons;" and that a definite number of men and angels, so fixed that it can neither be increased or diminished, are foreordained to everlasting death.

But they never required nor expected their candidates for admission to the churches to subscribe to this Confession. They may have been influenced by their high Calvinism in their search for evidences of vital piety. They were doubtless inconsistent at times with their own principle, that "severity of examination is to be avoided." They asked hard questions. Are there not aged persons lingering among us who were asked in childhood, on the threshold of the church, if they were willing to be damned for the glory of God? They doubted the vital piety of Quakers. They "made trial of many who passed for sound, and that not without good cause, but found them too light when weighed in God's balance, and threw them out lest they should be discovered too late to their eternal ruin."¹ That they rejected many true Christians by an extravagant estimate of orthodox doctrines as an essential evidence of experimental religion is more than probable. But we are bound to take their own words for it, that this was the only qualification they demanded for church membership. And, on the whole, the practice of the churches was consistent with the Cambridge Platform.

As a general rule, the churches made their covenant "the only instrument of their union in a church state." Plymouth Church "covenanted to walk together in a church state in all God's ways made known, or to be made known to them." They reserved an "entire and perpetual liberty of searching the inspired records, and of forming their principles and practices from those discoveries which they should make therein, without imposing them upon others."² The first church of Boston had a covenant but no creed. The first church of Hartford adopted no creed until 1822. The Old South Church of Boston never adopted a creed by vote. Dr. Blair (1766-69) used to read short articles to candidates for admission. "But the rule making this requirement was annulled immediately after Dr. Blair's dismissal. The Boston Confession of 1680 was printed as that of the Old South by a committee of the church in 1841, and subsequently. When the Rev. Alexander Cumming was installed in 1761, he was asked by the church to assent to this Confession, and the precedent then made was followed at every succeeding installation to and includ-

¹ Welde's *Answer*, 1644, p. 22.

² *Original Covenant*, 1602, pp. 8, 9.

ing that of Dr. Manning in 1857. But there is nothing in the records of the church to show that the Boston Confession of 1680 was ever adopted by vote of the church; nor that candidates for membership were ever required to give assent to it.”¹

It must not be inferred that such churches had no doctrinal basis. The “Shorter Catechism” was taught in all of them, and was well understood as their invariable creed. Many of their covenants referred to the Boston Confession, or to the “great and leading doctrines of the gospel usually embraced in the well-known standards in the substance of it.”²

Other churches agreed upon some specific articles at their organization for testimony and fellowship. When the First Church in New Haven was constituted, John Davenport and six others made public profession of their faith, and the rest freely joined themselves to this nucleus. The custom prevailed in many places of forming a church in this way, by designating seven brethren as “pillars” to give a reason for their hope. “But there is no evidence that such a profession was drawn up to be imposed upon all candidates, or to be used at all as a test of soundness of faith.”³ In 1665 John Higginson printed a brief Confession of Faith, and declared it to be the same for substance propounded to and agreed upon by the church of Salem in their first beginning in 1629. But “this was acknowledged only as a direction pointing to the faith and covenant contained in the Holy Scriptures; and therefore no man was confined to the form of words, but only to the substance and scope of the matter contained therein.”⁴

These local confessions, in many instances, were covenants rather than creeds, although symbolical in form. One of the most beautiful of them was found by Hon. J. H. Trumbull in 1862, and is believed by him to be the oldest confession of Connecticut now in existence. It is the Covenant of the Church of Christ in

¹ Hamilton A. Hill. See his *History of the Old South*, just issued.

² *E. g.*, New Ipswich, 1660; Brattle Street, Boston, 1699; Old South, Worcester, 1746; Franklin Mass., under Dr. Emmons, 1738; Winthrop, Me., 1776. The First Church in Cambridge adopted soon after 1680 the whole Boston Confession, and have never revoked it; never used it as a test in the admission of members; and we may probably add, no living person among them has ever read it! But the First Church in Norwich, which probably adopted the Saybrook platform about 1708, revoked it by a formal vote in 1717, evidently because a new minister could not sign it. For a very mild substitute was adopted in its place at his installation. *Manual of 1860.*

³ Dr. Bacon's *Waymarks*, 1853.

⁴ Morton's *New England Memorial*, p. 146.

Windsor, 1647. It begins: "We believe," but has no resemblance to a modern creed. It sets forth in six articles the mutual covenant of God with his people, and adds the Church Covenant in the seventh article.¹

Some churches had a rule that "male members," or "adult, regular and approved members," are "expected" to give their assent to the Church Articles as well as to the Covenant. If these were articles of discipline, rather than dogmas of faith,² the rule refers to the government of the church, not to admission to its sacraments. It would be entirely consistent with the following rules: "As we take the gospel revelation to be the rule of our discipline, so we mean to admit to our communion and fellowship all who give Scriptural evidence of a work of sanctifying grace in a judgment of charity, and whose lives correspond thereto."³ "No member of this church shall be subject to discipline, but for immoral conduct, or for an open and explicit renunciation of the great and fundamental doctrines of revealed religion."⁴

But if such a rule requires subscription to doctrinal articles, it is inconsistent with the principles and at variance with the practice of the original churches. For, though exceptions during later years may be found in obscure records, the invariable custom of the fathers is thus stated by the most competent witness among them: "The churches of New England make only vital piety the terms of communion; and they all with delight see godly Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Antipedobaptists, and Lutherans, *all members of the same churches*, and all sitting together without offense at the same holy table."⁵ "To the relation of [the candidate's] own religious experience is added either a confession of faith of his own composing, or a briefer intimation of what publicly received confession he chooses to adhere to."⁶ "It is the design of these churches to make the terms of

¹ Printed in full in the *Congregational Quarterly*, iv. 168. The church in Dedham, at its organization in 1637, "renounced all ye devices doctrines and commandments of men not agreeing with His holy word," but adopted a creed for Testimony in 1736; Northampton in 1668; Marblehead in 1684; Yale College in 1759; Princeton, Mass., in 1764, with two articles only, Trinity and Inspiration; Berlin, Conn., at its organization, 1775, "the male members signing it and becoming a church."

² As in the Manuals of the Tabernacle Church, Salem, 1786; of Foxborough, Mass., 1779.

³ Manual of North Church, Bath, Me., 1795.

⁴ Manual of Fair Haven Church, 1796.

⁵ Cotton Mather, *Rat. Dis. Intr.*, p. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

communion run as parallel as may be with the terms of salvation. A charitable consideration of nothing but true piety, in admitting to evangelical privileges, is a glory which the churches of New England would lay claim to."¹

This testimony is confirmed by another competent witness more than a hundred years later. In 1808 the church in Fitchburg, Mass., adopted a form of admission with public assent to its Articles of Faith.² The controversy which this form occasioned and Dr. Worcester's defense of it are the best proof we could desire that it was an innovation, and that it was not intended to reverse the general practice of making vital piety the only final test of membership. "It was intended, indeed, that this new form should be used in the future admission of members. Still it was not considered as an absolutely indispensable term of admission that the candidate should consent to every article in the doctrine of faith. If any person offering himself as a candidate for the communion of the church should have his doubts respecting any article of faith, he would not be immediately admitted; but if there were nothing beside in the way of his immediate admission, he would be requested to stand for a season on probation. In the mean time, it would be considered as the duty of the brethren, and of the pastor especially, to remove his doubts, and to enlighten him more fully into the doctrine of Christ. But if, after standing for a suitable time on this probationary footing, it should appear that the difficulties in his mind, though not fully obviated, do not result from enmity to the truth, but from some other cause, and that he is really a subject of the true Christian temper, the article in question would be dispensed with in his favor, and he would be admitted according to his desire. For it was never designed to exclude any from our communion, who appear to be made really subjects of experimental religion."³

¹ Cotton Mather, *Rat. Dis. Intr.*, p. 99.

² Adopted also in Bangor, Me., 1811, 1833, 1847; in Holden, 1828; and given as a model in Pond's *Manual*.

³ *Life of Samuel Worcester, D. D.*, i. 279. Dr. George E. Ellis, President of the Massachusetts Historical Society, cited by the *Congregationalist*, January 30, 1890, as "the most learned living student of New England History," says, in a letter, February 3, 1890: "The distinction was emphasized between a *Confession* and a *Creed* as requisite for admission to a church. The fair conclusion seemed to be that acceptance of a confession without assent to formulated articles of a Creed was accepted on such admission as the usage of all the New England Congregational churches. But this by no means justifies the conclusion that belief of the accepted creed was not avowed or implied. Before a candidate could properly come under the question of admission, he

But this very thing which was never intended was speedily set in motion. Park Street Church was organized in 1809 with a rigid creed to which all were required to subscribe.¹ The Unitarian controversy was beginning, and between 1810 and 1820 the manuals of the churches bristle with keen tests of orthodoxy in the admission of members. One of them has a tremendous creed, and a series of rules that "no person shall be admitted to membership until he gives public assent to it;" that "it is equally the duty of the church to discipline members for error and heresy as well as for vice and immorality;" and that "pastors must not only subscribe to the creed, but pledge themselves to defend it against Jews, Pagans, Mohammedans, Arminians, Polagians, Antinomians, Socinians, Unitarians, and Universalists"!² This is the worst, and the most logical and consistent manual, which I have found, between 1808 and 1820. Nearly all our churches adopted some form of subscription to a creed about this time.

The innovation was undoubtedly made in a panic. The Half-way Covenant had filled the churches with voting members who made no profession of piety. Meeting-houses were alienated and infidelity proclaimed. Then, after their vineyard was plundered and trampled, they put up the bars. And they put up the wrong bars! There are impenitent sinners who can adopt with perfect sincerity the most tremendous tests that can be devised of orthodoxy in opinion. What was wanted was a rigid enforcement of the old rule that "no person ought to make a profession of religion and join the church without experiencing a change of heart,

or she had been under previous examination and conference with pastor or deacon. This would start with the assumption that the candidate accepted the creed, and if any serious failure appeared, it would of course bar farther proceedings. Heretical views, exceeding a liberal allowance for individual haltings, would arrest the matter of admission at that stage. Orthodoxy of belief was assumed in private. The public ordeal related to heart experience and correctness of life. "I find abundant evidence that the development of so-called 'liberal beliefs' among Congregationalists brought in two novel devices as safeguards: first, the examination and scrutiny by members of a council for finding the doctrinal views of a candidate for the ministry (which was not originally the duty or prerogative of a council, but was adopted for security against heresy), and second, an assent to formulated articles of a creed as condition of admission to church membership in public." This is decisive on the only point at issue: that our present method of public admission to church membership is a novel device, occasioned by the development of liberal beliefs, which culminated in the Unitarian Controversy.

¹ Since modified. See Withrow's *Anniversary Sermon*, 1884.

² *Manual of the Church of Christ in Francestown, N. H.*, 1811.

and the church ought not to receive any person into their fellowship, whether he has been a professor or not, unless they are satisfied in a judgment of charity that he has been born again.”¹ This “novel device of assent to formulated articles of a creed as the condition of church membership” was the greatest blunder American Congregationalists ever made. It is absurdly uncongregational, and against all our best traditions.

And it has never done any good, and has always done great harm. This is another practical reason for giving it up. We are often asked to contrast the working of the old system for nearly two hundred years with that of the new system during the last eighty years. Are not our churches purer and more orthodox now than they were at the outbreak of the Unitarian controversy? What else has saved us except the use of the creed, test to rule out heretics?

The answer is not far to seek. The great missionary movement of 1810 and the continuous revivals ever since have saved us. These have operated directly to restore the old test of church-membership to its original power. The continued presence of the Spirit of God and the zeal of the churches especially in behalf of the children have secured to us a church membership, which, beyond all cavil, is more largely composed of converted and consecrated persons than at any time since the days of the apostles. This is the whole cause of our spiritual prosperity, rather than this newly invented barrier to the communion table.

The barrier has done no good and incalculable evil. It was imposed when young children were not generally expected to join the church. Since then a large majority of our members have been converted in childhood and youth. In countless numbers, these innocents have been required to profess their solemn belief of words they cannot understand. The creed-test has made cruel separations of families. On some subordinate doctrine like infant baptism, fathers have been divided from mothers, and in the controversy or the confusion, children have been lost from both churches. It has consigned those who were weak in faith and needed most our fostering care to unevangelical teaching at the formative period of their experience. It has been a sore burden to the conscience of pastors and of their converts from the world. There is no need of expatiating upon these evils. They are profoundly and universally felt.

¹ Art. 16 of the Discipline of the Church in Berlin, Conn. Date not given, but the rule evidently refers to the Half-way Covenant.

This great millstone has hung too long around our necks, for causing the little ones who believe in Christ to stumble. But the practical question remains, how to get rid of it. The rules and rubrics of nearly all of our churches impose this test. How can we escape from it?

One way is to wear it out. Place your creed in the hands of all applicants, and if they make no objection, proceed in the usual way. If objection is made by those whom you believe to be truly converted and exemplary Christians, contrive some way to evade it: explain it away; connive at mental reservations; if this will not do, exempt them by open vote of the church from subscription. It will not be worth much as a test after a few such wrenches as this. Such a process has been going on for years in many of our churches. Few churches apply their creeds as rigid tests in the admission of members. And the attempt to discipline devout and exemplary members for opinions not in harmony with all the articles of the creed would lead to the swift and startling discovery that this obnoxious rule is a dead letter.

But there are grave objections to this wearing-out process. It wears out the creeds also. Conservatives, at least, ought to be alarmed at this danger. What has become of the Boston Confession, the Shorter Catechism, and the faithful abridgments of them which were universally adopted when this test was first imposed? Why has the cautious utterance of the Creed Commission of 1884 called forth so feeble a response? Why have some churches revoked all their creeds, and many others dwindled their articles to a few generalities? Not because extended and unequivocal confessions are the abomination of desolation, but because they are standing where they ought not. The creed-test of membership has broken the backbone of Congregational creeds. Unless they are moved away from the communion table completely, we shall soon have no symbols to distinguish us as one of the original Evangelical churches.

There is a more serious objection to dead letters. Their ghosts will rise to frighten the scrupulous conscience. There will always be a suspicion of evasion. Subterfuges are unworthy of a church which is set to be the light of the world. The imposition of this test was an unlawful imprisonment of disciples of Christ, and you have no right to "let those men go" secretly. Come forward manfully and "fetch them out."

Revise rules and rubrics. The creeds need not be changed. They may be easily changed for more extended and accurate tes-

timonies to the doctrines generally believed, and diligently taught, and received without controversy. But first, repeal all rules and forms which require or expect assent to any articles at all as conditions of church membership. Proclaim without reserve that you mean to receive all comers whom you believe Christ has received. Will any man dispute the right of Congregational churches to take this straightforward action? The right to revoke creeds and to impose others has been exercised without question. There was a church of over three hundred members in 1860 which adopted, by a vote of twenty-four in favor and of nineteen opposed, a more stringent confession of faith, and retained the rule that all members were expected to sign it. By unanimous vote in 1888, the same church, then increased to over five hundred members, repealed this rule and required assent to the covenant only. The Congregational way is not a way of indirection, diplomacy, and compromise. Let there be light. Preach the truth. Expound the Scriptures. Bring out the startling fact that creeds, rituals, and venerable customs stood in Paul's day exactly where they stand now, as a barrier to church membership; and that he swept them away with a heavy hand. Describe to your churches the Scriptural, Evangelical, and Congregational way of the fathers, and see how eagerly they will hold up hands for it. It is incredible that any church, fully instructed, will perpetuate this blockade.

"And then how long will it be before all creeds will be repealed and the churches be left without defenses of their orthodoxy? And how can we say: We believe; unless every member is obliged to subscribe to the creed?" This is a strange question for Americans to ask. How can we have a written Constitution of the United States and say "we the people" do enact it? An alien becomes a citizen of the United States by renouncing fealty to foreign princes, potentates, and governments, and by promising obedience to our laws. But who would think of demanding of him an abstract belief that republicanism is the only legitimate form of government? It is an unchallenged fact that we Congregationalists believe and teach a definite system of doctrine. The majority in nearly all our churches have hitherto claimed the right to define that system in a creed, and to require all members to assent to it publicly. The majority in all our churches have a perfect right to define that system in a creed, and to require all members to receive the teaching of it without controversy, and to be loyal to the church. I recently asked a member

of a Congregational church, who does not believe the doctrine of infant baptism, what he would do if the proposal were made to expunge that article from the creed. I put the same question to another, who does not believe the doctrine of endless punishment. They instantly gave the same answer. They would oppose such a motion strenuously. These doctrines belong to the system which their church sustains. They are not required to subscribe to them, but they are bound by the covenant to study the things that make for peace and to bear truthful testimony. A Christian is at least a gentleman, and does not join a church to antagonize its well-known doctrines.

What a preposterous panic this is about filling our churches with heretics, and turning them into synagogues of Satan! Can it be that Presbyterians, and Episcopalians, and Methodists, and all the rest of the Evangelical churches defend their orthodoxy in a Scriptural way, while Congregationalists must be held back from Unitarianism and Universalism by putting every member into a strait-jacket!

“How shall our Congregational churches bear the fullest and most accurate testimony for the truth and against error, without imposing unwarranted terms of communion upon the disciples of Christ? He who solves this problem will do great service to the cause of truth.”¹ There is only one way. Remove all barriers of creed from the sacraments. Restore the covenant of personal surrender, consecration, and obedience to its place as the only instrument of our church state, and as the beautiful gate to the communion table. Sharpen the tests of Christian character. Keep out those who have hard and impenitent hearts. Turn out the wicked and scandalous. Make the church a communion of saints, and then, trust soundly-converted, holy men to take care of its orthodoxy, and the Lord Jesus Christ to defend it against the gates of Hell.

Wolcott Calkins.

NEWTON, MASS.

¹ Rev. Edw. W. Gilman, in the article already cited, *Congregational Quarterly*, 1861, iv. 192. He had previously solved the problem himself, perhaps unconsciously, by his clear description of the old way.

THE PROBLEM OF PAUPERISM.

"How is it possible to relieve want and destitution without serious moral harm to the recipients, injury to the community, and, in the end, increasing the amount of suffering?" This question Mr. Francis Peek places at the beginning of a paper read at one of the Charity Organization Conferences in London in 1879. It is the question which puzzles all who seek to ameliorate the condition of those suffering from poverty. An attempt to discuss in a single paper the whole problem suggested by this question would be sure evidence of never having studied it. This paper will consider certain phases which the writer has not often known to be treated by those who have made it a specialty. We will begin our study with a few limitations.

There are those temporarily in financial distress, always a large class: we will not consider such.

There are the poor who are able to earn a decent living, but who have few luxuries and only a moiety of comforts. They are, however, not on the public. Their condition needs improvement, but judging from recent events in this country and Europe, by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Knights of Labor, this class is abundantly able to work out its own salvation, and is doing so surely and swiftly.

Then there are the insane, and the children of virtuous parents who are left without help. These are not forgotten, but they, with the two classes previously mentioned, cannot at present be considered.

Pauperism denotes a condition. It has been defined as "the state of voluntary want," which is true as far as it goes, but it is an imperfect and unjust definition. All in voluntary want are paupers, but not all paupers are such voluntarily. Some choose pauperism; others are born into a state from which they would gladly rise, but cannot, from lack of faculty rather than choice. A weight is upon them, — the weight of sins of past generations; it crushes like a mountain.

Then there are those who, from earliest childhood, have had an environment of vice and wretchedness. They are physically, morally, intellectually diseased; they are children of the outcast; they never had parents; they were simply born and left. How large this number is may easily be imagined after an examination of the conditions of life in large cities. People in this class do

not dream that there is anything higher for them. Their environment so hardens to filth and pollution that they cease both to desire and to aspire. These two classes — those who are hereditarily paupers and those who are made so by their environment — are the hardest to reach, the most misunderstood and neglected, and it is concerning them that this paper will treat.

What are the causes of pauperism? This question will be answered within the limitations already suggested.

1. *Heredity.* Paupers are largely children of paupers. This is most evident in the older countries. Heredity is a demonstrated law. Diseases run in families, criminal propensities the same; eccentricities follow family lines; talent, as has been shown by Mr. Galton, is hereditary; and it is equally true that the physical and moral characteristics which tend toward pauperism are part of a natural inheritance. Mr. Dugdale's studies in this field are now well known. With most minute care, he has, by examinations running through six generations, found pauperism hereditary, and as a scientific conclusion he makes the statement that heredity of the tendency to pauperism is quite as indisputable as that to crime or disease. If the Bourbon family are distinguished by the Bourbon nose, and following the same law the Bach family by their talent for music, we should expect to find the descendants of Margaret Jukes both criminals and paupers.

Assuming the proposition that heredity not only governs the reproduction of physical features and peculiarities of temperament, but of mental and moral characteristics as well, and also that they will, sooner or later, manifest themselves unless modified or overcome by some stronger force, it is clear that, without fullest evidence to the contrary, we must presume the tendency to pauperism to be subject to the same law. Statistics show that the children of paupers usually become paupers, although they do not by any means show that all pauperism, or even the largest proportion, can be accounted for by this law.

2. *Environment.* Among the causes of pauperism included in vicious environment are the following: —

(a.) The tendency of population to congregate in cities. The mountains and valleys and even the prairies have streams running to the cities. Most of those who go to the towns are not skilled laborers; they are without trades, and are impelled thither by desire for excitement. Their services are not wanted. Their capital, if they have any, is soon spent. If they have not spirit enough to return home, they are soon on the street, becoming beggars.

Could they be induced to go back to the country, there would be hope for them: their only hope, indeed, for this world.

(b.) Overcrowding. Partially consequent on the rush to the cities, partially the result of greed of landlords, partially the fact that laborers must be near the place of work, is this next great cause of pauperism. What tongue or pen can describe the terrible reality we are now facing? Read the testimonies of Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. H. C. Meyer, an American engineer, before the Royal Commission in London in 1884, on the Housing of the Working Classes, published in the Blue Book of the following year. They show that the virtuous and industrious poor are not at first paupers. They must be near their work, and are therefore compelled to take such accommodations as are available. Few can afford more than one room. A part of Lord Shaftesbury's testimony is as follows; most of it is too terrible to repeat. "The effect of the one room system is physically and morally beyond all description. In the first place, the one room system always leads, so far as I have seen, to the one bed system. If you go into these single rooms, you may sometimes find two beds, but you generally find one bed occupied by the whole family. . . . It is impossible to say how fatal the result of that is. In the first place, it is totally destructive of all benefit from education. It is a benefit to the children to be absent during the day at school, but when they return to their houses, in one hour they unlearn almost everything they have acquired during the day. . . . The one room system may go on very well while there are a husband and wife and young children, but when the children have reached the age of eight or ten, and have to sleep in the same room as their parents, or with others, from that hour the consequences are most fearful both to their morals and to their health. In the one room system, where the inmates are many, you cannot introduce a sufficient amount of air. How remedy all this? You must either insist upon a man taking two rooms, or else you must separate the children from the adults. Either case seems to be an impossible supposition."

Let us now consider conditions not yet fully obsolete in our country. In 1879 the Tenement House Act was passed. Testifying before the same London Commission, Mr. H. C. Meyer, of New York, said: "Prior to that act, about ninety per cent. of the city lot could be covered. The authorities could not well reach old dwellings that were built for other purposes and that were subsequently converted into tenement houses; such buildings always had

a large proportion of dark inside rooms. The division of land in our city is very unfortunate. The blocks being four hundred feet long by two hundred feet deep; the streets are sixty feet wide, and ninety per cent. of each one-hundred-foot lot could be covered. The buildings were usually put up five stories high, and the landlord usually tried to provide for four families on a floor. You can imagine in our climate, from May till the last of September, the condition of the occupants of a large proportion of the inside rooms, with for two months the temperature averaging over eighty degrees."

Whatever their antecedents, people become both physically and morally depraved when compelled by the struggle for bread to live in such conditions. Lord Shaftesbury said they had found that workmen lost, on an average, about twenty days each year from causes directly related to overcrowded and unsanitary dwellings. He was asked if he had seen the pamphlet called: "Is it the Sty that makes the Pig, or the Pig, the Sty?" His answer was: "I am certain that a great many people who are in that condition have been made so by the condition of the houses in which they live." He then gives the genesis of a pauper family. "A young artisan in the prime of life, an intelligent, active young man, capable of making his forty or fifty shillings a week, comes up to London; he must have lodgings near his work; he is obliged to take, he and his wife, the first house that he can find. . . . In a very short time, of course, his health is broken down; he himself succumbs, and either dies or becomes perfectly useless. The wife falls into despair; in vain she tries to keep her house clean; her children increase upon her, and at last they become reckless, and with recklessness comes drinking, immorality, and all the consequences of utter despair."¹

Overcrowding means vitiated air, proximity to vice, consequent temptation, and usually indulgence in evil. Such conditions necessitate a weakened state both morally and physically. When ambition is dead, the body weak, and the gate that looks toward hope closed and barred, there is reached a state which makes pauperism inevitable. And it is well to stop here long enough to say that the victims of such conditions are not responsible for them. Their pauperism is not voluntary want. If pauperism results from the strike among the dock laborers in London, it should be laid chiefly at the door of the owners of the docks, who tried to compensate for their own extravagance by grinding

¹ "Housing of the Working Classes," *Blue Book*, p. 5.

the faces of their employees. Society is responsible for these conditions, and society alone can remove the evils. It must make such conditions impossible. An undertaker, who was also a house-owner, was besought by Octavia Hill to improve his tenements, on the ground that they would be more profitable to him. He replied: "Oh, mum, it's not the rents I depends on for my profits, it's the funerals!" Such a brute exists and carries on his hellish work because you and I do not lift up our hands and drive him from the face of the earth. Somebody is responsible for pauperism and its attendant crimes, but it is the man who sits in a ceiled house and the woman who dresses in lace and diamonds quite as often as the tramp who begs bread, or the thief who steals your purse. I am no socialist, but I see no way out of this terrible condition unless the state makes overcrowding impossible, and compels those who build houses for rental to make them comfortable, healthful, and decent, even though they do not pay over five per cent. on investments.

(c.) Intemperance. It is unnecessary to speak of this cause of pauperism; there is none more prolific. Where the one is, the other is invariably found.

(d.) The *esprit du corps* of the class. This is another element of vicious and pauperizing environment, and is as evident in the ranks of pauperism and crime as it was in Napoleon's armies. It does not apply to the temporarily poor, to those who have not lost remembrance of better things, but is true of paupers as distinguished from the poor. They argue that society owes them a living, and they exult in getting it without work. The chief of this clan is the fellow who induces society to do the most for him with the least trouble to himself. This vicious example carries its vicious inspiration. Children born in such an environment are subject to the influence of degrading ideals, and stimulated by examples still more degrading. Hence it comes that the *esprit du corps* of pauperism is one of its most fruitful causes.

(e.) Disregard of the marriage relation makes a multitude of paupers. When children are born to those for whom wedlock has no sanctity, the responsibilities of parents are usually lightly appreciated. In this way thousands of street waifs come into being. The father does not know of their existence, the mother is hampered by other duties, and the child is set adrift to become usually both pauper and criminal. How large this class is, the Maisenhaus in Vienna and the Foundling Hospital in London give a faint hint.

(*f.*) Indiscriminate giving. When to all these forces is added the indiscriminate giving of the charitable, it ceases to be a wonder that there are so many paupers, and only seems strange that there are not more. Mrs. Josephine Shaw Lowell, of the Charity Organization Society of New York, charges the Christian churches with being directly responsible for a large part of the pauperism of our great cities. Indiscriminate giving leads paupers to reckon on the doles of the benevolent as a fixed quantity. "The committee appointed in Bristol, England, a few years ago, to inquire into the condition of the poor reports: 'No remedy can be found for the pauperism and mendicancy of Bristol till a higher tone exists in regard to the sin of inconsiderate dispensation to the poor.' 'Careless almsgiving,' says Mr. William Low, 'produces directly such vices as imposture, improvidence, drunkenness, servility, religious pretense.'"¹ Twenty years ago one in every eighteen in London was a pauper. Charity organization followed upon knowledge of this fact, and as a result pauperism at the end of seventeen years had been reduced from forty-two to twenty-two in every thousand. Sooner or later every pastor finds that his church is supporting those who use piety as a cloak for laziness. The rector of a large parish in New York discovered that at one time his church contributed largely to the support of two maiden ladies supposed to be poor but worthy, who on investigation were found to be owners of the large tenement in which they lived. There are organized gangs of paupers in all great cities: some work the churches, others the Sunday-schools, still others go from house to house; they are adroit, persistent, innocent enough in manner to deceive the elect, and they continue their line of business because it pays. It would not pay, were it not for misplaced charity. There is truth in the French epigram, "Charity creates one half of the misery she relieves, but cannot relieve one half of the misery she creates."

This extended study of the factors of the Problem of Pauperism has been necessary before intelligent suggestions could be offered concerning its solution. In all that is attempted there should be constant reference to the removal of the causes. Occasional gifts to the poor have no more effect than does rubbing an irritation when the seat of the difficulty is within. The parallel may be continued. The more an inflammation is soothed by rubbing, the worse it becomes, and the more one alleviates pauperism by indiscriminate giving, the more is it aggravated.

¹ Rev. W. F. Slocum, Jr.

Pauperism, speaking in general terms, has two causes: corrupt heredity and vicious environment. The questions for us to consider are therefore two: (a.) How may an industrious and virtuous stock be substituted for that which breeds paupers? (b.) How may the conditions of living be so improved that the pauper class shall no longer be recruited from the ranks of the frugal and industrious? Speaking again in general terms, our reply is that there is one and the same answer for both questions. The only way in which a hard-working and frugal stock can be secured is by a change in the existing environment; and the only way which promises hope that the pauper class will no more be augmented from other classes is to secure such conditions as shall make men unwilling, even for selfish reasons, to sink to lower levels.

Let us now observe a few principles which are well established by scientific investigation.

1. "When the organization is structurally modified, as in idiocy or insanity, or organically weak as in many diseases, the heredity is the preponderating factor in determining the career; but it is, even then, capable of marked modification for better or worse by the character of the environment. In other words, capacity, physical and mental, is limited and determined mainly by heredity."¹

2. "Where the conduct depends on the knowledge of moral obligation [excluding insanity and idiocy], the environment has more influence than the heredity. . . . The use to which capacity shall be put is largely governed by the impersonal training or agency of environment."²

3. The correction for vicious heredity is change of environment, as the proper thing for a person by the seaboard with hereditary tendency to consumption is to go to Colorado or California.

4. "Environment tends to produce habits which may become hereditary, especially so in pauperism and licentiousness."³

"If these conclusions are correct, then the whole question of the control of crime and pauperism becomes possible, within wide limits, if the necessary training can be made to reach over two or three generations. From the above considerations the logical induction seems to be that environment is the ultimate controlling factor in determining careers, placing heredity as an organized result of invariable environment."⁴

¹ Dugdale, *The Jukes*, p. 65.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

² *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

These principles are fundamental. Heredity may be changed by environment. The lungs of the ancient Peruvians became expanded because of the rarefied air they were accustomed to breathe. The dweller in the tropics delights in heat which would utterly enervate a dweller in northern lands, and yet their race ancestry was the same. Change in environment has caused change in organism. The principle holds in moral and spiritual as well as physical spheres.

We have, then, our answer to the question, What can be done to lessen the pauperism of the world? Those who accept the words of our Master, "They that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak," as forming a universal principle, must devote themselves to the creation of new and more healthy conditions in which those below them can live and improve.

To this end, what can be done by society through the state?

The state can make it impossible for individuals or corporations to monopolize the land. This evil does not to any large extent exist in the United States, but it does in Europe, and already there are signs that it will cause trouble here. The state can so protect citizens in their right to the land that no injustice shall be done. None who are willing to devote themselves to agriculture should be prevented either by lack of land to till or tools with which to work.

The state should allow only the erection of dwellings fit to be human abodes. It may be a question whether the state should assume the functions of a landlord; but I can see no more reason why the state should carry our mail than build our houses. However, without advocating extension of an already overburdened civil service, it will be granted that building laws can be passed and enforced compelling landlords to erect only such dwellings as shall make homes possible, and which shall be inspected and kept in proper order. Overcrowding should be made as criminal as stealing. Laws forbid overcrowding on the sea: why not on the land? This evil requires the most tireless vigilance, but it can be eradicated. If any doubt, let them read the account of the changed condition of Whitechapel since the English Building Acts were enforced.¹

The state can pass uniform marriage and divorce laws, so that the number of children left to grow up in neglect shall be diminished.

The state can, if it will, utterly abolish and destroy the saloon, by one act removing a most prolific source of pauperism.

¹ *New Review*, October, 1889.

The state can attach to our postal service a system of Penny Savings Banks, so that there shall be before all people, even little children, a constant incentive to industry and frugality. The people will trust the nation when they would not trust individuals. And it should be as universal as the postal system, so that not only cities but towns and country districts may have the opportunity of investing the smallest sums. When formed in childhood, the habit of saving is seldom lost, and can be fostered in no way so well as by Postal Penny Savings Banks.

We thus see that it is within the power of the state to make monopoly in land impossible; to compel the erection of dwellings which shall put a premium on decent living and good behavior, dwellings to be rented at prices which the poor can pay; to pass uniform marriage laws; to abolish the saloon; and to establish Postal Penny Savings Banks, in all these ways creating a better environment for the people. And it can do one thing more, — it can make pauperism criminal. Certain localities do this now, but there would be no serious encroachment on the rights of the individual if there were to be a national law to this effect.

What can churches do toward creation of conditions which shall tend to the removal of pauperism?

They can, as churches, utterly refuse aid to any but those who on full investigation are proved to be deserving. This would cut off the support of thousands of church-tramps who find it easy to impose on the kind-hearted minister and deacons, and whose sole ground of confidence is that their statements will never be investigated. So far as practicable, the churches should work through charity organization societies, to which all cases requiring help should be referred for investigation. But churches are jealous, and object to intrusion. A Church Exchange has been suggested, by which, on stated occasions, the officers having charge of benevolences in all churches, Roman and Protestant, should meet and compare notes, and thus learn whether they have not in common members who in one ward believe in Apostolic succession, in Close Communion in another, in High Calvinism in a third; and all because the one who can swallow the greatest number of creeds receives the greatest number of doles for his insatiable pockets. A church exchange would be perfectly feasible in villages and small cities, but perhaps the charity organization plan is better for large cities.

But, more than all else, churches can do much by rising to an appreciation of the fact that the gospel is for the whole life of man. Jesus Christ came to save men in this world as well as for

the future. Whatever ennobles and beautifies human conditions, whatever makes possible a worthy life for man as a child of God here and now, belongs to the mission of the church; and in order for it to have its best effect, this large and generous conception of Christianity should be preached in churches whose doors and pews are free to all, — so free that a pauper may feel at liberty to be there even though he sleeps, and thus be found in the atmosphere of higher and better things. There are churches and churches. Some content themselves with sustaining the worship of the sanctuary for the elect who are able to pay for pews; others, though they keep the pew system, organize like the Congregational Union of London, to move in solid phalanx on the ranks of vice and degradation. That Union of London might well be studied by the churches. It works systematically. It provides preaching, bright and cheerful entertainments, work for those who are willing to work; it puts boots on children and sends them to school; it provides five o'clock breakfasts on Sunday morning, where men are fed before being asked to listen; it searches for the deserving who are willing to emigrate and sends them to the colonies; it allows no heedless giving, but strives in all ways to open the door of hope before those who live in darkness and despair. The Secretary of this Union issued "The Bitter Cry of Outcast London," that exceeding bitter cry which has echoed around the world. It was significant, showing that the church was far in advance of the state in its appreciation of the social condition of England.

Thus churches can do much toward creating an environment which shall discourage pauperism. They can refuse to countenance almsgiving except on fullest investigation; they can give up their prejudices and sectarian rivalries and organize a church exchange by which only the deserving will be helped; they can work through the Charity Organization societies; and, better than all, they can realize that Christ came to save man, body and soul; they can preach a gospel to the whole groaning creation, and esteem it a privilege to do anything which will uplift and ennoble men, thus helping them toward, if not into, the kingdom of God.

What can individuals do to create an environment which shall gradually exterminate pauperism?

They can learn that giving to beggars is giving to multiply beggars. They can remember that even paupers are children of God for whom Christ died, and therefore worthy of best and most careful efforts for improvement. The current philosophy says,

"The fittest will survive: let the rest die;" but the religion of Christ says, "All are children of God," and the very fact that a human being is sick, weak, poor, an outcast and a vagabond, is the strongest possible appeal for efforts toward amelioration of his condition. But to be more definite. A gentleman of wealth started the Polytechnic on Regent Street in London. It educates to industry and high ideals about fifteen hundred young people each year. Paupers are seldom, if ever, found among those who have studied there.

A number of Oxford and Cambridge students, under the lead of Arnold Toynbee, originated the University Settlement in East London. There the young men from the universities go, not to be missionaries, but to improve the life of Whitechapel. Toynbee Hall, in one of the worst districts of London, shows what certain individuals are doing to solve the problem of pauperism. They go among the people, live among them, try to elevate their local affairs, and to inspire the people in those districts to vote for good measures, are on the poor-boards and school-boards, assist the police in suppression of vice, and thus are themselves trained for larger and better work in the future.

If I were a city pastor with money behind me, I would try to duplicate Toynbee Hall in New York or Brooklyn, or where, perhaps, it is still more needed, in Jersey City.

The hero and heroine of Walter Besant's "All Sorts and Conditions of Men" are generally believed to be the Rev. S. A. Barnett, Vicar of St. Jude's, Whitechapel, and his beautiful and accomplished wife. They are reported to have inspired the novelist. He described in the course of his book an ideal Palace of Delight, which five years ago had no existence except in fiction. To-day it is a veritable reality. In 1887 it was opened by the queen, — a vast institution with industrial classes; art classes; a cooking school; a hall seating two or three thousand, where the best music in the kingdom is to be heard as frequently as at the West End; an art gallery, in which during the summer of 1889 there was the finest collection of modern paintings to be found in Great Britain. And this music, this art, these libraries and reading-rooms, these places for amusement and improvement, are to be enjoyed by any dweller in the heart of East London for the sum of twopence. Crowds go there. Life is made nobler and sweeter. Young men and maidens drawn from music-halls and saloons see something worth talking and thinking about. Boys and girls with some natural gifts are sought out and trained to arts and industries. In

addition to these, travel classes are formed, and men, women, and children are taken to the country for excursions in which recreation and instruction are combined. And, still better, the poor and friendless are brought near pure and noble spirits, who show them that the highest have no privilege so great as working to uplift those beneath them.

But perhaps the most helpful of all agencies started by individuals in this crusade against pauperism was the experiment of Octavia Hill. It is no longer an experiment, but an assured and magnificent success. She planned to take old buildings in the heart of London's poorest districts, make them cleanly and well-equipped dwellings, and as soon as possible erect new buildings. She presented her plan to John Ruskin, who furnished most if not all of the money for the venture. Miss Hill transformed old rookeries, made them comfortable and healthful, in one of them took up her residence, kept the stairs and halls as clean as her own rooms, filled the vacant places with flowers, became the friend and helper of the women and children, set an example of careful housekeeping which was a constant inspiration, and then insisted that her rents should always be paid. She demonstrated that, however it may be among animals, among human beings the "sty" has much to do with "making the pig." In other words, she has proven that people who have decent homes and a chance to see beautiful things are usually influenced by their surroundings, whatever their heredity may have been. Her example has already been followed to some extent in Europe and America, and it will be by following and extending it in future that most will be done toward solving our problem.

These are only hints. More familiar and equally valuable illustrations might have been found in New York, in the Children's Aid Society, and the reformed and renewed Gotham Court. They all illustrate the principle to which attention is directed in this paper. Our only hope that the problem of pauperism will ever be solved is in the fact that new and higher conditions always do much toward changing and improving character, however degraded it may have become.

And now, at the close of this discussion, we should remember that no permanent work for humanity can ever be accomplished without heeding the following fundamental facts: —

All men, just as they, — thieves, murderers, paupers, — are children of God, and therefore worth saving; are destined for an endless existence, and therefore worthy of most heroic and sacrificing effort.

Individual responsibility is an ultimate reality. We begin life where others put us, but after that we choose for ourselves. Heredity furnishes each man his capital, but compels none in its use. If the lowest are ever elevated, it will be by awakening their consciousness of responsibility and consequent ability.

Finally, efforts for the amelioration of humanity require time. The baleful effects of evil heredity, which are like streams running through many generations, are not easily overcome. In character, as in disease, more than one generation is needed to eradicate evil tendencies. But as the physical constitution is changed for the better if kept long enough in pure air and bright sunshine, so the lowest and most degraded humanity becomes ennobled and beautified if taken out of its surroundings of vice, idleness, and crime, and kept in the pure air of loving associations and beneath the bright and tender sky of the Eternal Father's love.

Amory H. Bradford.

MONTCLAIR, NEW JERSEY.

A MODERN PREACHER, AGOSTINO DA MONTEFELTRO.

THERE is a rumor of a new character over on the other side of the Atlantic. The report has come to us of a modern Savonarola, a man who is an Italian preacher, and who unites in himself several of the strong characteristics of the great mediæval Italian. Savonarolas are rarely seen in human history, and when one comes to the light, especially in this nineteenth century, he is worthy of receiving some attention. This man is a Franciscan, known by the name of Agostino da Montefeltro. He is reported to have unusual intellectual endowments, to have strong convictions as to the things which should be in distinction from the things which are, and to possess that rarest of human gifts, or what comes near being the rarest of human gifts, eloquence. It is putting the fact too mildly to allude to the knowledge of him here as a rumor. Still it is only recently that he has come into his present great conspicuousness in Italy. Bologna, Pisa, Florence, and Turin had been given opportunities of hearing him before this year which is just past, but it was seemingly not until March, 1889, that the opportunity came to him to apply his gathered experience in addressing large audiences at the centre

of the Italian world, that is to say, in Rome. The Roman sermons served more than anything which had happened before to widen and secure his Italian reputation, and to set men to looking at him and talking of him in the larger world outside.

If we were to accept unqualifiedly all that is said of him, we should have to believe that this man is not only something unusual, but something very extraordinary. Much, it seems, is set down to his credit as a humane man, as a "good" man in the sense of goodness in which it is disconnected from religious belief. But what he is principally famed for is his power of eloquent speaking. At Rome he had what would be called great "success." He preached in the church of San Carlo al Corso, a church, as its name indicates, on the Corso, and near the Via Condotti. It was a *course* of sermons which he gave, extending through Lent. All ranks of society seem to have been represented in his audiences. San Carlo is sometimes called a fashionable church, in allusion to the class of people who regularly frequent it, — an objectionable term, but one which may be accepted as giving a clue to one element represented in the Franciscan's audiences. One of the Roman journals said that he drew many young people, — young people who belonged to the ranks of the studious and the thoughtful. In the descriptions of his preaching, all the details are found which familiarly belong to the description of a powerful speaker addressing an enthusiastic audience. One of these I copy.

"The vast temple was not large enough to contain the multitude panting for a draught at this inexhaustible fountain of eloquence; and — a new miracle — of the listeners who hung upon his lips a good part were those who do not frequent the church, who do not feed upon spiritual food, and who are wont to accord to the religious idea a smile of indifference, if not of contempt. The long and uncomfortable waiting, the murmur of voices more or less audible which ran through the dense, crowded, and overflowing mass, all ceased at the appearance of the mystic figure of the humble servant of God. An irresistible and superior force seemed to weave a spell over the ears and the hearts of the listeners. They followed the exuberant speaker in every gesture. They were unwilling to lose a syllable of his utterance. They hung in emotion upon his lips."

This same description and others which appeared at the time disclose the somewhat surprising fact that the audience from time to time gave vent to their feelings in applause. But it is stated that the Franciscan begged them not to do so. I do not suppose

that applause is a thing expected of an Italian church audience. I think I am right in saying that such a thing is as much a violation of tradition, to say nothing more, with them as with us. It probably is not to be necessarily taken as indicating that the listener places himself over against the speaker in the attitude of one who is admiring a show or a spectacle. Applause does not always indicate that. Wendell Phillips's audiences used to applaud his anti-slavery speeches because they were so stirred by his words as to feel unable to resist the tendency to in some way indicate their feelings, to give some sign, to make some response to the speaker, although they were addressed upon a topic of hardly less dignity and seriousness than a pulpit topic. It must be said, too, that the Italian speaker does not by his way of talking disclose any secret wish to provoke applause or in any way belie the sincerity of his open appeal. His words were earnest and must often have been stirring, but all of what he says appears to come naturally in the development of his theme, and bears no marks of being inserted simply for effect.

It is possible to know what his words were, and to subject them to criticism in this and other respects, because the Roman sermons which he preached last March were taken down stenographically and printed. They were sown broadcast all over Italy, so that the observation was made at the time, that he was preaching not so much to the congregations which gathered within the four walls of San Carlo, as to the whole of the peninsula, from the Alps to the Tarentine Gulf. It has been to me a matter of interest to turn over the pages of these sermons and see how far they justify to the mind of the reader the extraordinary impression which they made upon his audiences, and what sort of a man they reveal. It would seem that there must have been intellectual force in them, that audiences such as his were could not have been attracted and retained by recitals entirely sterile of ideas, no matter how impassioned or earnest the delivery; and upon examination they do in fact show that he is not a mere rhapsodist or a person dealing solely in sentiment, but a person of vigorous and apparently of trained mind.

What has this man got to offer, and what does he offer? What are the themes which stir him? Against what does he feel called upon to make a crusade? In the general tone of most of what he says, he is much like a Protestant. He has the elevated tone of one who talks to educated persons in an intellectual way. In the majority of his sermons he takes the same stand-

point, talks the same as a Protestant preacher (saving peculiarities which are Italian, not Catholic), and places himself in much the same relation to his hearers. Out of about thirty sermons preached last March and April, I should say not more than half a dozen are purely Catholic. The rest cover a variety of subjects. Without undertaking to point out what is bad or repugnant to our feelings, let me undertake to mention some of the things that are good in him. What he wants to do principally seems to be to make his hearers religious, in distinction from irreligious people. The theme which most deeply moves him seems to be modern unbelief, and the greatest danger to the world, in his apprehension of danger, the danger from this source. He sees also matters of individual conduct, matters of family life, matters of social arrangement, matters in the existing order of the state, which impress him as evil. But they are all secondary, they follow in the wake of irreligion. Irreligion in the shape of nineteenth century unbelief is the enemy to be first attacked. The axe is then laid at the root of every evil. This has seemed to me to be the dominant note of his preaching. The particular themes are many. Among them are entire sermons where he allows himself to proceed as if he were talking to a world which accepted his fundamentals. But the impression which the reader gets, and which it seems to me the hearer must have received, is that the preacher's conception of his mission is not to unfold the beauties of their faith to the faithful, but to attack with so much power as in him lies the enemy which is assailing that faith in the form of atheism, materialism, agnosticism. That the situation is to his mind critical seems to be shown by his own assertions. He declares that a great evil is torturing the society of the present day. "This evil which is the source of so many others, this disturbed state of affairs which will end by turning our ideas, our affections, our morals, our character, into chaos is the falsification of truth, and of one truth above all others, that of the existence of God. Materialists and positivists indulge in debates as to what they shall substitute for God, — for God, the necessary existence in which we live and move, the author of creation, the ideal of perfection, of wisdom, and of virtue! Misguided as they are, they do not reflect that everything has its foundation in God, love of the true, the beautiful and the good, respect for the sacredness of the family, the virtue and the happiness of men; they do not suspect that without God man goes astray, that the mind becomes bewildered and loses itself in wretched systems." He puts the

question, "What has become in our day of the doctrine of the existence of God?" and says it is enough to look about one to obtain a response, that the existence of God is denied. He deprecates the attitude of science, poetry, history, toward the fundamental religious concept. "Literature ignores the subject. Poets treat it with insult, history is being reformed so as to banish the name of God from its pages." And continuing in the same vein he declares: "Modern atheism has got to the point of shamelessness. It shows itself in the light of the sun, penetrates everywhere, makes its presence known upon the rostrum, on the stage, in the press, even in the schoolroom, yes, in the sacredness of the home." The following is one of several passages of similar tone. We translate from the Italian edition.

"Persons so perverted as to dare to say that God did not exist were rarely met in the past. To-day their number is exceedingly large (*stragrande*). There are even men who dare to call God lacking in goodness, in justice, in providence. Belonging to no faith, they assert that religion is a false notion scarcely tolerable in the days of ignorance of our primitive fathers, and in our age made solely for those weak natures which are not able to see and appreciate the progress of reason. How can this evil be bridled which is so fatally bringing ruin upon our age? What remedy is there against this scourge which afflicts the family, the nation and society?"

A man with convictions as serious as his appear to be, about the extent of unbelief, even if mistaken, could not fail to be pushed by them to make great efforts to convincingly sustain his own position, his own side of the question. All of his sermons are not sermons directly on Christian evidences, but those in which he allows himself to speak as if there was no enemy to combat, no unbelief just outside the door, are in the minority. Among his topics are the following: the existence of God as a physical and moral necessity; the existence of the soul or the necessity of the concept of a soul; the necessity of religion to humanity; Christ as foretold by prophecy; the divinity of Christ. Treating more directly the subject of unbelief and the alleged science-religion conflict, he preached a sermon on the sources of unbelief, on the supernatural, on objections to religion, and two sermons on science and faith, where the subject in its general aspect is discussed at length. Any one of these sermons, saving occasional expressions, might have been preached in any Evangelical pulpit. Occasional expressions are found which suggest the

surroundings, but they are very few in number. In fact, I should say that not only they might have been preached, but they have been preached, in Protestant pulpits. Take for example the sermon on the existence of God. It is built for its principal points upon the universality of the belief in a deity, upon the necessity of a first cause, upon the order and design in the universe, upon man's idea and love of the infinite, and upon the existence of conscience. The sermon on the immortality of the soul considers the spiritual element in man and its necessary imperishability, the soul's longing for a state of happiness and impossibility of its being delusive, the inextinguishableness of the hope in face of death, the universality of belief in immortality indicating innateness, the impossibility that a God of wisdom, goodness, holiness, and justice would destroy the soul, and the necessity of a future state to furnish sanctions to conduct. In the sermon in which he speaks of the divinity of Christ the points are his perfect life, his sublimity in death, the simplicity of his moral teachings, their completeness, adequacy, and endurance in point of time, and Christ's own affirmation that He was divine. This will illustrate his general manner of subdividing his subjects. An occasional passage will illustrate more in detail his mode of speaking.

"There has not been a century which has lacked the inspiration of God, not one without a belief in manifestations of power infinite and divine in their nature. In our day these manifestations lie hidden by the veil which the age casts over them, hidden by idols with captivating names. But people unconsciously reverence these idols. They give them reverence in their discourse of nature, of science, of equality, of progress, of liberty, of fraternity.

"And this is the language of our age! The thoughts are lofty ones, transporting the mind, the passions noble ones which touch the heart. But this same language is also the language of religion, and every one of these potencies which stir and thrill society should be laid upon the altar of God, their source, and upon that altar should be inscribed those words which were read in the Areopagus at Athens: TO AN UNKNOWN GOD. Such, indeed, is the language of our age. O my brothers of this nineteenth century, let me point out God to you! Let me exclaim with St. Paul: 'What therefore ye worship in ignorance, that set I forth unto you!'"

"What would become of the world without a belief in the immortality of the soul? . . . It is said that the last hero of Poland

falling upon the field of battle exclaimed : *Finis Poloniae*. Ah my friends, that very cry may go up to-day, you may exclaim "*Finis Patriæ*" when among a people those who believe in the immortality of the soul, in the justice of a God who punishes and rewards, yield to materialism. When those insane doctrines find an echo in the hearts of the people, when the multitude takes them up, then, indeed, we may well cry "*Finis Italiæ*." for we shall have anarchy within and invasion on our borders. But in this duel between the true science and the false I look to the triumph of soul. And to you with your generous impulses, young men, does it belong before all others to secure the liberty and safety of your country by resisting the invading doctrine of materialism. It belongs to you to secure for her this liberty and glory, with the seriousness of thought, the force of will, with words and actions, which shall be worthy of your own immortal destiny."

"If there is any element in the perfectness of Christ which may seem to you less evident than another, constantly study it and you will find it ever more beautiful, more luminous. Conceive whatsoever you will that is most majestic, most lovable, most sublime, most compassionate, most just, most glorious, most humble, and most perfect, and tell me if it is not the character of Jesus. He alone justifies admiration to the point of worship, He exhausts the whole language of praise. Human nature has in Him all its right emotions, the divine nature, all its inseparable perfections. . . . And what shall be said of the truth of his words, of his doctrine? For nineteen centuries they have been subjected to every analysis, to the most bitter scrutiny. No utterances were ever analyzed, dissected, sifted, like those of Jesus. But no one has been able to accuse them of error or of contradiction. . . . They resolve the most difficult questions. . . . They will to all eternity furnish the ultimate word upon every discussion, present or future, in the field of religion and of morals."

"*Oportet Christum regnare.*' 'For he must reign.' These words of St. Paul sum up everything which preceded the coming of Christ. Yes, we must join in saying, it is in the necessity of things that Christ should reign. It is the great necessity, the thing of all others which *must* be, the necessity of heaven and earth. . . . Look at the world, examine history. You will see colossal empires go to ruin, systems vanish, . . . but the kingdom of Jesus Christ shall endure forever. Many a king of the

earth, of universal renown, after making his little stir by word or deed has passed into eclipse, leaving but a memory behind, but the kingdom of Jesus Christ shall endure to eternity. . . . The ages pass before Jesus and before the cross, bow in reverence, and raise the grand acclaim, 'Christ conquers, Christ is commander, Christ reigns.' For nineteen centuries has resounded this prophetic hymn. I do not know whether to this century shall succeed another, but I do know that nothing shall disturb this splendid harmony. The promises of God are without fail, and He has promised that 'of his government there shall be no end.' And when in the dust of the stars shall rest the sun, wearied of its course, when there shall be no longer dawn nor sunset, then shall still shine in splendor the cross rising from its earthly standard to say to mortals, 'Learn to suffer, learn to hope,' and in the heavens shall be raised the song, 'Christ conquers, Christ reigns, Christ is triumphant.'"

In the way in which he explained his attitude toward science there was more which was individual than in the evidential sermons; still, in the main, the points are those with which we are familiar. His principal topics, variously illustrated, are the rationality of faith, and the necessity of faith. He dislikes the idea of an antagonism between faith and science. He says he loves science, that it is for him the teaching of God, the explanation of his work, the divine light which shines through the clouds, containing something of the beauty of God himself; and that just as he admires the artist's conception when it stands beautified upon the canvas and breathes in the marble, so in science and through science he admires the conceptions, the plans, the works of God. He loves science also, he declares, for the good, in material respects, which it brings to the world. "The love which faith and charity inspire in us for the welfare of humanity, for the progress of civilization, makes us love science in all its extensions, in all its applications." He states it as his fervent wish that the form of an antagonism between science and faith may disappear. "I invoke with all the force of which my soul is capable this era of peace. With all my heart I invoke peace between these two potencies so well made for understanding each other. Their union has created the work of Christian civilization."

If Agostino da Montefeltro devotes much or the greater part of his attention to combating unbelief, it does not seem to be because he is indifferent to what are called practical evils, — de-

rangements of the social order, failure of the individual and social life to reach and move upon the highest plane to which it is capable of attaining, — but because he feels that, in combating irreligion, he is directly combating the cause of such derangements. He seems by no means insensible to evil in the society and the state, and in fact allows himself at certain moments to take the same mournful view of the trend of human affairs, morally considered, as he does of the trend of spiritual life. “There is no deceiving ourselves,” he in one place says, “we are in the midst of a crisis which will make an epoch in history.” And he enlarges on particular aspects of the existing state of affairs which impress him, saying that sacrifice and self-denial have become forgotten words; that selfishness is the controlling force; that marriage obligations are violated, children are allowed to grow up in insubordination, and the family is being undermined; that property is being attacked; that speculation and fraud are the order of the day; that every one is moved by the determination to be master of himself and mind nobody; that the poison of anarchy and rebellion is being infiltrated into the mind of the citizen; that the state is tortured by factions, her best energies paralyzed. And so forth.

The remedy which he insists is necessary, which is in fact indispensable to cure this aggravated condition of evil, is more religious life and religious thought, more loving of our enemies, more of the spirit of mutual concession and of sacrifice. Without religion, it is his feeling that what is bad must inevitably grow worse; while with it society cannot fail to move steadily along the path which is to lead it to an ideal condition. And he considers it impossible to separate the question of morals, the question of what is necessary for the highest development of individual, family, and national life, from the question of religion.

“‘You priests and monks,’ people say, ‘do not understand your mission, or you would let dogmas go, and preach practical morality. But I tell you that you cannot preach practical morality, if you sever it from religion. In a letter which was addressed to me a few days ago, and which, contrary to my custom, I opened, I was advised instead of what I have been preaching up to this time, to preach patience, resignation, truth, the spirit of sacrifice. But is it possible to have such things without religion and without principles? You cannot have patience, charity, the spirit of sacrifice, if you do not believe in God, if you do not believe in a future life. . . . Two moralities are offered us, the morality of Christianity and the morality of philosophy. Can Christian morality

stand without religion? No, because among its precepts there is this one: Love your enemies. Does this precept find a basis in natural law? No, because natural law teaches the maxim of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Christian morality therefore, is not founded in natural law, but is founded upon the doctrine of pardon, of grace, and of love of God.' ”

In what is said upon the family, — a sermon is devoted to it, — there is comparatively little which an American preacher would have felt called upon to say to an American audience. What he says upon religion and the state goes upon broader grounds than what he says of the family, and is of more general interest. The subject is one which a small man or a timid man would hardly have ventured upon in Rome. We are inclined to think at this distance and with the possible error which belongs to the opinion of outsiders, that the Italian citizen is not to be blamed for sometimes imagining that there is an inconsistency between the fullest patriotism and the fullest adhesion to the church, for thinking that he cannot yield to one the highest loyalty, make most fully his own all its ambitions and desires, without withdrawing in some respect that same loyalty from the other. What Agostino da Montefeltro said was patriotically said, and must have expelled from the minds of those who heard him any doubt about the speaker's belief in the compatibility of the highest patriotism and the highest faith.

Quite apart from any possible bearing upon political questions was the preacher's treatment of one division of his subject, when he undertook to combat the idea that the Christian faith in any way produced inferior or unmanly men. Perhaps, in addressing a chivalrous and a military people, he had need to attack this notion. His significant answer to it was to point to the Christian martyrs. What he asked his auditors to consider when they inclined to think that religion produced a weak-kneed type of humanity were the men who perished in the arena, died at the stake, submitted to every phase of torture, exhibited every phase of heroism, without flinching. Taking up his subject proper, he spoke strongly of the citizen's duty of obedience to the powers that be, his duty to render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, impressive words when, as here uttered, they applied not alone to Cæsar in the generic sense, but to the king who sits, as nearly as any modern monarch does, in Cæsar's seat. The second duty of the citizen, in the order in which he set these duties out, was to love his country, a subdivision of his theme which led him

to equally emphatic words. After this he spoke of the obligation to render service, and finally of the duty to strive for present harmony, saying: "There is still another duty which I call a duty of the moment. It is the duty to exert ourselves to secure harmony in our country. We are far too much divided in our religious, political, and economic notions. A spirit of brotherly love must be aroused. What is the use of doing as we are doing? Why not join hands to make our country a unit, to make it grand and powerful? In the name of patriotism, let us work for this harmony." Still, it was not a political address. As in speaking of the moral life of the individual and the right order of the family, so in speaking of the right order of the state, he affirms and reiterates his belief that religion lies at the bottom and is essential.

"Love of country is inseparable from love of religion. The daughter of Moab said, 'Whither thou goest I will go; thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God.' In these words is found the simple expression of the natural sentiment, which from the concept of country cannot separate the thought of God. . . . A nation without religion is like a body without a soul. What profound patriotism animates those men who unite in their breasts these two holy and sublime affections! See the Maccabees in the presence of the king of Syria. They say, 'It is better to perish with our arms in our hands, than to be witnesses of the desecration of the temple. For themselves, for their families, they would have been resigned to endure everything with the courage of martyrs, but once their altars come into question, and see how they rush enthusiastically to arms and how they joyously perish on the field of battle!'"

The Franciscan did not miss his opportunity of making a personal appeal, or of putting an illustration which would strike his hearers on a very sensitive side. That sad event in Africa, though not very recent, was still fresh to the Italian mind. In her ambitious colonization movements in Abyssinia, Italy had aroused the jealousy of the native ruler, and an encounter had taken place in January, 1887, near Dogali, between an Italian force and a largely superior native force, which resulted in the slaughter of almost all the men engaged on the Italian side. The preacher made a point of this occurrence, alluding to it in the following words:—

"And how can I stand silent and say nothing of those young men who, away from their native soil, have fallen there on the inhospitable sands of Africa? Poor heroes! yes, martyrs! Penned

in by a swarm of enemies, valiantly resisting, they passed along from hand to hand the national banner, never ceasing to struggle, until, overpowered, — not vanquished, — they fall in their ranks on that soil consecrated by their sublime heroism. I put the question to you, Were these soldiers atheists? Ask their mothers, ask their sisters, ask the towns and the villages who accorded them stately burials. They will every one of them tell you that they were Catholics, and that their bloody banner bore upon it these words: *Religione e Patria.*"

Among the noticeable general characteristics of Agostino da Montefeltro's manner are his earnestness, and his apparent willingness to grapple with intellectual questions on intellectual grounds. There is no doubt that he is accepted by his audiences as an intellectual force, that they view him as a man with a powerful and a trained mind. His manner is certainly forcible, and while there is no display of learning, there are things here and there which reveal some of the lines of his mental training. Occasionally, he brings a paragraph from the pages of scholastic philosophy to the front, permits himself to momentarily bewilder his hearers with talk about entities, about essential, communicated, and contingent existences, but of such talk there is little, hardly more than enough to give a suggestion of one branch of his reading. He himself says in one place, "*Le teorie astratte non provvedono ad alcuno dei bisogni del popolo,*" "Abstract theories do not meet any popular need." That his acquaintance with literature — not simply with the literature of his own church, but with literature in general — is wide, is indicated by plentiful quotations. Or if he has not read extensively, he has at least taken considerable pains to memorize a large variety of sayings of different authors. Human wisdom or unwisdom, religious or irreligious, very frequently furnishes him something to give point to one of his sentences or add a corroborative voice to his own arguments. There are not only to be found quotations from almost all the Latin and Greek classic authors, but from De Tocqueville, Lacordaire, Bossuet, Prudhomme, Fénelon, Guizot, Thiers, Littré, Blanc, Jules Simon, Victor Hugo, Renan, Strauss, Goethe, Kant, Bacon, Milton, Byron, and others. An acquaintance with the masterpieces of art is native to the Italian, and that he should have found occasional references to the works of Raphael and Michael Angelo useful in addressing his Roman audiences is not a matter for surprise.

How earnest and how serious must have been his manner appears clearly enough from the way in which his sermons read, and

it does not need the testimony of witnesses to make us see how large an element of his power must have lain in this. An indication of the seriousness and earnestness of his manner is found in the extemporaneous prayers which occur here and there in his sermons, not separated from the thread of them, but in most cases a continuation in another form of the same thought which he has been developing. Such a prayer appears in the sermon on Hope, another in the sermon on Incredulity; and still another at the close of the sermon on the Passion, in connection with the passage, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." He occasionally also prefaces his sermon proper with a short prayer, inserted after the introduction or statement of what his topic is to be. Some of these prayers are the following: —

"Jesus, divine master, the substance of truth and of love, breathe this love and this truth into my words. Give to them the sacred power of grace. Kindle in our hearts the warmth of this love, that the seeds of truth sown in us in baptism may germinate, unfold, and make us holy."

"*Dio mio*, give me words to-day which shall have power to transfer to others my own most living faith. Give me words full of that grace which subjugates the heart."

"O Hope, celestial daughter of God, the comfort of those in tribulation, the friend of the unfortunate, the sister of outcasts, the support of the weak, the consolation of the dying, the protectress of the tomb, forsake us not. Be ever the light of our hearts, the guide of our steps, the norm of our actions; that when we have passed with calm resignation through earthly trouble, we may merit a crown in that other life, set before us as our journey's end."

"*Tu Gesu*, . . . bless our country, — our country which we long to save, which we long to restore to thee. Save her from the divisions of factions. Make her respected. Grant that she may respond to her glorious traditions. Bless him whose duty it is by his high office to lead her in the way of truth and in the way of justice. Bless those who with him coöperate to govern our country. Illumine them, O Jesus, and make them realize that without faith and without religion our country cannot be prosperous or great."

"*Dio mio*, give to this land of ours so many devoted Catholics that their efforts may avail to bring back to thy bosom our brothers who are without religion. Abide with us and with them. Make thyself known to us as at Emmaus to thy disciples, whose darkened vision was illumined at the breaking of the bread of life, sublime symbol of thy love. To-day the clouds hang low upon the earth. Shine thou, O sun of justice, of truth, of love, and let none escape thy beneficent radiance."

"Saviour of men! Compass in us thy promise, draw us to thyself. If there is among my brothers here any one who is without love for thee, who is deaf to thy entreaties, who despising thy example nurses hatreds and rancors in his heart, who is held in the bond of his passions, work this thy miracle upon him. Convert him to thy love. May no one have heard in vain to-day the story of thy Passion. May no one steel his heart against thy affection. May there be no one who would not esteem himself happy to bear his cross after thee."

It would be a mistake to imagine that Agostino da Montefeltro is in any respect a Protestant, or that the doctrine which he preaches is in any respect anti-Catholic doctrine. To those sermons in which he declares and justifies the beliefs which all of the Christian faith have in common, he adds others in which he advances the beliefs which are peculiar to his own church. Such praise as is accorded to him by any one viewing him from the Protestant standpoint must be accorded with the consciousness that the reader of the sermons is liable to come upon doctrinal matter which will be repugnant to him. To be entirely fair, to give him all that is his due in speaking of him as a Catholic, it should be mentioned that he shows in all that he says a broad liberality which did not belong to the mediæval church, and which is not generally considered as characteristic of his church to-day. But so far as I know what Catholic doctrines are, I think he raises his voice in defense of them all. The right of the church to control scientific research is, among other things, touched upon, and one more argument is made in the famous case of Galileo which may be read with a certain curiosity by any one interested to know the latest form of the church's apology. His position, as he would have it understood, apparently is that any opposition to the scientific spirit *per se*, any desire or intent to generally bridle scientific investigation, is not to be predicated of the church,

and that doctrinal authority enters to utter its word only when science undertakes to lead its followers into an abyss. It is to his mind a practical instance of science falling into the "abyss" when it says to men, "Your derivation is in a direct line from the brute." In other connections, the preacher pronounces himself very emphatically for intellectual liberty, and what he says is so strongly said as to appear to be a part of his native belief. Words like the following seem to have the ring of genuine conviction about them : —

"But the true language of the age is that God in the rule of liberty and justice wishes liberty for all. It is God who illumines your intelligence, and He does not fear to have you consult nature with it. It is God who opens the road to wisdom, and He has no fear that you will by its aid lay bare his secrets of creation."

"*Signori*, the first law of the human soul, yes, the essence of the human soul, is liberty. The human soul is essentially free, and knows no other limitation than truth, and this does not restrain its liberty, it does not assail it, but it elevates it, secures it, since it is precisely to create truth that man is given liberty. How, then, could faith encroach upon this privilege of man which is liberty?"

What this preacher would say, if asked directly and unqualifiedly what he thought of people who undertook to lead the Christian life outside the pale of his church, does not appear, but apparently he does not consider the non-Catholic countries "lost." Photius, he says, succeeded in separating the East from the church, but not in canceling the image of Christ from the hearts of the people." "Luther succeeded in breaking the bond which bound the peoples of the West, but the spirit of Christ does not cease for all that to impart its vivifying power to the people of Germany." Of England, he says, that while Henry the Eighth made trouble for that country by schism and false doctrine, "nevertheless over that powerful nation reigns still the divine nature of Jesus." When he approaches directly the subject of tolerance, his words are such as to indicate that the spirit which promoted the inquisition is completely dead in his own heart at least. He considers tolerance in three different aspects.

"There are three sorts of tolerance, civil, personal, and dogmatic. It is needless to discuss civil tolerance. The church has spoken of that. 'Personal tolerance' signifies hostility to doctrinal error, but love for the person, or rather it signifies opposi-

tion to the unbelief out of love for the unbeliever, and that is the true science of our church and our religion. The church, like the civil state, would of right be entitled to put down its persecutors, but it loves affection more than strict right, it loves the existence of its children more than it does its own life, and we cannot reproach the church for the blood shed if sometimes this maxim had false interpretation. . . . The church said to her apostles, do not be executioners, but be yourselves victims. She produces her influence on the human mind through persuasion and not by brute force. And if there is blood to be shed in the conversion of the peoples, she will make holocaust of her own. It is the gentle Lamb which has triumphed over the world, not the Lion of Judah.

And now in what does "doctrinal tolerance" consist? Does it consist in placing upon the same altar Jupiter, Confucius, Mohammed, Christ? But that is a total denial of religion! It is not tolerance at all, it is hypocrisy, — any such pretended respect for all religions. . . . If we cannot shut ourselves up in indifference touching the social questions which agitate the heart of society, how can we remain non-caring in that which touches religion? . . . Repugnance to that sort of "doctrinal tolerance" shall lead you to embrace the truth, the truth in its entirety and totality, the truth which does not yield, which cannot stand side by side with error. . . . Your love of "personal tolerance" shall lead you to be charitable with that charity which binds you to your brothers, which reveals to your eyes in the perverted man not what he is, but the angel into which he may be transformed."

The likeness between Agostino da Montefeltro and Savonarola does not extend much further than that both are Italian monks with a conviction of a vocation and the gift of unusual eloquence. The Franciscan is in sentiment a modern, while Savonarola, even in the fifteenth century, presented a figure much more closely allied to that of an Old Testament prophet than to any of the religious types of his time. Savonarola's claim to the power of prophetic utterance — his belief that he was a voice from heaven declaring what should presently be upon this earth — is the most characteristic side of the man, because it separated him the most from the rest of his own world. Agostino da Montefeltro, so far as I discover, does not assume to read the vision of the future, except as all men do in the light of the present. Neither is he denunciatory in his manner. He does not deal in fulminations. Christianity, in its general aspect and in his particular phase of

it, is to be demonstrated in the light of reason as a rational thing, and apparently he would be glad to succeed in showing it also to be a beautiful thing. The mediæval Florentine preacher saw evil not only rampant everywhere in society, but rampant in the church itself. He felt it to be his duty to denounce the iniquity which degraded the priestly and the papal office, and did denounce it, obtaining as a natural result the hostility of the church toward himself. So far as appears from what he says, Agostino da Montefeltro does not feel it to be his mission to improve his church. Either it is his idea that the "army" is all right, or he gives no thought to it, and devotes his energies to attacking the enemy as being the more obvious duty and the one nearer at hand. Animated as he seems to be by this principle of action, there is little danger that he will be made the object of persecution from within the church.

But if safe from persecution within the church, he has not wholly escaped some trying experiences at the hands of his fellow-citizens. If not to persecution, he has at least been subjected to certain indignities by them, and has also been made to feel that his mission was in fact viewed as he sometimes said the preacher's mission was viewed in this nineteenth century, namely, as an attempt to move the world backward, as an attempt to bridle liberty of thought and scientific progress, as an attempt to re-create the condition of society which persecuted Giordano Bruno. On the 17th of March, 1889, in Rome, an ecclesiastic, taken for the Franciscan preacher, was assaulted by some one in the street who, it was thought, did it as a means of expressing his opinion of the man and his crusade. On the 19th of March a similar attack was made, which reached the man for whom it was intended. When the carriage which was taking the preacher and another person from the college of San Antonio to the church of San Carlo reached the foot of the Via Merulana, toward the church of Santa Maria Maggiore, an individual who stood there waiting for it to come up threw a large stone against the glass door panel, shattering the glass, and followed the stone with a bucket of some offensive compound which covered the clothing of the occupants and the upholstery of the carriage. The Franciscan also received a slight wound from the broken glass. An opposition, which is supposed to have been animated by the same motives, gathered during the preaching in the street before the church, and greeted the preacher when he appeared with cries of *Viva Giordano Bruno*. It was stated that on one day, the 29th

of March, the preacher delayed his departure from the church for some time for fear that his appearance might lead to a conflict with possibly serious results (*far nascere un parapiglio che sarebbe potuto divenire sanguinoso*). The boldest act of those who chose to antagonize him took place on Sunday, the 31st of March, when during the sermon in the crowded church a bomb was exploded behind the altar. No one was injured, and the mischief makers probably did not intend that any one should be, by the explosion of the bomb itself; but if a panic had ensued, the consequences might have been grave. Some complaints had been made before this of the indifference of the authorities to the assaults upon the preacher, and to the street disturbances. On this Sunday the situation was thought to call for the interposition of the strong hand. Troops were sent to the Piazza di San Carlo. They formed in a square about the entrance to the church, and under shelter of the bayonets the congregation dispersed without further trouble.

What shall be said of exhibitions of this kind? Certainly they are very much to be deprecated. That opposition to any man or any movement should ever take the form of personal assault is something which the prevailing sense of sober-minded men would pronounce to be pitiable anywhere. We rather congratulate ourselves that a preacher of this man's stamp would not be apt to meet such treatment on this side of the Atlantic, though millions would differ from him in opinion. That there is a liability to outbreaks of this sort in Rome, outbreaks of an opposition which is in its animus an opposition to religion, is something which would probably be learned by most Americans with surprise.

A. R. Willard.

BOSTON, MASS.

PROFESSOR ALLEN'S "JONATHAN EDWARDS,"
WITH EXTRACTS FROM COPIES OF UNPUBLISHED
MANUSCRIPTS.¹

PROFESSOR ALLEN'S "Jonathan Edwards" takes rank with the ablest books of its class; we do not recall any that is more stimulating and fascinating. It tells, indeed, nothing new concern-

¹ American Religious Leaders: *Jonathan Edwards*. By Alexander V. G. Allen, D. D., Professor in the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Mass. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.; The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1889.

ing the outward facts of Edwards's life, and makes no use of unpublished manuscripts, yet never before has his majestic personality been more vividly depicted, or his career and influence so broadly and firmly outlined. The success of the book, as a portraiture of Edwards, lies in the literary skill with which its chosen method is followed. Throughout, the man is studied as revealed in his successive works, and his works are interpreted through the man and his times. Both, also, are set in the perspective of history, and estimated according to their place in its development; and though the standard of judgment which is applied is gained from the modern point of view, it is no less the result of studies that have followed with careful observation the whole movement of Christian theology. It is safe to say that this interpretation of Edwards could only have been written by one capable of producing such a work as "*The Continuity of Christian Thought.*"

It is an interesting and noteworthy fact that, within a century and a half from the sudden and (to human view) premature closing of his earthly career, Edwards's works demand an interpreter. We are reminded at once how far from him and his age the world has moved in so short a time, and yet how important he is for us, how much we owe to him, and how much he has yet to give. Of only the greater, or rather the greatest, minds is such repeated interpretation called for. The smaller explain themselves, or have nothing to say. Not only divine prophecy has "springing and germinant accomplishment," to use Lord Bacon's phrase, but all profound thought and full and genuine spiritual life. Interpretation is the revivification of life in its appointed vernal season. The commentator may be a Dryasdust, he should be a reproducer and creator. It is matter for congratulation that Edwards's latest interpreter is endowed for the task, lacking neither in spiritual sympathy nor philosophical grasp.

Professor Allen finds not a few contradictions in Edwards's thought, traces of by-ways, points where there were mental struggles and confusions, changes and stages of opinion, — more, we think, than can be verified. Yet of what leader in the apprehension of Christian doctrine, or indeed in any realm of the spirit, in music, philosophy, science, is not such a record to some extent true? Consistency may be gained at the expense of truth, as clearness by shallowness. If Platonism were a wholly self-consistent system, it would never have charmed the centuries as it has, nor required ever-new exposition. Athanasius is no less awed by the baffling mystery, than resolute in the confession, of "the

Consubstantial." Augustine's contradictions are not eliminated by his "Retractions." "Consistent Calvinists" are not heard of for long after Calvin. Edwards is to-day a living power; Hopkinsianism, Emmonsism, Edwardeanism even, are outlived. "The Origin of Species" has proved to be an epoch-making book; Darwinism is but one camp, among others, and may be struck at the next daybreak. All great movements in the spiritual realm are fraught with manifold seeming inconsistencies; the system-makers who make all things clear and simple come after, and when their work is done there is need of a new prophet.

Usually his voice is heard amid tumult and alarm. He is deemed a disturber, an innovator, a stirrer-up of strife, and so his thoughts are worked out under the stress of controversy, though their origin is far different; and what he leaves to be commented on is not a perfected system, but a polemic, or a treatise on some single doctrine, — an "*Adversus Hæreses*," or "Orations against the Arians," or a tract on "The Freedom of a Christian Man." The system-makers come in the days of peace. They have their work to do, and we would not disparage it; but it is noteworthy and suggestive that it is not the systems as completed that live and call for ever-new interpreters, but the man who was ever greater than his system and never completed one, who was ever struggling to find the truth and to apply it, and who saw more than he could tell. So is it with the writings of Edwards: they have a centre and are parts of a system, but he wrote no *Summa theologiæ*. His own account, near the close of his life, of his method and aim in study is much more than a personal revelation: it is a philosophy of dogmatics in its deepest laws and truest aims, — the unwearying pursuit of every clue to truth, resistance of error with the heart as well as the head, the zeal of a reformer with the patience of a scholar; at length through toil and conflict the vision of a "great work, . . . a body of divinity in an entire new method" from the scholastic, in a historic, that is a vital and ever-renewing form; a synthesis of ideas and events having its unity in Him who is not only the Beginning and the End, but the ever-abiding Divine Presence in the evolution of doctrine as in the unfolding of life. Edwards was a teacher of truth who wrought in the Spirit — human, imperfect, fragmentary in achievement; his opinions upon many subjects are superseded; yet his testimony survives, and men drink and are refreshed at the fountains he opened, even as he passed through many a sterile waste of the Arminian and Deistic conceptions of God.

Professor Allen's interpretation confirms that put upon Edwards's thought by Dr. Henry B. Smith when he wrote: "The central idea of his system is that of spiritual life (holy love) as the gift of divine grace." Unfortunately, this was not the point of view from which his writings a generation ago were most studied, and for this reason, in no small degree, they had begun to fall into comparative neglect. Men in training for the Christian ministry were expected to be familiar with the "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will," but not with the sermons on "A Divine and Supernatural Light immediately imparted to the Soul by the Spirit of God" and on "Justification by Faith Alone," nor with the "Treatise on Religious Affections." One of the special services of Professor Allen's book will be, we trust, to turn attention anew to the sermon first named, and to the work on the Affections, and for such a perusal his excellent suggestions and cautions afford a needed introduction. Like the *De Imitatione Christi*, Edwards's delineation of the spiritual life is not for neophytes; it needs to be accompanied with a better presentation of the true relations of the natural to the spiritual.

Since Edwards, though a systematic thinker, left no system of theology, but only fragmentary discussions, or special treatises, which, however elaborate, never attempt more than is required for their particular purpose, and since these works were mostly occasioned by the exigencies of controversy or of practical religious instruction, it is imperative that his writings be interpreted from this point of view. Such a sermon, for instance, as that on "God's Sovereignty" cannot be justly accepted as expressive of his full conception of this theme. Many of his most important contributions to theology — the essay, for instance, on "The End for which God created the World" — were never revised by him for publication. Two volumes were edited by his son from fragmentary observations, some of them written at intervals as wide apart as the extremes of their author's ministerial life.

Professor Allen has recognized this feature of the writings with which he has to deal. Observing their chronological succession so far as this could be learned from the published works, he has traced to some extent the genesis and inner connections of Edwards's thought. The study is a fruitful one. It is conducted with subtle power and remarkable insight; it needs, however, at several points, as Professor Allen discerns, to be aided by a fresh examination of the unpublished manuscripts. It is our purpose in the remainder of this article to offer some suggestions upon one or

more of these points, aided by copies of very many of these manuscripts prepared under the direction of Rev. Sereno E. Dwight, D. D., in connection with his edition of "The Works of President Edwards."

One point in Edwards's teaching, which is made very prominent by Professor Allen, is his conception of Divine Sovereignty as the unconditioned, arbitrary will of God. The unpublished Observations, to our mind, put this conception in a somewhat softened light, give it a different accent. The same doctrine, indeed, that appears in the sermon on "God's Sovereignty" is to be found in the manuscripts. But it meets us there more in its principle and grounds, less in its immediate use as a motive-power to the "Great Awakening." Nothing is more marked among Edwards's characteristics than the firmness, tenacity, persistence of his purpose. If he is chasing a fallacy, he hunts it, as one has said, out of the world. So, if he is tracking and pursuing a sin, he drives it from every refuge, and consistently with his fundamental principle that being is everything, he makes no distinction between the sin and the sinner who commits it. Men have learned that his premises were too narrow, but what we wish now to say is, they were too narrow for Edwards himself. When he is not intent upon certain practical results, when he is less moved by the thought that he is an ambassador for the King of kings and must assert his Master's prerogatives unconditionally, his conception of sovereignty is more ethical and complete. We would not, however, make too much of this, for the same qualification, we think, is required by passages in his published writings. The will of God meant to Edwards the pity, the mercy, the affection, all that psychology includes under "the sensibilities," as well as the divine choice and purpose. God's "mere" pleasure or arbitrary decree did not signify a choice without reason, or a purpose without wisdom, or justice, or benevolence, but just the contrary; it was the good pleasure of a Being infinitely cognizant of all excellence and purposeful to maintain it. It included a divine control of that which seemed contrary and hostile to good, of the one ultimate evil; it assured the inevitable subjection of a seemingly uncontrolled lawlessness to a law which had in it the power of an infinite personal will. There can be no question that the presentation of the subject was in many respects misleading and unfortunate. Man the sinner and man the creature were hopelessly confused. His responsibility filled the compass of thought, his fall and corruption darkened the whole natural horizon. No distinctly conscious

thought appears of the larger and encompassing reality that man, though sinful, is still the child of God, that his history is an evolution, that his finiteness and weakness and need of guidance are as real as his sin; that there is a divine education of the race and of the individual as well as a moral probation; and that the Son of man is the appointed Head of humanity in both relations. But if Edwards here was narrow in his view, it is not breadth simply to see the truth he failed to discern. Kant teaches as radical a doctrine of depravity as Edwards. The latter's fundamental postulate cannot be shaken, — the universality of sin. Jesus teaches that man's greatest need is not guidance but recovery, not truth but life.

But not to digress too far, how do the unpublished manuscripts, to confine ourselves to their testimony, qualify the representation that Edwards's leading theological principle was that of arbitrary sovereignty, that his practical thought of God was absorbed in the conception of an immanent and unconditioned Will?

It must be acknowledged that in one passage, at least, there is an unqualified application of Edwards's idealistic philosophy to that which is most personal in human life. Edwards wrote, some years, if we mistake not, before he preached his famous Boston sermon on "God Glorified in Man's Dependence," these words: "An inclination is nothing but God's influencing the soul according to a certain law of nature." By this time, and probably long before, he had worked out his doctrine of original sin, with its tremendous inferences as to man's moral darkness, helplessness, and culpability. Indeed, the speculation respecting identity with Adam is to be found in an *Observation* written not much later, perhaps earlier, than his licensure (1722). Professor Allen's speculation as to the ultimate motive of the sermon on Dependence (pp. 63, 64) is also, I think, strikingly confirmed. For in another of Edwards's very early *Observations* we discern the recoil of his soul as he came from the mount with shining face, and saw men given over to idolatries. "Now the rectitude of human nature and of rational beings," he remarks, "most certainly is that they should be most highly affected with the highest excellencies and less affected with lower excellencies; that the mind should have the sweetest taste and most quick and exquisite delight of those things that are truly most delightful, and a lower delight and slower relish of those things that in themselves are less delightful; that the things that are most beautiful and amiable, as soon as ever they are seen, should most ravish the eye, and those things which are

less beautiful should less please the sight ; that men should have the quickest and easiest, highest and most delightful, perception of that which is best, and the slowest and dullest perception of that which is less good. This is the rectitude of human nature, and thus human nature once was ; or else most certainly human nature proceeded from God an inconsistent, self-repugnant, and contradictory thing. But we know, as well as we know that we have being, that this rectitude is not the present state of human nature." Here is the deepest root of Edwards's dark doctrine of human nature. It suggests, also, the inmost meaning to him of the divine sovereignty. Not Spinozism and Augustinianism, we conceive, were here the poles of his thought, but the brightness and fullness of the divine excellence, the consequent and contrasted sinfulness and guilt of men.

We are already far on the way to a recognition that the divine to Edwards was not ultimately an unconditioned and arbitrary will. It should, however, be observed that Edwards had not merely a general doctrine of the divine sovereignty, but a very special and Calvinistic one, that of a permission of sin which made it a part of a divine purpose that insured its certainty, and controlled it by the method of election and preterition. Edwards never tires of presenting this conception or aspect of arbitrary sovereignty. Here, it is claimed, appears in full evidence a cardinal principle of his theology, and this principle is the all-determining will of God. The unpublished *Observations* show no change of front here. Yet the conclusion which is claimed is not thereby justified. These acts of sovereignty are parts of a larger scheme, acts in a greater drama. His doctrine of election can only be understood in its connection with his conception of theology as a "History of the Work of Redemption, . . . considering the affair of Christian Theology, as the whole of it, in each part, stands in reference to the great work of redemption by Jesus Christ." We have said that he wrote in fragments ; what is now quoted shows that he knew this, and it imposes a special obligation on his interpreters. We do not believe that were he now living he would maintain unadjusted and unchanged his exact doctrine of election ; but we are equally clear that it was not a theory which gave supremacy to the mere will of God. The evidence of this will appear when we consider what he writes of the End of God in Creation, and of the Trinity. Before proceeding to this we may, though the limits of our space preclude our entering far into the intricacies of this subject, touch upon incidental proofs that he did not thus centralize his thought in the divine Will.

In one of his Observations, he says: "It hardly seems to me true to say that the command of God is the prime ground of all the duty we owe to God. Obedience is but one part of the duty we owe to God. . . . Our obligation to obedience is not the prime ground of our duty to love Him and honor Him. But on the contrary, our obligation to love and honor God, and to exercise a supreme regard to God, is the very proper ground of our obligation to obey. . . . There is something prior to God's command, that is the ground and reason why his command obliges." If the will of God were to Edwards supreme, objective fact, obedience would be to him the supreme and all-inclusive duty. The reverse is true.

This accords with the preëminence he gives to Faith. Dr. Allen has elucidated the theological significance of Edwards's masterly sermon on "Justification by Faith Only." His unpublished Observations show that the subject was much on his mind and heart, and the central position in the recovery and spiritual life of men which he assigned to Faith.¹

The unpublished papers shed light on his use of the word "arbitrary." Discussing the question, whether his contention that there is a natural fitness in faith's being the condition or method of receiving salvation does not militate against the doctrine that salvation is an arbitrary divine bestowment, he says that the phrase, "God's arbitrary constitution," is commonly used to denote that "God still remains absolutely at liberty from any such thing as we call obligation, or any indebtedness to men, to fix one way and not another." He further contends that the "arbitrary constitution" by which faith is required is seen by reason to be suitable, and to reveal the divine wisdom, and asks, "When reason shows us that the things which God does have a

¹ In one respect, Dr. Allen's exposition of Edwards's sermon seems to require qualification, namely, the ascription to Edwards of "silence" respecting Christ's organic union with the believer, and the explanation of this supposed silence. Edwards does not insist on the mystical word "union;" he will accept for his purpose the word "relation." Nevertheless, he says distinctly, "What is real in the union between Christ and his people is the foundation of what is legal." I find that he — previously, I infer — wrote these exact words in his note-book. They are his most deliberate utterance, first (apparently) committed to his private Observations, then copied into a sermon, then published, — each his own act. As to the explanation, — apart from there being, as I conceive, no fact which requires the supposition that "he saw no inward significance" in Christ's organic relation to a redeemed humanity, — I think that it will appear that he discerned this, though under rigid limitations.

suitableness in their own nature, is it absurd for us to suppose that God does them because it is suitable and wise?" And again, in a later Observation, he affirms that if the phrase, "arbitrary constitution," means a constitution without divine wisdom, and if faith is said to be required "only because it was his [God's] pleasure to appoint this to be a requisite," the assertion is "absurd." Still another meaning of "arbitrary" appears in other Observations, where it signifies "bound to no knowable law," above "the course of his [the Spirit's] ordinary dispensation;" "not confined to certain unalterable rules and laws in all circumstances, but acts done more in the manner of intelligent, voluntary creatures, and more directly showing the will and arbitrament of the Governor," — "done in the most general proportion, not tied to any particular proportion." An arbitrary will to Edwards meant a supreme will, but one acting "in the most general proportion," that is, guided by an absolute wisdom. The phrase emphasizes also the divine personality as over against particular instituted laws. Grace, as Dr. Allen observes, is with Edwards something personal; it is God himself. So is sovereignty, and the word "arbitrary" emphasizes this to his mind. Sovereignty is one aspect of Infinite Excellence viewed as personal. "There is no gift or benefit," he says, "that is so much in God, that is so much of himself, of his nature, that is so much a communication of the Deity, as grace is. . . . As this will show why God will bestow this good more immediately and directly, so also why He will specially exercise and manifest his sovereignty and free pleasure in bestowing of this gift. *God's grace is eminently his own.*" We touch here the deepest chord that vibrates in Edwards's doctrine of sovereignty, and we are not surprised to hear him say of free grace, that it is a manifestation "of a loving and good nature;" and of the divine love, that it "is the sum of all the exercises of the divine will."

Edwards's doctrine of divine arbitrariness has another relation, already suggested, but deserving more particular attention. In a paper written in his later years, certainly not prior to 1754, and probably a year or two afterwards, he notices that "the late discoveries and advances which have been made in natural philosophy" compel "all men of sense, who are also men of learning," to admit "a present immediate operation of God on the creation." Yet, he further observes, many who concede such divine action suppose it to be invariably limited by what are called "laws of nature," by which Edwards understands especially the laws of

matter and motion. Edwards claims that such restricted immediate action of God is impossible without a prior operation which he calls "arbitrary," not as being without wisdom, but as having the freedom and fullness of plenary wisdom. "It is the glory of God," he says, "that He is an arbitrary Being; that originally He in all things acts as being limited and directed in nothing but his own wisdom, tied to no other rules and laws but the directions of his own infinite understanding." Following this thought, he almost breaks over the bounds of his own determinism, claiming that in man there is an image of the divine freedom, "a secondary and dependent arbitrariness." He contends that the higher we ascend in the scale of beings, the more do we find evidence of God's "arbitrary influence." There is something more in the lowest forms of existence than the laws of matter and motion. Plants, in their rising gradations, show distinct laws; animals, something "more singular" and "nearer akin to an arbitrary influence;" the mind of man, and preëminently his spiritual faculties, the angels "who always behold the face of the Father which is in heaven and constantly receive his commands on every occasion," above all, the man Christ Jesus, "who is united personally to the Godhead," evince the possibility and reality of a divine operation superior to any action that is wholly conditioned by natural laws. We cannot enlarge at this point, but enough has been said to show something of the scope of his conception. The word "arbitrary," as he uses it, covers all that theology has included under the term "supernatural." Granted that the natural is too much depreciated, especially its religious significance, and that the word "arbitrary" is a most unfortunate one, the grandeur of Edwards's thought is still apparent. Originally and ultimately, everywhere and always, the only real law in which intelligence can rest is "the law of the infinite wisdom of the omniscient first cause." Man is not dependent now for divine knowledge solely on natural media, but has access to God and God to him, and he may anticipate a yet higher freedom of intercourse when knowledge will flow to him far more directly and fully from the "head of the universe and . . . the fountain and first spring of all." Not only against a Deistic conception of natural laws, but equally against an overestimate of them as a divine revelation, Edwards's doctrine of arbitrariness is a permanent protest from a mind capable of the highest achievements in science. We do not believe that in this regard the wonderful disclosures it has made since his day, if he could have foreseen them, would have altered

his position a hair's-breadth. Still, in the realm of pure and high intelligence, there is no necessary law but "the infinite wisdom of the omniscient first cause," nor, however vast the range of the finite, can it ever satiate the thirst of the soul for the living God.

All this prepares for what we find in Edwards's discussion of the End of God in Creation. His comments on this subject, like those on Justification and the Trinity, run through his ministry. If not too presumptuous, we would venture the opinion that, next to his vindication of the immediateness of the spiritual life, his greatest contribution to theology will prove to be his "Dissertation on the End for which God created the World." It is a posthumous and we may suspect an unfinished work, and we may therefore with the more freedom connect with it discussions found among his private papers. Its right understanding, or rather a just appreciation of Edwards's whole thought on this theme, is indispensable to a correct interpretation of his doctrine of God's sovereignty. We can here but touch upon aspects of his thought which are fitted to qualify criticisms that have been passed, particularly that his representation enthrones over the universe "an infinite and celestial selfishness," and that, through his failure to appreciate the divine Sonship of our Lord and "the Christian Trinity," he was left in philosophical bewilderment whether he should turn to "an eternal Christ" or "an eternal creation," and how he could utterly renounce the Deistic conception of God, and yet save himself from pantheism.

In the period before his ordination (1727), or in the earliest years at Northampton, Edwards wrote a number of Observations, some immediately consecutive, all in apparently rapid succession, from which, using the copies to which reference has been made, we will now make extracts in the order of their production.

"Happiness. It is evident that the end of man's creation must needs be happiness from the motive of God's creating the world, which could be nothing else but his goodness. If it be said that the end of man might be that he might manifest his power, wisdom, holiness, and justice; so I say too; but the question is, Why God would make known his power, wisdom, etc.; what could move Him to will that there should be some beings that might know his power and wisdom? It could be nothing else but his goodness."

"Name of the Lord. The children of Israel used to speak of the Name of the Lord in a manner to us very unintelligible. They used to attribute those things to it of which a name merely is not capable, but only Persons or Distinct Beings. Thus they spake of it as what they trusted in; as what delivered them and defended them. . . . They seem frequently to have meant, by the Name of the Lord, the sensible manifestations of his presence. . . . Though

they spake of the Name of God as if it had been God himself, they yet also spake of it as if it had been another Person, and made a distinction between the Lord and the Name of the Lord. The Name of the Lord was He who most immediately appeared in the Temple and is the only Redeemer of God's Israel, and who manifested and declared God the Father all along from the beginning ; who was the *Shechinah*, in whom they trusted, and *for whose sake* they desired that their prayers might be answered."¹

"*Justice of God.* It appears plain enough that an Omnipotent and Omniscient Being can have no desire of being unjust for his own advantage ; because He can so easily bring about all his ends without it. But this appears beyond all objection, if we consider the Nature of Excellency, which is *beings' consent to entity*, and we have shown that this must necessarily be consentaneous or agreeable to perceiving being ; and that the contrary contradiction, *dissent to entity*, must necessarily be disagreeable to it. Hence it follows that all excellency, when perceived, will be agreeable to perceiving beings ; and all evil disagreeable. But God, being Omniscient, must necessarily perceive all excellency, and fully know what is contrary to it, and therefore all excellency is perfectly agreeable to his will, and all evil perfectly disagreeable ; and therefore He cannot will to do anything but what is excellent. But justice is excellency."

"*Trinity.*² There has been much cry of late against saying one word, particularly about the Trinity, but what the Scripture has said, judging it impossible but that, if we did, we should err in a thing so much above us. But if they call that which necessarily results from the putting of reason and Scripture together, though it has not been said in Scripture in express words, I say if they call this, not said in the Scriptures, I am not afraid to say twenty things about the Trinity which the Scripture never said. . . .

"I think that it is within the reach of naked reason to perceive certainly that there are three, distinct, in God, each of which is the same, three that must be distinct ; and that there are not, nor can be any more, distinct, really and truly distinct, but three. . . . It is often said that God is infinitely happy, from all eternity, in the view and enjoyment of himself, in the reflection and inverse love of his own essence, that is, in the perfect idea He has of himself — infinitely perfect. The Almighty's knowledge is not so different from ours but that ours is the image of it. It is by an idea as ours is, only it is infinitely perfect. . . . An absolutely perfect idea of a thing is the very thing, for it wants nothing that is in the thing ; substance or nothing else. . . . Whatsoever is perfectly and absolutely like a thing, is that thing ; but God's idea is absolutely perfect. I will form my reasoning thus : If nothing has any existence any way at all but in some consciousness or idea or other ; and therefore that things, that are in us created consciousness, have no existence but in the

¹ Cf. Dr. Allen's *Jonathan Edwards*, p. 334.

² Most and probably all of the citations I make on this subject are from Observations written from twenty to twenty-five years at least before the publication of Chevalier Ramsay's *The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion*, Glasgow, 1748-1749. From a statement of Dr. Dwight (*Life*, p. 56), and the number of this first Observation on the Trinity printed above, it would be inferred that it was written before Edwards was nineteen years of age. It cannot be much later.

divine idea ; or, supposing the things in this room were in the idea of none but of God, they would have existence no other way (as we have shown in Natural Philosophy) ; and if the things in this room would nevertheless be real things ; then God's idea, being a perfect idea, is really the thing itself ; and if so, and all God's ideas are only the one idea of himself, as has been shown, then God's idea must be his essence itself, it must be a substantial idea, having all the perfection of the substance perfectly ; so that by God's reflecting on himself the Deity is begotten : there is a *Substantial Image* of God begotten. I am satisfied that though this word *begotten* had never been used in Scripture, it would have been used in this case ; there is no other word that so properly expresses it. . . .

"Again : That Image of God which God infinitely loves, and has his chief delight in, is the Perfect Idea of God. . . . But the Scriptures tell us that the Son of God is that Image of God which He infinitely loves. Nobody will deny this, that God infinitely loves his Son (John iii. 35 ; v. 20). So it was declared from heaven by the Father at his baptism and transfiguration. . . . So the Father calls Him his Elect, in whom his soul delighteth (Isa. xlii. 1). He is called 'the Beloved' (Eph. i. 6). The Son also declares that the Father's infinite happiness consisted in the enjoyment of Him (Prov. viii. 30). Now none, I suppose, will say that God enjoys infinite happiness in two manners ; one in the infinite delight He has in enjoying his Son, his Image, and another in the view of himself different from this. . . .

"There is very much of the image of this in ourselves. Man is as if he were two, as some of the great wits of this age have observed, a sort of genius is with man, that accompanies him, and attends wherever he goes, so that a man has a conversation with himself, that is, he has a conversation with his own idea ; so that, if his idea be excellent, he will take great delight and happiness in conferring and communicating with it ; he takes complacency in himself, he applauds himself ; and wicked men accuse themselves, and fight with themselves, as if they were two ; and man is truly happy then, and only then, when these two agree, and they delight in themselves, and in their own idea, their image, as God delights in his.

"The Holy Spirit is the Act of God, between the Father and the Son infinitely loving and delighting in each other. Sure I am that if the Father and the Son do infinitely delight in each other there must be an infinitely pure and perfect Act between them, an infinitely sweet energy which we call delight. This is certainly distinct from the other two ; . . . and yet it is God : the pure and perfect Act of God is God, because God is a pure Act ; . . . that which acts perfectly is all act, and nothing but act. There is an image of this in created beings that approach to perfect action ; how frequently do we say that the saints of heaven are all transformed into love, dissolved into joy, become activity itself, changed into extasy. I acknowledgo these are metaphorical in this case ; but yet it is true that the more perfect the act is, the more it resembles the infinitely perfect act of God in this respect. And I believe it will be plain to any that thinks intensely, that the perfect Act of God must be a substantial act. We say that the perfect delights of reasonable creatures are substantial delights, but the delight of God is properly a substance, yea, an infinitely perfect substance, even the essence of God. It appears, by the

Holy Scriptures, that the Holy Spirit is the perfect Act of God. The name declares it; *the Spirit of God* denotes to us the activity, vivacity, and energy of God; and it appears that the Holy Spirit is the pure act of God, and energy of the Deity by his office which is to actuate and quicken all things. . . . And if God is love, and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God and God in him, doubtless this intends principally the infinite love God has to himself, so that the Scripture has implicitly told us that that love which is between the Father and the Son, is God.¹ . . .

"It may be observed that at this rate one may prove an infinite number of persons in the godhead, for each person has an idea of the other person, . . . but you will argue that his idea must be substantial. I answer, that the Son is the Father's idea, himself; and if He has an idea of this idea, it is yet the same idea; a perfect idea of an idea is the same idea still, to all intents and purposes. . . . And if you say the Holy Spirit has an idea of the Father, I answer: The Holy Spirit is himself the delight and joyfulness of the Father in that Idea, and of that Idea in the Father. It is still the Idea of the Father; so that if we turn it all the ways in the world, we shall never be able to make more than these three; God, the idea of God, and delight in God. . . .

"I think it really evident from the light of reason that there are these three, distinct, in God. If God has an idea of himself there is really a Duplicity, because if there is no duplicity it will follow that *Jehovah* thinks of himself no more than a stone; and if God loves himself and delights in himself, there is really a Triplicity; three that cannot be confounded; each of which are (?) the Deity substantially.

"And this is the only distinction that can be found or thought of in God. If it shall be said that there are power, wisdom, goodness, and holiness in God, and that these may or will be proved to be distinct persons, because everything that is in God is God; I answer: As to the power of God, power always consists in something; the power of the mind consists in its wisdom, the power of the body in plenty of animal spirits, etc. . . . And as it is distinct from those other things it is only a relation of adequateness and sufficiency of the essence to everything. But if we distinguish it from relation, it is nothing else but the essence of God, and if we take it for that by which God exerts himself, it is no other than the Father; for the perfect energy of God with respect to himself is the most proper exertion of himself of which the creation of the world is but a shadow. As to the Wisdom of God, . . . this . . . is the same with the Son of God. And as to Goodness, the eternal exertion of the essence of that attribute is nothing but infinite Love, which . . . may be resolved into God's infinite love to himself; therefore this attribute, as it was exerted from eternity, is nothing but the Holy Spirit. . . . And as to Holiness, it is delight in excellency; it is God's highest consent to himself, or in other words his perfect delight in himself, which we have shown to be the Holy Spirit."

¹ Dr. Allen says: "It is the common mode of speech to say that God is love. It indicates some profound change in the basis of thought when the expression is reversed and it is said that love is God. But to such a mode of thinking Edwards had come. And now the qualifications of his earlier writings," etc., *op. cit.* p. 367. But it will be observed this precise reversed expression occurs in this early Observation.

We may add here that the paper quoted by Dr. Allen on pp. 355, 356, was probably written very soon after the one from which we are quoting above.

"Trinity. It appears that there must be more than a unity in infinite and eternal essence ; otherwise the goodness of God can have no perfect exercises. To be perfectly good is to incline to, and delight in, making another happy in the same proportion as it is happy itself ; that is, it delights as much in communicating happiness to another as in enjoying it himself, and is an inclination to communicate all his happiness. . . . But to no finite being can God either incline to communicate goodness so much as He inclines to be happy himself, for He cannot love a creature so much as He loves himself, neither can He communicate all his goodness to a finite being. But no absolutely perfect Being can be without absolutely perfect goodness. And no being can be perfectly happy who has not the exercise of that which He perfectly inclines to exercise ; wherefore God must have a perfect exercise of his goodness, and therefore must have the fellowship of a person equal with himself."

"End of the Creation. We have proved that the end of the creation must needs be happiness and the communication of the goodness of God ; and that nothing but the Almighty's inclination to communicate of his own happiness could be the motive to Him to create the world ; and that man or intelligent being is the immediate object of this goodness, and subject of this communicated happiness. And we have shown also that the Father's begetting of the Son is a complete communication of all his happiness, and so an eternal, adequate, and infinite exercise of perfect goodness that is completely equal to such an inclination in perfection ; why, then, did God incline further to communicate himself, seeing he had done it infinitely and completely ? Can there be an inclination to communicate goodness more than adequately to the inclination ? To say so, is to say, that to communicate goodness adequate to the inclination, is not yet adequate, inasmuch as he inclines to communicate further as in the creation of the world. To this I say, that the Son is the adequate communication of the Father's goodness, and is an express and complete image of Him. But yet the Son has also an inclination to communicate himself in an image of his person, that may partake of his happiness, and this was the end of the creation, even the communication of the happiness of the Son of God, and this was the only motive herein, even the Son's inclination to this. But God the Father is not the object of this, for the Father is not a communication of the Son, and therefore not the object of the Son's goodness ; but man, that is those of them that are holy ; as the Son says (Psalm xvi. 2, 3). It is Christ here speaks, as is evident by the following passage, and man, the consciousness or perception of the creation, is the immediate subject of this. Therefore the Church is said to be the completeness of Christ (Eph. i. 23), 'Which is his body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all.' As if Christ were not complete without the Church, as having a natural inclination thereto. We are incomplete without that which we have a natural inclination to. The man is incomplete without the woman: she is himself. . . .

"Corol. 3. Therefore the Son created and doth govern the world ; seeing that the world was a communication of Him, and seeing the communicating of his happiness is the end of the world."

"Deity. Many have wrong conceptions of the difference between the Nature of the Deity and that of Created spirits. The difference is no contrariety."

"Union Spiritual. From what insight I have into the nature of minds I am convinced that there is no guessing what kind of union and mixture by

consciousness, or otherwise, there may be between them ; so that all difficulty is removed in believing what the Scripture declares about spiritual union of the persons of the Trinity, of the two natures of Christ, of Christ and the minds of saints."

"*God.* The greatness of a soul consists not in any *extension*, but in its *comprehensiveness of idea and extendedness of operation*. So the Infiniteness of God consists in his perfect comprehension of all things, and the extendedness of operation equally to all places. . . . We ought to conceive of God as being Omnipotence, Perfect Knowledge, and Perfect Love, . . . and not as if He were a sort of unknown Thing, that we call Substance, that is extended."

"*Christian Religion.* It seems to me exceedingly congruous and in the highest manner consentaneous that a God, a being of infinite goodness and love, who, it is evident from mere reason, created the world for this very end, to make the creature happy in his love : I say it seems exceedingly congruous, that He should give to the creature the highest sort of evidence or expression of love. For why should not that love, which is infinitely higher than any other and the love of a being infinitely more excellent, of which other love is but the emanation and shadow ; why should not that love have the highest and most noble manifestations and the surest evidences ? Now we know that the highest sort of manifestations and evidence of love is *expense* for the beloved. How much soever the lover gives or communicates to the beloved, yet, if he is at no expense himself, there is not that high and noble expression of love as if otherwise. Now I can clearly and distinctly conceive how the giving of Christ should have all that in it that renders it every way an equal and like and perfectly equivalent expression of love to the greatest expense in a lover ; as I have shown elsewhere. And this is a way that is exceedingly noble and excellent and agreeable to the glorious perfections of God. But no other way can be conceived of ; and they that deny the Christian religion can pretend to no other ; and if they do it is impossible they should think of any in any measure so exalted, noble, and excellent."

"*Glory of God.* For God to glorify himself is to discover himself in his works, or to communicate himself in his works, which is all one. For we are to remember that the world exists only mentally ; so that the very being of the world implies its being perceived, or discovered. Or otherwise, for God to glorify himself, is, in his acts *ad extra*, to act worthy of himself, or to act excellently. Therefore God does not seek his own glory because it makes Him the happier to be honored and highly thought of, but because He loves to see himself, his own excellencies and glories appearing in his works. He loves to see himself communicated, and it was his inclination to communicate himself, that was a prime motive of his creating the world. His own glory was the ultimate end ; himself was his end ; that is, himself communicated."

"*End of the Creation.* It is, indeed, a condecant thing that God should be the Ultimate End of the creation, as well as the Cause ; that in creation He should make himself his end, that He should in this respect be *omega* as well as *alpha*. The Scripture saith, 'God hath made all things for himself,' and this may be, and yet the reason of his creating the world be his propensity to goodness ; and the communication of happiness to creatures be the end. It, perhaps, was thus : God created the world for his Son, that He might prepare a

spouse, or bride, for Him to bestow his love upon, so that the mutual joys between the bride and bridegroom are the end of the creation. God is really happy in loving his creatures, because in so doing He as it were glorifies a natural propensity in the divine nature, namely, goodness. Yea, and He is really delighted in the love of his creatures, and in their glorifying Him, because He loves them and not because He needs ; for He could not be happy therein, were it not for his love and goodness ; (Col. i. 16) 'All things were made by him, and for him ;' that is, for the Son."

"*Trinity.* . . . After you have in your imagination multiplied understandings and loves never so often, it will be the understanding and being of the very same essence, and you can never make more than these three : God, and the Idea of God, and the Love of God. Hereby I would not be understood to pretend to give a full explication of the Trinity ; for I think it still remains an incomprehensible mystery, the greatest and most glorious of all mysteries."

"*End of the Incarnation and Death of Christ.* The infinite love, which there is from everlasting between the Father and the Son, is the highest excellency and peculiar glory of the Deity. God saw it therefore meet, that there should be some bright and glorious manifestation made of it to the creatures ; which is done in the Incarnation and death of the Son of God. Hereby was most clearly manifested to men and angels the Distinction of the Persons of the Trinity. The infinite love of the Father to the Son is thereby manifested, in that for his sake He would forgive an infinite debt, would be reconciled with, and receive into his favor and to his enjoyment, those that had rebelled against Him and injured his infinite Majesty ; and in exalting of Him to that high mediatorial glory. And Christ showed his infinite love to the Father in his infinitely abasing himself for the vindication of his authority, and the honor of his Majesty. When God had a mind to save men, Christ infinitely laid out himself that the honor of God's majesty might be safe, and that God's glory might be advanced."

"*Holy Ghost.* It appears that the Holy Spirit is the holiness or excellency and delight of God, because our Communion with God, and with Christ, consists in our partaking of the Holy Ghost. . . . Communion with God is nothing else but a partaking with Him of his excellency, his holiness, and happiness."

"*End of Creation.* God is glorified within himself these two ways : —

"1. By appearing or being manifested to himself in his own perfect Idea, or in his Son, who is the brightness of his glory.

"2. By enjoying and delighting in himself, by flowing forth in infinite love and delight towards himself, or in his Holy Spirit.

"So God glorifies himself towards the creatures also two ways : —

"1. By appearing to them ; being manifested to their understanding.

"2. In communicating himself to their hearts, and in their rejoicing and delighting in, and enjoying, the manifestations which He makes of himself.

"They both of them may be called his glory in the more extensive sense of the word, namely, his shining forth or the going forth of his excellency, beauty, and essential glory, *ad extra*. By one way it goes forth towards their understandings, by the other it goes forth towards their wills or hearts. God is glorified not only by his glory's being seen, but by its being rejoiced in. When those that see it delight in it, God is more glorified than if they only see it.

His glory is then received by the whole soul, both by the understanding and by the heart. God made the world that He might communicate and the creature receive, his glory ; but that it might be received both by the mind and heart. He that testifies his *views* or *idea* of God's glory does not glorify God so much, as he that testifies also his *approbation* of it, and his *delight* in it. Both those ways of God's glorifying himself came from the same cause, namely, the overflowing of God's internal glory, or an inclination in God to cause his internal glory to flow out *ad extra*. What God has in view in either of them, either in his manifesting his glory to the understanding or his communication of it to the heart, is not that He may receive but that He may go forth.

"The main end of his shining forth is, not that He may have his rays reflected back to himself, but that the rays may go forth."

We have thus far given extracts from notes written by Edwards before or during the earliest years of his ministry. We will give a few more from the middle and latest periods, presenting them in chronological order.

"*End of the Creation.* There are many of the divine attributes, that, if God had not created the world, never would have had any exercise : the power of God, the Wisdom of God, the prudence and contrivance of God, the goodness and mercy and grace of God, and the justice of God. It is fit that the divine attributes should have exercise. Indeed God knew as perfectly that there were those attributes fundamentally in himself before they were in exercise as since. But as God he delights in his own excellency and glorious perfections, so he delights in the exercise of those perfections. It is true that there was from eternity that act in God *within himself*, and *towards himself*, that was the exercise of the same perfection of his nature. But it was not the same kind of exercise ; it virtually contained it, but there was not explicitly the same exercise of his perfection. God, who delights in the exercise of his own perfection, delights in all the kinds of its exercise. That eternal act or energy of the divine nature *within him*, whereby he infinitely loves and delights in himself, I suppose does imply, fundamentally, goodness and grace towards creatures, if there be that occasion which infinite wisdom sees fit. But God, who delights in his own perfection, delights in seeing those exercises of his perfection explicitly in being, that are fundamentally implied."

"*End of the Creation.* The glory of the Lord in Scripture seems to signify the excellent brightness and fulness of God, and especially as spread abroad, diffused, and as it were enlarged : or in one word the excellency of God flowing forth. This was represented in the Shechinah of old. . . . Therefore the diffusing of the sweetness and blessedness of the divine nature is God's glorifying himself, in a Scripture sense, as well as his manifesting his perfection to their understandings. The beams, that flow forth from the infinite fountain of light and life, do not only carry light, but life, with them ; and therefore this light is called the light of life, as the beams of the sun have both light and warmth, and do both enlighten and quicken, and so bless, the face of the earth.

"This twofold way of the Deity's flowing forth *ad extra*, answers to the twofold way of the Deity's proceeding *ad intra*, in the proceeding and genera-

tion of the Son, and the proceeding and breathing forth of the Holy Spirit; and indeed is only a kind of second proceeding of the same persons; their going forth *ad extra* as before they proceed *ad intra*."

"*End of the Creation.* . . . These two ways of the divine good beaming forth, are agreeable to the two ways of the divine essence flowing out or proceeding from eternity within the godhead, in the person of the Son and Holy Spirit; the one in an expression of his glory, in the idea or knowledge of it; the other, the flowing out of the essence in love and joy. It is condecant that, correspondent to these proceedings of the divinity *ad intra*, God should also flow forth *ad extra*.

"The one last end of all things may be expressed, thus: It is, that the infinite good might be communicated; that it might be communicated to, or rather in, the understanding of the creature, which communication is God's declarative glory; and that it might be communicated to the other faculty (usually, though not very expressively, called the Will), which communication is the making the creature happy in God, as a partaker of God's happiness."

"*End of the Creation. God's Glory.* . . . Although the things which God inclines to and aims at are in some respects two, namely, exercising or exerting the perfections of his nature and the effect of that [exertion], namely, communicating himself; yet these may be reduced to one, namely, God's exerting himself in order to this effect. . . . It is himself exerted, and himself communicated, and both together are what is called God's glory."

In one of his earlier Observations Edwards claims that Calvinists admit that Christ died "to give all an opportunity to be saved," and adds: "He did die for all in this sense; it is past all contradiction." And in another he breaks over the bounds of the traditional theology in these words:—

"Such thoughts as these are ready to run into our minds when we think of the death of Christ; and would enflame our hearts with a sense of our love therefrom, that we cannot certainly argue so great love of the eternal Logos from it, for the Logos felt nothing, no pain, and suffered no disgrace, but it was the Human Nature. But I answer, The Love the Human Nature had to mankind, and by which he was prompted to undergo so much, it had only by virtue of its union with the Logos; it was all derived from the love of the Logos, or else they would not be one person. Many things also might be said together with this."

Many things, certainly! And among them this. If, as indeed it was, the love of Jesus was the love of God, what must be the origin and fountain of his "enthusiasm for humanity?" In one of Edwards's later Observations the end for which the world was created is stated as in his earliest,—that the Son might have "an object for his infinite grace and love," and Christ is presented as the ground of Election, and "The Purpose which God purposed in Him" is called the "Sum of God's Decrees." In all this, however, we find no conscious modification of the tradi-

tional doctrine of Election. It is still the task of Theology, on this subject, as on others, to follow out to their legitimate conclusions principles which Edwards introduced, but failed to develop—most of all these two, that Love is God, and the end of Creation the Glory of this Love as revealed through Christ and communicated by his Spirit.

Egbert C. Smyth.

EDITORIAL.

THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF NEGROES.

THE sentiment of the North, without becoming less considerate of the freedmen, is becoming more sympathetic with the white citizens of the Southern States in respect to the relation of the two races. There is a growing appreciation of the inherent difficulties of the situation. The unfitness of large numbers of the blacks to participate in government is beginning to be realized in the North. Such an orator as the late Mr. Grady, of Georgia, is heard not only with admiration of his eloquence, but also with candid recognition of his facts, when he portrays to the leading men of Boston the intellectual deficiencies of the negro population of the South, and the dangers involved in their enjoyment of the political power to which they are legally entitled, although some of his inferences are not accepted. This is saying that the North is passing into a second, and a very sober second, thought about this vast and perplexing problem. It is seen that the Southern whites are not actuated merely by unreasoning dislike of the negroes, nor wholly by a sullen resentment because they must live in changed relations with those who were formerly their slaves, nor altogether by an obstinate unwillingness to accept the results of defeat in the conflict which ended twenty-five years ago. It is seen that those Southerners who are entirely free from such feelings, and many of those Northerners who have taken up their residence in the South, are greatly perplexed about the whole matter. It was only natural that for several years after the war the people of the North should be unsympathetic with the aversion of the South to admit negroes to a share of political power. In view of the part slavery had played in producing the war, in view of the enormous sacrifice by which it had been abolished, in view of the oppression and even cruelty under which slaves had suffered, it was inevitable that feelings of exasperation and of distrust towards the South should prevail. But time has softened indignation and asperity. It has also introduced new factors into the relations of blacks and whites, and into the relations of North and South. There is a new generation, constituting the majority of voters in all parts of the country, who know of slavery only as a thing of the past, which existed in their youth, or even before they were born. There is a new generation of blacks who were never in slavery at all, or only when they were children and knew nothing of its meaning. The negro population has also increased from four millions at the end of the war to ten millions now, a ratio of gain somewhat greater than that of the whole country, and even more largely in excess of that in the region they occupy. The growth of industrial interests in the South, and the extension of diversified commercial relations with the North, have also contributed much to a better understanding between the two sections. There is obviously an

advantage for the discussion and treatment of difficulties in this change of feeling. The elements of indignation and vindictiveness on the side of the victors in a war, and the element of resentment on the side of the conquered, have become weaker, so that the conditions are more favorable than formerly to a dispassionate judgment. There is a disposition to bring more patience to the task than when, in the flush of victory, it was believed that legislation could accomplish all the necessary results. And yet, as the race-problem presents itself in larger proportions, as it is seen that external measures have been inadequate, as it is seen, also, that an unguided evolution cannot be trusted to eliminate injustice and oppression, the people, we believe, will not therefore relinquish the task, but will persist in it with a patient but unbaffled determination to bring to pass that which is just and right.

It is by some considered a mistake that the Constitution was amended to admit the entire body of the freedmen to the franchise under the conditions which applied to all voters in the several States. But whether it was a mistake or not, one thing is certain, that the franchise should not be, and will not be, taken away. The solution of the problem will not be found in that direction. And we do not admit that the Fifteenth Amendment was a mistake. Although actual voting is not at present allowed in many of the Southern States, yet such security as the blacks enjoy is due to their legal status; and the prospect of improvement in their condition and of their healthy absorption into the political community would be small indeed, if they were not in law possessed of the guarantee of the Fifteenth Amendment that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Protection and right of domicile would be worth very little, although promised by Mr. Grady and others, if the full rights of citizenship were denied or abridged. We do not see how the protection of the freedmen after the war could have been provided if the conquered States had been admitted to the Union without the solid guaranties which were incorporated into the Constitution of the United States. Nor would the South wish to have the franchise taken away, unless at the same time the Fourteenth Amendment were repealed. For to disfranchise the negroes would be to reduce the number of representatives in Congress by forty or more, and to reduce correspondingly the electoral vote for President. A resolution has, indeed, been introduced into the legislature of Mississippi proposing to Congress the repeal of that amendment. But we do not believe the people of any Southern State are so lacking in political sagacity as to propose such repeal. If it should pass, the reason would be, not expectation of success, but a desire to intimate, in an almost insulting way, that it is not proposed to admit the blacks to any participation in political affairs. It is because colored men have rights which may be enforced that their industrial development has become as considerable as many facts show it to be. A union has recently been effected between two large societies

composed of colored men to constitute a single alliance, known as the Colored Farmers' Alliance and Coöperative Union, with headquarters at Houston, Texas. A proclamation issued by the superintendent of the new society states that "we now have a million members, with business activities in more than twenty States, exchanges permanently established in half a dozen great cities, and we are everywhere enjoying the greatest goodwill and the hearty coöperation of the white inhabitants of all the States." In Louisiana the Colored Farmers' Union has made arrangements with the Farmers' Union (white) to use the agencies of the latter in trading, thus receiving the benefits of cheap goods without the expense of a separate agency, and uniting the financial strength of both orders.¹ Such indications of progress are most encouraging as indicating an industry, a practical sagacity, and a habit of economy beyond what was generally expected twenty years ago. But if the freedmen had been left without the rights of citizenship and voting, and therefore in a state of peonage, it may be doubted whether they would have made so substantial gains in prosperity, or would have had the incentives to organize so generally and effectively even in the interests of economy.

The practical question is pressing upon us how to do justice to the negro, and at the same time promote the interests of the South and of the whole country. The deportation scheme is impracticable. It is a physical impossibility to transport ten millions of people to Africa. To establish them in the Southwestern Territories is equally impracticable. They could not be shut up in a limited area. Neither could the industries of the South be maintained without their labor, as it is estimated they produce from the soil values annually of one billion of dollars. They must remain where they are. The method proposed by the South is to use the labor of the blacks, but to keep them from voting, if need be by intimidation. The method advocated in the North is to make the negroes fit to vote intelligently, and therefore to educate them. The North still believes in this method. Large sums of money have been and will be expended, and many teachers employed, to educate the blacks. The healthy industrial development which is going forward is looked on with deep satisfaction, because it is a kind of education and the best preparation possible for taking part in public affairs. Political and industrial interests are mutually dependent, and it is believed the negroes will not be slow to understand what political measures are economically advantageous. It is thought, whatever the limits of improvement may be, that the average negro can become intelligent enough to have a voice in local, state, and national affairs. It is also thought that when this degree of intelligence is reached, the South has no good reason for objecting to the participation of negroes in politics. If the South would

¹ These facts are taken from the *National Alliance*, the organ of the order, and republished in the *National Economist*, the official organ of the National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union, published in Washington, and are quoted with comment in the *New York Nation* of February 13, 1890.

address herself in earnest to the task of political adjustment, many apparent difficulties would prove to have been imaginary; the negroes would be found supporters of good order, and, very likely, attaching themselves to different political parties as their local interests might dictate.

A definite measure is available to the several States of the South, which would meet most of the alleged difficulties of the situation. No State may deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, but any State may deny or abridge the right to vote on account of ignorance. Let the States impose an educational qualification, requiring a moderate degree of proficiency in reading and writing. Then, if the negroes are so densely ignorant as represented, they would be lawfully denied the right of voting. But if they can sustain a moderate test of intelligence, they are as well fitted to vote as many of the whites who, perhaps, would fail under it. This test could be made yet more definite by passing ballot-reform bills, such as the States of the North are adopting. And then, if voters cannot read the names of candidates, their ballots will be lost.

Reliance must be placed chiefly, if not wholly, on the education of the negroes, on the advantage they are gaining by industrial prosperity, and on the clearer recognition by the South of the practicability, the importance, and the justice of permitting their active coöperation in government. It is doubtful whether additional legislation would bring about any desirable result. A general law placing elections under national control might be a mischievous tool of the party in power in other sections of the country, and would not reach intimidation and other influences under which the negroes are afraid to offer their votes at all.

The negro has faults and limitations, but he is peaceable, loyal, ready to learn, grateful to his friends, and is becoming industrious and honest. He is less objectionable as a citizen than many of the foreigners who pour in upon the North. While the whole country is making generous and humane efforts to assimilate various unwelcome elements, the South should accept with cheerfulness the share in this task which Providence has assigned her.

THE PROGRESS OF THE DISCUSSION ON REVISION.

"What Reformed Theology has got to do is to Christologize predestination and decrees; regeneration and sanctification; the doctrine of the Church and the whole of the Eschatology." — *Professor Henry B. Smith, D. D., LL. D.*¹

THE last General Assembly of the Northern Presbyterian Church sent down to the Presbyteries the following question: "Do you desire a revision of the Confession of Faith?" According to a table published in the "Independent," thirty-four Presbyteries have replied in the affirma-

¹ *The Presbyterian Review*, July, 1884, p. 562.

tive, and fifteen in the negative. There are still one hundred and sixty-one to be heard from. The Presbyteries which have voted "Yes" include 1,318 ministers and 190,422 communicants; those which have voted "No" include 664 ministers and 112,717 communicants. Among the former we find the Presbyteries of Baltimore, Morris and Orange, Brooklyn, New York, Troy, Rochester, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Chicago, St. Paul. Ten of the fifteen negative votes are from a single State; the affirmative Presbyteries are located in Texas, Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, Montana. The opinion in favor of revision is evidently widespread, and it is confidently predicted that if no unforeseen change occurs, it will carry by a large majority.

The Assembly submitted a second question to the Presbyteries, inquiring, in case they desired revision, "in what respects and to what extent?" The rejoinders are naturally somewhat various, though there is a recognizable common centre at which relief is felt to be indispensable. In some way or other the Confession of the Church must proclaim the universality of the gospel, as grounded in the love of God, and revealed for the salvation of mankind. When Dr. Hall suggested an explanatory note to the chapter on "Decrees," Dr. Crosby replied, "The only objection I have to Dr. Hall's proposition is this: That it places the love of God in a foot-note." The whole question is there.

In September last we said: "The Confession is written from a particular point of view. The demand for revision requires that it be written from a very different point of view. This cannot be done by a little change of phraseology here and there, by an easy verbal omission or addition. In a word, the call for revision involves a conviction which requires for its satisfaction a new creed." We expressed, also, the opinion that the American Presbyterian Church was not so well prepared for this method of relief as the English, but added, "What discussion may accomplish we cannot say." If we interpret the signs aright, the movement for revision now points toward a new creed as the ultimate end. Those who look in this direction admit, rightly, we think, that considerable time is requisite before such a result can be reached, and some of them certainly desire to bring it about in concert with other branches of the Presbyterian Church, and possibly with a still larger circle of churches. Others are at present contenting themselves with the scheme of modifying the present Confession. The method of increased laxity of subscription, we are glad to notice, is not at all prominent, nor do we hear much at present of a declaratory act.

For two weeks, at public afternoon sessions held daily, except Saturdays and Sundays, the New York Presbytery has debated the questions of the nature and mode of relief. The discussion was in general admirable in tone and spirit, and highly creditable to the courage and theological sincerity of the Presbytery. At the eleventh session, held on Monday

of the third week, the Presbytery voted to ask that the chapter in the Confession which treats of "God's Eternal Decree," after the first section, should be "so recast as to include these things only: The sovereignty of God in election; the general love of God for all mankind; the salvation in Christ Jesus provided for all, and to be preached to every creature;" also, that the chapter on "Effectual Calling" "be so revised as not to appear to discriminate concerning infants dying in infancy, or so as to omit all reference to them (Section 3); and so as to preclude that explanation of Section 4 which makes it teach the damnation of all the heathen, or makes it deny that there are any elect heathen, who are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, and who endeavor to walk in penitence and humility, according to the measure of light which God has been pleased to grant them." A clause follows which affirms that there are changes in other parts of the Confession which are desirable, but the Presbytery abstains from asking for them.¹ An overture for a new creed was then adopted by a majority so large that a division was not called for. What is desired, it is explained, is "a short and simple creed, couched so far as may be in Scripture language, and containing all the essential and necessary articles of the Westminster Confession." It is not asked for "as a substitute for our Confession, but only to summarize and supplement it for the work of the church. . . . We want no new doctrines, but only a statement of the old doctrines made in the light and the spirit of our present activities, of our high privileges, and of our large obligations—a statement in which the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord shall be central and dominant." The result was a compromise between those who desired merely changes in the Confession and those who desired in addition or solely a new formula. The Presbytery decided for both—one method apparently for speedy relief; the other for a larger good. We shall be surprised if, in the end, the movement for a new creed does not absorb every other.

The Presbytery of Morris and Orange, New Jersey, after protracted deliberations, voted: "That instead of a revision of the text of the present Confession, the Presbytery expresses its preference for a new and shorter Confession of Faith, containing only the essential doctrines of the Presbyterian system of faith, and to which a harmonious subscription would be

¹ The vote on adoption of the Report containing these requests was 93 to 43. We are informed that "many voted 'No' because they wanted something more. Less than 40 are opposed to Revision. Probably not more than 30 would oppose Revision altogether." The *New York Evangelist* notices several "suggestive facts. One is the overwhelming preponderance of the elders who are in favor of revision. . . . Another . . . is, that the five graduates of Princeton Seminary who occupy prominent pulpits in this city, all voted for revision; and four out of the five Directors who represent the interest of New York in that Seminary voted on the same side." It adds: "The war-cries of fifty years ago will not rally the clans. We have passed into a new and a broader stage of our history as a church. There will not be any new division."

expected." It adds, that if the Westminster Confession is to be changed, a number of statements which it specifies should be revised. The list is somewhat longer than that of the New York Presbytery, and includes expressions pertaining to the Fall of Man, and his consequent inability. The Confession is found to lack "certain things . . . which it is most desirable that it should contain,"—an adequate "declaration of God's infinite love to the world, and his full and free offer of salvation to all men through the atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ ;" "a full and clear statement of the doctrines of the Person and work of the Holy Spirit ;" a "clear recognition of the great commission."

A committee of the Presbytery of Syracuse, of which Dr. George B. Spalding is chairman, has reported unanimously in favor of a response similar to that of the body just referred to. If the Confession is to be altered, they recommend that "no part of the Confession be wanting in the assertion or inference of God's love for all mankind, of salvation in Christ Jesus provided for all, and to be preached to every creature." The committee, however, deprecate any attempt to revise the Westminster Confession. They say that it "cannot well be altered in any of its parts," and give cogent reasons for this opinion, and add :—

"By the same law and right and obligation which these ancient worthies had, and claimed to have, to shape a creed which should express their belief and sense of need, so have we of this far-off generation the very same to give expression to the new phases of the old belief, to a new sense of altogether new duties, new oppositions, and new opportunities which confront us at the very opening of the twentieth century of our Christianity. With profound reverence for the Westminster Confession as a symbol of a mighty belief of a mighty time in the past, glorying in it, apologizing not one whit for it, we would simply let it be, and with not less reverent hands than those which reared that great structure, we of to-day would build a simpler Confession, a more catholic creed, a more missionary symbol of our Christian belief and duty."

We agree with this committee in believing that the working faith of the Church cannot to-day be suitably expressed by simply mending the Westminster Confession. Certainly, all attempts thus far made excite emotions of incongruity and inadequacy. Even the proposals of the New York Presbytery for amendment suggest the difficulty of applying a new patch to an old garment. They recommend the retention in the third chapter of the stately and impressive article respecting God's universal sovereignty, and its harmony with free agency, and propose to substitute, for all that follows, articles on "The sovereignty of God in election ; the general love of God for mankind," etc. But such phraseology is out of the old Calvinistic mint, and naturally suggests its doctrine of preterition. From what is the general love for mankind to be distinguished, and what is election, and what God's sovereignty in it? We are not criticising the action of the Presbytery, but pointing out the difficulty of revising a venerable Calvinistic symbol. If the old language—election, common as

distinct from special grace, sovereignty in election — is retained, the old ideas linger also, and preterition, though unnamed, is necessarily implied. On the other hand, if the traditional phraseology is abandoned in order to secure a perfectly clear expression of conceptions at variance with those of the men who wrote the Confession, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to avoid confusion and contradictions in the Confession. It is not wise, confessionally, to put new wine into old bottles.

Is not the subject of election one which it is preëminently desirable should be presented in a Creed from a distinctively religious rather than a predominantly logical point of view? The substance of the doctrine lies in the truths of the preveniency of grace, and its sole inspiring efficacy. Every mature Christian realizes that his life is from his Redeemer, and that it is Christ's apprehension of him which is primary and fundamental in his experience. He knows, too, that the fulfillment of the divine idea of his being must imply for him recovery from sin, and that whatever indispensable divine help comes to him for this end is necessarily of God's good pleasure, and is not the fulfillment of any divine obligation to him created by his own right disposition and good deeds. This antecedence of grace, this origin of spiritual life in God, and primary and indispensable direction of it by Him, is the immediate truth in election. What is beyond and more belongs to the general doctrine of divine sovereignty.

Here we touch at once the conception of a divine kingdom, having a central principle, an origin and development and end, related in every part. It is all one Purpose in the divine Mind, or sum of purposes, which, as Edwards recognized, is Christ. Election is too much treated apart from Him. If He is the Beginning and the End, and all and in all, then any ultimate distinction which exists in the divine counsel in respect to the elect and the non-elect is in Him, and according to his mind and will. It is impossible from this point of view to entertain the ordinary doctrine of preterition; certainly not that of the Westminster chapter. He who tasted death for every man has passed no man by; not those who passed Him by as He hung on his cross, and railed on Him, for whose forgiveness He prayed; not one of the uncounted millions of our race. He, as was said in the New York debate, — He, the Son of Man, is no priest nor Levite passing by on the other side, when there lies in need a brother man. If, as Scripture seems to indicate, there are those who will reject Him finally and utterly, it may well be that in his search for men He has expended upon them more of the recovering energy of his grace than upon any others. And such an issue would be not a defeat of his power, but a self-imposed and ethically necessary limitation of his will, and it carries with it a revelation of the highest good in the universe, a love whose purity is equal to its intensity, and its righteousness commensurate with its self-sacrificing benevolence. When Luther was sorely tried with the doctrine of Election, Staupitz said to him:

"Predestination is understood and found in the wounds of Christ, nowhere else." If there are elect, there are in the same sense non-elect. Sovereignty is universal; its self-imposed limitations are proofs and pledges of its divine authority and power; it stoops to conquer. It will conquer, but in its own way, according to its own character. Calvinism has in it the fundamental truth of all religion; it still needs modification, and always has been undergoing it; it is capable of development, for there is life in it, an undying life. It has over all other apprehensions of Christianity this imperishable advantage and renown, — it most thoroughly and effectively puts first what is first, and it rises on strongest wing to the height of inspiration, as it declares: "For of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things: to whom be glory for ever." Those who talk of Calvinism as a thing of the past seem to us to see aright neither the past, nor the present, nor the future.

Yet it is a small thing to contend for a Calvinistic name; the one thing is to see that our Calvinism, if this be our religious inheritance, is "according to Christianity." The course of the debate in Presbyterian circles shows that again the doctrine of Decrees is to receive special attention. We are glad of it. The present humanitarian tendency of thought needs to be adjusted to, and grounded more deeply in, a distinctively religious one. The two should be conceived of as different aspects of one principle; they are distinguishable, but not separable.

We congratulate our Presbyterian brethren on their opportunity to revise the old Calvinism, to purify it by sacred Scripture, to adjust it to the demands of a life generated by the Spirit of God and consecrated to the work of making this world Christian. May they fully realize in their labor the deep significance of the motto we have taken from among the latest words of one of their own revered leaders: "What Reformed theology has got to do is to Christologize predestination and decrees." "Love," he added, on the same slip of paper, "is the deepest ground and last end of Redemption. A love which works through and by the law and justice of God, satisfying and not annulling them; and by such satisfaction meeting the ends of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. Yet so that this love flows through and irradiates and organizes all its parts, and its open face to the whole human race is that of divine grace! redeeming love."

REV. JOSEPH HARDY NEESIMA, LL.D.

AT this critical period in the history of Japan, when so many and such radical changes are taking place in her religious, social, and political institutions, and when she needs the highest wisdom and the most unselfish devotion of her best citizens, it is with especial regret that we record the recent death of Dr. Neesima. The sad intelligence reached Boston, January 27, and has already elicited from every quarter the warmest expressions of sympathy for his bereaved family and associates.

How widespread this interest in him had grown to be, we hardly realize. Not long since, a traveler in Silesia was invited to visit the country-seat of a Prussian nobleman, near the Polish border. Quite to his surprise, his hostess proved to be a friend of Mr. Neesima, at least in the sense that she knew the story of his life, and was praying for his success, — a representative, no doubt, of many others scattered through Europe, whose information, less definite than ours, perhaps, has yet been sufficient to bring them into that outer circle of friendship which contributes so much of valued support to the missionary as well as to the statesman.

Born in the year 1843, Mr. Neesima was ten years old when Commodore Perry's fleet first sailed up the Bay of Yedo, and sixteen when the trading settlement was established in Yokohama. He was old enough to be deeply stirred by the new thoughts which filled the minds of men, but young enough to weigh them candidly and fairly. At the age of twenty, he was well versed in Chinese literature, unusually so for one of his years, we understand, and more or less acquainted with the Dutch language, which was even then an important medium of communication with the foreigners pressing into the open ports of Yokohama, Nagasaki, and Hakodate.

By means of missionary tracts in the Chinese language, he learned of the Bible and the claims of Christianity. His appetite for Christian literature was only whetted by the prohibitions of the government, and, like many another of his countrymen, he surreptitiously procured a few Christian books, which the Japanese booksellers, even in those dark days, knew how to provide for their customers. The story of his flight to Hakodate, thence to Shanghai in an American vessel, of his joining there the *Wild Rover*, another American vessel, as captain's boy, and of his passage, after one or two trading voyages, to Boston, need not be dwelt upon here. It was in some respects a hard experience, and it is a wonder that it did not embitter his life. It seems, however, to have served rather as a foil to set off the more brightly the kindness of the captain of the *Wild Rover*, who treated him as a friend, and especially the generous hospitality and truly parental care with which the late Hon. Alpheus Hardy and Mrs. Hardy watched over him. Their interest in Japan was not a new thing; and while their *quasi* adoption of the young stranger was not premeditated, it was the natural outcome of thoughts which had been for many years working in their minds.

His life at Phillips Academy, Andover, at Amherst College, and Andover Seminary was one of almost unbroken happiness. He found friends everywhere, and the memory of those days of successful study and delightful social intercourse was always fresh with him. No man ever enjoyed his friends more than Mr. Neesima; none felt their loss more keenly when they were called away.

He lived in America, as it were, under sentence of death. He could not return to Japan, for death was in those days the penalty for emigra-

tion. It was thus a happy day for him when, in the year 1871, a pardon was received from the Japanese authorities, and he was ordered to join the Imperial Embassy in the capacity of interpreter. He was brought into the closest relations with Mr. Tanaka, a member of the embassy, who was commissioned to inspect the school systems of Europe and America, and who was for several years thereafter the head of the department of education. He traveled with the embassy in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, adding daily to his knowledge of men and to the number of his friends. He subsequently returned to Andover.

Having completed his theological studies there, he was ordained in the Mount Vernon Church, Boston, September 24, 1874.¹ He had by this time decided upon the main purpose of his life. That purpose was to build up a college in Japan which should do for his young countrymen what Amherst had done for him. The strength of his resolution was revealed on the platform at Rutland, when without consultation he made his first appeal for aid. The sum raised, though small (about \$3,500), was sufficient to insure an interest in the undertaking on the part of the Prudential Committee of the American Board. He returned to Japan in the following November.

It was early decided that the college should be opened in Kyoto. There was an almost unanimous agreement that the college must be made independent of the extra-territorial provisions of the existing treaties, a decision most abundantly justified by the course of events, though for several years there seemed to be great reason to regret it. There was much tedious delay, but at last a beginning was made with eight scholars and two teachers. The prefect of the city, though professedly a friend, was the bitter enemy of the enterprise, and left no stone unturned to prevent its success. It was here that the friendships formed while connected with the embassy were turned to good account. The influence of the prefect was not strong enough to overshadow the memory of Mr. Neesima and his faithful service. The school grew, slowly at first, but still it grew, in spite of the untiring opposition of its enemies. The very sacrifices which he underwent in its behalf strengthened the hold of the school upon Mr. Neesima. It became a part of his very being. The students soon caught the enthusiasm of their president. He loved them almost as a parent loves his children, and they looked up to him with a feeling akin to veneration. As the school grew and its scope increased, Mr. Neesima was able to give little time to teaching. Even the business of administration came to be too severe a strain upon him. At first there was only the nucleus of a college, then a theological seminary, then a girls' school; later on a preparatory department for the college, and later still a training school for nurses, with nearly a thousand students altogether.

¹ Mr. Neesima was received December 30, 1866, by baptism and on confession of faith, into the Seminary Church, Andover. He was then a student in Phillips Academy.

Meanwhile Mr. Neesima and his associates became interested in a scheme for bringing this group of schools into closer correspondence with the educational system established by the government, with the view of establishing a Christian university. Japanese friends of the enterprise, including two cabinet ministers and many other men of prominence in public and private life, subscribed the sum of yen¹ 60,000. An American gentleman has given \$25,000 for land, buildings, and apparatus, and \$75,000 towards the permanent endowment of the prospective science department. Apart from these institutions, there are not less than four or five academies of excellent grade closely affiliated with them, whose very existence is in large degree owing to the work which Mr. Neesima accomplished. It is true he did not work alone; he was supported by Japanese fellow-workers of rare ability; the foreign staff, selected with much care, has, we believe, never failed to coöperate most heartily with him. All these have contributed their full share, no doubt, to the present success, but yet Mr. Neesima, so far as human eyes can see, was the one essential man connected with this movement, so full of promise for Japan.

Mr. Neesima's zeal for education did not lead him to undervalue direct evangelistic effort. His personal influence was one of the most potent factors in the earnest religious life of the school. His sermons to the students were always impressive. Like the best sermons everywhere, they were the expression of the preacher's own character. It is related that during the famous Satsuma rebellion, which taxed the resources of the government to its utmost, a high-spirited man, of large influence, set out from his home in one of the central provinces to join the rebels. As he passed through Osaka, he chanced to hear Mr. Neesima preach on the Love of God, a favorite topic with him. He did not listen long before his zeal for the rebellion gave way, and he returned home to work for Christianity. In Annaka, the home of his father, he was the means of starting one of the most remarkable evangelistic movements which Japan has seen.

It is a satisfaction to know that the aged father and mother were fully reconciled to their son's adoption of the strange and much dreaded religion, and not merely reconciled, but that they also accepted it with hearty faith and joy.

His relations with his associates, both Japanese and foreign, were always marked with the most delicate consideration of their rights and wishes. For their sakes, he was ready to forego much which he himself desired, but he always held tenaciously to the main line he had laid down for himself, in spite of the greatest discouragements. In a way quite consonant with his extreme modesty, he appears to have been impressed as Moses was with the signs of the guiding hand of the good Providence

¹ The Japanese yen is the equivalent of the Mexican dollar. At the present rate of exchange, it is worth about seventy-seven cents, United States coin.

which led him step by step through his career. Devotion to duty — a marked characteristic — took with him the form of an Abrahamic following of providential leading.

We are not able yet to measure the work he has done for Japan. Even those nearest to him confess their inability to appreciate the difficulties he met and overcame. His life was one to be grateful for, and his work will remain.

Is there not in his lamented death a call to his friends in America and Japan to increased effort in behalf of the enterprise which he loved better than life, that the university he planned, and whose foundation he has so well laid, may stand, a lasting monument to his enlightened Christian patriotism?

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS. SECOND SERIES.

VII. MADAGASCAR.

SINCE our last report from this great African island, just after the aggressions of France had resulted in an involuntary consent on the part of Queen Ranavàlona III., that the French should have entire control of the foreign relations of Madagascar, the religious interests of the island appear to have settled into a certain stagnation. This, however, we should judge to have little or no connection with political changes. The French, in order to secure their supremacy over the foreign relations of the Hova kingdom, have fully conceded what they had previously denied, the right of Queen Ranavàlona to paramount sovereignty throughout the island. So far as we can discover from the reports of the London missionaries (who, it is true, have now to be very cautious in their political allusions), France appears to have been as good as her word, and to have interfered little or not at all with interior administration.

We must recall a little of the geography and ethnography of the island, in its 970 miles of length and 300 of breadth, and a little of its history, in order to give a distincter view of the present condition of Christianity there. It will be remembered that it consists of great stretches of alluvial and malarial plains around the circumference, of a belt of deep aboriginal forest covering the rising slopes of the midland, and of the great interior table, rising to the height of 4000 feet (with various peaks as high again) and occupied by the ruling tribe of the Hovas. These appear to have made their way from Eastern Polynesia about the time of the Norman Conquest, and, finding a population akin to themselves, but less vigorous, to have established themselves in the great interior citadel, from which they are more and more extending their authority throughout Madagascar. The western tribes, the Sàkalava, who have the least of Polynesian and the most of African blood, and who pay the least regard to the Hova claims of sovereignty, are the most thoroughly and obstinately heathen. But wherever the effective authority of Queen Ranavàlona extends, avowed idolatry is prohibited,

and has, indeed, for the most part been spontaneously abandoned, although a large part of those who have forsaken its public practice remain essentially heathen. This slight veneering of Christian monotheism extends over something more than half the population of the island, including the tribes of the interior, the eastern and northeastern coast, and something of the south. Effective Christianity, expressed in church organization, is principally found among the sovereign tribe of the Hovas, and next to them among the Betsileos, their near kinsmen and neighbors, occupying the southern part of the great plateau, and sloping down toward the southern plains. The great people of the Betsimisaraka, who occupy a very large proportion of the coast plains of the east, are passively amenable to Christian teaching, and to the establishment of schools, as being commended to them by their Hova rulers, but do not appear to have any deep interest in either on its own account.

Among the Hovas themselves the history of the church appears to have gone through three stages, and now to have entered upon the fourth. The first was when, under the vicious and heathen but civilizing king, Radama I., the elder missionaries gathered a few hundred converts around them, whom Radama neither molested nor encouraged. The second period comprised the thirty years taken up by the reign of his usurping and murderous widow, Ranavalona I., who extirpated her husband's family, drove out the missionaries, and bitterly persecuted the converts. When the persecution ceased at her death, it was found that the few hundred Christians had multiplied to some 37,000. The third stage (passing over a time of transition) lasted until lately, when, under the reign of two Christian queens, succeeding a tolerant heathen queen, thousands, as in the time of Constantine, demanded and received baptism under the impulse proceeding from the palace. This impulse, which the missionaries, as English Congregationalists, have always regarded with misgiving, seems in a great measure to have spent itself, and the influx into the churches to have come to a stay. The present period, the fourth, the missionaries appear to regard as destined to be the period of purification, of a measurable separation of the nominal Christians from the living nucleus, and therefore of apparent shrinkage. The system of schools has been taken under the conduct of the government, but as the missionaries have unrestricted access to them, and virtual control, they hope through them to ground the gospel more thoroughly, and in the forms of a more enlightened morality, in the hearts of the next generation, than those in which it is exemplified in the lives of the present. Absolutism and slavery still remain as perplexing and poisonous forces.

The embarrassments induced by the utter unscrupulousness of the Roman Catholic missionaries in their vilification of the methods, motives, and aims of the English missionaries, are to be borne with as a matter of course, like the pestilential poison of the tropical fever. They are equally ready as Frenchmen and as Papists to work mischief where they can for English Protestants, especially in a country of which their government is suzerain. However admirable they may be within their own range, they have always been taught to regard English nonconformists as a pestiferous race, that are hardly within the pale of either justice or charity. The English High Churchmen, also, have intruded needlessly, though not calumniously. However, they have coöperated with the Congregationalists in Bible translation, and in the promotion of temperance and other moral interests. The Friends are helpers, and only

helpers. But we are sorry to say that the Norwegian Lutherans do not seem always to have shown that cordiality to their predecessors, or that care, in the wide regions of the island, to find distinct fields of labor, that might have been desired. This confusion of influences seems to be at its height in the Betsileo province.

We give various extracts from the "Chronicle" of the London Missionary Society for the last two years.

The ready reception given by the Hovas to the gospel is in part explained by a citation in the "Chronicle" of January, 1888, from the Rev. W. E. Cousins, to the effect that through the debasing cloud of their gross superstitions the Hovas still retain traces of an original theism.—The following, from Rev. J. A. Houlder, shows that the Hovas are as yet decidedly lacking in that missionary zeal which guarantees the extension of the gospel throughout the island. "We have had a mission established in Tamatave for several years. Things are very different, however, from what they are in the centre of the island, where circumstances have been favorable to the spread of Christianity, and where steady progress has been continuously made. Neither churches nor schools are in anything like so flourishing a condition. The Betsimisarakas care little for the religion of their Hova conquerors, whilst not a few of these seem to think that what is good for them in Imerina is, to say the least, not requisite on the coast. Still something is being done for both Hova and Betsimisarakas,—highlander and lowlander,—and therein we cannot but rejoice. All along the coast small congregations are gathered, and a number of children are being partially taught." In the port of Tamatave itself, the gate of the country, "rum and godless foreign influence make Christian work very difficult. Then there is the heathen element. Why, only the other day the Hindus in the place carried their peacock god in procession through the streets to the sound of a band of music, and preceded by numerous torch-bearers and burners of brilliant-colored fire. That, I suppose, will now be repeated yearly until the Hindus are either won to Christ or prohibited from a public exhibition of their heathen practices." The editors say: "The French in the Capital have started a newspaper, called *Le Progrès de l'Imerina*, a specimen of which has reached us. We regret to say that it is disfigured by abusive language respecting everything British in general, and respecting British missionaries in particular."

The Rev. P. Rewlands has been since 1879 in charge of the southern mission, and has seen the number of stations and schools increasing from eighteen to sixty. "Teachers and evangelists have been trained; the district has been organized and consolidated; Bible-classes have been regularly conducted in all parts of it, at which the Word of God has been expounded and brought home to those who attend; psalmody and homiletics have been extensively taught; scores of people have, from time to time, been added to the church; and, not the least blessing, . . . scores have been separated from church fellowship."

Miss Cockin, at a meeting in England, gives a very distinct picture of the workings of the gospel among a people in a very rude social state. She remarked that much less interest was manifested in the work in Madagascar, owing to the fact that no visitors pass through the country to witness what is going on there, as they so frequently do in India and China. She could, however, say that Christianity has had great influence in the island over the governors, who show more mercy in the car-

rying out of the laws than in former times; while also the great enmity between the Betsilèo and the Hova classes is gradually subsiding. Civilization is still very backward, the furniture in many houses being little more than a mat, a water-pot, a cooking-pot, and a basket for the wardrobe of the family. The fireplaces are without chimneys, so that the smoke has to escape by the door and window. The missionaries have induced some of the people to have tables, chairs, and bedsteads. The children are quick and easily pick up what is taught them, delighting most in the hymns, which they sing together for an hour or so before the service commences, and so attract outsiders to enter and see what is going on. The reverence with which the missionary is regarded is so great that Miss Cockin, in closing, begged the friends in England to pray that she might be kept humble in the Master's service.

The rude living of the Malagasy is just about what that of the English peasantry is described as having been only three hundred and fifty years ago. The mention of the national fondness for singing hymns reminds us that, when the thirty years of persecution ceased at the death of Ranavalona I., the long-repressed devotional feelings of the Christians, for months together, found scarcely any other channel of expression than in meetings for praise. The missionaries had to wait, with a certain discontentment, until the accumulated flood of religious feeling had in a measure spent itself, before they could do much for more practical ends. And, indeed, a year or two of simple devotional enjoyment could hardly be grudged to the Church of the Catacombs, rising again beyond the equator. The favorite hymns of the present generation are the Sankey collection. As one of the missionaries says, there is "a ring" about them which engages the people, and they are the better suited to them in that they are of a light and easy burden of thought and experience.

The number of scholars in the Protestant elementary schools was, in 1863, 365; in 1868, 1,735; in 1870, 15,837; in 1875, 36,534; in 1880, 43,904; and in 1886, 102,747. All these are under the charge of the London Missionary Society missionaries, except 14,355 under the charge of the Friends, "whose missionaries coöperate heartily with us, and are scarcely distinguished from us by the natives."

"On Wednesday, March 28, 1888, a very large and enthusiastic meeting was held in the Memorial Church at Ampàmarinana, Antanànarivo, to celebrate the fourteenth anniversary of the opening of the church, and the thirty-ninth anniversary of the event which the church was built to keep in lasting remembrance. On the 28th of March, 1849, eighteen Malagasy Christians suffered death for their love to Christ—four of them by being burnt alive at Fàravòhitra, and fourteen by being hurled from the summit of the precipices on which the Ampàmarinana church is built; and it was thought that this double event should be kept in memory by a special service, so that the Christians of the present day, and especially the younger people, might know what their fathers had suffered for the religious liberty they now enjoy. The building was crowded to excess, and deep interest was manifested during the whole of the three or four hours' service. Many of the old Christian men and women, including relatives of the martyrs, occupied a prominent position on the communion platform, and some took part in the service by reading and offering prayer. All the hymns sung were those contained in the old hymn-book, many of them being those which were hallowed by sacred associations with the death and sufferings of those who laid down their lives for the gospel."

Bunyan's "Holy War" has just been published in Malagasy. The "Pilgrim's Progress" has always been a great favorite in Madagascar, and was a great comfort to the martyrs. When some of them were led forth to execution, they said to one another: "Now are we like Christian and Faithful," encouraging each other to steadfastness by the remembrance of this concentrated type of martyrdom. — It seems that there is a tribe called the Bara, occupying the centre of the island south of Betsileo, who are still so pugnaciously heathen that they will not even allow missionaries to stay among them, and the great Sakalava tribe of the west are almost as obdurate, though not quite so intolerant, as the Betsileo churches do succeed in maintaining some evangelists among them. The Hova sovereignty must be more thoroughly consolidated in the east before the fierce tribes of the west and the interior south are likely to pay much attention to the Hova religion.

The Rev. H. E. Johnson, of Betsileo, says: "There are lights, and there are shadows, too, in our missionary work. The sale of intoxicating liquors, brought into the country by traders, is, we are sorry to say, on the increase. And not only in Fianarantsoa, but also in the country markets in Betsileo, we see almost on every hand that this soul-destroying traffic is apparently making headway. We are having pledge cards printed in Antananarivo at our mission press for the Bands of Hope, which we are organizing, not only in Fianarantsoa, but also in some of our country stations. We trust, too, that we shall soon have an adult total abstinence society as a distinct branch of our missionary work."

At the annual meeting of the London Missionary Society for 1889, the Rev. W. E. Cousins "expressed thankfulness to God that the Madagascar Mission still exists, notwithstanding the fears expressed by some that the late war with France would abolish Christian work. Thus far, the missionaries had suffered no hindrance in their labors, and were now working with more energy and with more diversified agencies than in the past. It had been said that their work had grown so prosaic that the story told by one missionary was like all the rest. He acknowledged that it was so, because the body of the people were placed under the missionaries' care, and they had to do the prosaic work of endeavoring to instruct, encourage, and guide the young native churches. But to himself it was not altogether prosaic, for it was lighted up by the noble story of the past. The missionaries had the care of 1,200 churches, with many of which Sunday-schools were connected. They were training those who they believed would in turn become missionaries and evangelists to their still heathen countrymen.

In our former report on Madagascar we described the inauguration of Queen Ranavalona III., and cited the expressions of Christian faith and purpose with which she commenced her reign seven years ago. We notice one or two references to her in the "Chronicle" of the last two years. One was a congratulatory message from her to the people of Ambohibeloma, a Hova town, on occasion of the dedication of a new church. It was, "after the congratulatory clauses, an appeal to the people to be diligent in praying, not for her sake or for fear of her, since she, like them, was a sinner seeking salvation, but because it was for their highest good that they should be diligent in the service of God."

On this same occasion some interesting incidents of the persecution were recounted by the native pastor, J. Andrianaivoravelona, who is called the Malagasy Spurgeon. His musical but somewhat alarmingly

protracted patronymic, bearing witness to the ample leisure enjoyed in Madagascar, is commonly, even for her, abbreviated to Andrianivo. "He said that at the time of the persecution he was a mere youth, but he was also a Christian, and also knew something about music. The then commander-in-chief of the Malagasy army was anxious that his brass band should be taught some European tunes, and asked Andrianivo to teach them, which he was only too glad to do. He not only taught them tunes but the gospel also, and the result was that nearly every one of the band became a Christian." The commander-in-chief, though not a Christian, was well content, and even concealed the Christian books in his own house, where the officers of the persecuting queen never dreamed of looking for them.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

It is now possible to look back on the work of the year 1889. Though as yet its exact value remains unknown, there can be no doubt that it has been a year of social progress. This may be seen in many ways, notably in the passing of an act of Parliament, which, though not of the first rank in political importance, is a sign of the times. The Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, which has just come into force in this country, has already dealt a blow at a class of crime which has often been left untouched by justice. The terrible sufferings sometimes borne by the children of the criminal class, and even by children of a higher social grade, have been exposed by a Congregational minister, the Rev. Benjamin Waugh. It has been through his writings and philanthropic efforts, extended over many years, that a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children has been carrying on with great success a crusade against the cruel and unnatural treatment of children: it is Mr. Waugh's work that has really placed this new law in our statute book. The law deals sternly with all offenses against children, extends the previously enacted provisions against the employment of children in the streets to sell articles and to perform in public entertainments, and has introduced two new principles: it enables a man to be examined as a witness against his wife, or a woman against her husband, in charges of cruelty to their child, and it enables the magistrate or judge to increase the penalty, when the conviction is for cruelty to a child whose life is insured. Many of our statutes, passed with the best intentions, are from the first dead letters; and this has been especially frequent with so-called "philanthropic legislation." But this act no sooner became law than it was enforced in a great number of cases, and it will no doubt help to cure one of the greatest evils in the life of the brutalized substratum of our society.

Another very useful piece of legislation recently passed, and showing that the condition of the people at large is more and more becoming the object of government concern, is a law for compulsory notification of infectious diseases. Any case of a dangerously infectious disease must now be immediately reported to the medical officer of health in the district in which it occurs; a penalty is provided for neglect of duty, and a small

fee is given to the medical man for every case which he reports at once. It is believed that this law will not only furnish a complete record of certain diseases throughout the whole country, but it will enable local authorities to find out the unhealthy portions of their townships, and to lay their finger on the unsanitary blocks and dwellings, which they will have to improve.

Quite recently, the "Times" newspaper, which is more ready to record than to recognize the growth of public opinion, declared that within the past year no movement has gained so much in the public mind as the desire for sanitation. It has for years been a recognized principle of our law that the dwellings of the people are so far a matter of national concern that local authorities have been intrusted with powers for enforcing in every home the conditions necessary to decency and health. But these powers have been rather permissive than obligatory; until recently, our system of local government has been (and indeed it still is) very imperfect; local authorities are elected on entirely different systems in London, in our large towns, and in rural districts; there is great confusion and uncertainty in the numerous laws, which have been intended to apply to very variously constituted bodies. These facts have been mainly responsible for the scandal of a country, whose laws recognized that life in unsanitary conditions is a public offense, still allowing thousands of its people to live in unhealthy homes. Recently; however, many convictions have been obtained in our courts, some fining landlords for not keeping their houses in proper condition, others ordering the closing of premises declared unfit for human habitation. These cases have been mostly in London, and are due partly to the action of private philanthropists, who have appealed successfully to legal powers which have hitherto never been used, but more largely to the action of the local authorities, who have been roused from their inactive torpor by the public interest which recent changes in the local government system of the country have attracted to them. These events and proposals, which are soon to be laid before Parliament for extending the powers of the so-called "sanitary authorities," and for providing houses for the working classes under the public management, show that it is now a recognized duty of government to guarantee to every citizen not only light and air, but a house which will be healthy, and a life free from all possible risk of disease.

The "Labor Movements," of which one now hears so much, seem likely to be overshadowed or absorbed by one great labor movement in favor of an act of Parliament which shall embody the principle of a working day of eight hours for the workingman. State regulation of the hours of labor has long been familiar to us through the Factory Acts. Some years ago, the great annual conference of the Liberal Party declared in favor of an extension of the Factory Acts, and there is no doubt but that the powers of the state will be soon invoked in some form or other, in order to assist the natural desire of the workmen for shorter hours. A committee of the House of Lords has been engaged in an inquiry into the "Sweating System," or the exploitation of labor by middlemen in such conditions as to be free from inspection and control under the Factory Acts. Its chairman, a conservative Peer, has become a convert to the principle of an "eight hours' working day all round," and his views are shared by that popular but not very influential political free-lance, Lord Randolph Churchill. Magazine articles, correspond-

ence, and controversies in the press have helped to force the question on the notice of politicians. A bill will be introduced into Parliament, which, if passed into law, will empower localities to decree by a popular vote whether or not the average working day shall be of eight hours only. If this question has not yet become a burning problem of the day, it promises to be a problem of the near future.

The reunion of different bodies of Christians seems likely to be realized soon, at least in one or two cases. For some years, the various sections of the Methodist Church have had the need of their reunion and amalgamation constantly advocated by the most liberal and most influential of the Methodist papers, the "Methodist Times." The result is that two of the Methodist bodies, the New Connexion and United Methodist Free Church, are arranging to join hands and become one body. More important still, the Disestablishment movement in Scotland has had the result of starting a most important discussion as to the future relations of the three Presbyterian churches — the Established Church, the Free Church, and the United Presbyterian Church. On the one hand, some of those who oppose disestablishment are seeking to prevent the inevitable, by suggesting that the three Presbyterian churches should share the state endowments now enjoyed by the Established Church alone. On the other hand, it is contended that this is no solution of the real difficulty, as the national property which is now enjoyed by the Established Church would still be employed for the good of a part of the people only. The eagerness and the tone in which the subject is being discussed in Scotland show that whatever be the actual outcome, there is a strong current of feeling in favor of Presbyterian Reunion. No one can doubt that it is only a matter of time when the three Presbyterian communions, one in doctrine, in form of worship, and in tradition, shall become again a greater and more united Presbyterian Church than Scotland has ever yet seen. In England, unfortunately, though one hears something of "*theological reunion*" of Churchmen and Congregationalists (see "Andover Review," January, 1890, p. 69, ff.), *ecclesiastical* reunion seems farther off than ever. This is partly due to the extreme reactionary aims of a section of the Church of England in touching the question of Popular Education. At Salisbury and at York a voluntary Association of extreme ritualistic tendency has been allowed to supply needed school accommodation, though a very large number of the people whose children will have to attend these schools object on religious grounds to the principles and practices of the schools to which their children must go. The intensely strong feeling aroused not only in these cities by this state of things, but through these cases having become notorious in the country at large, is bad alike for the progress of Popular Education and for the cause of religious reunion. The same result is produced by the extremely advanced ritualistic practices of the so-called Catholic party in the Church of England. Services are often conducted, and "mass" is often celebrated, with a ritual for which the forms used by the Roman Catholic Church are admitted to afford the only model and precedent; and in churches to which the ecclesiastical law does not extend, practices are used which are allowed to be illegal in a consecrated Parish church. The growing boldness in Catholic ritual is of course always accompanied by an increase of dogmatic assertion and of authoritative sacerdotal claims. It is thus that the Anglican Church seems to be making reac-

tion against the better spirit of the age, which in the case of most other religious bodies is passing from toleration to sympathy, and cultivating, instead of the jealousy of divisions, the earnest energy of comprehension.

Joseph King.

HAMPSTEAD, LONDON.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.¹

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT. By EDWARD CAIRD, LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Two volumes. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons (Macmillan & Co., N. Y.). 1889.

Dr. Caird's former book on Kant has been out of print for some years, and it was understood that its author was preparing a more extended work. The first treatise, it will be recalled, covered only the Critique of Pure Reason. The implied promise has been most amply redeemed. We have now a report upon all of Kant's work, the minor writings as well as the three main Critiques, even the former exposition being entirely rewritten. The reviewer who would undertake to give anything approaching a fair account of these thirteen hundred compact although clear octavo pages must be either wiser than the present reviewer is, or more ignorant than he would be willing to confess himself. Yet there are some things which at least may be said *about* these volumes, — some things upon which there would be no difference of opinion among those competent to judge. All would admit that Professor Caird has written *the* book upon Kant in the English language, — most would add, in any language. About the thoroughness, the accuracy, the clearness of the exposition, there could hardly be two opinions. Concerning the maturity, the lucidity, the deftness, the firm-handling of the critical portion, I do not see how judgments could vary. That Dr. Caird has made what is, as to substance, a contribution to the history of thought of the very first order, and that in form his volumes have a unity, a massiveness, and a simplicity of treatment which marks them as a work of art, must be the verdict. All this, whatever philosophic standpoint the critic may himself occupy. The opinion of the absolute philosophic value of the work will of course depend upon the extent to which the critic shares the view of philosophic method and results embodied in it. To pretend in a short notice upon such a point to do more than express one's own conviction is sheer dogmatism. I can only say, then, that for myself I believe these volumes to be the richest and wisest outcome yet published of the philosophic Renaissance now in progress in Great Britain. And I do not know who will transcend them until Professor Caird himself shall do it. Were I asked not only for the best English account of the Kantian philosophy, but for the best account of philosophy itself in the English language, I should point without hesitation to Caird's "Critical Philosophy of Kant." But this judgment depends, as I said before,

¹ In accordance with the announcement of the Review for 1890, the department of Book Reviews and Notices is enlarged in this third number by sixteen pages.

upon the critic's own philosophic position. That the work marks an epoch in the English treatment of the history of philosophy depends upon no position.

Only a few words may be said, to give the reader an idea of the method of Professor Caird in these volumes. After an extremely suggestive chapter upon "The Idea of Criticism," we have almost two hundred pages given to an account of Kant's life and relation to his times; his connection with his precursors from Descartes (this part is not quite so full as in Professor Caird's former book); and then what the Germans call an *Entwicklungsgeschichte* of Kant up to the point of his undertaking of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. In this portion, the author has not only utilized the very numerous and detailed researches of German writers, but has materially added to them. Then follows an exposition of all Kant's critical writings, following approximately a chronological order. The account of the "Critique of Pure Reason" opens with a condensed and clear outline of the whole,—of its problem and the solution. From this point on, Dr. Caird's method is uniform. He first sets forth, in a way at once so accurate and so clear as to be the despair of the average reader who has struggled with Kant's tortuosities, Kant's own doctrine. Kant becomes fairly transparent in the lucidity of Caird's treatment, not, however, at the expense of any minimizing of difficulties.

Then follows the criticism. If the exposition is so admirable, what words remain with which to characterize the criticism? It is wholly an immanent criticism. We are shown whence Kant started; we are shown the nature and requirements of Kant's own method in dealing with the subject-matter; we are shown how far Kant goes in the reconstruction of the views from which he sets out; and we are shown how much further he should have gone in order to be true to his own principle. The great, the permanent value of Caird's work is to me the fact that he sets up no external standard by which to try Kant, but that he so develops Kant as to make him pass judgment upon himself. Here we have the Kant held back and hampered by prepossessions inherited from previous dualisms, set over against the Kant freed from his bonds and developed into consistency and integrity. In this way the book becomes, in effect, a summary of the entire Kanto-Hegelian movement, and, in addition, a statement of constructive philosophic results.

To summarize this re-creation of Kant is an impossibility,—the summary is the book itself. Professor Caird's philosophic position may, perhaps, be indicated, if I say that he has absorbed all the results of such criticism as that of Thomas Hill Green, but that he has a positive, constructive touch which in finals seems to have been denied Green. The great Oxford thinker seems never to have quite freed himself from the negative element in Kant,—the idea that the regress from the world to self is an abstracting process, resulting in the notion of a spirit, *for* which indeed reality exists, but of which in itself nothing may be said. It may be roughly laid down as the purpose of Caird's work to show that, according to Kant's own principles, the movement from the world to mind, and from both to God, is a movement from the partial to the complete, from the abstract to the concrete, in which the lower becomes a factor in the spiritual process of the higher. The carrying-out of the purpose, not merely as a general principle, but in the treatment of all specific philosophic questions, is the heart of these two volumes. Dr. Caird shows that Kant reconstructed the previous dualism, that of mind set

over against the world, so far as to show that all existence is existence *for* a self, for mind, but that, still in the toils of the very dualism which he was overthrowing, he denied that anything could be known of this self as such. Since, too, the known world is known only in relation to a self which is only logical, not real, that world was to Kant only phenomenal. The world of reality is shut off from intelligence. But Caird shows that the inevitable outcome of Kant is that existence is not only a phenomenon *for* self, but a phenomenon *of* self, — an element in the spiritual process of God. The result on the side of knowledge is to show that, since nature is only a factor in the self-determination of spirit, a solution of the most pressing of contemporary problems is possible. The categories of physical science can be reconciled with the principles of the moral and religious life by being taken up into them. Nature must, in Caird's words, take a new aspect, if it be conceived as standing in a necessary relation to spirit; "not only must we deny that the explanation which seems to be sufficient for matter is sufficient for life and mind, but, since matter is necessarily related to mind, we must deny that the explanation in question is sufficient even for matter. We must 'level up' and not 'level down'; we must not only deny that matter can explain spirit, but we must say that even matter itself cannot be fully understood except as an element in a spiritual world."

The same imperfect overcoming of the dualism between mind and the world, which is at the basis of Kant's unsatisfactory position as regards knowledge, affects also Kant's æsthetic, ethical, and religious position. In respect to the latter question, Caird shows clearly how the separation of the self from reality leads to Kant's conception of the moral law and of freedom as merely formal; to his conception of the moral ideal as something which merely *ought* to be, but is not; to his separation, in the name of freedom, of one individual from another; to his conception of society as essentially only an external collection of individuals; and to his denial of the possibility of any objective moral mediation. As a summary of Caird's idea of the relation of the moral will to nature, to humanity, and to God, the following quotation must serve: "Nature can be a means to the realization of our life, only in so far as in spirit nature comes to *a* self and to *its* self; that is, in so far as spirit reveals what nature implicitly contained. And other spiritual beings can be a means to the realization of our individual life, only in so far as our individual life itself becomes a means to the realization of a principle which is identical in them and in us. We cannot live except as we die to live; and the culmination of the effort after the realization of our own Will and our own Good must be the consciousness that *Deo parere libertas est*, and that all things 'can be ours' only as 'we are God's.'" So far, then, is freedom from being, as Kant conceives it, an assertion of the individual's will in his isolation, that "the *truth* of freedom lies in the unity of the self with the principle that is realizing itself in all nature and history. Behind the freedom that breaks the bonds of nature and necessity, we find a divine necessity in union with which alone man can be truly free. But, just because it is a divine necessity, it cannot really be an external necessity." With the impression derived from these words, we may fairly leave these volumes, hoping that we may have said enough of them to induce every philosophic-minded reader to turn to them himself.

John Dewey.

KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR ENGLISH READERS, by MAHAFFY and BERNARD. Vol. I., *The Kritik of the Pure Reason explained and defended*; Vol. II., *The Prolegomena*, translated with Notes and Appendices. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1889.

In connection with Caird's book, it is worth while to direct attention to Mahaffy and Bernard's edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and of the *Prolegomena*. Mahaffy's books, almost a score of years ago, were practically the first to direct the attention of the English-speaking public to Kant as he really was. Mansel and Hamilton had indeed presented a Kant of whom the less said the better. Mahaffy, however, left his work in an incomplete form; with the aid of Mr. Bernard it has now been happily completed, and reprinted in a more convenient and accessible form. The *Prolegomena* does not appear to have been much changed from the first edition; the *Critique*, with its omissions and additions, is practically a new work. The *Prolegomena* is a translation; the *Critique* a paraphrase and condensation, with occasional explanatory and critical remarks, which are, however, carefully distinguished from the exposition. The plan of the work is such and its carrying-out so careful and accurate that it fills a position not occupied by any other of the numerous Kant expositions. The writer speaks from personal experience in saying that it is a most admirable book with which to introduce advanced undergraduates in our colleges to Kant. The exposition of the *Transcendental Deduction* is hardly up to the level of the rest of the book. And one feels occasionally as if the authors, in their condensations, had omitted the nub of the matter; but, on the whole, the book is a judicious and accurate rendering of Kant's thought into a form more valuable for the ordinary student than that supplied by a translation. One who has been through this book will be admirably prepared to take up his Caird.

John Dewey.

THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. Discussions bearing on the Atonement. By D. W. SIMON, Ph. D., Professor of Theology in the Congregational Theological Hall, Edinburgh. Pp. xvi, 440. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1889.

This book is occupied with criticisms of various theories of atonement, the indication of certain elements involved in atonement, and the suggestion of a theory of atonement as producing a change in the relation of God to men.

Among the theories repudiated is that of satisfaction rendered to an eternal law, "having an objective existence independent both of God and the creature, a law to which God and the creature are alike subject, what is often called the eternal law of righteousness."

Akin to this and therefore to be rejected is the theory that atonement pays a debt due to justice, — a theory which distinguishes God's judicial from his personal relation to men, and which maintains that the obstacles to forgiveness are not personal resentment or unwillingness to show mercy, but his aversion to sin as the supreme Lawgiver and righteous Judge. Dr. Simon maintains that law and justice cannot be considered as abstractions apart from the personal relation of God to men, and that what is due to God is not the condemnation of sinners, which is an eternal loss to God, but their restoration to sonship.

The most searching criticism is directed against the governmental theory, which, in the judgment of the author, is to be classed among

moral influence theories. The object of atonement, according to the governmental theory, was to exhibit certain things to men, or impress them on men, such as the ill desert of sin and the holiness of God, so that God's law and government might be honored; while so far as God himself is concerned there is no obstacle, and He might forgive and redeem without an atonement. The atonement, therefore, according to the governmental theory, was intended to produce an effect on sinners. The advocates of that theory might object to this criticism, as not recognizing the influence of atonement on the whole universe, but even then, in principle, the theory is unchanged.

The contribution made by the author to the subject is indirect rather than direct. In the chapter on "The Constitution of Humanity" he develops a very satisfactory statement of the organic or corporate life, and yet does justice to the individual life. In the following chapter he shows that corporate relations are upheld through representatives, whose acts the body of individuals consciously and freely adopts as its own; that an eminent individual embodies the whole spirit of an age, as Dante, Shakespeare, Milton; that it is the secret, what may be called the subconscious, desire of every writer, or speaker, or artist, to be at once individual and generic, to be the mouthpiece of the thinking and feeling of at least his own circle, to have not merely individual but collective thoughts and feelings. The true representative of men would focus the idea of human life in its highest relations of faith and worship. Moses was in a degree such a representative. David, in a higher degree, was the organ and medium of his people's relation to God. The nation rendered corporate worship to God through its priestly representative. Lawgiver, king, priest, and prophet were typical of the complete representative yet to come. The manner in which Christ realizes this function is indicated in the chapter entitled, "The Passion of Christ the Passion of Man."

The reality of God's anger towards sin is maintained as against incorrect views of the divine immutability and impassiveness, and is distinguished from enmity and vindictiveness.

The author considers it a grave defect that the teaching of Scripture and of the fathers has been so far departed from as to make forgiveness consist in the remission of penalty rather than in the remission of sins. He advocates warmly a return to the Scriptural view that forgiveness establishes a right relation with God, that it is first of all reconciliation, and not primarily escape from penalty. He holds that the significance of atonement is obscured and nearly lost by setting it over against penalty, the demands of law, the punishment to which the sinner is exposed, instead of finding its fitness to bring God and man together in peace and in the forgiveness of sins. No part of the book is so important as the chapter which makes this distinction, so simple and obvious, yet so damaging to theories of atonement which are chiefly concerned with the substitution of Christ's sufferings for the penalties of sin.

No definite theory is formulated by the author, but in the chapter on "The Atonement and Prayer," he offers some suggestions pertaining to the objective reality of the atonement and the substitutionary character of the sufferings and death of Christ. In prayer God works in us awakening desires for holiness and bringing them to expression. When we pray for help to live aright towards our fellow-men, God moves upon our hearts to produce an active obedience to his will. It is our work, but it is God's work. "God fulfills his own law on our behalf, and his fulfill-

ment stands as ours, or rather really becomes our fulfillment." God's thinking, feeling, willing in us are in the truest sense our own, more truly our own than what we work by and for ourselves. As applied to the atonement, Dr. Simon says, "When, therefore, Christ takes our place in the atonement, He does — that is, God does — in principle the same thing that is done when, in answer to prayer, God helps us to render unto Him due obedience. In both cases the righteousness of God becomes our righteousness: it is his, yet ours; it is ours, yet his. . . . So far from the endurance of our penalty involving greater difficulty than the performance of our duties, it might be considered to involve less difficulty. It seems easier to conceive of a substitute bearing our burden than doing our work. . . . That relatively, to which I am and must be passive seems more readily transferable than that relatively to which I am and must be active. . . . If God can be righteous on our behalf in the form of obedience, why not in the form of suffering? If it be untrue and perverse for Him to endure our penalty and *count* it as ours, nay, *make* it our endurance, why is it not untrue and perverse for Him to render obedience to Himself on our behalf, and make his obedience ours?" It is finally argued that when we pray to God in sorrow or suffering for comfort and help, we believe that he really sympathizes, that our sorrow is his sorrow, our suffering his suffering. And, as sorrow and pain are directly or indirectly the fruit of sin, God, in taking on his own heart our troubles, undertakes to bear for us in a measure the violation of his own law. And this He does more deeply in the sufferings of his dear Son.

This brief description indicates the character of the book, and also the considerations which the author emphasizes as essential to a theory of atonement. His theory is rather indefinite, but the lines on which it moves are clearly seen. The discussion indicates what is going on in Christian thought respecting this central doctrine. There is a growing dissatisfaction with external theories, with suppositions concerning law, debt, penalty, judicial demands, and the like. There is also dissatisfaction with subjective theories, which find little more in the sacrificial work of Christ than an impression, an exhibition, or an influence. It is felt that neither of these views goes deep enough into the reality of redemption. It is seen that Christian life and thought needs to appropriate the eternal and universal mediation of Christ, to accept the Incarnation of the Son of God into humanity with all it involves of the constitution and the reconstitution of men, to recognize the inworking of Christ's personality and love in the actual life of the world, and to regain the early conception of the kingdom of God realized in the organic life of men through the identification of the Son of Man with those whom he came to seek and to save.

George Harris.

CHRISTIAN THEISM. Its Claims and Sanctions. By D. B. FURINTON, LL. D., Vice-President and Professor of Metaphysics in West Virginia University. Pp. vii, 303. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1889.

The object of this work seems to be to gather up the results of recent discussions, and to combine them into a form convenient for use in the class of college students. Very free use has therefore been made of ideas wrought out by contemporary American and English authors.

the titles of their works being given at the end of the chapters in which they have been most copiously drawn from. The usual ground is traversed in the examination of the so-called arguments for the existence of God. The proofs of intelligence in nature are derived from the order and law which prevail, called by the author the Eutaxiological Argument, the proofs of volition from adaptations in nature, the proofs of personality from our own self-consciousness, the proofs of goodness from the facts of history, the proof of unity chiefly from the unity of nature, and the proofs of infinity from causality. The Introduction emphasizes the universal character of Christianity, and the authority of the Bible, topics somewhat remote from the objects of the work, and there are chapters at the end on Anti-Theistic Theories, Evolution, and Immortality.

The only part of the work which can lay claim to originality is the chapter on "Infinity," in which it is argued that the causal evidence of infinite power is as great as, in the nature of the case, it can be. The universe is greater than we can conceive, yet does not exhaust the divine power, because it must be sustained after it is created. And however vast the universe might be conceived, the cause must be greater. The same conclusion is reached from the infinity of space. The location of the Universe in space involves the absolute control, not only of the Cosmos, but of space itself.

The author takes up a decidedly hostile, and a needlessly hostile, attitude towards Evolution, urging objections which were much more in vogue ten years ago than now. For example, rudimentary organs which are useless in some animals are supposed to have become weakened by disuse, and indicate the derivation of one species from another. This is a reasonable explanation. But Dr. Purinton rejects it, and adheres to the old explanation of unity of type in the creative thought, a sort of general model from which the Creator did not depart, even when some features would be useless. Resemblances of anatomical structure point, indeed, says the author, to a common origin; but that common origin is a conscious, intelligent Creator, rather than an unconscious, material organism. His whole argument against Evolution proves too much, for it would deny altogether the derivation of species, and set aside those conclusions on which all naturalists are agreed. A book is of doubtful service to the cause of Theism which antagonizes the settled opinions of all reputable scientists.

George Harris.

MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS. An Analysis of Ethical Conceptions. By S. ALEXANDER. Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. 8vo, pp. 413. London: Trübner & Co.; Ludgate Hill. 1889.

The chief general interest of the present work is the tendency which it represents. It is a reaction against the school and teachings of T. H. Green, as also was Fowler and Wilson's "Principles of Morals," published two years ago. However we may judge of Green's metaphysics and his sympathies for Kaut and Hegel, there was a spiritual breadth and depth in his thought which dissenters from his opinions do not often appreciate. Certainly neither Alexander nor Fowler and Wilson have approached an understanding of him, nor exhibited any of that deep psychological analysis of the moral consciousness which makes Green a master. They have evidently taken offense at the transcendental char-

acter of his philosophy, and so have not taken the pains to ascertain, and then appreciate, ideas which were either independent of that philosophy, or could be appreciated without penetrating its arcana. This is to be all the more lamented because the protest carries with it implications about Green's position which are not true, but which are likely to be accepted by all who do not make an effort to understand the doctrine of that school. The work under notice professes adhesion to the party of empiricism, and makes haste to conciliate itself with the doctrine of evolution. With this it is not necessary to quarrel in its main aspects. But there is something very provincial in the insinuation at this late date that Kantian philosophy is incompatible with empiricism and evolution. If any philosophy ever dispensed with the necessity of antagonizing experience, or rose above the opposition between the school of Locke and the Intuitionists, it was the Kantian, and it only creates a smile among philosophers when some novitiate whose ethics is empirical announces his dissent from the *a priori* position, as if Kant and his followers did not insist that the only possible philosophy was one which combined experience with *a priori* functions. T. H. Green is not wanting in characteristics exposed to criticism, but it is not because he was disposed to minimize or ignore the importance of experience in the moral development of consciousness. His faults, however, are overshadowed by merits which the University of Oxford cannot afford to depreciate, if high moral ideals are to be stimulated and encouraged. Green's spiritual elevation and insight into the aspirations of man are worth too much to have them supplanted by a system which is a stranger to them.

The ethical formula by which the author summarizes his moral theory is clear evidence that he has not risen to an understanding of the school from which he dissents. The fundamental object of ethics he considers as "the equilibrium of conduct." This position at once betrays the traditions of Oxford; for one requires only a slight acquaintance with the history of ethics to recognize in this formula Aristotle's doctrine of "the mean." It is not necessary to dispute either the truth or value of this position in order to criticise the author for defect of moral vision. Equilibrium of conduct is a very useful ethical norm. But it is pertinent, in connection with this and with what we have already said, to remark that the author has not profited by that very fine chapter of Green which compares the Greek and the Christian ideals of virtue. Had he fully appreciated the thought of that chapter, he would not have departed so far from his master, nor have chosen for his ethical principle a conception which represents only resistance to sensuous impulses instead of the higher and positive pursuit of an ideal as the essence of morality. In other respects, we would be less critical of the work. Indeed, we could give it high praise, and would not hesitate to use it as a text, because of its admirably clear outline. But it would be with the intention of employing very frequent and free criticism.

It is impossible to discuss the work in any detail. But the chief points of interest in any theory of ethics are its moral ideal, its relation to the theory of hedonism, and its conception of responsibility. As to the first of these the author does not reach the high elevation of his master. He shows unmistakably the relaxation which always follows a reaction, and so far misconceives what is meant by "the moral ideal" as to confuse it with the particular "realized ideals" of actual history, rather than to see it is an aspiration which gives dignity and worth to actions aiming

high, and is as a measure for the worth of actual achievement. As to hedonism, the author admits the fatal objection to Bentham's form of it when he accepts as final that there is a distinction of quality, and not merely of quantity, in pleasure and pain. But he does not seem to appreciate how fatal such a distinction is to every form of hedonism, because it distinctly indicates that the whole moral problem has to be decided after admitting or supposing that pleasure is an object of action. The opposing school reject pleasure, not because it is *per se* an evil, but because when unqualified it is not *per se* a good; and those who affirm a difference of quality coincident with the good and the evil are bound to supply the reason for their distinction, and we suspect that they would give much the same reasons for it as are given by their opponents for a different system. It is strange that so many cannot realize what Plato settled once for all, that the indeterminate nature of pleasure was decisive against its use as a criterion of conduct as long as it is divisible into good and bad pleasures, because it is the distinction between good and bad that ethics endeavors to account for. Had the author seen that Green's formula for conduct, namely, "the satisfaction of desire," was intended to express an approvable end or object more than personal pleasure, although not opposed to it, he would have displayed more appreciation of it and have found it *above*, and so only relatively, if at all opposed to the position assumed by himself. The manner in which responsibility is discussed measures better than the other topics the limited distance to which the author has penetrated the ethical problem. His whole position is one which tacitly denies freedom and yet maintains a doctrine of punishment. He distinctly asserts that the argument from conscientiousness is an illusion, and that a man is free only as he chooses the right; that "he is free in the sense that he ought to be good, but that he is not free therefore to be good." If a man is free who chooses the right, and he is not free who chooses the wrong, it is hard to see how we can talk about responsibility or institute any punishments whatever, because, unless he were free, a punishment would not alter his conduct. It is absurd to say that "it is just because a man cannot help doing what he does that he is responsible," and then add in a footnote that there "is a sense in which sometimes a man cannot help doing what he does when his will is forced and when he is not held responsible." For this only indicates that the author understands neither the freedom of the will nor the doctrine of responsibility.

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COLUMBIA COLLEGE.

THE MORAL IDEAL. A Historic Study. By JULIA WEDGWOOD. Second Edition. 8vo, pp. 400. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1889.

The second edition of this work deserves notice because of its value to the student and teacher of morals. We shall not go into its contents with any detail, although their character merits more than a passing remark. The fact that the work has previously been before the public makes it unnecessary to say more than is required to announce a second edition, and to call the attention of new students to a book of rare worth. It is much more than a history; it is philosophic treatment of the "moral ideal" as it has been represented in the highest aspirations of men from the dawn of history, but of course limiting the subject to the

main conception of India, Greece, Rome, and the modern civilizations dominated by Christianity. The interest of the treatment lies in the fact that it is not a mere narrative of beliefs and practices, but a comparison of great ideas that have dominated the moral development of man. The essay has a special interest in these times when the theory of evolution exercises so much influence to obscure the nature of morality by dissertations about its genesis, and also when the reactionaries of the day are so exuberant for Greek ethics in which they see all the glory of the race. But the author of "the moral ideal" does not share that feeling. She sees a very different meaning in that history and progress which have survived the best endeavors of the Greek and the Roman. It certainly does seem a piece of folly to laugh at the work of twenty centuries, and to fall down in worship before a product which Providence or nature has refused to protect and preserve. Modern ethics will occupy high ground when it appreciates what Christianity has done for elevating and purifying moral ideals. In too many cases the critic is deceived by associating with a language inherited from the ancients moral ideas which they never held, and which perished in default of the vitality to secure them a continued existence. All this is brought out by the author in a manner which makes her work a perpetual feast for the student. The generalizations are those of a philosophic and profoundly versed mind. Their masculine character is a very marked feature of them, in all perhaps but that delicate sympathy for the religious conception of life which can nearly always be detected in the thought of woman. But aside from elements of style, it is the thought that commends the work to attention. The very fact that the standpoint is the *ideal* gives the subject a commanding position, from which the mind can look upon the discussions of empiricists and evolutionists with some indifference; not that it can ignore their influence or be justified in depreciating them, but that the ideal affords a conception which secures ethics against the infringements of mere facts or the endeavor to represent ethics as employed only with *what is*.

We should be glad to give an outline of the work, but circumstances forbid. We must be content with indicating in a passage of the author's own words the standpoint from which the moral ideal is approached, and it will be sufficient to measure the value of the essay to the general moralist. Few have been able to give so exalted a conception of the Christian ideal while viewing it from the broad plane of philosophy, and the merit of it is that the account is not overdrawn. It is conceived by contrasting the Hellenic and Hebrew consciousness in the fact that the watchword of the former was, "Know thyself;" of the latter, "Deny thyself." The background of the Hebrew consciousness was "the vision of God which threw a gleam on the whole history of man and lit up its moral development with a meaning which was borrowed from a higher sphere." "This influence," says the author, "is visible in those to whom it is most obnoxious; to this day the dialect of men who deem it an obsolete error to connect humanity with aught beyond itself is stamped indelibly with the ideas and beliefs of those who felt all its value to lie in such a connection; the protest against Scriptural teaching, which is the form in which many in our day know most of the Scriptures, records their influence in inverted outlines, ready to be restored to their original form when mirrored in a sympathetic mind. Hebrew thought has given its bias to all moral speculation, not because the Hebrew mind was spe-

cially interested in moral questions, but because it sprang at its initial movement to a point above them, and came upon them from a higher view."

J. H. Hyslop.

THEORY OF CONDUCT. By ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER. 16mo. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1890.

In the leisure which relief from personal and official duties affords, Professor Alexander has produced four chapters of much interest on the Theory of Ethics. They treat respectively of "The Theory of Right," "The Theory of Duty," "The Nature of Character," and "The Motive to Morality." It is unfortunate that the work is not more exhaustive, for it is not without freshness and vigor, and would be of more service could it appeal to a wider circle of readers. Its chief interest is in the fact that the author abides by the religious sanctions of morality in a time marked by all but universal desertion of it. It is a good summary for those who have not the time to keep abreast of more exhaustive works.

J. H. Hyslop.

LES SOURCES DU PENTATEUQUE. Étude de critique et d'histoire, par ALX-ANDRE WESTPHAL, licencié en théologie. Vol. I. LE PROBLÈME LITTÉRAIRE. Paris : Librairie Fischbacher. 1888.

Readers of the first volume of M. Westphal's very valuable work will be apt to gain an erroneous impression, unless they carefully bear in mind a distinction often ignored, — rarely emphasized as it should be. The volume before us presents a very complete history of Pentateuch criticism, from the tradition of the "Great Synagogue" down to the latest phase of the Documentary Theory, but it is a history of that branch of the science only which is variously called "analytical," or "literary" (*le problème littéraire*), as distinguished from the complementary department of "historical criticism" (*étude d'histoire*).

The inexperienced reader might perhaps find fault that he was left to infer from the title-page alone this important discrimination, and hence was led to accept as a complete and continuous history an account which practically passes over two of the most important periods of critical study. But in spite of some superficial drawbacks, M. Westphal's plan has much to recommend it. His ensuing volume (*Le Problème Historique*?) will doubtless intercalate the account of De Wette's brilliant comparison of the laws and the history in the first decade of the century, and his fixing of a pivotal point for the dating of Pentateuchal documents in the establishing of circ. 620 B. C. for the date of Deuteronomy. Then we shall doubtless be given the account of the last two decades, in which Graf and his followers have accomplished their marvelous work along the lines of history mainly. With the author's whole work before us, we shall doubtless lose that singular sense of disproportion likely to be conveyed by vol. i. read by itself, as if the author were deeply versed in that which other critics have either never read at all, or else have forgotten some twenty years ago, and profoundly ignorant of that which to the critical world of to-day is most familiar and most interesting.

M. Westphal proves himself, in his thirty pages of preface or introduction, ardently evangelical as well as fearlessly progressive. He deplores the present tendency toward establishing "two Bibles, the Bible of the believer, and the Bible of the man of science." This tendency is due, he says, to the *post*-Reformation dogmatism which abandoned the broad and evangelical position of the Reformers to set up an artificial and *a priori* system. Luther had said: "Even should it be true that the sacred writers have mingled wood and straw with their pure gold and precious metals in the construction of the Scriptures, the foundation remains no less immutable, and the fire of criticism will destroy its imperfect elements." The dogmatists of the next century set up an infallible letter, and forced an unnatural conflict between faith and reason. The time has come to welcome discoveries formerly decreed inimical to faith. "Let us so transform our theology as to bring to an end the incompatibility introduced by men between the Bible as science has discovered it to be, and the Bible as faith desires to have it." That very documentary analysis of the Pentateuch, when received as a friend and not an enemy, affords us a triple tradition of the Old Testament, — three witnesses for one.

Large space is given to the history of tradition and of the forerunners of criticism. The chain of objections to the Mosaic origin is shown to be at least as worthy of consideration and almost as continuous as the Rabbinic tradition itself.

The observations of independent thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries appear, under M. Westphal's scrutiny, more numerous and more searching than is commonly supposed. They are treated by one who plainly describes at first hand. Not the only surprise to persons unfamiliar with the writings of these critics before criticism will be the very considerable mass of evidence accumulated by them in opposition to mere tradition and dogmatism, nor the shrewdness of their early guesses, but the fact which M. Westphal does not fail to point out, that in the majority of cases they enter the lists as champions of the church against unbelief. Thus Simon's "*Histoire Critique*" opposes Spinoza, and Le Clerc's "*Sentimens*" in turn refutes Simon.

With J. Astruc's discovery of the sources of Genesis, the real history of criticism begins. Heretofore, investigation brought mainly negative results, necessarily disconnected. Astruc's modest Conjectures furnished the first clue to a rational explanation of the long familiar incongruities and mutual inconsistencies of the Genesis sagas. It was as the champion of Moses that Astruc appeared, and he prided himself on having eliminated from Genesis what he called its *antichronismes*. By a separation of the document using Elohim from that using Yahweh, Astruc deemed the difficulties in the way of Mosaic authorship removed. Gen. xxxviii., which requires in its present context the birth of four generations within twenty-three years, and Gen. xxiv., which in its connection requires that Dinah should have won the heart of Shechem at the age of four years, and Simeon and Levi to have wrought their deed of vengeance at the age of ten and eleven at the most, found a new and harmonious connection. The fact that the simple process of arranging in parallel columns the portions of Genesis which employ respectively the names Yahweh and Elohim removed the *antichronismes* of this kind, gave more satisfaction to Astruc than the fact that his parallel columns were found to constitute two distinct and divergent documents or *Mémoires*.

The story of the adoption by Eichhorn of the remarkable discovery of Astruc and its introduction into the schools of Germany is more familiar. Westphal's especial contribution to this part of the history is his glowing tribute to the genius of Ilgen. Critical analysis, for more than half a century after the publication of Ilgen's "Urkunden" (1798), remained behind the discoveries of this brilliant critic. To him is due the discovery of the second Elohist, so called, whom Hupfeld in 1853 was to bring forward *de novo* as the triumphant solution of a half century of entanglement. Vater and Geddes introduced only confusion and despair with their Fragmentary Hypothesis. Ewald regained but half the lost ground with the Supplementary Hypothesis, and the recognition of the unity and literary integrity of the "Grundschrift." Not till the analysis of the present day, resting upon the labors of Hupfeld, Nöldeke, Schrader, Colenso, Wellhausen, Dillmann, Kuenen, Budde, Bruston, have the true elements of the problem as recognized by Ilgen been appreciated.

The part of modern criticism, so far as it has given itself to analysis, has been to extend the work of Ilgen throughout the Hexateuch, and to recognize (as do Budde, Kuenen, Bruston) a second Yahwist beside the second Elohist.

Tables of analysis, and copious illustrations from the parallel narratives, including chapters of salient interest from the creation to the sending of the spies (Num. xiii.), are given at the close, with some original suggestions for analysis of the difficult section of the Sinaitic legislation.

The work will be exceedingly useful for acquainting the reading public with the history of patient research and brilliant discovery in Pentateuchal criticism. The author's careful work should not have been marred by the gross carelessness of the proof-reader.

B. W. Bacon.

OSWEGO, N. Y.

DIE GESCHICHTE DES ALTTESTAMENTLICHEN PRIESTERTHUMS, untersucht von W. W. GRAFEN BAUDISSIN. Leipzig: Hirzel.

Baudissin has rendered a real service to the Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch by his investigation of the genesis and the history of Priesthood in the Old Testament. He takes his stand with Dillmann, Delitzsch, and Kittel over against the school of Reuss, and yet he is entirely independent in his methods, and has not a few opinions of his own. He holds that E was the most ancient of the documents. This was united with J by an editor who compacted them so tightly that it is often difficult to separate them. In the priestly document, he distinguishes P¹ and P² by differences in their views of the ministry of the Levites. He thinks that the legislation of P is the result of a long legislative development in priestly circles at Jerusalem. From time to time, separate codes of priestly rules were written down. In the first half of the seventh century, shortly before the reign of Josiah, a priest collected these, with the exception of the sanctity code (Lev. xvii.-xxvi.) into a larger work with historical and genealogical frames. This document was a private code for the priesthood at Jerusalem. It elaborated the priestly legislation far beyond existing circumstances. The ideal in it is so prominent that many of its laws have never been realized in fact. The pri-

vate priestly character of this document is the reason why it was unknown to the author of the Deuteronomic code, or disregarded by him. For the author of D wrote a people's book in view of the conditions and circumstances of his time. This code was composed shortly after P, and reflects the religion and doctrines of the times of Jeremiah. When discovered in the temple, it became the basis of the reform of Josiah. But the priest's code did not become a public code until after the exile, in the times of Ezra and Nehemiah. The sanctity code remained as a document by itself until late in the exile, when it was incorporated in P. Ezekiel used it as his favorite law-book, while it was a code by itself. Baudissin argues that the neglect to use P by D, together with the use of JE by D, implies, not the non-existence of P, but only that at that time JE was a document by itself. He proves the præxilic composition of P by showing that the legislation of Ezekiel is an advance upon it in several particulars, such as the limitation of the priesthood to the line of Zadok; the slaying of sacrificial victims by Levites instead of by the offerers, as in P; the partial substitution of the prince for the high priest and the ignoring of the latter; the enhanced sanctity of the priesthood, and the extreme precautions for guarding the approaches to the divine presence. He also shows an advance of the chronicler, who writes in the late Persian period or early Greek period with the use of older documents from the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, beyond P; and that the legislation of P does not suit the circumstances of the new community in Jerusalem at the Restoration in many important respects. He does not hesitate to regard P and D as written at about the same time. The documents were compacted during the last years of the exile by the Deuteronomist, who united P with JE, and then used D as the closing legislation. Baudissin thinks that this order, that was followed by the Deuteronomist who edited them, favors the priority of *P* to *D*. We can do little more than call attention to this important investigation. Baudissin agrees with all critics in the analysis of the Hexateuch, except that in a few cases he suggests improvements and modifications. The difference between him and other critics is in the date of the document P, and the time and method of compacting the four great documents. He adds to the investigation of Dillmann important materials for that work which is so greatly needed, the detailed analysis of the document P; for, after the separation of the sanctity code, to which critics are agreed, there still remain different layers of legislation which must be analyzed and arranged in historical order before the problem of the Hexateuch can be entirely solved.

C. A. Briggs.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE LILY AMONG THORNS. A Study of the Biblical Drama entitled "The Song of Songs." By WILLIAM ELIOT GRIFFIS, D.D., pastor of the Shawmut Congregational Church, Boston, Mass., and author of "The Mikado's Empire." Pp. viii, 274. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1890. \$1.25.

"The Lily Among Thorns" is a genuine contribution to Biblical literature. Dr. Griffis has recovered for us from the rubbish of fanciful, rabbinical, and mediæval interpretations "a gem of purest ray."

The book testifies not only to the author's thorough and broad general scholarship and culture, but to his mastery of the Hebrew lore — historical, literary, and linguistic — connected with the subject.

Dr. Griffis reveals a strong and poetic element in his nature responding vividly to the subtle touch of the noble sentiments embodied in this unrivaled poem. Certainly, without a sympathetic imagination, he could not have so clearly and eloquently unfolded its exquisite beauty or dramatic art.

In the light of the exposition here given, based on the Revised Version, "The Song of Songs" ceases to be a mere allegory, or a book unsuitable to be placed in the hands of the immature, and becomes a poem of the purest love, — of love with every sweetest human quality mingled with that which is a spark of the divine fire.

This book should not be undervalued in its relation to the social evils of our time and country.

It is, indeed, no small matter that, in this age of wonderful progress, we discover in the Hebrew Bible, from which Mormonism, Polygamy, and the advocates of laxity in marriage relations have derived both their defensive and offensive weapons, a perfect antidote to the poison of their base doctrines.

"The Lily Among Thorns" exemplifies principles which, if applied, will leaven the whole lump of society, purifying and elevating to the highest plane our individual, family, and national life.

G. Gannett.

BOSTON, MASS.

ARABISCHE GRAMMATIK, mit Litteratur, Paradigmen, Chrestomathie und Glossar. Von Dr. A. SOCIN, Ord. Professor an der Universität Tübingen. Zweite vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. 8vo, pp. xvi, 137, 211. Berlin: H. Reuther's Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1889.

That a second edition of this grammar has been called for within four years is sufficient evidence that the test of experience has confirmed the favorable opinion which scholars formed of it at its first appearance. The new edition has profited by both criticism and experience. The definitions and statements have been carefully revised throughout, with manifest gain in clearness and precision. The arrangement has been improved by a better distribution of the matter into paragraphs; by numerous changes in the order; and mechanically, by printing the Remarks in smaller type, thus distinguishing them better from the body of the text. More material changes meet us in the chapter on the Noun (chap. iii.). Beside a concise survey of the more common noun-types, which is new, the chapter now contains a series of paragraphs on the formation of nouns from weak stems, matter which was formerly scattered in the form of observations through the chapter on the Verb. The whole subject of the infinitive and participle has also been transferred to this place. The treatment of the verbs whose second or third radical is a half-vowel is much simplified. The traditional presentation of this subject was open to more than one objection. It is, to say the least, doubtful whether it is historically true; and it put no inconsiderable unnecessary difficulty in the way of the beginner. I am very glad that Socin has broken with it. I think, however, that the statements, for example, on p. 39, are capable of further generalization. In the Syntax several paragraphs, among them the important ones on the Passive (§ 101), and on Negative and Copulative Sentences (§§ 128, 130), are new; others, as § 120 (on Concord in Verbal Sentences), have been entirely recast. An

appendix gives the names of the days of the week and the months, and explains the peculiarities of the Moslem chronology. The Literature has been brought down to date, though I notice here and there an oversight, for example, vol. ii. of Derenbourg's *Sibawaihi*. The second part of the volume contains the Paradigms and the Chrestomathy. In the Paradigms, Table IX., exhibiting the irregular forms of verbs containing Hamza, is new, as is also the table of infinitives and participles, p. 51. Other corrections and improvements cannot be noticed here. The Chrestomathy has been enlarged by about one fourth. The most important addition is that of a collection of exercises and examples (pp. 30*-47*) to be used in connection with the study of the grammar, enabling the learner to put his knowledge at once to use, and bridging the always difficult passage from the elements to the reading of continuous texts. The selection of examples illustrating the different kinds of sentence (p. 42* ff.) will, I think, be found especially useful: they will also make the use of the corresponding exercises for translation into Arabic, in the third part of the Chrestomathy, much more practicable. The selections for reading are the same as in the previous edition; only that from *Mas'ûdi* is lengthened by about six pages. The Glossary has been revised and enlarged to include the new matter in the Chrestomathy. These changes add materially to the usefulness of the book. It is to be hoped that, some day, we shall have an English translation worthy of it. The printing is done with the correctness and beauty of the Drugulin presses. The few broken points I have noticed will hardly trouble even the beginner. Of misprints I have observed but one or two. P. 38, l. 8, for *î* read *û*; p. 48, l. 4 from below, for *و* read *ب*; p. 104, l. 7, read *لا ت*.

George F. Moore.

GESCHICHTE DES JÜDISCHEN VOLKES IM ZEITALTER JESU CHRISTI. Von D. EMIL SCHÜRER, Ordentl. Professor der Theologie zu Giessen. Zweite neu bearbeitete Auflage des Lehrbuchs der neutestamentlichen Zeitgeschichte. Erster Theil. Erste Hälfte. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1889.

The "Second Part" of this work was published, it will be remembered, early in 1886 (see "The Andover Review" for August, 1886, p. 216 f). At that time Professor Schürer thought that the remainder, that is the First Part, of his work would require comparatively little enlargement, and might be expected within a year. But both he and his readers have learned that art is longer than time. After the lapse of nearly four years, we receive the *First Half* only of the promised First Part. An examination of it, however, verifies the adage that a patient waiter is no loser. Its 256 pages correspond to 157 in the earlier book, and every one of them gives evidence of thorough revision. Indeed, down to the 220th page, hardly a paragraph reappears as it was first published; and by far the greater number have been completely re-written.

The author's painstaking endeavor to improve the book shows itself even in external matters — such as the broader page, the more lucid or convenient arrangement of material (for example, the massing together in fine print of the annotations after each one of the Syrian kings), the more frequent insertion of dates, and particularly in the practice of numbering the notes consecutively from the beginning of each chapter to its close, — a device of such obvious convenience for purposes of reference, that it

would be universally adopted, were the users of books the makers of them.

Students in the habit of betaking themselves to Professor Schürer's work for an outlook over the "Literature" of the many and diverse topics of which it treats will find it even more helpful in its new form than before. The lists have been both weeded and supplemented; the scope and character of the works named often more precisely defined, and the new publications recognized, including those of the year 1888. Nothing important, whether out-of-the-way book, or article buried in some learned periodical of narrow circulation, seems to have escaped our author's vigilance. And he adds to his knowledge of continental publications an exceptional acquaintance with those in the English tongue. Lewin, Milman, Raphall, Robinson (whom, by the way, Professor Schürer, unlike many of his countrymen, knows to be an American), Stanley, Porter, are among the vernacular writers on sacred history and geography whom he enumerates; Etheridge, Deutsch, Ginsburg, and others, on Jewish matters; Conder, Kitchener, Wilson, Warren, and the rest, contributors to the publications of the Palestine Exploration Fund; Hicks, Gardner, Head, Madden, who have treated of epigraphy and numismatics. The encyclopædias, too, and Bible dictionaries, — Alexander's Kitto, Hackett and Abbot's Smith (which our author pronounces to be greatly superior to the London edition), — together with the dictionaries of Christian Biography and Antiquities, have not been overlooked. Even the numbers of the "Academy" and of the "American Journal of Philology" are referred to. Of course, in literary references of so wide a range, some slight inaccuracies and oversights are to be expected. In the case of Prideaux's "Connection," for example, the edition of 1749, in 4 vols. is indeed the best of the old editions; but it has been quite superseded by that in 2 vols. 8vo, edited by J. Talboys Wheeler in 1858. Among the works on Biblical geography, also, mention might well have been made of the "Bibel-Atlas," by Riess, in its second edition (1887), with its full and convenient index; and (on p. 10) of the fifth edition of Raumer's "Palästina," edited by Furrer, which was announced many months ago. But the fullness and accuracy of the lists are marvelous; and more serviceable even than their copiousness is the scholarly discrimination which has evidently governed both the selection and the description of the works.

Admiration for the accessaries, however, must not absorb us to the neglect of the body of the work. Prominent among the impressions made by that is the conviction that the author has not merely taken account of what other historians and critics have said since he first wrote, but has subjected his *Sources* to a thorough reëxamination. Especially is this apparent in the case of Josephus and the books of Maccabees. It is not surprising, therefore, that the preliminary account of the former and his writings has swollen to twenty-five pages in place of eleven. And it is gratifying to find that this renewed study warrants Professor Schürer in reaffirming his discreet judgment respecting the general trustworthiness of the Jewish writer, especially in his "Jewish War." The two books of Maccabees were considered in the volume published in 1886. In the part which has just appeared we find the discussion, then promised, of the long-standing question, whether these two independent sources agree in beginning the Seleucid era (which fixes the chronology of all the important events they record) with the autumn of the year 312 B. C. Our

author's reëxamination of this question is of marked clearness and ability, and leads him to abandon the opinion he expressed in his first edition, and to hold, with the majority of critics, that in the first book of Maccabees the Seleucid era begins, not in the autumn, but in the spring of B. C. 312, and that there are no sufficient reasons for assuming a different chronology for the second book.

The work impresses the reader also with the frequent aid the author has derived from coins and inscriptions. It illustrates strikingly the great historic value of Oriental exploration. The literary fertility during the last few decades, especially in Jewish numismatics, has evidently been keenly watched by him; and not a few details relative to the Syrian and Maccabean periods have been elucidated by this means.

Further: it is easy to see that renewed study has been given to the Jewish sources. Twice the space occupied in the first edition is now devoted to the Rabbinical literature; and the account given of its contents, origin, and worth, while marked by judicious circumspection, is eminently lucid and useful.

In spite of the unavoidably encyclopædic character of his book, the author has not allowed himself to forget that it professes to be a "history." A reader who so chooses can neglect the notes altogether, and thus get a narrative fairly continuous, and one which, with all its condensation, is often extremely vivid and engaging. An excellent specimen is the chapter entitled "Die Religionsnoth und die Erhebung" (pp. 138-162). On a leisurely re-perusal he will find packed away in the foot-notes discussions and references relative to such interesting points as the alleged visit of Alexander the Great to Jerusalem (p. 138 sq.), the effacement of circumcision (p. 151), the situation of Acra and the topography of the Temple (p. 154), the identification of Modin (p. 156), the sect of the Asidæans (p. 157), the derivation and meaning of the name Maccabee (p. 158), the Feast of the Dedication (p. 162), the internal arrangements of the pre-Herodian Temple (p. 176), the location of Ephraim and Ramathaim or Rama (p. 183), the relations between the Jews and the Spartans (p. 186), — and so on indefinitely. Grateful for the unwearied labors of the author, he will be ready to pardon him in advance for the non-fulfillment of his half-promise to complete the work before the close of the year 1889.

The typography of the book as respects accuracy is in keeping with its scholarship. The slips noted are such trifles as "Abbott" for "Abbot" (p. 8, l. 25), "on" for "one" (p. 14, l. 17), "Mischnah" for "Mishnah" (p. 104, last line but one), "Aramic" for "Aramaic" (p. 123, l. 31).

In conclusion, it is not superfluous to express an earnest hope that the task of translating this volume may fall into thoroughly competent hands.

J. H. Thayer.

CAMBRIDGE.

SERMONS AND ADDRESSES. By Rev. JACOB MERRILL MANNING, D. D., Pastor of the Old South Church, Boston. With a Likeness, and brief Biographical Note. Pp. 542. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889.

This volume contains thirty-six sermons, an address on Samuel Adams, another on John Brown, and a eulogy on Henry Wilson. The historical

portraiture of these men, specially of Adams and Brown, is unusually good; indeed, it has been rarely excelled, we think, by anything of the kind in American literature. Dr. Manning was peculiarly well qualified to understand and appreciate such men. He himself had, unobtrusive, but deep and strong, the same moral earnestness as they; and so in these addresses his words take, very naturally, the heroic movement of their lives, and are suffused with their spirit and his own.

Of the sermons, one, on "Christian Missions," was preached before the American Board; all the rest were prepared for his own people. One, on "Worship as a Means of Spiritual Culture," was preached at the dedication of the new Old South Church. One, on "The Gospel of the Windows," is an interpretation of the pictures and symbolism of that edifice. One, on "Sickness and its Lessons," was preached in 1863 upon his recovery from a long and very dangerous illness incurred while serving as chaplain in the army. One, on "The Natural and the Spiritual Body," was preached at Easter, 1879. None of the others have any reference to any special occasion. As Dr. Manning's pulpit work was very uniform in quality, many other sermons might doubtless be selected from his manuscripts as good and profitable as these, and these may be taken as representing his ordinary preaching.

Those who heard them will of course read them with the greater interest, for they will recover as they read some of the influence of the preacher's personality. Others who seldom or never heard him will read them with the influence of his character which they honored, and find his words reinforced by their knowledge of the man. Those who know little or nothing of him may be confidently assured that his sermons well represent his life and character. But they are less dependent than sermons usually are on the presence and voice of the preacher. They bear printing with less loss. Some who thought the preacher's manner was weighty rather than warm, and dignified rather than tender, may be almost surprised as they feel the warmth and tenderness of these printed pages.

These sermons are all on the higher planes of revealed truth; they all pertain closely to Christ and his mission, and they all bear very directly on the spiritual interests of men. The special subjects are quite various. Each is treated from a natural standpoint and within very simple outlines. The style is clear, terse, and vigorous. There is not an obscure sentence in the book, nor a thought which a reader of fair intelligence cannot grasp. But there is abundant thought for the most intellectual, with invigorating moral tonics, and healthy nourishment for the spiritual life. In the range of his thought in preaching, Dr. Manning kept within the limit of those truths which, as he viewed them, can be made evident to any fair-minded person in a Christian community. In these sermons he does not try to enlarge this province. Beyond it he never indulges surmising, and within it he never discusses a doubt. Hence his thought never hesitates; its steps are firm and its stopping-places are secure. He knows in part, and all the more surely, and all the better for us, because in preaching he does not guess at the unknown part. The sermons impress us with his strong sense of the great spiritual realities, with his sacred respect for the claims of truth as it chiefly concerns us, with his own befitting sincerity and faithful purpose. So he presents his truths without any apologizing, or skillful prefaces, or oratorical ingenuity, as though they would be dishonored by any adventitious attractions. They always appear in their dignity and dignifying influence.

Yet there is no lack of freedom in these sermons. We feel no constraint in them but that of evident truth and worthy motive. Here are no legal conceptions of the gospel, no servile following of religious tradition, no demand for an unvarying religious experience, no violence to a reasonable faith. Dr. Manning was conservative, but he was also entirely free from the restrictions of a technical theology. Its forms never governed and rarely guided him in preaching. His thought is too full of the spirit of truth to be in bondage to its letter. His sermons are vital and invigorating.

From the one on "The Suffering Saviour," we cite the following: "Christ so entered into our humanity as to be our Brother, the perfect and sinless Brother of all the world. That brotherliness in Him must needs have caused that our guilt and woe should be to Him a source of infinite anguish. They are his brethren, and He is not ashamed to call them such, who have broken the laws of God, who are living and rioting in that sin which God abhors. It is in their behalf, his tender relationship to them bringing the awful load of their shame on his divine heart, that He answers to eternal justice, and meets the condemnation launched against them. This brotherliness, this oneness with all sinners, so that their shame became his shame, was more than everything outward which embittered his lot. . . . This being the brother of a rebellious race, and confessing himself such while He is without sin, is what singles out Christ, from all that have ever lived on the earth, as peculiarly the burdened, and bruised, and rejected, and stricken One."

We are glad that Dr. Manning's influence, so salutary, so evangelical in the best and unperverted sense of that word, will be extended by the publication of these sermons. The Old South Church, enriched with this legacy from their honored pastor, can do the church at large good service by promoting their circulation.

W. E. Merriman.

BOSTON.

SIGNS OF PROMISE. Sermons preached in Plymouth Pulpit, Brooklyn, 1887-9. Printed from Stenographic Reports. New York: Fords, Howard & Hurlbert. 1889.

The author of these sermons is the spiritual adviser of a larger number of persons than any single writer or speaker in America. Even while Mr. Beecher was living, many who more or less consciously made him their "Father" were glad to find in Dr. Abbott an "Instructor in Christ," who, when they desired a reason for the faith that was in them, could give them answers, as it were, in their own vernacular, easily remembered and repeated. Now that the voice which is heard in Plymouth pulpit is the same which has so long spoken through the editorials and expositions of the beloved paper, there is surely no other oracle so widely consulted and appealed to. Men and women distressed by riddles of Scripture, offended by caricatures of the truth, harassed by current forms of doubt, perplexed as to questions of general ethics or personal duty, have come to look for guidance, or gratefully ascribe their relief, to this source.

The consciousness of this need appealing to him, the calm assurance that he possesses a supply for it, and an eager love for his task, furnish the preacher with the inspiration and impulse for these sermons. They

are not separate wholes, each elaborating some text or embodying symmetrically some truth, they are parts of a continuous message addressed to an audience visible and invisible, chapters in an epistle, shaped to meet the difficulties of faith in this generation, as the Epistles of Paul arose out of the present and pressing needs of his contemporaries. It is certainly this similarity of functions rather than likeness in habit of mind, or thorough appropriation of the thought of the Apostle, which links these sermons so closely to his writings. Eleven out of eighteen are headed with texts from his Epistles, and his name, cited either to introduce his words or his experience, looks out from almost every page. This, too, is an age of transition. Old truth must be preserved; new truth must be appropriated and adjusted; new occasions are teaching new duties. Men at their wits' end in this perilous yet glorious process look to Dr. Abbott for guidance, and in these sermons, with an alacrity, a confidence in his "Gospel," and an assurance of "calling" which are entirely Pauline, he responds.

To serve the average man in such a crisis, his life, training, temperament furnish him with unequaled elements of equipment: a familiarity with the Bible which saturates language, feeling, and thought; a personality thoroughly Christianized, effacing self, absorbed in the ardor of ministry, loyal to the truth, candid and tolerant, yet zealous and confident; an easy mastery of the results of scholarship, which, without making original contributions, has digested truth of all kinds, and is equipped to meet the objector from every direction; a minute sympathy with the life and thought of the day, not having perhaps a pastor's range, but enriched by a journalist's contact with many minds; a lucidity of thought and simplicity of utterance, with a homeliness almost of illustration which keep him not only well in sight but at the side, linked arm in arm with his auditor. Thus furnished to gain the attention, win the confidence and esteem, and carry the judgment, he here presents truth rooted in the past, sanctioned by revelation, related to the thought and duties of to-day, and fortified on every side against current forms of attack.

These sermons will not convict the impenitent and obdurate. They will not secure the approval of scholarship for any new interpretations, or solve any unexplored mysteries. They will not convince the scientific agnostic or the Calvinistic dogmatist, who are almost too often summoned to these pages to be refuted and discomfited in silence. But to that class, large in our day, "perplexed in faith but pure in deeds," who would believe if they could, but are offended by dogma and alarmed by skepticism, they cannot fail to restore light and courage.

C. L. Noyes.

SOMERVILLE, MASS.

COLLOQUIES ON PREACHING. By HENRY TWELLS, M. A., Honorary Canon of Peterborough Cathedral, Rector of Waltham, Leicestershire, and Rural Dean. Pp. 248. London: Longmans, Green & Co; and New York, 15 East 16th Street. 1889.

This is by far the best book on preaching which the English Church has put forth since the volume of "Homiletical and Pastoral Lectures," edited by Bishop Ellicott, appeared, which was chiefly valuable for the lecture on "The Emotions in Preaching," by Archbishop Thomson. The

title is true to the contents of the book. The author has the rare good sense to dispense with a preface, and to allow the characters to begin at once to speak for themselves. The sermon, as it is to be heard in English churches, is made the subject of very bright and free discussion by nearly all classes of people concerned with it, — church wardens, club men, the squire and his guest, Hodge and his wife, the old lady and her maid, the Churchman and the Salvationist, the lawyer, the doctor, and the merchant, and various other parties, including the clergy themselves. There are twenty of these colloquies, and most of them are fresh, natural, and to the point. Canon Twells is generally stronger in criticism than in suggestion. Hodge talks better to his wife than the bishop to the archdeacon, or the father to the son. When the canon gives advice through his characters, or sets forth his own idea of preaching, we feel that his words are vigorous and wholesome, but still lacking in the highest intellectual or spiritual stimulus. But his humor is at times delicious. Here is a bit from the opening of the colloquy between the Old Lady and her Maid.

SCENE : *The Parlor of a Small House.*

O. L. Martha !

M. Yes, Mum.

O. L. Sit down, Martha. Put that hearth-brush aside. This is your first Sunday with me, and therefore you have not yet got to know my manners and customs. Unfortunately my maid, as a general rule, is unable to attend morning service. It is my plan, therefore, to have her in of an afternoon, and to talk to her about the sermon to which I have been privileged to listen.

M. (*a little frightened*). Yes, Mum.

O. L. I am told that the Queen does the same with *her* maids.

M. La ! does she now ?

O. L. Not, you know, that they are maids like you : but maids of honor and that. Often and often, Martha, I bless God for sermons. You see I lead a rather lonely life. My eyes are bad, and I can read but little. The Sunday sermon gives me things to think about.

M. But they do say, Mum, that the vicar is n't much of a preacher.

O. L. I know where you got that. It's Mrs. Gibbs' Ann. Don't you mind Mrs. Gibbs' Ann. Much she knows about preaching. The vicar suits *me*. He may n't be fine, but he's thoughtful. Now, Martha, don't twiddle your thumbs, but just hear what I have to say.

M. Yes, Mum. Mrs. Gibbs' Ann, she asked me if I thought that you was converted. She said she was afraid not.

O. L. Mrs. Gibbs' Ann is a Wesleyan Methodist. She has not had the advantage, poor thing, of the teaching of our Church. If Mrs Gibbs' Ann would keep her mistress's house a little cleaner, instead of judging other people, it might be better. But listen. The text this morning was part of the twenty-ninth psalm : "The Lord shall give his people the blessing of peace." Now, Martha, most probably you have often heard these words without thinking much about them. So have I, I am sorry to say, but I hope I shall never hear them in that careless way again. There's a deal of meaning in them. Take this prayer-book, and find the place.

The colloquy of the lawyer, doctor, and merchant gives the canon the opportunity to say some very good things in behalf of the clergy through the reply of the merchant to the criticisms of the lawyer and doctor. But the chief object of the book is to show the clergy of the English Church what people are saying, or might be saying, about the sermons they hear. And whether the style is serious or humorous, it is throughout a sincere and manly plea for better preaching, a protest against the

subordination of the sermon to ritual or routine. The book is written on the background of English society and the English Church, but any one, as he reads it, can make the application where it may be equally needed.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

THE CHURCH IN MODERN SOCIETY. By JULIUS H. WARD. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.; The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1889.

Mr. Ward has here made a very earnest plea for the unity of the church, in many respects the most effective now before the public. The strength of his argument lies in its moral persistence. He pushes his ideas and convictions hard against the line of practicability, not violently, but resolutely and hopefully. The book is written with full appreciation of the difficulties to be overcome, but without any surrender of purpose. The progress of thought on the part of the writer can be measured by the growth of conviction on the part of the reader. When one lays the book down, the unity of the church seems more necessary and less impracticable as a final result than when he took the book in hand. And yet Mr. Ward has advocated no scheme of unity. He has simply lodged the *idea* in the mind.

Mr. Ward's plea is for the recovery of the church to its organic influence in society. Once the church had this kind of influence. This was the power of the church of the Middle Age. Much that belonged to its influence at that time has become obsolete. Much that would then have been inconsistent with it has now become necessary, not only to its influence, but to its life. The Reformation gave the individual a new and abiding place in the church and in society. But the individualism of the modern church has been developed at the expense of institutionalism. This result is particularly true of religious life in this country. "The defect of American Christianity lies in its individualism, in its hand-to-hand methods, in the narrowness of its religious beliefs, and in its slight grasp of the central truth of the Incarnation." "The religion of this country has been characterized as a 'commonwealth of sects.'" "American Christianity is weak to-day because it has no recognized voice. There is no national note about it. Whether Protestant or Catholic, it is the religion of specialists and has no national or race significance." "The national mark of our religion is that it does not control society. The religious element is absent from the common life of the people."

These quotations, taken from various chapters, indicate the author's point of view. The weakness of modern, especially of American, Christianity as a *social* power is the refrain of the book. Religion is busy about the regeneration of the individual; it is not saving society. Any one may say, of course, that the regeneration of the individual goes far toward the saving of society. One may go further and say that society cannot be saved except through the regeneration of the individual. Still we believe that Mr. Ward is right in laying the stress which he does upon the social need. Society is more than the sum of the units of which it is composed. Otherwise, how is it that corporations made up of Christian individuals so often go wrong? Why the proverb in Christian communities that "corporations have no soul"? There is a possible social

conscience, possible if society can be acted upon as the individual is acted upon. But society is not acted upon in any large and steady way through a common Christianity. The church at large does not command society as the local church commands its individual membership. Somehow there is an immense loss of authority in the combined action of the churches. All the churches do not begin to have the power which the one church might have in its unity.

The unity of the church is the postulate which Mr. Ward lays down for its organic influence in society. While it is dissevered and disjointed, it cannot come into organic relations to society. It may be a spiritual presence, working zealously for good, but not a social reality like the state, "dealing with humanity as a whole." The analogy of the state may be easily overworked. The church must always act in considerable degree by forces which are intangible. And it must be so much more than the state, while it seems to be so much less. But certainly it cannot claim institutional power, as Mr. Ward clearly points out, while it contents itself with reaching only a part of the humanity common to it with the state. The design of each of the three great institutions, the family, the state, and the church, is universal. Sectarianism can never represent the power or the glory of institutionalism.

But granting the social loss from the want of unity in the church, is there any help for it? Can we really hope for any better state of things? Must we not make up our minds to the diversities of Protestantism if we are to have its abounding vitality? The book before us is a hopeful answer to these questions, partly because it does not promise too much. The problem is not underestimated. The chapter on Constructive Unity in Religious Forces opens with a frank statement of the difficulties which beset the different organizations in their endeavor to realize a conscious unity. No one is complete enough in its present working life to offer itself as the inclusive form. Mr. Ward is an Episcopalian, yet of the Anglican Church he writes: "The Anglican Church in its American growths is based upon the fundamental principle of historical continuity and the recognition of the institutional character of Christianity; but, as it has been mainly developed in this country, it has quite too little taken the catholic position to which it is entitled. It is only here and there that its development has answered to its inherent character. It supplies the basis by which Protestantism may escape from its insularity and rise to the comprehension and freedom which are demanded of the Christian religion in a great democratic country like our own; but it can never expand to a dominating position or meet the demands of a work like this without the coöperation of every religious body in America which maintains any vital principle of Christianity, and by virtue of that principle is entitled to fellowship in the Kingdom of God." Such an acknowledgment as this is in itself a step toward unity. And to our view nothing is so hopeful as the growing humility of the better minds in all the sects in regard to polity, united with a growing agreement in regard to doctrine. We have reached the stage of appreciation of the value of principles other than our own. Toleration of the rights of others has passed into the valuation of their inheritances. We are beginning to act upon the advice of the Apostle, "Not looking each of you to his own things, but each of you also to the things of others." Or, to borrow the sententious language of our author, "What the churches are in the way of help to society comes mainly from the magnitude and strength of their agree-

ments." And again, "The piety of the hour is the substitution of charity for self-will."

It is not well to impose too narrow limits upon the spirit of unity which is beginning to actuate modern Christianity. Let the *spirit* grow and prevail. That alone can determine, as it alone can produce, the form. Let nothing be done to hinder the spirit. All officious books and all contentious books are equally out of place. It is the good fortune of Mr. Ward to have written a book which is really helpful to the desired end.

We have reserved no space in which to refer to the incidental features of this argument for the unity of the church, but we would especially commend, for its spiritual naturalness and simplicity, the chapter on "The Spiritual Method of the Church."

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

FREE TRADE IN CAPITAL, or Free Competition in the supply of Capital to Labour, and its Bearings on the Political and Social Questions of the Day. By A. EGMONT HAKE, Chairman of the Free Trade in Capital League, and O. E. WESSLAU. London: Remington & Co. 1890.

This is a work of considerable art and power, strictly on the lines of old-fashioned English political economy. It is intended as an attack upon the Bank of England and the English system of banking at large, and as a plea for out-and-out free banking. The authors, believing as little as did Ricardo in any sort of governmental surveillance over business, insist that the logic of free trade in international commerce, which has in England never been applied to banking, should be rigidly carried out. To the failure herein they trace all the economic misery of England in recent years. If free banking had prevailed, they would have us believe, such prosperity would have resulted as to have rendered impossible not only all riots and strikes, but the entire social ferment which has of late characterized English history. Their precept is, therefore, "Back to Ricardo," only they would make banking freer than Ricardo ever thought of doing. To establish their positions, the authors present some ten or fifteen introductory chapters, which are exceedingly interesting and valuable in spite of the fact that, to a great extent, they thresh old straw. The first chapter deals with capital, the second with the division of labor, the third with money in its two characters of value-measurer and medium of exchange. The fourth makes it clear that these two functions may easily be subserved by different materials. This chapter contains a rare bit of monetary history concerning the Mark Banco of Hamburg, which, consisting in silver rated according to quantity and fineness, was for centuries the standard of value in Hamburg, though naturally it did not circulate.

The book contains a great deal of keen, thorough, and beautiful economic analysis, of the sort which many teachers neglect in these days, when too much is made, relatively, of mere descriptive economics. It has rich information, also, on the nature of banking as practiced in different countries, and on the minutiae of the foreign exchange business. These aspects of the volume cannot be too strongly praised. They make it a worthwhile contribution to economic literature.

This is about as far as commendatory criticism of the work can go. Many views which the authors lay down we consider altogether wrong.

The contention of the bi-metallists they wholly misconceive. Public education they denounce, wishing us to believe that England would have been better off if the state had never undertaken to educate. Of the factory acts it is said that they are "worse than useless when times are bad and ridiculously superfluous when times are good." All intervention of the state in the domain of industry is declared inevitably an evil, and the entire movement toward state socialism considered a piece of insanity. There is not the slightest appreciation of the great socialistic thinkers, or of their arguments.

What may be regarded the main thesis of the volume is that the free circulation of bank notes by private corporations and individuals without let or hindrance from the state would cure all economic woes. In England itself it would abolish the sweating system. It would solve the Irish question, restore the ancient prosperity of Egypt, and establish, if not a political imperialism of Great Britain and the colonies, at least an economic one. The authors trace all the world's economic distress to the sundering, through over-regulated banking, of capital and labor. Capitalists are scrambling to get their capital used so as to receive interest. Laborers are equally anxious to secure labor, that is, get into coöperation with capital. Each side to a painful extent fails, and the failure is due to the lack of freedom in the issue of notes. Let every one who can market promissory notes, putting them into circulation as money, and the problem is solved.

The theory of the economic evils of society here propounded, and of the cure, is very similar to that set forth a year ago by Mr. Hugo Bilgram, of Philadelphia, in a bright little book entitled "Involuntary Idleness." Mr. Bilgram and the writers of the volume before us contend that at present only the rich can secure discounts. Producers with little capital cannot do this, but are at the mercy of money-lenders. They can at best tide over pinches in their business by mortgaging their little property, which they do not love to do. They therefore keep their production, and their power to employ labor down to the lowest terms, instead of making both as large as they would inevitably be if easier credit conditions prevailed. Bilgram would relieve this difficulty by giving all citizens the privilege of securing greenbacks from the government on the hypothecation of any and every sort of property. The present authors would procure the same result by absolute freedom in the issue of bank notes.

Were this possible, they think, small bankers would start up in every community, whose profits would depend upon the widest possible dissemination of their notes (through discounting) consistent with the safety of their loans. That is, every small producer who was at the same time honest, capable, and likely to succeed, would have credit forced upon him instead of its being withheld as now. Multitudes of men working for wages and salaries would become producers on their own account. Middlemen would be immensely reduced in numbers. Labor would find capital, and capital would find labor.

Such is the new social panacea. In the way of criticism our first question is whether such a system would work as smoothly, justly, and automatically as these gentlemen suppose. There is no doubt that freer banking would be a blessing to England and to Germany. It is possible that in communities so thickly settled as those of Great Britain the free issue of notes would operate somewhat in accord with the theory of this book.

The overwhelming preponderance of economic opinion in England and on the Continent is in favor of some such system rather than of that on which the Bank of England is based. Yet it seems to us both visionary and vicious to advocate free banking as universally safe and feasible. Experience, notably that of the United States from 1814 to 1863, reveals that in sparsely settled localities, at any rate, such a plan is certain to put into circulation vast amounts of poor bills, swindling the unwary and the poor, driving hard money from circulation, raising and distracting prices, and provoking and aggravating commercial crises. We believe that such unhealthy inflation may occur at least locally even when no bills are legal tender and all are instantly convertible. It is not true that the public will infallibly determine the solidity of every bank and curtail its credit just where this ought to be done. The notes will wander to a distance and not be returned as the theory supposes. The acceptance of them may be to a certain degree compulsory, even when not explicitly so. They may form so great a part of the circulation that people have to accept them for lack of other media of exchange. The poor are never in condition to refuse what is offered them as money, even if not too ignorant to suspect it.

If the unhampered issue of bankers' notes were to operate so neatly as Messrs. Hake and Wesslau believe, we should be in favor of it, because it would certainly do some good. It is incredible, however, that it should in any case be so beneficent an ordinance as they think. Discount banking is already free, and note issuing is of use only to enable a banker to carry further his discount business. In kind, all the motives so well described by our authors, tending to crowd credit upon competent producers with small capital, are active already. The unrestrained marketing of notes or private account might somewhat quicken these motives, and perhaps aid a little in bringing them to effect. That it could, even if admissible in other particulars, have more than this insignificant result, does not appear.

Lastly, the notes of mere private parties and firms, however sure to be cashed instantly on presentation, must constitute an insufferably poor currency in comparison with either greenbacks or national bank notes.

E. Benj. Andrews.

PROVIDENCE, R. I., 72 COLLEGE ST.

THE INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS OF THE NATION. Consumption Limited, Production Unlimited. By EDWARD ATKINSON, LL. D., Ph. D., Author of "The Distribution of Products," "The Margin of Profits," etc. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons; The Knickerbocker Press. 1890.

Mr. Edward Atkinson has here collected some essays published in "The Century Magazine," and "The Forum." There has been no attempt to correlate these papers, consequently there is a lack of unity about the book that is to be regretted. The first paper, a commencement address, is so diffuse and personal as to injure the scientific value of the work, though adding to its human interest; the same may be said of the last chapter upon "Religion and Life." Naturally, a good deal of repetition follows from the mere collection of magazine articles. There is further an occasional failure to make plain the logical connection between propositions which makes the work hard reading. But these minor criticisms do not detract seriously from the solid worth of

these essays of a serious, observant man trained to business ; one, too, whose philanthropy and intellectual honesty are always impressive. In his fundamental proposition, "Consumption Limited, Production Unlimited," he finds nothing but promise for the future of the human race. It must be admitted that science more than keeps up with population. But this does not, as he seems to think, prove Malthusianism wrong, nor overthrow the "Law of Diminishing Returns from Land." A little practical farming in central Dakota would convince him that there is much truth in the orthodox economic doctrine. This does not state that there will be no addition to the product from the application of additional capital, but that at a certain point the return ceases to be in proportion to the capital. The exhibition of the food resources of the United States is an exceedingly interesting one ; but is it not a little sanguine to say that "A knowledge of the alphabet of food is what is needed in order that all alike may have their necessary equal share of food" ? — not that Mr. Atkinson is wrong in thinking that just this subject of consumption is the undeveloped subject in theoretical and practical economics. Indeed, the chapter on "The Missing Science" deserves very careful study. Such serious and intelligent contributions to the subject of economical consumption have great value ; certainly they hasten the time when scientific cooking will be understood and taught experimentally in our public schools. There could be no more important study, from an economic point of view alone, if national savings are a question of five cents daily savings per capita, as Mr. Atkinson thinks.

The interesting chapters upon "The Food Question in America and Europe" and "The Relative Strength and Weakness of Nations" exhibit, by the graphic method of lines, our strength and Europe's weakness ; a fact which he presents in the startling form of "Disarm or Starve," so large is the proportion of the product of labor that is consumed by soldiers in idleness. Mr. Atkinson computes the proportion of national taxation to estimated product at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in the United States against 15 per cent. in France, and while the annual labor of 500,000 men sustains, in the United States, all the functions of the national government, directly or indirectly, in France it requires the labor of 3,000,000 men to do this. The heading of another chapter, "Low Prices, High Wages, Small Profits," is a volume in itself. One of the curious facts he here brings out is "that the conversion of corn into pork is an absolute and total waste of nutritious food," and "all the pork could be spared and yet the daily ration — of the American workman — would be more than ample."

Upon the subject of "Progress and Poverty" his conclusions tally with those reached by Mr. Wells. "The capitalists are working under an imperative law of diminishing profits. The workingmen who do the work intelligently and skillfully are progressing under an imperative rule by which their wages are increased while the purchasing power of their wages is yet more increased." The rule is then "Progress from Poverty," which is indeed the title of a subsequent chapter.

The "Single Tax" system receives small favor at his hands. So many a popular nostrum is unable to stand up before so practical a man as Mr. Atkinson. It is this contact with reality that makes these essays so healthful, especially to those who live more in ideals. We confess to a feeling of dizziness when Mr. Atkinson soars into the future upon his numerical pinions. Small fractions are dangerous when one multiplies

by millions. Finally, averages are instructive but misleading. A few Vanderbilts average per capita wealth up rapidly. We want to know the relation of numbers to the average. In as far as Mr. Atkinson has thrown his facts into classes, he has done statistics a service. Perhaps it remains true that social reformers still regard too much the exceptions — forgetting the rule. Here, again, such generalizations as crowd this book are useful.

D. Collin Wells.

ANDOVER, MASS.

ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT. By A. LAWRENCE LOWELL. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.; The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1889.

Of the five essays which make this book, three discuss subjects which belong to our political life. The first of these, which treats of "Cabinet Responsibility," combats the opinion that the Constitution ought to be amended so as to give members of the cabinet seats in the House of Representatives and empower them to introduce and advocate there financial and other measures. This scheme, if implying that the cabinet officers would be removable by Congress, and only by it, would, Mr. Lowell justly thinks, involve both taking all governing power from the President, and the rapid centralization of the government. In short, it would mean the abandonment of our present political system for another not so well adapted to the conditions of our national life. The suggestion that the cabinet officers be given seats without votes Mr. Lowell passes over with the remark that this would either make no material change in the working of the government, or amount to entire cabinet responsibility. But he does not try to prove this, and his essay may fairly be charged with incompleteness at this point.

The second essay, entitled "Democracy and the Constitution," shows the admirable adaptation of our Constitution to the life of a democratic country. Just such restraints upon the popular will as are needed to prevent excessive and enfeebling legislation are furnished by its complicated system of checks and balances. The third paper, which is entitled "The Responsibilities of American Lawyers," points out very forcibly how much the stability of our institutions depends upon the way the legal profession performs the task given it of authoritatively interpreting the Constitution. . . . "It is because our people care more for their Constitution than for any single law enacted by the legislature that constitutional government is possible among us. So long as such a feeling continues, our Constitution and the power of our courts will remain unimpaired; but if at any time the people conclude that constitutional law, as interpreted by lawyers, is absurd or irrational, the power of the judiciary will inevitably vanish, and a great part of the Constitution will be irretrievably swept away. Our constitutional law depends for its force upon the fact that it approves itself to the good sense of the people; and the power of the courts is held upon condition that the precedents established by them are wise, statesmanlike, and founded upon enduring principles of justice which are worthy of the respect of the community."

The last two essays are careful studies in political science; the first, a sketch of the history of the "social compact theory," is a valuable contribution to the history of political speculation; the second, a discussion of

"the limits of sovereignty," argues convincingly against Austin's doctrine that sovereign power cannot be limited.

The book is an interesting illustration of the way a mind trained in constitutional law approaches the problems of free government, and is likely to foster a healthy political conservatism.

Edward Y. Hincks.

GESCHICHTE DER PÄPSTE SEIT DEM AUSGANG DES MITTELALTERS. VON DR. LUDWIG PASTOR, Professor der Geschichte an der Universität zu Innsbruck. Zweiter Band. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1889.

The first volume of this Catholic History of the Popes was noticed in this journal at page 656 of vol. viii. The second appeared at the close of 1889. It covers the period from the beginning of the reign of Pius II., 1458, to the close of that of Sixtus IV., 1484.

This volume exhibits throughout the same characteristics as the first, but the period of which it treats is one of far less general interest. The details of papal policy are minutely followed; something more of general interest is added in the negotiations with Louis XI., of France, and with the Bohemians concerning reunion. The Turkish war is continued, and the papacy is depicted as a bulwark of Christendom, though often discouraged by the apathy of Western Europe and the selfishness of the Italian states. Italy with its internal politics necessarily occupies a large share of the book, though hardly beginning as yet to have the general interest which will speedily attach to it as the stage upon which the great drama of modern international politics is to begin. The conspiracy of the Pozzi is discussed with the aid of new material, but with no important new conclusions. Pope Sixtus, whose weaknesses, at least, are not disguised, encouraged the political conspiracy, according to the author, but knew nothing of the intended murder.

Attached to the volume is an appendix of some forty pages in reply to the more important criticism on the first volume. In this, mention is made of French, English, and Italian translations of that volume completed or undertaken.

The announcement is made that volume third will finish the reign of Leo X., covering thus a period fully equal in general interest to that of the first volume.

George B. Adams.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE STORY OF THE NATIONS. THE HANSA TOWNS. By HELEN ZIMMERN, Author of "A Life of Lessing," "Heroic Tales from Firdusi," etc. Pp. xvii, 389. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1889.

This very easily read book fills in to the full of our need the shadowy conception we previously had of the great Hanse League, which began of itself, no one just knows when, controlled the whole commerce of the North for some two centuries, swept into its compact some two or three hundred German towns, constituted a veritable "Hanse nation," which was a nation for one end only; commerce became so wealthy that, to emphasize its merchant modesty, it only permitted its subject burghers to put eighty dishes on a table at one entertainment, opened

to them a various life extending from Novgorod to Jerusalem, crushed implacably all rivals, under the lead of Lubeck, its permanent head, and perished at last of the Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, the change in the migrations of that little fish, the herring, on which it rested, and of its obstinate and boorish incapacity to see the marks of a widening era.

Not the least interesting side of the story is the description of the many generations of steady faithfulness to compacts, during which the English allowed the Easterlings to rule them commercially. Elizabeth at last set her people free, but while resolute for them, did not drive out the Germans until they showed that they would have all or nothing. The economist Therold Rogers seem justified in his enthusiasm over the economical side of the great Queen's policy. But only in 1853 did the Germans finally part with the London Steelyard. And only last year did the last relic of the mighty league disappear by the compelled yet voluntary entrance of Hamburg into the German Zollverein.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

IRIS: Studies in Colour and Talks about Flowers. By FRANZ DELITZSCH, D. D., Professor of Theology, Leipsic. Translated from the original by the Rev. A. CUSIN, M. A., Edinburgh. 12mo, pp. 227. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1889.

"The prismatic colors of the rainbow, the brilliant sword-lily, that wonderful part of the eye which gives it its color, and the messenger of heaven who beams with joy, youth, beauty, and love, are all named Iris." So the learned author explains the title of these curious yet captivating studies.

The charm of Dr. Delitzsch's personal character invests the contents. He treats lovingly of "The Blue of the Sky," of "Black and White" as the colors of ecclesiastical dress, of "Purple and Scarlet," and of "Academic Official Robes and their Colors." No one can call him unscientific and untheological. With the scholar he blends, however, in a thoroughly German way, the child and the poet.

It is over twenty years since Lazarus Geiger, at a conference of naturalists at Frankfort-on-Main, showed that color-sense in primeval man was comparatively impotent. Mr. Gladstone's studies in Homer looked to a similar result. Dr. Delitzsch illustrates the blindness of the ancients to the blue of the sky, especially of the day-sky, in a most interesting way. Not a word in praise of that lovely color does he find in the Rig-Veda, though blue is the color of Indra, the sky god. Neither does the old Persian Avesta ever anywhere celebrate the blue of the sky. The North Semitic languages have not even an adjective for blue, nor has the Egyptian. Yet Egypt and Babylon both knew blue mineral dyes. In the Edda its waves are of the terrestrial, never of the celestial ocean. The classical literature of Greece, under its laughing canopy of azure, betrays the same lack. Not till the third century before our era do the old Latin poets designate heaven by the color-name *cœrulus*; thenceforward it is a favorite pictorial epithet. Outside of Holy Scripture, the Chinese seem to have the priority in color-perception and color-expression, since their Schi-King, before the seventh century, calls the sky the vaulted blue.

Dr. Delitzsch concedes that the Hebrew had no specific word for sky-

blue. Yet even here the Book of books maintains its uniqueness in the literature of nations. It calls to its aid the *transparent sapphire* under the feet of the God of Israel. Sapphire-blue is the blue of heaven. It is the hue of the Covenant. Hence the Israelitic fringes were meant to recall God. The old tradition of the painters makes blue the color of the upper garment of our Lord, who stooped from the throne of light to the manger and the cross.

Something of the simple joy and jubilant mirth of Israel, which the author is sure survived the exile, survives in his chapter on "Dancing and the Criticism of the Pentateuch."

The German colors are red, black, and white, — colors, he says, essential to man as such. Who will not echo his prayer of youthful fervor and patriarchal benignity, "May the German Empire, in conformity with its colors, approve itself a helper of humanity, — a helper, that is, of the religious and moral disposition and destination which are set before us by the Sinaitic law, and its profounder exhibition in the Sermon on the Mount, as the bond and goal of the human brotherhood!"

John Phelps Taylor.

WORDSWORTHIANA. A Selection from Papers read to the Wordsworth Society. Edited by WILLIAM KNIGHT. Pp. xxi, 342. London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1889. \$2.25.

The Wordsworth Society was formed in 1880, and held meetings annually until 1886, when it dissolved, having accomplished the work it had to do. It was at first a private club, with a small number of members. As the plan became known, a large number of persons desired to join it, and at the last annual meeting the society had 344 members. It included some of the most distinguished men of England, such as Professor William Knight, Robert Browning, John Ruskin, Lord Coleridge, Lord Selborne, R. H. Hutton, the Bishop of St. Andrews and the Bishop of London, the Dean of Salisbury, Matthew Arnold, and Edward Dowden. The objects of the society were not only to draw together those who were in sympathy with the literary spirit and teaching of Wordsworth, but to carry on the literary work that remained to be done in connection with the text and chronology of the poems; to collect original letters and reminiscences of the poet; to prepare a record of opinions with reference to Wordsworth, and to investigate various points connected with the first appearance and history of his works. A volume of Transactions was printed each year, and issued to the members. It includes a report of the meeting, the papers read, and others prepared for publication only.

The volume before us contains twenty papers, selected from a much larger number in the seven volumes of the Transactions of the Society. Readers of Wordsworth will be likely to turn first to the paper by Mr. H. D. Rawnsley entitled, "Reminiscences of Wordsworth amongst the Peasantry of Westmoreland." The writer, coming to reside in the lake country, set himself to gather up the memories of the poet among the dalesmen. He found an aged woman who had once been at service at Rydal Mount; an old man who used to provide meat for the kitchen; another who had been employed in his youth in Wordsworth's garden; two old house-builders who used to meet the poet almost every day; and still another who had lived for years as a servant in the family at Rydal

Mount. All these had pleasant recollections of the poet. They describe his dress, his appearance at home and on the streets, his peculiar likes and dislikes. "He went humming and booing about, and Miss Dorothy kept close behind him, and she picked up the bits as he let 'em fall, and put 'em together on paper for him." He was a "plain man, plainly dressed," — "was much on the road with his cloak and umbrella." He had "a great deep voice," — was "fond of his own bairns," but not of those of other folks. "He was a' for study," and would n't come to dinner when he was called; he went every Sunday to church and sat in his own pew, the second or third from the front on the right from the chancel.

Another interesting paper is on the portraits of Wordsworth, by Professor Knight. He gives the history of forty-two portraits, including some busts. The best of these are the ones painted by Henry Inman, an American; B. R. Haydon, "Wordsworth upon Helvellyn;" and one by the elder Pickersgill. Very valuable also are the addresses delivered at the annual meetings by the presidents of the society, — by Matthew Arnold, in 1883; James Russell Lowell, in 1887; Lord Houghton, in 1885; and Lord Selborne, in 1886. The final meeting of the society was held in London, in the Jerusalem Chamber in Westminster. The great feature of this meeting, besides the president's address, was a paper, read by Professor John Veitch, of the University of Glasgow, on "The Theism of Wordsworth." It is the most satisfactory discussion we have seen of the religious element in his poetry. The writer discusses the passages which seem to have a pantheistic tendency. But he quotes other passages which show that the poet regarded the transcendent Power as personal, with intellect, and will, and emotion, fully conscious of himself and of his workings. "Man is the nearest type of God, and every step we take in nobler effort is a stage of assimilation with the Divine."

Other papers in the volume are, — The Platonism of Wordsworth; Wordsworth's Modernization of Chaucer, by Professor Edward Dowden; Earlier and Later Styles of Wordsworth, by R. H. Hutton; Wordsworth's Guide to the Lakes, by Stopford Brooke; Personal Character of Wordsworth's Poetry, by Aubrey de Vere; Wordsworth's Position as an Ethical Teacher, by the Dean of Salisbury; The Poetic Interpretation of Nature, by Roden Nöel; Wordsworth's Relation to Science: his Treatment of Sound; Wordsworth and Charles Lamb; Wordsworth and Turner; and The Poets who helped to form his Style.

This volume shows, in a very clear way, the hold which the poetry of Wordsworth has upon the men of greatest intellectual power, and of the highest culture, in Great Britain.

Ezra Hoyt Byington.

WORCESTER, MASS.

PORTRAITS OF FRIENDS. By JOHN CAMPBELL SHAIRP, Author of "Culture and Religion." With a Sketch of Principal Shairp, by WILLIAM YOUNG SELLARS, and an Etched Portrait. Pp. 212. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889. \$1.25.

Thomas Arnold and John Shairp were both connected with Rugby, though not contemporarily. They were both devoted to the kingdom of God, but the former chiefly as leavening the nations, the latter chiefly as developing itself interiorly, in the intellect and soul. They are

alike in the completeness and satisfactoriness of their lives; the former massive, the latter slight in mass, but ethereally penetrating. Shairp had a magnificent crown of English and Scottish friends. His portraiture of Thomas Erskine, of Linlathen, explains why the latter, retired and quiet, was such a power. He combines the depth of mysticism and the distinctness of Calvinism. Shairp shows John Campbell, of Row, as less than Erskine, but better balanced even than he. These men, fathers of the New Theology, point out its great danger, — realized in more than one American example, — namely, that it shall forget that the Fatherhood of God, though supreme, includes the Righteous Governor, and that his end is never to be so urged as to cause men to forget the awfulness of means which he may have to use. The sketch of Norman Macleod is pleasant. He must have been a charming man, though hardly a great one. A kindly notice of that most delightful of men, Dr. John Brown, is given, remarking that in the brief compass of his writings is summed up the best heart of Scotland for many a year back. Shairp himself combines Scottish strength and English culture, and alike in blood and associations, the Celtic Highlands and the Scandinavian Lowlands. An English University man, he remained Presbyterian, and, deeply profiting by Newman, he was never enchanted by the glamour of even a mitigated ritualism, although in his portraiture of Bishop Cotton, the Primate of India, he shows us what grand uses the Episcopal office may always serve where it is filled up to its measure.

Shairp's devotion to Wordsworth at once raises him and his nearest friends, and is elsewhere fully justified by him. In what ideal nobleness and truth does he bring out "The White Doe of Rylestone Hall"!

"Thou, thou art not a child of time
But daughter of th' eternal prime."

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

EMERGENCY NOTES. By GLENTWORTH R. BUTLER, M. D. New York : Funk & Wagnalls, Publishers. 1889.

Dr. Butler has a large hospital practice in Brooklyn, is the medical director of the Red Cross Society of Brooklyn, and a lecturer on Emergencies and Home Nursing. From a material point of view, his book is a little one — containing 102 pages of large print, 5 1-2 by 3 1-4 inches, of which about twenty pages are occupied by the preface, the index, and other auxiliary matter. It is illustrated by seventeen figures.

The design of the work, and the quality of it, are both well represented by the description given on the title-page: "Emergency Notes. What to do in accidents and sudden illness until the doctor comes." For compactness and intelligibility, it would be difficult to excel this, but the book throughout is equally compact and intelligible. As a layman, I am not competent to decide whether it is medically and surgically orthodox, but I know that I could easily commit it to memory, and understand it well enough to follow the instructions it gives; and that is high praise to bestow on such a book.

W. J. Beecher.

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
AUBURN, N. Y.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Commentar über das Buch Jesaja, von Franz Delitzsch, Vierte durchaus verbesserte Auflage. Mrk. 16. *Die Heilige Schrift und die Negative Kritik*. Ein Beitrag zur Apologetik von E. E. Johansson, Deutsch von J. Clausen. Mit einem Anhang über rechte und falsche Verteidigung der Bible von Franz Delitzsch. Pp. vi, 240. Mrk. 4. *Kephas der Evangelist*. Studien zur Evangelienfrage von Th. H. Mandel. Pp. 139. Dörffling & Franke in Leipzig. Mrk. 2. — The work of Professor Delitzsch is so well known that we need only remark that the present edition, by reason of its great improvement, is really a new commentary, and that an English translation is already in preparation. Dr. Johansson's book will be found of great usefulness. The clear statement of the principles of negative criticism, and the dispassionate discussion of their validity, which characterize the volume and occupy the first sixty-four pages, illuminate many dark places and dispel some current errors. Various traditions, legends, and national myths are considered from the point of view of their general historical conditions. The two chapters, pages 77–232, on the Old and the New Testaments and negative criticism proceed on historical and critical lines, with special reference to negative claims and methods. The author is master of his thoughts, and presents them with delightful terse simplicity. The supplement by Professor Delitzsch is a lecture which was prepared last summer for the Anglo-American Exegetical Society.

Die Entwicklung der modernen Ethnologie, von Dr. Thomas Achelis. Pp. ix, 149. E. S. Mittler und Sohn. Berlin: Königliche Hofbuchhandlung. Mrk. 3. — The purpose of the author is to call the attention of scientific circles to the hopeful condition of this youthful branch of natural philosophy. This purpose is embodied in a very succinct study of the course of modern ethnology in its leading ideas and principles. The *punctum saliens* of the whole investigation is to exhibit the social-psychological aspect of the subject. The standpoint taken is that of the comparative method. This method determines the selection of the writers that are reviewed, and at the same time brings ethnology almost entirely within our own century. The fathers of a scientific sociology in a special sense were Lafitan, Forster, and Chamisso, while Voltaire, Rousseau, Herder, and Schiller are its more general representatives. But ethnology did not rise to the dignity of a social science before the labors of August Comte, who may be regarded as its real founder. The second chapter, pages 27–146, studies the progress of the science through its most prominent disciples. Quetelet and Schäffle emphasize the sociological, while, among others, J. C. Pritchard, Bastian, Waitz, Lubbock, Tylor, and Ratzel have developed the more strictly ethnological side. Dr. Achelis is thoroughly familiar with his subject, and has given an excellent presentation of the character and position of the science.

Allgemeine Geschichte der Literatur des Mittelalters im Abendlande bis zum Beginne des XI Jahrhunderts, von Adolf Ebert. 3 Bände. Mrk. 33. Erster Band: *Geschichte der christlichlateinischen Literatur* von ihren Anfängen bis zum Zeitalter Karls des Grossen. Zweite vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. Pp. xiv, 667. Verlag von F. C. W. Vogel in Leipzig. Mrk. 12. — This work is recognized as one of extraordinary

merit. The literary language of the Middle Age was the Latin, and it may be said that the national literatures of the Western world are members of that organism. Rome gave to the modern world prose and poetic forms as well as law. Dr. Ebert places great emphasis upon the value of a correct analysis of the representative literary productions. Herein is the chief excellency of the work before us. The author has objectified his work. In the various analyses we see form, content, and relations clearly defined. The first volume has been thoroughly revised and much augmented by reason of the recent publications of the "*Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum*" and the "*Monumenta Germaniæ historica*." Three periods are distinguished, the first from Minucius Felix to Constantine, the second, pages 105-357, to the death of Augustine, and the third closing in the age of Charlemagne with Beda and Boniface. This volume is complete in itself, and furnished with an excellent index. It is a work which may be commended alike to students of history, philosophy, or literature.

Geschichte der Pädagogik, dargestellt in weltgeschichtlicher Entwicklung und im organischen Zusammenhang mit dem Kulturleben der Völker. 4 Bd. Mrk. 39. Erster Band: *Die Geschichte der Pädagogik in der vorchristlichen Zeit*, vierte Auflage vielfach vermehrt und verbessert, auf den neusten Quellenstudien und Forschungen beruhend, von Dr. Fried. Dittes und Dr. Emanuel Hannak. Pp. xxxii, 958. Cöthen: Paul Schettler's Erben. 1890. Mrk. 12. — The great work on the history of education is, without doubt, that of Schmidt. This fourth edition of the first volume, which comprehends the history of education among the peoples of the Orient, including the Greeks and Romans, not only has no rival, but is a marvel of observation and investigation, the most extensive and accurate yet furnished. The eighty pages which introduce the general subject characterizing the different periods and literary sources, and the forty pages of special introduction to education among the ancients, constitute an invaluable prospect of the whole field. The study opens with the Chinese, Japanese, and Egyptians, pages 118-250, then turns to the Semitic peoples, pages 250-347, of which sixty pages are given to Israel. In the one hundred pages given to the Aryans, India holds the chief position. Education in Greece, pages 446-738, and in Rome, pages 738-925, is presented with completeness without prolixity. Throughout the work, special effort is made to place theories and practical methods in a clear light. It is needless to say that this history is in a very important respect the history of morality, religion, and law among these different peoples. This volume is not of less value to the philosopher and theologian than to the pedagogue. An elaborate index makes the storehouse easily accessible.

Pädagogische Bibliothek. Erster Band: *Einleitung und Geschichte der Pädagogik mit Musterstücken aus den pädagogischen Meisterwerken der verschiedenen Zeiten*. Achte vermehrte u. verbesserte Auflage. Pp. viii, 462. Eleg. geb. Mrk. 5. Zweiter Band: *Die systematische Pädagogik und die Schulkunde*. Achte vermehrte u. verbesserte Auflage. Pp. xiii, 454. Hannover: Verlag von Carl Meyer (Gustav Prior). Eleg. geb. 1890. Mrk. 5. — Simultaneously appear new and greatly improved editions of the three most serviceable works on Pedagogics in the German language. The above-named volumes by Dr. Schumann constitute an admirable compendium of the whole subject. His work still remains the most popular and satisfactory digest of the history and theory of teaching.

As a handbook, Schumann is to pedagogy what Schwegler is to philosophy. Both volumes have undergone thorough revision in the present edition. In the history we notice a new chapter on education among the early Germans, and at the end of each chapter a brief summary and comparative review. A more complete analysis of difficult historical matter is also given. The systematic part, which grows out of psychology and anthropology, is constructed inductively, bringing into view suggestive lines of experience and observation. The works are noticeably rich in brief and characteristic extracts from the literature of education. The price of the volumes is noticeably in the favor of teachers, as are also the arrangement and condensation of their matter.

Handbuch der Praktischen Pädagogik für höhere Lehranstalten, von Prof. Dr. Herman Schiller. Zweite umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Pp. ix, 658. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag (R. Reisland). 1890. Mrk. 10. — This work is receiving the highest commendation from professors as being the latest, best, and most scientific contribution to systematic pedagogy. The second edition followed closely upon the first. The aim of the work is to place the teacher upon a foundation at once theoretical and practical. The author claims to present a practical theory, — a theory that contains nothing which is not based upon long and successful experiment. The general mental coloring of the work may be indicated to the English reader by the names Lotze, Höffding, and Wundt. This is seen in the chapter on "Psychology," pages 79-133, which is about equally divided between psychology proper and ethics. The twenty pages given to ethics are new to this edition, and furnish an excellent statement from the standpoint of experimental psychology. The larger and more constructive part of the work, pages 275-654, is given to methods of instruction. In the part which considers the teaching of languages, pages 292-535, the author has gone far beyond others in his appreciation of structural differences as well as of the necessary qualifications of the instructor. The schemes seem to be well constructed and complete. The work of Dr. Schiller is of a very high order, and should be in the hands of those who are concerned with higher education. It comprehends the school, the scholar, and the teacher; the whole man in his physical, intellectual, and moral development. The chapter on school discipline, pages 133-216, is a valuable little treatise on practical morality, with an introduction on religious duties.

Handbuch der -theologischen Wissenschaften in Encyclopädischer Darstellung mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Einzelnen Disziplinen, herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Otto Zöckler. Dritte sorgfältig durchgesehene, teilweise neu bearbeitete Auflage. Band IV.: *Praktische Theologie*. Pp. viii, 660. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Oskar Beck). 1890. Mrk. 10. — The present edition of this excellent handbook shows much improvement. The publishers have issued for the benefit of the holders of the first and second editions, a volume containing subsequent additions. They have also placed the four volumes, Biblical, Historical, Systematic, and Practical Theology, including an index, at the very moderate price of fifty marks. There is no handbook of theological science that rivals this in its completeness and wise division of labor. It is the product of a score of the best scholars in Germany, each making his contribution in his special department. The present volume is the most practical member of the

series, furnishing in a condensed form a complete outline of the various features of practical theology. After an introduction to this branch of theology, the history and theory of missions is presented in its course from Apostolic times to present day activities. An excellent view is given of the evangelical methods of the Middle Ages, but more valuable still is the handling of the problems of modern missions. The commercial spirit is the blasting breath. Catechetics and Homiletics are treated with more emphasis on theory but also in their historical developments. The history of preaching, pages 230-399, is perhaps the most instructive part of the work. With Origen, preaching begins to take form as an art. The art is studied in the Latin homilies and mission sermons of the Middle Ages to its decline before the Reformation. The new period of preaching is presented with reference to Germany, France, and England. Liturgics and Pastorology are ably treated by Professor Dr. T. Harnack. The chapter on the "Diaconate," by Dr. Schäfer, involves an excellent review of questions relating to poverty, pauperism, and relief. The final section is a history of the constitution of the church. The Handbook seems to meet every just demand. Its matter is condensed and systematic. There is reference to an extensive literature in each department, including many works by French and English authors.

Abriß der gesamten Kirchengeschichte, von Prof. Dr. Herzog, w. o. ö. Professor der Theologie in Erlangen. Zweite vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage, besorgt von Lic. theol. G. Hoffmann. Erster Band, Erste Abteilung: Die alte Kirche auf dem Boden der griechisch-römischen Kultur. Pp. xi, 414. Erlangen: Verlag von Eduard Besold. 1890. Mrk. 6. — Among many excellent features of Dr. Herzog's work we notice first, that it holds the strong mean between such extensive works as those of Neander, Gieseler, and Baur, and the somewhat inadequate abstracts of Hase and Niedner. The present edition, which covers the whole field of Christian Church History, will be completed in two volumes. The second excellency of the work is the outcome of the author's well-known character as a truth-seeker. Our third note relates to the work of the editor, who has availed himself of the suggestions of special criticisms of the work and devoted much time and judgment in correction, condensation, and addition, that the book may answer the requirements of the present day. The part of the work above indicated is complete in itself, giving the history from the beginning to the Council of Chalcedon in the year 451. Of special interest is the treatment of Gnosticism and Arianism.

H. A. W. Meyer's Kritisch exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament. Das Matthäus-Evangelium. Achte Auflage, neu bearbeitet von Dr. Bernhard Weiss, Oberconsistorialrath und ordentl. Prof. an der Universität Berlin. Pp. iv, 500. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht's Verlag. 1890. Mrk. 7, geb. 8.60. — Professor Weiss has found it necessary to make a complete revision of Meyer's work on Matthew. The main purpose is to give the text a thorough interpretation and make the commentary strictly exegetical. The original work was neither free from error, nor from matter foreign to its purpose. We may also say that the value of the work was unequal, as many parts were overworked, while others were left without sufficient notice. These weak points have been made strong, and while Dr. Weiss has added much material by his notes and observations, the commentary is not so extended as was the last edition. This arises from striking out the dogmatic and the historico-

critical elements which do not belong in an exegetical work. It is noticeable that the very points in which Meyer's work excelled are those which receive the most thorough attention of Dr. Weiss. The objective point is to make a critical exegesis, and this point is attained with remarkable success. The work, as it now stands, is not only without a rival, but a necessary aid to the study of Matthew.

• *Grundriss der Praktischen Theologie*, von D. Karl Knoke, ord. Prof. d. Theol. an der Universität Göttingen. Zweite umgearbeitete Auflage. Pp. vi, 168. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht's Verlag. Mrk. 2.60. — A few years ago, Professor Knoke published a brief outline for the use of his students. This outline now appears rearranged and enlarged as an aid to students of practical theology. The arrangement as well as the succinct treatment of the various topics will be found of value not only to students, but to all who are called upon to treat the subject.

Das Heidenthum in der römischen Kirche. Bilder aus dem religiösen und sittlichen Leben Süditaliens, von Th. Trede. Erster Teil. Pp. iii, 342. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. Mrk. 5. — One would seek long to find more brilliant pictures or a more faithful exposition of the moral, social, and religious life of Southern Italy. Here is an opportunity to look into the home life of the great majority of our Italian immigrants. The author has lived many years in Italy; he knows the people. He is undoubtedly right in saying that the place to study Roman Christianity is Rome, that "the Church" is not identical with Christendom, and that Southern Italy has yet to receive the gospel. But his word-pictures of the people must be seen and read in the seventeen chapters of the work. The book is far more than description of the present life and customs of the people. It is full of historical reflection and solid information, bringing the classic Italy alongside of the Italy of to-day.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

LEIPZIG, GERMANY.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

D. C. Heath & Co., Boston. The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics. A Sketch of Institutional History and Administration. By Woodrow Wilson, Ph. D., LL. D. Pp. xxxvi, 686. 1889; — An Introduction to the Study of Shakespeare. By Hiram Corson, LL. D., Professor of English Literature in the Cornell University. Pp. 397. 1889.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. History of the Old South Church (Third Church), Boston, 1669-1884. By Hamilton Andrews Hill. In two volumes. Vol. I. Pp. xiii, 602; Vol. II. Pp. viii, 688. 1890. \$10.00; — American Religious Leaders: Dr. Muhlenberg. By William Wilberforce Newton, D. D. 16mo, pp. x, 272. 1890. \$1.25.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. The Salt Cellars: Being a Collection of Proverbs, Together with Homely Notes Thereon. M-Z. By C. H. Spurgeon. Second series. Pp. 367. 1890. \$1.50. For sale by De Wolfe, Fisk & Co., Boston; — The Sermon Bible: Isaiah and Malachi. Pp. vi, 511. 1890. \$1.50.

The Baker & Taylor Co., New York. The One Gospel; or the Combination of the Narratives of the Four Evangelists in One Complete Record. Edited by Arthur T. Pierson. Pp. vi, 203. 1889. 75 cents.

Iverson, Blakeman & Co., New York. An Inductive Latin Method. By William R. Harper, Ph. D., Professor in Yale University, and Isaac B. Burgess, A. M., Latin Master in Rogers High School, Newport, R. I. Pp. viii, 323. 1888; — An Inductive Greek Method. By William R. Harper, Ph. D., Professor in Yale University, and William E. Waters, Ph. D., Cincinnati, Ohio. Pp. 355. 1888.

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THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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APRIL, 1890

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
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APR 2 1890

THE

ANDOVER REVIEW:

A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XIII.—APRIL, 1890.—No. LXXVI.

RELIGIOUS LIFE IN OUR STATE UNIVERSITIES.

I WILLINGLY comply with the request of the editors of this "Review" to furnish this article on Religious Life in our State Universities. There is doubtless not a little misapprehension in the East, and possibly in other parts of the country, concerning the religious influences and religious life in these institutions. Since we have so complete a separation of church and state, it seems to be assumed by many that a college supported by a state must be devoid of the religious spirit. Parents are often exhorted to keep their children away from state universities, if they would not expose them to the danger of losing Christian character. The fathers and the mothers who send their children to college do, with few exceptions, desire, and rightly desire, that those children should be helped, not hindered, in the Christian life, while they are pursuing their studies. The state universities—and for the purposes of this study the agricultural colleges may be considered with them—have now become so numerous, and the attendance upon them is so large and is so rapidly increasing, that questions well worthy of the notice of a Review like this, and well worthy the attention of all Christian men, are these: What is the spirit of religious life in these institutions; what kind of men make up their faculties; what sort of religious services, if any, are held within their walls; what religious organizations, if any, exist among the students? Are they, as has sometimes been said, "godless institutions"? Are their teachers interested only in what is called "secular learning"? Are Christian character and Christian

life not cultivated? Worse still, are these institutions so administered as deliberately to destroy Christian faith? Or, on the contrary, are the great majority of the instructors members of Christian churches? Are they engaged, in college and in church and in Sunday-school, in religious work? Are vigorous Christian Associations organized among the students? Are earnest Christian men and women going forth each year from the walls of these state institutions to all worthy pursuits, not excepting that of the minister and of the foreign missionary?

It is not practicable to procure statistics to answer all these questions. Indeed, it were impossible, with the fullest statistics, to answer them all in numerical terms. But figures can be given which will aid in answering some of them. It is believed that the following facts concerning five agricultural colleges and the collegiate department of nineteen state universities¹ will be found instructive.

In twenty-two of these twenty-four state schools of learning daily chapel services are held, and in twelve of the twenty-two the attendance of the students is compulsory. Nine of them have preaching on Sunday in the college buildings. Four of them require attendance on church as well as on the service of daily prayer. One of them has a chaplain paid by the state. One of the two which have no daily chapel service provides preaching on Sunday by very eminent divines. The attendance of students on religious exercises is not so generally made compulsory as in the colleges under denominational control. But I think I am not mistaken in saying that many religious men in the state universities, and some in other colleges, are persuaded that the voluntary system is best for the students so mature as those in our Western colleges. That is a point on which good men may differ. But where, as at the University of Michigan, the average age of the freshman on entering college is nineteen and a half years, it is at least open to discussion whether the spiritual welfare of undergraduates will be promoted by their being driven to religious service under fear of a monitor's mark. In passing, it may be remarked as a little singular and inconsistent that those who have criticised the state universities for having no chapel service, or only voluntary attendance at chapel, have never criticised scientific schools for making no provision for the service of daily prayer. If I mistake not, the custom of holding daily prayers is "honored more in the

¹ In this list are included all the principal state universities, as well as Cornell University, which, perhaps, some might not include in the category.

breach than in the observance" at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Sheffield School, and some other schools of a similar character, against which Christian parents are not habitually warned as they are against state universities. Who will explain this?

Again, in twenty of the state institutions — all from which I have facts on this point — it appears that seventy-one per cent. of the teachers are members of churches, and not a few of the others are earnestly and even actively religious men who have not formally joined any communion. When we remember that colleges not under state control — certainly this is true of the larger ones — do not now always insist on church membership as the condition of an appointment to a place in the faculties, and that no board of regents or trustees of any state university will knowingly appoint to a chair of instruction a man who is not supposed to be of elevated moral character, it must be conceded that the pupils in the state institutions are not exposed to much peril from their teachers. That a few men whose influence was calculated to disturb or weaken the Christian faith of students have found their way into the faculties of the state institutions is true. But it is also true that such men have been, and still are, I fear, members of faculties of other colleges. Men appointed in denominational colleges have, after taking office, changed their faith or lost their faith, and retained their positions. No doubt, however, in the faculties of such institutions, a somewhat larger percentage of church members is likely to be found than in the state universities. But the great majority of men who choose teaching as their profession always have been, and are likely to be, reverent, earnest, even religious men. So it has come to pass that seven or eight of every ten men in the corps of teachers in the state universities are members of Christian churches. And if you go to the cities where those universities are planted, you will find a good proportion of these teachers superintending Sunday-schools, conducting Bible classes, sometimes supplying pulpits, engaged in every kind of Christian work, and by example and word stimulating their pupils to a Christian life.

It is believed that the first college Christian Association ever formed was organized in a state university, whether in the University of Michigan or the University of Virginia is not quite certain. In every one of the twenty-four state institutions of which I am writing, there is now a Christian Association or Christian Endeavor Society of students. In several of them there are two,

one for men and one for women. Rooms are generally provided for them in the university buildings. In two cases, at least, costly buildings have been erected for the Associations by private contributions, a generous share of which was given by professors and students. Religious meetings are held by these bodies with frequency.

As I am more familiar with the details of religious work in the University of Michigan than in other similar institutions, I may be pardoned for referring particularly to what is attempted here. I have no reason to doubt that in other state universities similar means are used. Meetings of the Christian Association are held every Sunday morning and every Wednesday evening; and meetings either of that society or of classes or departments, on every other week-day evening except on Saturday. The Association holds Sunday afternoon services in the two hospitals connected with our medical colleges, and also organizes classes of students for the study of the Bible. At the Sunday morning meeting, an address of half an hour is usually given by a member of some one of the faculties. The Association admits members from all departments of the University. There is no more active and energetic society of any kind in the institution. It invites from time to time distinguished preachers or evangelists to visit the University and preach. Mr. Moody has recently spent five days here, holding three meetings daily. At the evening meetings in University Hall, audiences of nearly three thousand were in attendance. Some years Sunday afternoon discourses have been given by members of the various faculties to the students. There have also been in existence here for some years a ministerial band, composed of students looking to the ministry, and a mission band, comprising those who were considering the question of entering on foreign missionary work.

It is certainly an interesting fact that the University of Michigan has sent about twenty-five missionaries to the foreign fields. At least seventeen are now at work in the service of various boards. Fourteen have gone as medical missionaries, among them eight women. One of these women, Mrs. King (formerly Miss Howard), has attracted much attention through her influence with the Chinese viceroy, Li Hung Chang, and his wife. The late Dr. Trowbridge, President of the Aintab College, who was so much respected in Asia Minor, was an alumnus of this institution. The interest in missions which has been of late felt in so many colleges is shared by the students here. Several times during each

year returned missionaries are invited either to give public addresses or to meet for conference with the mission band.

Moreover, there have sprung up in connection with the churches in Ann Arbor Christian organizations designed to aid in the Christian culture of students, and similar organizations are likely to be formed about state universities and other universities. These are guilds, provided each with a fine building, which may be called a sort of religious home or club-house, if that term is understood in an elevated sense. The Episcopalians and the Presbyterians have each such a building. The Methodists, who have a guild, will probably soon have another. The Roman Catholics also have a guild. The Unitarians have their Unity Club, with its library in a convenient room in their church. The Episcopal Hall, which is so far the most completely furnished, has parlors, reading room, supper room, gymnasium, and lecture room. Each spring a course of lectures on religious themes is given in the Guild Hall by some eminent divine. The Presbyterians have a large library of religious works, numbering several thousand volumes, and they provide a course of lectures on religious topics. The Methodists, Baptists, and Congregationalists also bring distinguished preachers from abroad to their pulpits through the college year to address the students. All the guilds and all the churches give frequent opportunities for students and citizens to meet each other for social intercourse. In all these ways, and by these various instrumentalities, aids are furnished for the cultivation of religious life among the men and women who resort to the university. While compulsion is nowhere used to oblige a student to attend on religious services, certainly strong inducements are furnished to every student to place himself within the reach of wholesome religious influence. The cases are not few in which students who came here with an aversion to Christian doctrine have while here entered upon the Christian life. A large proportion of those who have entered the missionary service have formed their purpose to do so while here.

Being myself a graduate of a denominational college, and having been for years a member of its faculty, I can truly say that I know of no religious instrumentality ever used there that may not be and that is not freely used here. There is no more restraint here than there upon the liberty of any teacher to use his influence in a reasonable and courteous way as a Christian man. That is reported to me to be the fact in every state university. Of course sectarian proselyting would be, by an unwritten law,

forbidden in any American college under Protestant direction. College officers generally have the good sense illustrated by Dr. Wayland, the Baptist President of Brown University. A student once went to him, saying that his mind was not clear on the subject of immersion. The doctor handed him a copy of the New Testament, saying, "All I know on that subject is in this book. Let us pray." He knelt with the young man and prayed that the inquirer might have light, and dismissed him.

It must be conceded that one element of the Christian constituency is weaker in the state universities than in most of the denominational colleges. The number of students for the ministry is proportionally less. The reasons are obvious. In the first place, most of the denominational colleges have scholarships for candidates for the ministry, while none of the state universities have them. This, of course, offers the premium of free tuition, sometimes of other pecuniary help also, to such students to choose the former and not the latter. Again, even where a young man looking to the ministry does not need pecuniary aid, there is generally a strong pressure on him to attend some college of his own denomination. I count it a distinct religious advantage to any college to have a good number of students who are intending to become preachers. They are likely to be active in religious work. But the statement made above of the chief causes which determine the majority of men, who have decided before going to college to enter the clerical profession, to resort to denominational colleges shows that it is unjust to infer, as some have inferred, that life in a state university is unfriendly to religion because the state universities have not graduated a larger proportion of men who have gone to the ministry. Indeed, some writers have leaped to very unwarranted conclusions concerning the state of religious life in the denominational colleges of New England, especially of Yale College, by contrasting the small percentage of candidates for the ministry in the recent graduating classes with the large percentage in the early part of this century. It should be remembered that formerly few went to college except those intended for one of the three professions, — law, medicine, or the ministry. But now men looking to every pursuit wisely take the college course. The percentage of those following any one profession must therefore be reduced. I doubt whether a really better state of religious life has ever existed in our principal colleges and universities than now exists. As in society at large, so in the schools of learning, the type of religious character has somewhat changed. But never

within my recollection was the life more wholesome and vigorous than now. Notice the extraordinary response last year to the appeal for missionaries. And so far as I know, the spirit of the religious students in the state universities is not essentially different from those in the other colleges and universities. It is universally conceded by the older college teachers that the morals and manners of students have materially improved within the last thirty or forty years. I believe that their religious spirit, if less monastic and introversive, is more healthy and aggressive. In my observation of the students of this generation, I find no good ground for the despondent view of their religious condition which some men seem to take. No doubt pious platitudes, cant, mere appeals to denominational zeal, go for little with them. But straightforward, earnest, manly words; a large and catholic Christian spirit; a reasonable interpretation of Scripture; the application of the principles of the gospel to social problems; appeals for hard but noble and Christlike work for the poor and the ignorant, — all these the students of to-day, whether in denominational colleges, or agricultural colleges, or scientific schools, or state universities, appreciate and welcome and respond to, at least as heartily as any other class among our people.

I cannot but think that some Christian men have assumed an attitude toward the state universities which is highly inexpedient, not to say wrong. They have either stood entirely aloof from them, or have contented themselves with criticising them as irreligious. Now it seems as certain as any future event that the state universities have come to stay, at least in many States. They are founded on national endowments which the States have accepted under pledge to administer the institutions. Moreover, the States have made large investments in buildings, libraries, apparatus, and other plant. Some have in the aggregate made appropriations exceeding a million of dollars. Is it to be supposed that the States will sacrifice such investments? In most of the States which have founded universities, these institutions are stronger and richer, have more teachers, more students, more books, more apparatus, and give a larger variety of instruction, than any other collegiate institution in those States, or in any other State west of Ohio. There is, therefore, every probability that most of them are to remain for a long time, probably as long as the States remain.

Now the Christian citizens of each State are entitled to their proper influence in determining how these universities shall be

administered. Of course, if they show no interest in them, if they simply attack them and do not try to help them, if they content themselves with acrid criticisms of them, — and what college or college administration may not be struck by a hand which is unfriendly? — the universities may fall under the control of any men, good or bad, who will take an interest in them. There is educational work enough to be done in the rapidly growing West and Southwest to render inexcusable much jealousy between different institutions of learning. One may without inconsistency strengthen the hands of the state university, and also of the local college, where he deems the latter necessary. Not a few good men do this. Certainly, far better than to stand apart from the state universities is it to imitate the example of those Christian men who are strengthening and multiplying the instrumentalities for encouraging the Christian life in these great schools. Whatever defects they may think they see in the organization of such schools, it is certainly the dictate of Christian wisdom for them to do the utmost possible for the Christian nurture of the young men and young women who are in them. They will find that their aid will be gratefully welcomed by the great body of teachers and students, and will perhaps learn, on closer acquaintance with the state universities, as many have learned on inspecting them closely, that an earnest, simple, genuine Christian life is developed and encouraged within their walls.

James B. Angell.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

WHAT IS SALVATION?

THE Rev. Frederic Palmer has done the Andover movement an inestimable service in subjecting it to his searching elenchus. And nothing could better attest the fearless love of truth that animates the "Andover Review" than its willingness to welcome to the very heart of its pages the healing virtue of this cutting criticism.

Whether every word in "Progressive Orthodoxy" is consistent with every other word is one of those external minor matters which, like discrepancies between the Evangelists, is incidental to composite authorship, and in no way affects the general outcome and impression. If, however, there is a bridgeless chasm between

the fundamental premises and the characteristic conclusion ; if, for instance, as the critic suggests, the Andover hypothesis does not follow from the doctrine of the immanence of God, then the movement is, indeed, a case of the blind leading the blind, of which we do well to beware.

The critic rightly points out that the whole question turns on the definition of salvation. What, then, is salvation? From what? By what? To what?

First: From what?

The characteristic of man is his power to set up an ideal in thought, and realize it in conduct. This ideal may be drawn from his particular animal self, with its lusts, appetites, vanities, ambitions, jealousies, and hates. It may be drawn from the inherent, universal, objective worth of nature, man, human society and institutions, divine laws and revelations. The pursuit of the former ideal, with its attendant grossness, hardness, meanness, unkindness, lovelessness, is what we mean by sin. Devotion to the latter ideal, with the resulting reverence, humility, kindness, gentleness, justice, mercy, and love, is righteousness. Salvation is deliverance from the slavery and bondage of the former ideal. Salvation is deliverance primarily from sin. Secondarily and incidentally it is deliverance from the woes and miseries, the shame and death, which follow sin as certainly and inevitably as shadow follows substance ; and are as inseparable from sin as right is from left, upper from under, mountains from intervening valleys.

This deliverance may be wrought by a sudden reversal of the fundamental bent of conscious choice, which we call conversion ; or it may be effected by the gradual and unconscious absorption of the successive features of the new ideal through nurture, training, example, and influence. In either case, abandonment of the selfish, sensuous ideal of our private appetites and passions, and deliverance from the state of sin which such an ideal begets within the breast of him who holds it, is the essence of the process. Salvation is from sin.

Second: By what? Wherein resides the power that works this change? Certainly not in the naked power of the abstract will of man. The naked abstract will of man is as impotent to create and adopt a new ideal as is a leopard to change its spots or an Ethiopian his skin. It is as powerless to bring forth out of itself alone the fruits of righteousness as a seed abiding alone, apart from soil or sunshine, is powerless to put forth stalk and leaf and flower and fruit. No. The ultimate ground of the

change must be sought in the attractiveness of the ideal that is presented to him.

To be sure, there is in the seed a principle which refuses to find contentment until it becomes the full corn in the ripened ear. And so, as Aristotle says, "Man is by nature a social animal," and we exclaim with Augustine, "Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in thee." There is in man the capacity for the divine life, an ability to respond to the divine ideal when once that is presented; but unless this ideal comes home to man, rousing and quickening this capacity into life, the soul remains dormant awhile, and then succumbs to decay and death like an unplanted, unsunned, unwatered seed. The presentation of the divine ideal is therefore the efficient cause of man's salvation. God's effectual calling precedes man's successful choosing. It is by the attractiveness of the divine ideal presented to our wills, and accepted by them, that we are saved. Since the very essence of sin is slavery to a low ideal, the only conceivable salvation from sin must consist in devotion to a high ideal. For without some ideal man would not be man.

How, then, is the presentation of this divine ideal made to man? The depth and breadth of any system of theology is tested by its answer to that question. The divine ideal of human life, the Logos, the Holy Spirit, God, has never been without witness in the world, and is now not far from any one of us. We live and move and have our being in a world in which every natural object is the creation and expression of the Eternal Reason; every righteous law and beneficent institution of society is the embodiment of the Divine Spirit; and every fellow-man is in his inherent capacity and dignity the image of God, the Father of us all.

The call of God, the presentation of the divine ideal of human life, consequently may come through any or all of these its manifold embodiments. It is not a ghostlike apparition, robed in the shroud of mystery, entering unannounced some secret presence-chamber of the soul, when all the doors of sense are closed and all the avenues of reason are barred by superstitious fear and bolted by blind credulity. The call of God is the outward, visible, audible, tangible appeal of the divine goodness and glory and truth and love, as it comes home to man's heart through the love of father and mother, the nobleness of brothers, the tenderness of sisters, the sweet charities of family and home, the honor and bravery of man, the purity and gentleness of woman, the claims of the neighbor, the call of country, the majesty of law, the

grandeur of mountain and sea, the glory of sunlit clouds and starry skies, the solemn rites of temple service, the spoken word of pious exhortation, the attitude of silent prayer, the written Book of special revelation, — the old, old story of the words and deeds and life and death of Him who was at once Son of man and Son of God.

Third: To what are we saved? Salvation brings us into union with God; into a state of mind and heart in which the manifold divine goodness is the sole cherished ideal in which, to which, by which, and for which we live.

In these voices of nature and man whereby we are called away from the selfish, sensual, sinful life, God is present in different degrees of fullness and completeness. In some there is more, in some there is less, of that spiritual divine element which is the substance of the new ideal. Response to any one of these calls is a step, longer or shorter, toward salvation. And the degree and fullness of salvation thereby attained is proportioned to the degree and fullness of that revelation of the divine to which response is given.

The love of father, mother, wife, and child, the love of nature and of native land, pure devotion to science or to art, are of divine origin, and have divine potency to lift man out of that exclusive selfishness which is the soul of sin.

Yet they reach and redeem only parts of the man. They do not take the whole man, on all sides and in all relations, up into that blessed life of divine love which is salvation. The salvation wrought by these agencies, though real as far as it goes, is incomplete. The man who feels the noble stirrings of human affection in his breast is not wholly dead in trespasses and sins. Nor have we therein the guarantee that he has wholly entered into life. Life and death may be striving together in him; and the issue may yet be doubtful. Response to one of these divine voices does not of necessity insure a like response to all the rest. It is at most a ground of hope. And yet, how often is that hope betrayed! Have we not seen men so alive to natural beauty that they could seize and make immortal the fading glory of a sunset, who yet were so far dead to the diviner beauty of the human heart that they could betray to lasting wretchedness and shame a woman's trusting love? Have we not seen a devotion to wife and children that was worthy to be a type of God's care for his children, and of Christ's union with his church, existing in the same breast with a fiendish treachery towards business competitors and the

most heartless betrayal of customers and creditors? Have we not seen patriotism and pollution, zeal for a great cause and contempt for humble men, the love of truth and the hate of duty, stamped on the same features, animating the same heart, and struggling for control of the same life? Now in such a soul there is neither full, complete life, nor is there hopeless and final death. Just so far as the man is true to these divine loves, his soul will be ripened and expanded by them into fuller love and larger life, and receptiveness for more of God. In so far as he is false, and betrays any human interest which has a claim upon him, to that extent the forces of death are gaining over the powers of life within him.

The ultimate outcome of this conflict must be one thing or the other. Either sin must lead to death, or righteousness must lead to life.

A man who is growing in sin; who is selfish all around; who in the presence of the beauties of nature slinks into his ugly selfhood; who turns a deaf ear to every appeal of human tenderness and human need; who would sacrifice his family to gratify his lust, and betray his country's interests to secure an office, — this man we feel to be in most imminent peril of everlasting destruction; and we are sure that if he is ever saved it must be "so as by fire." And the man who can see and feel the inherent nobleness and loveliness of the supreme ideal of self-devotion to the glory of God and the good of man, as that ideal is made real in Jesus Christ and brought home to the individual man by the Spirit dwelling in the Christian church, — the man who can see and feel that, and then blasphemously reject it, is already hopelessly and eternally lost.

On the other hand, the man who, not by the hearing of the ear nor by the speaking of the lips merely, but by the assent of the mind and the devotion of the will, has made Jesus Christ his personal ideal; who day by day strives to serve and follow Him, and asks and receives forgiveness for all wherein he comes short of that perfect ideal, — this man is as sure of salvation here and now, and always and everywhere, as the other man is sure of perdition.

Not that his life is lifted all at once to the level of his ideal. "We are saved by hope." And yet the intelligent and whole-souled acceptance of Christ is the promise and potency of a complete and perfect triumph over every form of selfishness and sin, and an abundant entrance into eternal life. And the reception

of this perfect Christ-ideal in faith and hope and love is the only way by which complete salvation can be attained. For sincere devotion to Him means that his ideal becomes our ideal; his life our life. And since his ideal and life is nothing less than the comprehensive will of God, it follows that every true disciple of Christ is in principle and at heart faithful to every duty, loyal to every relationship, devoted to every cause, friendly to every person, the supporter of every institution in and through which the divine goodness is manifested to us here in our earthly life; and that such fidelity and loyalty and love will continue to respond to whatever spheres of the divine goodness and love the future may reveal. Who are such true disciples and who are not, it is for God, not man, to say. But that all who truly are such disciples are saved to a complete and perfect participation in the life of God, God has declared, and man may with confidence and certainty repeat it.

If, now, salvation is participation in the life of God, and perdition is exclusion from it, it is evident that some attain the assurance of salvation, and others receive the doom of perdition, here in this present life.

Between these two classes are multitudes who have not hopelessly hardened themselves against all the appeals of God that come to them, and have neither rejected nor accepted that ultimate presentation of the divine life in Christ which, rightly apprehended and loyally obeyed, is the promise and potency of perfect oneness with the life of God, and whole-souled loyalty to every human institution and claim which this universal Christ-principle includes and comprehends.

They are neither wholly alive nor utterly dead. What is to become of them? We know what becomes of such persons, when, in the course of continued life in this world, the presentation of the ultimate ideal in Christ is made to them. We know that some of these persons eagerly welcome that life of supreme self-devotion to God and man, which an adequate and worthy presentation of Christ always demands; and gladly accept this as the crown and complement of that true life which hitherto they had only partially found in their human affections and enthusiasms.

We also know well that many find this Christ-ideal too high, too hard, too costly. Men who have kept all the law that their natural environment has brought to their attention often go away sorrowful from the complete self-sacrifice demanded by the Christ-

ideal. The finite does not include the infinite. Partial righteousness is not sufficient guarantee that perfect righteousness will be accepted. The same presentation of the Christ-ideal, whether it come formulated in the propositions of theology, or embodied in the life of the Christian community, — the same presentation of Christ is “a savor from death unto death in them that are perishing, and a savor from life unto life in them that are being saved.”

It is impossible to say which goal these multitudes will reach. Persons in this class sometimes reach one goal, sometimes the other, when there is sufficient time and opportunity allowed them in this world to carry the process to completion. This we know. And it is all we know.

What shall we say, then, concerning those in whom time and opportunity have not been sufficient to bring the process to either one goal or the other; to evident corruption and perdition, or assured life and blessedness? Ultimately, every such soul must reach one goal or the other. What will be the process? Will it be by sudden, arbitrary interference from without; accelerating choice by terror, or cutting it short by violence, suspending further exercise of freedom, and thus destroying the very essence of the soul itself? Or will it be by the continuance of essentially the same process of freely rejecting or accepting the divine ideal, until the soul is either self-excluded from the presence of God and shut up in the outer darkness, or else is educated and developed unto the stature of the fullness of Christ, and filled with all the fullness of God?

Andover has chosen the latter alternative, presumably because it is more harmonious with what we know of the process as it takes place in this life, and more consistent with our thought of God as a reasonable, loving, law-abiding Being.

Dealing as it does with matters which do not admit of certain knowledge or adequate verbal expression, it is a hypothesis merely, and can never become a dogma. Being simply an earnest and honest attempt to carry the torch of reason and the lamp of experience into regions that have long been given over to worse than Egyptian darkness, it was not to be expected that it would find favor in quarters where an inoculation of prudent agnosticism is the regular prophylactic against the charge of heresy at home, and nothing short of the unmistakable marks of downright logophobia, or horror at the very mention of reason, is accepted as evidence of fitness for missionary service.

To the catholic spirit and philosophic insight which animate the recent "Criticisms on the Andover Movement," however, it ought to be apparent that this hypothesis, and whatever is characteristic of the Andover movement as a whole, is entirely independent of "the old misty idea of salvation as some beatific state to be entered upon only after death," with "its melodramatic and mediæval dress" of "forensic substitutionalism;" but is rooted and grounded in the conviction that God is immanent in the world; that the infinite includes the finite; and that "salvation is always salvation from sin."

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EDWARD THRING.

THE name of Edward Thring is known to a considerable portion of the reading public of the United States — especially to that portion of it which is interested in education — as the author of a little volume, published for the Syndics of Cambridge University, entitled "The Theory and Practice of Teaching," and of a perhaps less well-known volume called "Education and School," issued by the Messrs. Macmillan. For some years it has furthermore been known, at least to a limited circle of educators, as that of a man vitally in earnest about educational work, whose personality had for some time been stamping itself upon the methods and achievements of a long-established school in one of the midland English counties. From an admirable article contributed to the "Century Magazine" for September, 1888, by Professor Parkin, of Canada, to which the present writer is indebted for certain of his details, we learn that in 1887 so deep an interest had the work of Mr. Thring succeeded in arousing in the United States that he was asked to write an address to the teachers of Minnesota, in which State, we believe, "The Theory and Practice of Teaching" is used as a text-book in the normal schools; and we infer that he was personally known, by correspondence at least, to a number of prominent Americans interested in educational work.

That a man engaged in the management of an old-established historical school for the sons of wealthy Englishmen should be consulted and looked upon as a leader by any considerable number

of men employed in education in the United States, under circumstances so dissimilar to his own, was certainly not a little singular, though the explanation, after all, is not so very far to seek, even when we have laid aside the consideration that the spirit—if not also the methods—of true education must be much the same in all civilized lands. There is probably nothing which strikes the careful observer of our American methods of education more pronouncedly, if he be one whose senses have been quickened by a thoughtful consideration of the interests at stake, than the fact that the danger to which our system is exposed is that of substituting routine and mechanism for vital influence. We believe that no man can make the round of any considerable number of our larger common schools, from the lowest to the highest grade, without being impressed by the fact that there is a real danger lest, in the pursuit of the methods and in the application of the externals of education, the essence of education should be lost sight of. This is possibly perforce the fact in the present stage of our educational evolution; it is indeed difficult to see how, under the existing régime, the teacher of a city school, in nine cases out of ten, can be much more than a vehicle for the imparting of information, rather than an educator in the true sense of the word. The multiplicity of classes and of studies; the rapid introduction and translation of pupils from one grade or one school to another, which makes it difficult for the most thorough teacher to gain any considerable knowledge of personal idiosyncrasy, or to fit methods to individualities; the fact that “to pass,” “to graduate,” is the all-absorbing aim of far too many pupils and far too many parents,—these things militate actively against any real process of education, even where the teacher is alive to the responsibilities and the opportunities of his profession, and is fitted to his department. It is, perhaps, to this fact—felt rather than understood or analyzed—that the reception accorded in America to Mr. Thring’s little volumes is to be assigned; for it was to remedy such a state of affairs—to substitute life for routine and education for information—that the head master of Uppingham felt himself called upon to war, and to inaugurate what has been perhaps the most vital movement in the conduct of school life in England since the days of the elder Arnold.

Dying in October, 1887, at the end of something over a generation of service as head master of the “*faire free grammar school of Uppingham*,” founded in 1584 by Archdeacon Johnson, Edward Thring may be considered as having been favored by the

fates with a reign which permitted him at least thoroughly to test the principles by which he stood, and favored by them also in this — that before he was called upon to lay down his armor, he had long ago seen those principles triumphant. Coming to Uppingham in 1853, to find there a total attendance of twenty-five boarders and six day scholars, he left it at his decease with the full roll of three hundred, to which he had deliberately limited the school, and for years had been obliged to turn away applicants in excess of that number whose parents sought to place them in his control.

We have already indicated that the conduct of Uppingham, under the mastership of Edward Thring, marked a new departure — or at least a radical improvement — in the principles by which it is sought to educate the young in the great English historic schools, from which Uppingham differed only in being less illustrious than the rest at the time of Mr. Thring's appointment, though it was perhaps hardly less known than Eton, or Rugby, or Westminster, at the time of his decease. And this departure consisted, first, in the open recognition of a fundamental difference in the view taken of the nature of the material upon which it was sought to work, and, secondly, in the postulation of a different goal as the object to be pressed forward to. Less specifically religious, possibly, than the reform of Arnold, in one use of the term, that of Edward Thring began, first of all, with a pronouncedly high ideal of the nature and the capacity of boyhood; and, secondly, it saw in education, not the instilling of book-learning merely as such, but the creation, by means of moral and intellectual discipline, of an abiding character. We have said "less specifically religious" than the reform of Arnold, for there was a suspicion that the system of the great Rugby master sent up to the universities, in the person of its weaker boys, something akin to priggishness and cant of a rather unhealthy kind: that of Edward Thring, however, while it might perhaps bewilder, here and there, a weakling with the rigidity and the intensity of its aim, never sent out from the gates of Uppingham any fungoid growths; it was as bracing and as strenuous morally as the ocean airs of Borth, which played for one summer round the brows of his three hundred boys during their forced migration from Rutlandshire because of local sanitary remissness.

These remarks of the writer are introductory to a notice of a little volume entitled "A Memory of Edward Thring," from the pen of one who, for fourteen years, was an assistant master, and,

in earlier days, a pupil, at Uppingham — the Rev. J. H. Skrine, now Warden of Glenalmond.¹ Of the “Memory” but little need be said, though that little will be commendatory. It is not often that the reviewer is called upon to speak unqualifiedly in approval of a book, still less frequent is it, in these days of introspection and self-culture, that he can so speak of a volume of biography; yet this the writer desires to do in the case of Mr. Skrine, though less for the workmanship of his book than for the subject of it, and the whole-hearted and loyal way in which it has been penned. In his analysis of the great founder of the modern scientific method, Kuno Fischer has pointed out to us how the very steadiness of that “dry white light” which Bacon brought to bear upon intellectual questions worked disadvantageously when the subject-matter of discussion was colored with a moral significance; showing us how, reversing the intellectual formula, in the realm of the emotions he only who is prejudiced is safe. Paradoxical as it may appear, this is, nevertheless, the truth: he only who is biased can be trusted to interpret to us aright the shades of character. If any reader of these words shall doubt this dictum, the writer will only ask of him to read carefully those great biographies upon which the verdict of mankind has stamped its most emphatic and most permanent approval, and see how far that verdict shall bear it out. Plato was certainly more biased than Aristophanes in his delineation of the son of Sophroniscus, Carlyle than Hare in his portrayal of John Sterling; Stanley had “sent his heart before him” when he wrote the life of Arnold, as Brooke had done with his when he wrote of Frederick Robertson, and Clarendon when he portrayed the lives of the great royalists. These are some of the memoirs which have been made to live; and they will live long after the memory of those volumes written at the instigation of the publisher and his market, and in so many series, shall have passed away. It is the great merit of “A Memory of Edward Thring” that its author has carried out that saying of the wisest of English novelists — Thackeray: “Learn to admire rightly; the great pleasure of life is in that.”

Lest, from such commendation, the reader shall imagine the treat in store for him, in the perusal of Mr. Skrine's little volume, to be greater than it really is, the writer hastens to state that its literary workmanship, though showing intimate acquaintance with the dominant phases of thought and life in England, does not

¹ *A Memory of Edward Thring.* By John Huntley Skrine, Warden of Glenalmond. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1889.

reach the high-water mark, save in here and there a sentence; though of this character certainly is the following, where the biographer is commenting upon one of the profound paragraphs of his leader: —

“There is doubtless nothing in these extended illustrations which has not been felt and said before by others. But we are now in that moral region where there can be no originality other than that of the new intensity with which a mind realizes a primal human fact. The higher spirits among those who are united by the same creed, when they try to read the meaning of their universe, can but find their way to one and the same eventual mystery. They will differ only in the several names which they will give it, according to that ruling element in their several natures which gives them their contact with divine things. Its name will be Light for the subtle spirit; Love for the ardent; and the strong will call it Life. One or other of such large words will be the chosen abstraction, which gathers up into a focus the manifold of human duty, experience, and hope: they are symbols by which the mind apprehends the inexpressible central law, wings on which it broods over the unfathomed deep. To have been fascinated by one of these vague symbols; to have made it the summary of all thought; and to have insisted on it with disciples even to monotony, has before now been recognized as the mark — not of barrenness or ineffectuality — but of an intellect deeply spiritual.”

With extracts from Mr. Thring's own utterances and writings the volume is all too scantily furnished, were it not that its author deliberately restricted himself in this direction in view of the authorized biography, the materials for which have been intrusted to Professor Parkin. We extract, however, at random, here and there a sentence revealing to us the attitude Mr. Thring adopted towards his pupils, and his own estimate of the successfulness of his life. The subject, in the first place, is a discovered “crib;” it is the master himself who speaks: —

“A very disgraceful thing has been brought to my notice. Two of you have been cheating in work. I mean the school to know what I think of this kind of thing. I hold that to cheat a master is inexpressibly base. You may call it what you please: I call it sheer, unmitigated, contemptible lying: you who do it are liars and cheats. Oh! yes, I know the mean things you say to yourselves, some of you, in your mean hearts, about its being natural for boys, and ‘they all do it at other schools,’ and the rest of the

pitiful talk. But we are not 'other schools.' There have been times, and I knew them well enough, when schools were like prisons, and there was some wretched kind of excuse for cheating your gaolers. But you don't live in a prison here. We make your life free and pleasant, we trust you, we make your temptations few, we make it easy to live a true life — and then you turn traitors to truth. Now, which you will! The prison, if you prefer; bars and bolts (I could make a prison if I chose); or the free life of a true society. But you sha'n't have both. You shall not be traitors and have the privilege of true men. . . .

"For the rest of you, all of you at least who can see how despicable these schoolboy notions and these 'thieves' honor' ways are, I call on you to remember what is at stake. I hold that we are not, as some choose to think, just like other schools. This school is being built up on the belief that if boys are treated truly, they can live as truly as men. We stand here for truth and true life. Remember, in other things other schools will be your equals and superiors: in things which are their glory, they will beat you; yes, they will beat you as far as numbers, and social reputation, and intellect-power goes. Our glory will be to show the world that in a school there can be true life. There you can be first. Win that. That is what you can do, from the oldest to the least, for the name of Uppingham. I call on you to be true to it."

And then, with a sad wisdom which recalls to us Newman's thoughtful lines on Gregory Nazianzen, this verdict upon himself: —

"I have been disappointed in every object that I framed for myself since I came here, . . . all this place is as nothing to me. I am *not* part and parcel of it as I seem to be: it is all nothing to me, and the *life* is everything. . . . My work here is *not mine*, though I have done nothing but fight for it; God has moulded it: it is not what I should have chosen, and it is *not mine*; therefore it lives."

Certain striking sentences of Mr. Skrine's, too, linger in the memory, as where he says that the hearing of the head master translate the vast boulder-like words of the "Agamemnon," in the dimly lighted school-house hall, had the solemnity of a religious service; or where he speaks of a group of delinquent boys, called up to register their names in the "late-book" under the scorching eyes of the head master at his desk, being as if a soul were registering its own misdeeds under the dictation of the recording angel; or recounts how one of the onlookers said of him, at a great

gathering of representative English educators away from home, that "A. said this, and B. that; and then Thring got up and talked like an archangel."

More striking still, however, than even the most dramatic episodes in his life was Edward Thring's devotion to the individual training of both the brains and characters of his boys, so that even the weakest and most backward made the utmost of his abilities, and shared as in his own home in a personal and peculiar care and thoughtfulness. The desire to be strictly just to each pupil in his control; to place character above intellectual achievement; to make his boys manly first and afterwards good Latinists and Grecians; the determination to believe in virtue rather than in vice, to trust rather than to suspect, and to lean on natural chivalry rather than on any system of repression or espionage; the determination that, whoever won the university scholarships, Uppingham at least should send out strong and manly characters into the world, and return to their homes boys as pure in heart and brave in deed as when they left them, — these were some of the things Edward Thring set before himself as the work he had to do, and these were some of the things in which he so eminently succeeded.

We have been lately told that the recent ascendancy of evolutionistic theories of life, and the suddenly widened arena in which luxurious living has been made possible by success in trade, has resulted in a lessening of that stern personal bravery which for so long characterized the British soldier and sailor under fire; and grave forebodings have been uttered therefrom, with regard to the possible future of the English arms. But it may safely be said that, of the boys who were trained at Uppingham, there can have been few who would not have followed Napier in his campaign against the robber tribes of Scinde, or made with him that dash for the gates of Magdala by which he achieved his peerage. It is, indeed, to men like the Napiers and the Lawrences that we turn for types, in a different field, of what Thring was as an educator. Not greatly gifted intellectually, any more than John Lawrence of the Punjaub, he yet had the same insight into character, and the same impatience under concerted action, with perhaps on the whole less of adaptableness and manipulative ability. Certainly, he was less successful in making the utmost of his subordinates.

Amid much of the march of modern life in England and on the continent and in America, Edward Thring would have stood alone. Of the achievements of science he was wont to speak disparagingly, and to dread the outcome of the universal triumph of the scien-

tific spirit upon character and what he called "life." In this respect it is not for the writer to criticise or disagree, since he can confess to sharing to the full with him in his apprehension; nor was it possible that the attitude of a mind like Thring's, which to much that was of the prophet added somewhat also of the poet, in actually written and published verse, should have been otherwise. The wood-cut of him prefixed to Mr. Parkin's article in the "Century" shows him seated, and reveals to us what might have been a country parson of an unascetic type, or even a cultivated and educated English gentleman-farmer; but in the portrait which accompanies the "Memory" by Mr. Skrine, we find something of the seer and moral tyrant who dominated, somewhat ruthlessly as a number of his colleagues thought, the councils and processes at Uppingham. A mystic of a practical and modern type, with a hot hatred of all insincerities and wickednesses, and a love of aggressive goodness, linked, too, with much patience with and compassion for the weak and erring, and a deep conviction of the worthlessness of everything but indurated righteous character, — such, it seems to us, was Edward Thring, the martinet who was yet not quite a martinet, the tyrant who nevertheless refused actually to dominate, in his realm of three hundred souls. In contrast with much that he has to tell us of him, there is something striking in Mr. Skrine's delineation of the tender and melting mood in which he returned home towards the end from a happy and warmly appreciated visit to the Dean of Worcester, the impress of which, upon himself, he recounted one twilight to his subordinate, who, looking back upon it afterwards, says of him — using that expressive northern monosyllable for which in English we have no equivalent: "In a fashion most quiet and beautiful, he was *fey*."

The writer had marked many passages for extract or for comment, which the limits of this article forbid him to make use of; he must content himself with unhesitatingly commending the little "Memory" as one of the most interesting and inspiring of late biographies, and with recommending the reader to procure it for himself. It is to be regretted that an edition at less than half the present price cannot be put upon the market, so as to place the volume within the reach of every educator in the land. Possibly the Messrs. Macmillan may see their way to do this so soon as the first edition shall be exhausted. At any rate, it is to be hoped that the biography by Professor Parkin will use lavishly the materials from which Mr. Skrine was by the purpose of his

task excluded, and that a popular edition will be issued in addition to that provided for the library.

It has been said by more than one recent visitor to Great Britain that the boys of the wealthier classes in the mother country show a superiority to our own in some directions; that the American boy is possibly a shade less manly and more "gushing," more luxurious where he has an equal opportunity, more mercenary and calculating where he has not. It is, perhaps, natural that some of these things should be so in a country so new as ours is, and where the sudden amassing of wealth has placed a weapon in the hands of thousands to which they are unaccustomed, and put a premium upon money-getting even among the young. At any rate, as Professor Parkin has pointed out, there is a lesson for us in America to be learned from the great English historic schools, in which the sons of the English nobility and gentry meet upon a common and rigidly governed platform, in a republic of brains and muscles, where the accident of wealth exempts no one from rough knocks or strenuous discipline, and where the expenditure of large sums of money upon personal gratification is looked down upon as bad form by the members of the school, if not actually inhibited by the management. There was more than one occasion in the history of Mr. Thring's headmastership at Uppingham when his actions were declaimed against in the public press, and, at least once, boys were removed by their parents because they had been flogged; but, on the whole, the strenuousness of his discipline more than justified itself by the result, and when boys had got to know him, physical force had rarely to be resorted to. It is, perhaps, one of the truest and least perishable tributes to his greatness, and to his power upon youthful souls, that many an Uppingham boy confessed in later life that he had been held back from sin, at a time when the maelstrom of passion raged strong within him, by the memory of a voice and presence he had left behind, and a "What would Thring say?" that shamed him into victory. Upon his wise manipulation of buildings and their embellishments, in the belief that all sincerely beautiful and impressive things that strike the eye have their share, and an abiding one, in the development of character, we in America shall do well to dwell; as we shall also upon the way in which he worked that motive — always so potent among the young — of *esprit de corps* and a common enterprise. The boys — it got to be said at Uppingham — were not materials to be moulded from without, subjects of a purely external disci-

pline; they were helpers in Edward Thring's crusade for the deliverance of education in England from the thrall of a false control, and felt for him a personal loyalty and affection akin to that which in the Middle Ages actuated the members of the knightly orders.

It is interesting to know that, like the late Professor Green at Oxford, Mr. Thring was deeply interested in the welfare of the community in which he lived, serving as chairman of various town committees, and inaugurating many local improvements; that Uppingham was the first English school to support a mission in the East of London; that its cricketers badly vanquished a picked eleven from Marylebone in a single innings with many runs to spare; and that of Mr. Thring's paper on "The Best Means of Raising the Standard of Public Morality," read before the Church Congress at Carlisle, a workingman afterwards wrote to him that "Its words ought to be written up in letters of gold in every great city."

Such, hurriedly glanced at, are some of the points of interest in Mr. Skrine's "Memory" of an inspiring and eminently noble life, — a life all the more helpful because of its limitations, and all the more noticeable and worthy of our study and affectionate regard because of its divergence from the common type with which recent literature acquaints us. If any man is tempted to ask in our day whether there is still a field of usefulness left for sanctified and devoted service in the cause of education by men not pre-eminently gifted intellectually, or to think that in these scientific days vitality of character and purpose fails largely of its reward, let him make the acquaintance of this "Memory of Edward Thring," and we assure him that he will leave his doubts behind him.

William Higgs.

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HAVE WE A RELIGION FOR MEN?

SYDNEY SMITH, confronting his Edinburgh congregation, the larger part of it habitually shawled and bonneted, was wont, as he read the one hundred and seventh Psalm, to lay particular stress on the third word of the refrain, "Oh that *men* would praise the Lord for his goodness and his wonderful works to the children of

men!" Beneath the unexpected yet pertinent turn which the witty curate gave to the Psalmist's outburst there lurks the deep longing which the Christian preacher cannot wholly stifle, whether he live early in the eighteenth or late in the nineteenth century. It is not that he lightly esteems the privilege of ministering to women. It is not that he does not thrill with joy Sabbath by Sabbath, at the thought that theirs, too, is the kingdom of God. But he fails to see why, if his message is what he took it to be, it falls upon so few masculine ears. "Have I a gospel," he asks in surprise, "whose universality is limited by sex distinctions?"

To be sure it is only the tyro in the pulpit who is greatly disturbed because Christianity appears to win the adherence of men in the mass rather than of women in the mass. Most of us, preachers and laymen alike, as we become accustomed to the phenomenon, relapse by degrees into the conviction that perhaps after all it is a part of the normal order of things. Dr. Pentecost's theory, that women naturally gravitate to the prayer-meeting and men as naturally to the penitentiary, finds considerable, though not at first a cordial acceptance. That women should constitute three fourths of the Sabbath congregations and nine tenths of the mid-week assembly, that they should be the ones to set the machinery of church work in motion and to keep aglow the fires of spiritual religion, seems eminently fitting to him who is impressed chiefly with the angelic side of the daughters of men and with the earthward tendencies of his brethren. "The more I see of men," said an outspoken person the other day, "the fonder I grow of dogs."

But ever and again the truer, larger conception of mankind, Christ's own view of humanity apart from their classifications by color, sex, or circumstance, the thought of men from the point of view of their redemptive possibilities, reasserts itself in the heart of every one who is trying to do Christ's work in the world. And the query, "Have we a religion for men?" gives birth to related questions, in the light of the answers to which the thoughtful spirit discovers an approximate solution of his original problem: "Is the genius of Christianity foreign to the masculine make-up? Have women always outnumbered and outweighed men in the church? Do other religions show a similar disproportion? If the predominance of women be an essentially modern feature of our faith, what causes operated to produce it? If such predominance be on the whole undesirable, how may it be remedied?" To pursue each of these separate interrogations any distance is not

feasible here. Only two or three of them can be touched upon, and those but briefly. First, however, a caveat needs to be inserted.

It is easy to exaggerate the masculine defection from the church. It will not do to cleave the race in twain, and label the masculine half "heathen," and the feminine half "Christian." We must not forget the men of wealth, the men of brain, the men of position, the men of influence, who are identified with Christian interests and enterprises. Viewed individually, they are often the pillars and the ornaments of the local church. Viewed collectively, when they are massed together at some great ecclesiastical conclave, — a Presbyterian General Assembly, an Episcopal Church Congress, a Congregational National Council, — they are such a dignified, substantial body that even the casual observer can hardly fail to respect and reverence the Christianity which is there so tangibly and so impressively embodied. Three hundred young men, the cream of our colleges, gathered at Northfield in the fervid days of July for Bible study and spiritual recreation, are a demonstration to the most skeptical and despondent soul that the faith has not altogether lost its grip upon the masculine intellect and conscience.

Moreover, it should be remembered that the present prominence of women in various departments of Christian activity has made men's share in the labor of the church less conspicuous and apparently less indispensable. Contrasted with what their fathers and grandfathers did in Christ's name, the men of to-day may not suffer by the comparison ; but contrasted with what their mothers and sisters and wives are now doing, they seem to show a sad and almost ignominious inferiority. The last thirty years have been marked by a projection of women on the stage in a way that has diverted attention from the important masculine personages who were hitherto its chief occupants. Woman has found that she can do something more than bathe the Saviour's feet with her tears and anoint his body with spices. It is her privilege and province, too, to be up and doing. So it has come about that into her hands have been committed the management of large missionary and philanthropic concerns, the greater part of the instruction in the Sunday-school, the bulk of house-to-house visitation. Temperance and other moral reforms find in her a ready and devoted ally. Her hands and her feet are enlisted in all sweet ministrations. From her lips spring forth the glad tidings, as the pent-up water gushes from the rock that is riven. God, who did not for-

sake her when it was her lot simply to stand and wait, is blessing her richly, now that He has called her from a life of retirement and contemplation to one of multiform activity. But the very fact that women can do, and do so well, certain services which once were deemed exclusively masculine, inclines some men to yield entirely the field to her. They leave her to do both the skirmishing and the heavy fighting, complacently thinking that their whole duty is done if they furnish a share of the sinews of war. Consequently, the world gets the idea that the church of God is, to a very great extent, an army of women.

But the question, "Have we a religion for men?" is not disposed of by pointing to the respectable fraction of men already in the church, or by saying that their light is eclipsed by the other and more brilliant luminaries which have flamed forth in the sky of this nineteenth century. The stubborn fact remains that, despite here and there its useful and eminent masculine supporters, the mainstay of the modern church is its consecrated women. When the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A. sends abroad the statement that only one young man in twenty in this country is a church member, and that seventy-five out of every hundred never attend church, it is time — though one may doubt the absolute accuracy of the figures — to ask the question, "Where are the men?" The truth is, that those of them who are not in the penitentiary are at the Odd Fellows Hall, or at the Grange, or at the Club House, or attending the meeting of this or that order. They are interested in every conceivable kind of organization from a philosophical society down to a fire-engine company, except the church of the Lord Jesus Christ. We must dare to hold the mirror up before the facts. To affirm, however, that this disparity of sexes, as respects their affection for the Christian religion, is inevitable and irremediable, is to fly in the face of both history and reason.

Christianity began in a company of men. Its first heralds were men. The New Testament mentions four men to every woman connected with Christ and the early church. The writer of the Acts does not punctuate the text with an exclamation point every time the faith makes a masculine convert. Judging from what records we have of apostolic and sub-apostolic times, it does not appear that "saint" was synonymous exclusively with "sister," or that the assemblages for prayer were ever so barren of men as to provoke the women to any disregard of Paul's injunction to keep silent. When Christianity emerged from its swaddling clothes

and went forth to possess the world, it did not abate one tittle of its claim to the esteem and the allegiance of men. Its steady and splendid march across the Roman Empire was owing to the fact that it commended itself to virile minds like Justin Martyr's and Origen's, to intrepid spirits like Polycarp and Ignatius, to ambitious potentates like Constantine. Throughout the Middle Ages, perverted and obscured as the Christianity of Christ became, it never was looked upon generally as a thing designed for women rather than men. Such an idea is essentially modern.

To account for this change by laying all the blame upon the church itself would betray but a superficial view of the movements and counter-movements of our time. Doubtless men are to be censured because they do not come to the church. But are we sure that the church can clear its skirts from all responsibility for this masculine defection, which in some quarters amounts almost to an alienation, from its standards and its sacraments? It may be true that men, as contrasted with women, are unsusceptible to appeal, earthly-minded, encased in selfishness, constitutionally averse to the yoke of religion. All the more incumbent, then, is it upon the church to study ways of approach to men, to make her faith intelligible, attractive, compelling, in their eyes.

What if, in her zeal to point the way to heaven, the church has thrown around the Christian religion an "other-worldliness" which has depreciated its value in the judgment of the unimaginative, matter-of-fact men of the counting-room, the shop, and the factory? Whatever advantage may accrue to the believer in distant ages beyond the grave, *they* are in the habit of looking for immediate returns. Practical in every other concern of life, they want a religion which has some relation to things seen and temporal. When men can find in a secular brotherhood more genuine sympathy, more of the real spirit of fraternity, more "brotherliness by illustration," — to borrow Miss Dawes's fine phrase, — than they are able to discover in the church of Christ, we must expect that these orders will gain recruits at the expense of the church. But if godliness be profitable for the life that now is, then let us try to make men see it. If institutional Christianity be called to-day, not to provide a harbor where a few happy souls may chant their *Te Deums*, but if the summons be to invade the great region of secular pursuits and gild them each and all with the glory of the risen Lord, then in our Master's name let us "conspire with the new works of new days." Let us not think less

of heaven, but let us strive to bring heaven and earth nearer together.

Another possible defect in conventional methods of presenting Christianity to men may be the tendency to encumber the message of Christ with doctrinal distinctions in no way germane to it. This practice arises from the laudable desire to have the truth in its purity and entirety impressed upon the mind of the convert. But no one has ever been invested with authority to add anything to Christ's invitation, "Follow me." Now a man does not have to decide the authorship of the Pentateuch before he can repent and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ. It is no essential part of the glad, trustful faith of a child that it should be absolutely sure of the endless conscious suffering of all who die impenitent. When we condition the extension of our Christian fellowship on conformity to such tests as these, we are getting very far from what Saint Paul so beautifully calls the "simplicity which is toward Christ." The average man does not penetrate very far in his thinking into the mazes of theology. The exceptionally thoughtful man quickly discerns that however desirable be a knowledge of the great Christian doctrines in their proper relation and proportion, that knowledge usually follows and does not precede a saving familiarity with Him in whom all doctrines centre. Why, then, should the proclamation of the gospel be weighted down with accretions which to one class of men seem largely unintelligible and to the other class of men wholly superfluous?

It is possible, also, that a similar mistake has been made in saddling upon the appeal to men to link themselves with Christ and with his church certain restrictions respecting one's personal life, which the manly man resents, and which, like the doctrinal *addenda*, are purely extraneous. When men are told that they cannot be Christians if they drink a glass of wine, or attend a theatre, or smoke a cigar, the Christian gospel is warped and wrested in a way that strikes at its very heart. This limitation, too, is made in the interest of the purity and the fair fame of the church. "Would you fill up our churches with drinkers and smokers and theatre-goers?" it will be at once asked. Certainly not. But the purity and fair name of the church are never conserved by false statements respecting the nature of the Christian religion, and by the imposition of conditions which Jesus Christ himself never laid down or sanctioned. He bids men come to Him, and He trusts them to decide in the light of his love and sacrifice for them what each will do respecting those

habits and practices denominated questionable. As a matter of fact, most of them do give up what is harmful to themselves or offensive to their brethren. We are far from being advocates of wine-bibbing and tobacco, the theatre and the other things which are ordinarily classified with them. But we insist that those who would commend their religion to strong, broad-minded, common-sense men must learn to distinguish between its essentials and non-essentials. Perpetually, men must be entreated to leave their sins and fly to Christ. Always and everywhere it must be made evident that it is a kingdom of righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost which is proclaimed. Then let us leave men to the liberty with which Christ doth make them free. Should the modern church be less wise than the apostolic respecting the *adiaphora* both of thought and of conduct?

Here, then, may perhaps be found at least a partial explanation of the comparative indifference of men to Christian things. The representatives, the accredited spokesmen of Christianity have sometimes made it appear too remote from this life, too complicated as a theory, too elaborate and minute as a system governing conduct, to win the acceptance of men who view the world practically, simply, largely. Even if the church refuses to be held accountable for all the prevalent misconceptions of Christianity, it cannot shut its eyes to their existence. They form one of the mightiest barriers to the on-moving of Christ's kingdom. False conceptions of a religion, no matter how they become rooted in men's minds, are the hardest of all ideas to displace. If the laboring man had an intelligent notion of the inner essence and spirit of Christianity, he would cease his tirades and his maledictions. If the millionaire understood what Jesus' discipleship really means, perhaps he would no longer neglect, or, what is still worse, patronize the church. It is barely possible that if Mr. Ingersoll had in his plastic days come in contact with other and sweeter types of piety, he would not now be fighting a man of straw, under the impression that he is beating the life out of Christianity. These strange and persistent misconceptions of our blessed religion, encountered almost daily in the endeavor to reach men, are what chill the ardor of him who would share with them the peace and joy which have come, soft-footed, into his own soul. He lays his hand upon the shoulders of a man grimy with toil and says, "Behold I bring you good tidings," and it is more than an even chance that he will respond, "You don't want such as I up to your rich church." He pleads with a friend, "Will you not

believe the gospel?" and the rejoinder is, "I have my doubts about Jonah." He tells a boy: "It is time you were up and treading the Christian way," and the youth at once tries to start an argument respecting card-playing and dancing.

The work of bringing men to Christ is thus seen to be, to a great extent, one of reconstructing their ideas. But this rectification must be along positive as well as negative lines. The preacher, the teacher, the worker, must exhibit the especial suitableness of Christianity to the masculine temper. First among positive measures is the exaltation of the manly qualities in Jesus Christ. We are indebted to Mr. Thomas Hughes for demonstrating so clearly in his little volume, "*The Manliness of Christ*," that Jesus conforms in every particular to the highest ideal of manhood. More recently still, Professor Drummond has quickened the spiritual pulse of hundreds of thoughtful young men on both sides the sea, by bringing into unwonted prominence the side of Jesus' character which appeals most strongly to men in the flush of youth, conscious of power, thirsting for achievement. In consequence, Oxford and Cambridge send certain of their best oarsmen and cricketers to the missionary field, and our American collegians think it not beneath their manhood to ask God's blessing upon their athletic sports and contests. College piety thus becomes vital and marrowy. When men can be made to see the courage, the daring, the fortitude, the heroism of the strong Son of God, as well as his gentleness and grace, if there be a note of manliness in their natures it will vibrate in response. So long as we have a Jesus to preach, we have a religion for men.

Again, those who think religion weak and womanish may well be pointed to the manly men whose native manhood took on a richer lustre as they yielded themselves to Jesus Christ. How they shine out along the track of Christian history! Men whose blood coursed strong and hot through their veins, fine specimens of muscular, soldierly Christianity; men like Frederic Robertson, and Charles Kingsley, like Livingstone and Patteson and Hannington, — these were not pusillanimous souls. Who, contemplating them and the hosts of others, living and dead, who deserve to rank by their side, dare affirm that the Christian faith, in its purity and power, does not engender manliness?

For it is here, after all, that we must make our final stand. If Christianity can really produce a better type of men, then the battle is won. "They who listened to Lord Chatham," says Emerson, prefacing his essay on Character, "affirmed that there

was something finer in the man than anything which he said." It is this fineness of fibre in the Christian's make-up which becomes the potent and the sufficient commendation of the faith. Is there a certain something about Christian men as they stand in the market-places, as they enter the arena of politics, as they mingle in society, which makes them marked men? Are they always recognizable as "God Almighty's gentlemen"? Are their words and their transactions governed by such a high sense of the honorable as to surprise their fellow-men who are not always just and seldom generous? Then the faith will in due time win its way into the circles beyond. Even hard-hearted, avaricious men of the world can no more withstand the power of manly lives charged to their full with the gospel than an ice-bound river can resist the advent of spring.

The church needs men to-day as never before, — their hands, their hearts, their money, and, not least of all, their brains. Woman has yet to evince great capacity for constructing the theology of the church. The roll of eminent Christian thinkers is almost exclusively a masculine one. In our day, to be sure, Mrs. Humphrey Ward has set afloat a certain sort of theological driftwood, but she, after all, has done nothing more than popularize the ideas of her distinguished uncle, Mr. Matthew Arnold. But self-interest is not the sole or the chief motive which should impel the church to greater aggressiveness in behalf of men. Their need of Christianity is sorer than the church's need of them. A religion which is a religion for women only is no religion. The pendulum will in time swing back. "God so loved the world." "He died for all." In the blaze of these magnificent declarations, our question shrivels and vanishes.

Howard Allen Bridgman.

BOSTON, MASS.

AN AMERICAN BOARD OF THEOLOGY FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.

No one should be quick to declare such a board superfluous. It is not a self-evident proposition that theological peculiarities which may be safely tolerated in the pastor of an educated Christian congregation can be safely deported to a community from which all religious faith has disappeared, and which has become equally hospitable to any creed that comes to it, if backed by the authority

of the locomotive, the magnetic telegraph, and Christian civilization generally.

So one may be too sure that the theological fitness of missionary candidates, in a purely *practical* point of view, can be best determined by a council, or a presbytery, or a bishop, unless indeed he be a "missionary bishop," whose interest and thought are upon the heathen abroad rather than upon Christians at home. A mere dogmatic preacher, who does little more than turn the crank of a well-worn theological machine, may be a fairly useful man in a pulpit which is flanked with a Sunday-school on one side and a Society of Christian Endeavor on the other; while the same man, if called to interpret the pages of natural theology on some Mars Hill in India or Japan, would be an absurd failure. If missionary organizations had attempted no other theological function than to obtain reasonable satisfaction that their missionaries would be wise to win the heathen to Christ, extending their inquiry, under this restriction, both to the manner and the matter of their teaching, no question would ever have been raised as to the propriety of their becoming commissioners for theology as well as commissioners for missions.

But there are some other things as to this theological function of missionary officials which are equally evident. It is evident, for example, that the protection of orthodoxy in the current theology of Christendom is not quite the same thing as disciplining the nations, nor is the formulation of an improved scientific theology identical with preaching the gospel to every creature, closely as they are related. A missionary cannot be too scientific; but he may be as unscientific as Peter the Hermit, and yet be a missionary of notable power. A theological professor or a metropolitan pastor cannot be too practical; but he may be as practical as Dwight W. Moody, and yet prove a failure in his particular sphere. Especially should it be insisted on just now that the theological equipment of a missionary shall not be measured by men whose eye is mainly fixed upon the theological issues at stake in some home controversy.

A board of commissioners qualified to superintend military academies, or to draft models for steamships, may not be the men to select the best officers to guard an Indian frontier, or to lead a naval engagement. During the late civil war, it was not the men of highest rank at West Point who proved the best generals. Lincoln was really a better strategist than Halleck, for the reason that Lincoln knew the enemy, while Halleck knew only

manœuvres. Grant only cared to put down the rebellion, while McClellan was bent on a model army organization. The Austrian generalissimo said of Napoleon, "That's a boy, sir! He knows nothing about war!" But the boy marched into Vienna for all that! The Austrian was very orthodox, and very eminent in the profession of arms. Napoleon was sufficiently orthodox, but very much determined to be present in force at some point where his enemy was weak. Grant combined Lincoln's common sense with enough of technical skill to give the order after each day's defeat in the Wilderness, "Gentlemen, you have done well to-day. We will march by the flank to-morrow on our way to Richmond." It is a mistake to say that West Point training alone conquered the rebellion. West Point orthodoxy was leading us to hopeless defeat. West Point technics did us yeoman's service as soon as it found men who set little store by West Point traditions. The war brought out the essential defectiveness of the military academy as emphatically as its great merits. Martinets are not soldiers, neither are dogmatists missionaries. A well-drilled catechist who is responsive to all the distinctions of a finely elaborated theological "memorandum," a web of inwoven doctrines and dogmas, full of the interplay of propositions and hypotheses, may be entirely sure of the exact position, among possibilities and probabilities and certainties, of a point, of which both he and his examiners are equally, because entirely, ignorant. But such a man is not necessarily the best man to don leather and camel's hair, and go out into the wilderness crying, "Repent ye, for the kingdom of Heaven is at hand."

When Jonathan Edwards left Northampton and became a missionary to the Stockbridge Indians, it is hardly to be wondered at that he distinguished that frontier town more by writing "The Freedom of the Will," and by ferreting out the depredations of certain eminent families upon the government funds granted the Indians, than he did by his discourses. He is said to have adorned his sermons, though delivered in high English through an interpreter, with the same minute divisions and subdivisions which he had found to be eminently effective in reaching a commanding climax in his Northampton pulpit. Nor were the fine distinctions of thought wanting with which he had often carried discomfiture into the ranks of the Arminians and to the Rev. Solomon Williams. If "The Reverend and Honorable, The Board of Commissioners," as they were styled after the pompous fashion of the times, then representing in Boston an English missionary society

to which Edwards had applied for appointment, had assumed the theological function we are now discussing, it is quite likely a long correspondence would have been evolved, conducted affectionately but sharply, as to the undesirableness of serving up Christianity in this comminuted form to North American Indians. The example, ten years before, of his friend and son-in-law, David Brainard, and especially of Eliot a century earlier, who not only learned the Indian tongue but reduced it to writing in a translation of the New Testament, would have been courteously but very persistently urged upon him.

So far our supposed Board of Theology for Foreign Missions would have done a good work, and even though it had been a little disposed to magnify its office unduly, it doubtless would have commended itself to its English employers as well as to the "Great and General Court of Massachusetts," which seems to have furnished a part of the funds used in the enterprise, and indeed to the great theologian himself.

If, however, this correctional board in Boston, under cover of ascertaining Edwards's fitness to be a successful missionary to the Stockbridge Indians, had undertaken to bring to definition certain inchoate speculations of his as a theologian, then just beginning to be whispered about in connection with the great Arminian controversy, and for that end had forwarded for his examination certain formulas of doctrine, not creeds at all, but only little "memoranda," the use of which the London society had been good-naturedly, perhaps a little thoughtlessly, allowing for some considerable time, the case would have been essentially changed. A very slight familiarity with Edwards's controversial correspondence would enable a skillful student of style to compose, even now, just such a letter as "The Reverend and Honorable, The Board of Commissioners" in Boston would have undoubtedly received in response from the Northampton divine. Whatever defects such an imaginary reproduction might have, it could hardly fail to present a marked contrast to the great doctor's meek treatment of the suggestion that he should not allow himself to go beyond *fifteenthly* in his discourses to Algonquin audiences, accustomed as they were to the crisp metaphorical style of Indian oratory, and that he should be specially diligent as to civil service reform within his missionary diocese. It is also easy to see that, humbly as Edwards might have received the practical suggestions of the commissioners, had they insisted upon testing his missionary gifts by challenging him to a contest in theological

dialectics, they might not have issued from that kind of encounter with any addition to their reputation among the sharp theologians who then bristled in armor all over the hills of New England.

It will serve to draw the line of definition still farther about the functions of our Board of Theology, if we fancy this Board of Commissioners of the year 1750 informing their missionary candidate that, not being fully satisfied as to his views respecting the prevalent Arminian speculations, and, especially, being left in some doubt as to his faithful application of the Westminster doctrine of the universal condemnation of all heathen to the dead braves and non-elect infants belonging to the Stockbridge aborigines, among whom he desired to preach the gospel, they would hold his application *under advisement*, not in the expectation that they should see their duty more clearly, but that he might mature his own views by remaining in Northampton until he had completed the treatises he then had in preparation, entitled "The Freedom of the Will," "Original Sin," and "God's End in Creation." There certainly would be some danger that such theological zeal on the part of the Board might not commend itself to Edwards, or to the churches who were then feeling a special responsibility for the souls of these heathen within their gates, or to the "Great and General Court," and the English Society, who might not readily see the bearing of these fine distinctions in theology upon the immediate conversion of the savages in the Berkshire forests. For the Board, whatever the fact might be, would *seem* to be caring more about the result of a theological controversy in Boston than for the salvation of the Indians in Stockbridge, especially if it had been for a long time issuing pathetic appeals, declaring that these Indians at their very doors were "perishing for lack of knowledge," and calling for a missionary to go to them at once, not omitting a shrewd suggestion as to the duty of "special thank offerings" to be employed in plucking these particular heathen as brands out of the burning. It is not difficult to see that all this would have an appearance of inconsistency, not to say insincerity, which, if these Boston Commissioners had then come to be a "*Prudential Committee*," they would doubtless have been prudent enough to avoid. It would not have been strange if such a course had made these missionary officials pose before the public as theological martinets. The more excitable of the Edwardians might have regarded them as a reproduction of the ancient Rabbis who were addicted to tithing mint and anise and cummin. In the heat of debate some strong orator

might have given a hint of Uzzah, putting forth his hand to hold the ark of the Lord. Some sturdy pulpit might have found a more charitable analogy in the slightly egotistical speech of Elijah: "I have been very jealous for the Lord God of hosts, because thy people have forsaken thy covenant, and I, even I, only am left." And when the preacher in the climax of his discourse would thrill his audience by apostrophizing indignantly these missionary commissioners, calling out in the orotund register, "*What doest thou here, Elijah?*" the strongest opponents of the Edwardean speculations might have felt that the Board, though very sincere, had made an unfortunate mistake in assuming such large responsibility. And this regret would not probably have been diminished as the preacher, with a slight touch of humor, reminded his hearers that, as the result of Elijah's intermeddling, he was ordered to commission at once, and to anoint in the name of the Lord, two very objectionable persons, especially from Elijah's point of view, — *Hazaël* in Syria and *Jehu* in Israel, — though they were far from being model monarchs or even model men. All this might not have been exactly charitable, either to the prophet or to the commissioners, both of whom were, no doubt, earnestly desirous of doing their duty as they understood it. But it would go to show that the Lord's ways are not as men's ways, even though the men are prophets and missionary commissioners. The trouble which our theological board of A. D. 1750 would thus have brought upon themselves would have come of their overlooking the plain fact that, for the sake of testifying their disapproval of Edwards's new orthodoxy, then just being suspected, they had forbidden the water of life to the perishing heathen. Making a misleading issue is exceedingly bad strategy for honest men to adopt in controversy. It is a style of logic which should be left for sophists and politicians exclusively. Nothing could be worse than to identify, in the minds of common people, opposition to false doctrine by alarmed theologians with opposition to Christ's last command by missionary commissioners. A theological board that has in its eye a *home issue*, instead of a *heathen need*, would, anywhere and at any time, be sure to manœuvre itself into defeat, though it might be made up of the most single-hearted and simple-minded of men.

Over and above this mistake of making the salvation of the heathen wait for the settlement of every elusive hypothesis and doubtful exegesis in the minds of candidates, another restriction upon our Board of Theology for Missions seems to be necessary.

Nothing but actual experience would ever have suggested such a strange necessity, it is true. But actual experience has suggested it and imposed it. It is that our Board of Theology for *Missions* shall not understand itself as set for the defense of a sound theology *at home*. Such a board may be quite convinced that some new speculation is "perversive, divisive," and generally dangerous. New views uniformly appear so to those who do not apprehend the defects in the old views which give rise to them. In fact, "improvements in theology" usually are somewhat crude till they have been smelted over in the fire of controversy. But a missionary board cannot safely undertake to bear its testimony against the new views by setting up a *boycott* against those who hold them, excluding them from its offices and its mission fields. "Cast out the beam from thine own eye" is the response they will be sure to provoke. If these new opinions are held in an aggressive way, and occupy a disproportionate place in the thought and speech of a man, that is a matter of method, and comes properly within the theological functions of a missionary board. The same would be true of disproportionateness in preaching old views, both true and false. But to use a missionary organization as a theological die to stamp with a mark of Cain a particular opinion which happens to be offensive to the majority of its temporary directors is a thoroughly bad thing to do, and will surely end in destroying the sacredness of the association, and eventually in bringing it into contempt.

If in Edwards's time such a board had strongly approved his personal fitness to be a missionary, but had written him that they had *also* an important duty to discharge in reference to certain "improvements in theology," which he had announced, and that they could not commission him as their missionary until he had purged himself of all complicity with said "improvements," which their home society, without knowing much about them, had pronounced "perversive and divisive," it is easy for us to see now, at a distance of a hundred and fifty years, that such a theological board would have come to grief. They would not have had a very comfortable time, to begin with, in dealing with Edwards himself. The great theological thinker of the eighteenth century might have been too mighty for them — "The Reverend and Honorable," as they were. Then the whole Arminian party, who had been led to suppose, from the accusations of these missionary officials and their theological sympathizers, that Edwards had really become a pervert from Calvinism, would assail them.

Next, after that party had become committed against them, and thoroughly alienated, when the Calvinists came to discover that the "improvements" were really a new defense of the supralapsarian hypothesis of necessarianism and race-sin, in which their souls delighted, they also would become its fierce accusers. The poor board, like the benevolent gentleman who undertook to defend the Hibernian wife from her husband's shillalah, would be set upon by both parties. The Edwards party would have been alienated, because it had been unjustly attacked and persistently misrepresented. The Arminian party would have been alienated, because the board had led them to suppose, by their confident accusations of Edwards, that they had gained a new adherent in the renowned divine, whereas it had turned out that he was more dangerously, because more intelligently, their enemy than the board itself. By the time both these opposing discontents had been exorcised from the Stockbridge mission, it probably would have been taken up as one dead, insomuch that many would have said, *It is dead*. And all this trouble would have come of meddling. It would have been the condemnation of Uzzah over again, the inevitable consequence of a zeal which is not according to knowledge.

I had intended to illustrate the principles that should govern the organization and policy of a Board of Theology for Foreign Missions by a careful statement of the questions which the majority of our American Board have recently dragged into its administration, in the attempt to put its ban of excommunication upon certain esoteric matters, incident, like a thousand other hypotheses, good, bad, and indifferent, to all active inquiry in all the departments of science. It is plain to those who have had a personal knowledge of all the facts in this matter from the very beginning, that our Board of Missions have entered upon this foolish and hopeless crusade in such a way as to array against them, not merely those whom they think to discredit by their violent and largely unintelligent condemnation, but every friend of devout and candid investigation. Many of us set no scientific value upon theological hypotheses as they are usually employed, but when they are used in spying out "the secret things that belong unto the Lord our God," we condemn them as perverse, divisive, and dangerous in the superlative degree. Many of us, in view of the extensive abuse of hypotheses in the sciences, are ready to echo the words of Newton, that master in the true use of this crutch of thought, *Hypotheses non fingo*. More of us condemn,

with special emphasis, the particular hypothesis which has created the present disturbance as unscientific and useless, as we do the old hypothesis it is displacing. But the *manner* and manifest *motive*, and the *weapons employed* by our Missionary Board, and those who are using it for partisan purposes, are so reprehensible and so subversive of the first principles of all free theological investigation, that the proportions of the error assailed sink into insignificance by the side of the monstrous usurpation through which it is sought to drive it out. The stamp tax of our Revolutionary period was a small wrong, which could well enough have been argued and decided in a justice's court, while the principle involved in it fired the heart of a nation and plucked from England the brightest jewel in her crown.

The space assigned me allows room, after this long negative treatment of this subject, to indicate only in the briefest way what seem to be the positive functions of an American Board of Theology for Foreign Missions. They may be indicated as pertaining to the *manner* and *proportionateness* of missionary teaching, and to a strong emphasis upon those truths and facts of Christianity which are *immediately essential to the salvation of the individual soul*. If Edwards had been exhorted not to give undue prominence in his missionary sermons to the distinction between natural and moral ability, and if he had been urged to press upon his Indians without undue prolixity the duty of immediate repentance and faith in Christ, the Board would have been clearly within the limit of its theological functions. But if it had insisted that Edwards should accept unqualifiedly the Calvinistic hypothesis of the loss of all moral ability in Eden, and deny unqualifiedly the hypothesis of a present moral ability clogged and enervated by a voluntary unwillingness over which the sinner has absolute and exclusive control, it would have started a question upon which even Edwards had not then thought himself clear, if he ever did; a question, too, upon which they were even less qualified than he to pronounce a dogmatic decision. There can be no reasonable doubt, from what we know of the man, that he would have replied, quoting in the Miltonic style of anticipation some recent words of a young man whom Japan, in her great need, cannot have to tell its inquiring millions what they must do to be saved: "Whatever my views may be in the future, I should at least want to have the *liberty* of holding the same doctrines and hypotheses that I now hold." Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that if the present Board and the present Prudential Committee had then

been in power, Jonathan Edwards would have been refused an appointment as missionary to the Stockbridge Indians!

Perhaps I can best give my meaning by condensing it into formal votes. I may add that the votes appended were prepared for presentation at the Springfield meeting in 1887, and were regarded with favor by some gentlemen prominent in the Board. Votes quite similar, if I mistake not, were discussed at a private conference at that time, but it was thought that the Board was not then ripe for so definite a form of action.

Voted, That it is the desire and purpose of this Board to send out missionaries who shall know nothing among the heathen save Jesus Christ and Him crucified, and to decline sending those whose interest and convictions concerning any of the mere concomitants and accessories of the doctrines of the gospel are so strong as to endanger the integrity or proportionateness of their message.

Voted, That, observing these restrictions as to degree and proportion, the Prudential Committee are instructed to use a large liberality as to the form of those methods of harmonizing and systematizing the doctrines of natural and revealed religion, concerning which methods there is a wide difference of opinion among evangelical theologians.

Voted, That in reference to the cases now under advisement, awaiting definite instructions from this Board, the Prudential Committee are requested to seek personal interviews and other forms of direct communication with the parties concerned, in order to ascertain whether certain ambiguous terms in their previous communications do not bear to them a meaning consistent with the test now laid down.

Voted, That in these and all future cases in which the question of theological fitness shall come up, the candidate shall have the privilege of personal interviews with individual members of the Prudential Committee, and with the Committee as a whole, and also the privilege of appealing from their decision to the Board itself.

These forms of votes are given not from any confidence that they contain the true rule or law which should be enacted in the case, but simply in the confidence that *some* rule or law will have to be adopted of a similar sort. General declarations, such as the elaborate letters of Dr. Storrs, can easily be taken in a Pickwickian sense, and actually are so taken, even when their author is at hand to expound and apply their real meaning. What seems to be wanting in addition is a principle — a *statute* — drawn up in the style of a statute, and made as precise as the case will allow. If a clear and correct answer to the question, *What must man do to be saved?* is to be the definition of the whole theologi-

cal function of the executive officers of the Board in dealing with missionary candidates, a very considerable portion of the present uncertainty will be shut out. But little will remain to be determined by those officers except the practical adaptation of the candidate to give *proportionately, wisely, and forcibly*, the message of salvation.

The *ideal* administration of this theological function, both in a Board of Missions and in many other relations, will be reached, when we have become familiar with the scientific use of hypothesis, and are prepared to condemn unqualifiedly its employment in such questions as God's methods of bringing restoring grace to *moral imbeciles* (a term which we borrow from the controversial literature of the last generation). Hypotheses of various kinds as to moral incompetency have vexed the church with controversy from the third century to the present time. For all these centuries the glorious gospel of the grace of God has been loaded down with these human conjectures, concerning matters upon which we have no evidence, and can obtain none. The scientific plan for hypothesis is in the search for *new* evidence. It then acts like a modern electric search light. It penetrates dark nooks, and illumines slightly a misty air. Then it becomes a "good working hypothesis." But when the search light is turned upon a *blank wall*, it not only does no good, but it dazzles the eyes and simply bewilders the observer. The more brilliant it is, the more injurious. The present contest is between two hypotheses as to a matter concerning which God has not seen fit to give us one word of information. Neither party is specially strong in the positive defense of its own hypothesis; but each is irresistible in its assault upon that of its opponents! It is very hard to characterize this controversy in fitting terms, without implying a disrespect the writer is far from feeling for the honored and beloved Christian brethren who are engaged in it. But we are learning fast, though our scientific lessons are enormously expensive. And the time may be nearer at hand than we think, when the little leaflets of questions sent out to candidates from the Missionary Room will culminate with the Hopkinsian test, printed in heavy-faced capitals, "*Do you feel willing to leave the government of the universe entirely in the hands of God, while you go forth to preach the gospel to every creature, or do you feel an unconquerable desire to have a hand in it yourself?*"

John Putnam Gulliver.

WHAT IS REALITY?

VII. A HIERARCHY OF BEINGS.

THERE are real things in the world that are more difficult to conceive of than atomic souls. In its absolute unity, in its spontaneity, and in its diversity of operation, the hypothetical atom corresponds very closely to that which the soul believes itself to be. The *ego*, in the light of self-consciousness, is one and indivisible. The diversity of its activities never suggests a real diversity of being. It always stands in the imagination as a thing quite apart from the organs of the body, which seem to be the instruments of its will. The atom, therefore, indivisible, spontaneous, and varied in its activities, is no inapt symbol of the soul as known to itself. Indeed, so far as the combination of these particular qualities is concerned, it would be impossible to find another as good.

But that aspect of reality which the soul exhibits to itself is not the only one that must be taken into the account. Unit as it is, its unity is somehow coincident with an amazing complexity, — a complexity that admits of analysis. And though we have resolved to regard the elementary atoms of the world as beings, the problem of the unity of the soul is as far from solution as ever. In fact, the concept we have applied to the interpretation of atoms seems to render them quite unavailable for the construction of an organically connected world. The very essence of soul life, from this point of view, is isolation and independence.

So profoundly was the mind of the great Leibnitz impressed with these characteristics of being, when he constructed his theory of the world as an aggregate of atomic souls, that he represented these souls as leading absolutely separate lives. There is, he supposes, no real action of one upon another. Each carries within itself the reason of its own changes. Everything that takes place in a monad is the development of its individual, unstimulated activity. To account, then, for the diversities of being, he made his atomic souls, or monads, of various orders, ranging from the Supreme Being, the source of all other monads, to souls having no self-consciousness. And to account for the appearance of interaction between these beings, he invented the hypothesis of a *preëstablished* harmony, arranged in the beginning by the Creator. The internal development of each monad was said to be so adjusted to that of all other monads as to pro-

duce the *false* impression that they are mutually influenced by each other. In short, he tried to harmonize the facts of the world by reducing one great class of them to illusion, — a method with which we are familiar, but which our philosophy sedulously avoids.

All that we know about the nature of the soul is derived, in the first instance, from our knowledge of the human soul. And this, as we shall hope to convince the reader, is known to us not simply as a unit, but as a unit that rests upon and embraces within itself an untold multitude of beings. If, therefore, we would use the *ego* for the interpretation of the universe, we must always carry with us these two conjoined, though not harmonized, aspects of its reality. Thus far, we have found in the atom a symbol of the soul's unity. Now let us ask, do we in the combination of atoms find a symbol of its unity in multiplicity? I think we do. Our elementary atom does not maintain an isolated, independent existence. It combines with others, not simply in the union of an external association, but in the real union, which gives rise to another individual.

For instance, we have two highly inflammable gases, hydrogen and oxygen. Two atoms of the former combine with one of the latter to make a molecule of water. The hydrogen seems to have surrendered its individuality, and the oxygen has likewise lost its identity. But in their place we have an absolutely new unit, with a nature that bears no resemblance whatever to either of its constituents. What has become of the atoms? Have they been destroyed? It appears not; for they can be brought back again, absolutely unchanged by the experiences through which they have passed; they have lost nothing, they have gained nothing, they have remembered nothing. And what shall we think of the new unit, the molecule of water? Is it an arch-being, containing within itself three subordinate beings? Who can say? There are more things in heaven and earth than can be pictured to our imaginations. We might, indeed, guess that in stable combinations, like this, the consciousness of the atoms is suspended, and that until some further chemical change arouses them to activity, they rest as in a deep sleep.

But of the molecule of water we must postulate a real individuality. In many diverse relations it acts as a unit. In steam it separates itself from other molecules and takes on the appearance of an isolated, independent being, pursuing its individual ends with irresistible energy. In water it appears, still in motion, but

with movements coördinated to that of other molecules, with which it forms a homogeneous, mutually attracting aggregate. And again in the form of a solid it enters into that class of relations to which Lotze refers when he finds himself "constrained to conceive extended matter as a system of unextended beings that, by their forces, fix one another's position in space, and by the resistance which they offer — as if to the intrusion of a stranger — to any attempt to make them change their place, produce the phenomena of impenetrability, and the continuous occupation of space."¹ When entering into this latter state, moreover, molecules display, in crystallization, phenomena that suggest instinct. Obedient to some magnetic or other influence they arrange themselves in those definite structural forms of great beauty with which snowflakes and frost have made us familiar.

Some compound molecules, again, act as units in the formation of other substances of greater complexity. As compound radicals, they associate themselves with elementary atoms and produce molecules that are composed in some cases of more than one hundred atoms. Carbon atoms unite thus with each other to form groups of great stability that act as radicals. These, Professor Cooke tells us, "may be regarded as the skeletons of the organic compounds. Locked together, like so many vertebræ, these carbon atoms form the framework to which the other elementary atoms are fastened, and it is thus that the complex molecular structures, of which organized beings consist, are rendered possible."²

Now there is certainly nothing in all this to *compel* the belief that molecules are beings. Not every closely related assemblage of units constitutes a new unit; and it is impossible for us to determine, in every case, whether what we are contemplating is a real union or merely an association. It might be urged that if molecules are beings, then crystals, which are an assemblage of molecules having definite structural relations to a common centre, or axis, should be regarded as beings also. But, on the other hand, it might be shown that the phenomena of crystallization imply no real union of a multitude in a higher unity, but a symmetrically connected aggregation, that finds its analogue in a colony of closely related beings.

But we cannot *demonstrate* the non-existence of individuality in a crystal, nor its existence in a molecule; it is all a question of the fitness of analogies. It was in obedience to the law of con-

¹ *Microcosmus*, i. 358.

² *The New Chemistry*, p. 312.

tinuity that we ventured to postulate the existence of atomic souls; and it is in obedience to the same law that we see in molecules an illustration of that unity in multiplicity that characterizes being in its highest manifestations. But we are at present laboring under a disadvantage with the reader. Our reasons will become more apparent as we ascend the biological scale; and this we will now proceed to do.

Organic molecules combine to form living organisms. The least complex of these appear to us as single nucleated cells. They are sometimes called simple or homogeneous. But that these are only relative terms is demonstrated by the great complexity of their behavior. So much has been recently written upon the marvels of adaptation displayed by these microscopic beings that we need not dwell long upon the subject. M. Alfred Binet, who has made a most elaborate study of them, leaves the existence of consciousness an open question, but he contributes the following facts that bear upon it. He finds in these beings —

1. "Perception of the external object."
2. "Choice made between a number of objects."
3. "Perception of their position in space."
4. "Movements, calculated either to approach the body and seize it, or to flee from it."

This is an exceedingly modest set of deductions from the facts set before us by their author. For instance: "The *didinium* knows precisely the position of the prey it follows, for it takes aim at the object of its pursuit like a marksman, and transpierces it with its nettle-like darts." Another species exhibits all the appearance of a voluntary and intelligent combination on the part of individuals for the attainment of a common end. "The *bodo caudatus* is a voracious flagellate possessed of extraordinary audacity; it combines in troops to attack animalculæ one hundred times as large as itself, as the *colpods* for instance, which are veritable giants when placed alongside of the *bodo*. Like a horse attacked by a pack of wolves, the *colpod* is soon rendered powerless. Twenty, thirty, forty *bodos* throw themselves upon him, eviscerate and devour him completely."¹

Rising, now, another step on the scale, we come to communities formed of a number of connected cells, in which each individual is like every other. Here we have a suggestion of unity in multiplicity; but it appears, in fact, to be only a closely connected association of beings. The following account of such an associa-

¹ *The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*, p. 60.

tion is given by the writer above mentioned: "In the genus *volvox*, colonies are found of which the structure is very complicated. Such are the great green balls formed by the aggregation of diminutive organisms, which form the surface of the sphere, and are joined together by their envelopes; they have each two flagella, which pass through the inclosing membrane and swing unimpeded on the outside; the envelopes, each tightly holding the other, form hexagonal figures exactly like the cells of a honey-comb. Each *volvox* is at liberty within its own envelope; but it projects protoplasmic extensions which pass through its cuticle and place it in communication with its neighbor. It is probable that these protoplasmic filaments act like so many telegraphic threads to establish a network of communication among all the individuals of the same colony. It is necessary, in fact, that these diminutive organisms be in communication with each other in order that their flagella may move in unison, and that the entire colony may act as a *unit* and in obedience to a single impulse."¹

Passing on from communities in which all the cells are alike, we come next to those in which there is some degree of differentiation and division of labor. In the *diæcian volvox*, the female cellules are all joined together in one colony, and the male in another. In the male colony every individual is alike, but in the female there are neutral cellules which are not designed for fecundation, but which simply perform a locomotive function. "Equipped with one eye and two flagella, they are intended to move the great colonial ball; they are the oarsmen of the colony."

Our next step is a long one. The colony of the *volvox*, as we have seen, exists as a sphere. It never gets beyond this form. But the *hydra* exists as an open sac, the inside of which is composed of cells that not only differ from those of the outside, but also perform very different functions in the economy of the organism. When we have reached this stage we are, without any question, contemplating a permanent organism, composed of a multitude of lesser organisms, — a single being that exists by the combined action of other beings, varying from each other in form and function. We may therefore turn from the consideration of the taxonomic series to that of the ontogenetic; and study the increasing complexity of being as it appears in those stages that succeed each other in the life history of each individual of a higher species.

Every animal, man included, is at the outset a single nucleated

¹ *The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*, p. 57.

cell. The first step in the upward development of this individual is its division into two, by a process called segmentation. This process continues till we have a multitude of cells, every one of which is like the other. The form which these cells take in animals belonging to all the chief groups is called a *planula*. It is a form that calls to mind the spherical colony of *volvox* just considered. It is described by Professor Huxley as a *central space* around which the aggregate of cells is disposed as a coat or envelope, the inside being filled with fluid.

The next stage is the transformation of this fluid-filled vesicle into an open-mouthed sac. This is done not by opening the planula, but by a process called invagination. Its wall, the blastoderm, is gradually pushed in on one side. Mr. Spencer has made this process very easy to understand by the following illustration: "Take a small india-rubber ball, not of the inflated kind, nor of the solid kind, but of the kind about an inch or so in diameter with a small hole through which, under pressure, the air escapes. Suppose that, instead of consisting of india-rubber, its wall consists of small cells, made polyhedral in form by mutual pressure, and united together. This will represent the blastoderm. Now, with the finger, thrust in one side of the ball until it touches the other, so making a cup. This action will stand for the process of invagination. Imagine that by continuance of it, the hemispherical cup becomes very much deepened, and the opening narrowed, until the cup becomes a sac; of which the introverted wall is everywhere in contact with the outer wall."¹

This two-layered sac is called a *gastrula*. It is permanently represented among living forms by the *hydra*, which we have just considered, with the addition of tentacles around the opening of the sac, which serves the animal for a mouth. But, now, in the embryos of higher animals a layer of cells makes its appearance between the outer and the inner walls. While the process of introversion is taking place, and before the two surfaces have come in contact, cells are budded off from one or the other, or both, to form this third class of cells, that are quite different in their characteristics from either of the others. At this stage, then, we have an organism consisting of three classes of cells or beings. But this is only the foundation for a new series of transformations; for each of these classes, by the same process of multiplication and differentiation, gives rise to a number of other classes. From the outer layer, the *epiblast*, is

¹ *The Factors of Organic Evolution*, by Herbert Spencer, p. 64.

developed the epidermis and the whole nervous system. From the inside layer, the *hypoblast*, springs the nutritive system, and the lining of the air-tubes of the lungs; and from the middle layer, the *mesoblast*, are derived the blood-vessels, muscles, bones, etc. Thus, by repeated transformations, the most heterogeneous results are reached.

This is one aspect of the process; but now we must take note of another, that is no less wonderful. Out of this ever-increasing diversity there emerges, how we can never imagine, an ever-increasing unity. In the case of a human being it is represented by the intelligent, self-conscious, self-asserting ego. This unmistakably real person comes more and more prominently into view, while the individuality of the constituent beings sinks out of sight. As soon as we turn to this more familiar view, it seems as if the one to which we have been giving our attention must be an illusion, founded upon some mistaken analogy. But can it be so? Our first cell is a real being, to which we have every reason to impute a degree of sensibility and consciousness. Our second and third and following cells, made from the first, seem to be duplicates of it. If the individual cell-life ceases, at what point does it cease?

Shall we make the hypothesis that the individual life of cells comes to an end when the main work of organization is completed? that, as soon as they become *nonprogressive*, they, as it were, surrender to the *ego* their psychic life, and are henceforth its mechanical instruments? We might, indeed, conjecture that this ought to be the course of events, but there is no evidence to show that it is. On the contrary, there is much to show that the individual cell-life, in its *semi-independence*, continues in full force.

The most striking illustrations of this are to be found in those classes of cells that most readily suggest detached organisms, by the freedom of their movements, and by the means used for the capturing of food. Speaking of the walls of the intestines, M. Alfred Binet says: "They are covered with epithelial cells, each of which is an organism endowed with a complex of properties. The protoplasm of these cells lays hold of food by an act of prehension, exactly as the ciliate infusoria and other unicellular organisms do, that lead an independent life. In the intestines of cold-blooded animals the cells emit prolongations which seize the minute drops of fatty matter and, carrying them into the protoplasm of the cell, convey them thence into the chylifactive ducts." Another mode of absorption of fatty matters, met with

among cold-blooded as well as warm-blooded animals, is described as follows: "The lymphatic cells pass out from the adenoid tissue which contains them, so that upon arriving at the surface of the intestines they seize the particles of fatty matter there present, and, laden with their prey, make their way back to the lymphatics."

Of another class of cells, the white globules of the blood, we know that they lead a life almost as independent as that of the wholly separate amoeba. Bent on errands of their own, they swim through the veins and arteries, gaining their own livelihood, and contributing in some way to the well-being of the community. It is surmised that they constitute a sort of patrol corps, that, passing up and down the system, arrest and digest suspicious foreigners that may have found their way into its life currents. Spirited encounters between them and the flagella-armed microbes of malaria have been described by eye-witnesses. Of still another class of cells we know that the individuals detach themselves from the organism for the continuance of the race by the production of other organisms, and we know, further, that each one of these goes freighted with a potentiality of constructive power that, from the start, bankrupts the imagination that would seek to follow it.

But now, let us observe, freedom of locomotion is not the only or most impressive evidence of individual psychic efficiency. The greater part of the thinking and planning and directing among human beings is done by sedentary individuals to whom locomotion is an unimportant incident.

Millions of nerve cells lead a sedentary but most active life within the organism. Each occupies its own settled position, but all are so linked together by nerve fibres that each one is in communication with the whole cell-system. At first sight this system would seem to be more correctly described as composed of homogeneous matter, differently distributed; some in masses, and some drawn out into delicate fibres, that convey energy between the masses as electricity is conducted on wires. But a more careful investigation reveals the fact that both the masses and the fibres are composed of individuals. The fibres are a connected series of elongated cells, and the masses are an agglomeration of cells, differing both in form and function from those of the fibres. This division into two great classes is, however, only the beginning of the differences that exist — differences that are made known to us not simply by the outward appearance of the cells. For though these

vary much, both in size and form, the material of which they are composed appears, to chemical tests as well as to the eye, to be the same everywhere. It is only by their behavior that we know them to have characteristics that separate them widely from each other, both as species and as individuals within the species.

The case is the same as with germs. All animals start from germs that so closely resemble each other that it is impossible to say what kind of an animal each one is destined to produce. But, notwithstanding this similarity, we know that one has in it the possibilities of a most elaborate organism, consisting of millions of cells each one differing from all the others; while another has in it only the most simple constructive powers. From this, we infer a complexity of structure in germs just as certainly as if we could see it. It is not otherwise with the apparent simplicity and uniformity of nerve cells. One elaborate set is connected with the sense of sight, another with that of hearing, another with that of smelling. Now if we apply the very same stimulus to each one of these sets in turn, the result will be three very different sensations.

The following is, in substance, a quotation from Dr. Ewald Hering's account of the matter. If, in a perfectly dark room the nerves of the eye are irritated by an electric current, the sensation of light is produced; but if we pass an electric current through the auditory nerve in an absolutely silent room, we hear sounds. Or if, again, the current is applied to the nerves of the skin, the sensation of heat and cold is experienced, although we are not in contact with any cold or warm object; and if by the very same current, we excite the nerves of the tongue, gustatory sensations are produced.

In view of these facts Hering, accepting Johannes Müller's theory of the specific energies of the sensory nerves, makes the following statement: "The diverse structures of the nervous system, the nerve cells and the nerve fibres, are internally different in spite of all external similarity; and the diversity of the sensations produced is a manifestation of such difference."¹ And in another place, speaking of the educating influence to which nerve cells are subjected by means of their manifold anatomical connections, he says: "Every single cerebral element, in the course of its development and under the influence of sensory experiences, attains an individual character. And it may be asserted that not even two

¹ An Address on *The Specific Energies of the Nervous System*. Translated for the Open Court, December 22, 1887.

of the innumerable cerebral cells are alike in kind and degree of individual energy."

But, it may be said, mere difference of constitution does not carry with it the necessity of inferring consciousness. Why should we not limit ourselves to a chemical expression of the phenomena? When a nerve cell responds to a stimulus, it is simply the reduction of an exceedingly unstable compound to simpler elements. And if the responses are different, why should we not ascribe all such differences to variations of chemical composition? Our reply is that, however correct an account of the matter this may be from one point of view, it is not exhaustive. All consciousness in the human ego is also conditioned upon chemical changes. But in self-consciousness we have revealed to us another side of the process; and the more intimately we become acquainted with cell-life, the more necessary does it seem to reason analogically from the human ego to the hypothetical cell ego.

We know that a cell consists of a protoplasmic body and a nucleus; and that this nucleus somehow exerts a controlling and modifying influence over the cell as an organism. This suggestion of a relation of parts or organs, similar to that existing between the human brain and the rest of the organism, might not in itself be considered important. But there is that in the behavior of the nerve cell that strongly suggests the most distinctive characteristic of mind; that is, self-control. A normal cell when stimulated does not react to exhaustion, but responds by measure. Just as a person *chooses* to be more or less indifferent to one set of influences while responding freely to another, so also it seems to be with nerve cells. This power of *inhibition*, as it is called, differs in cells and groups of cells as much as persons differ in temperament, and there is every indication that it is a phenomenon of exactly the same nature as that which convinces us that we are, to a certain extent, responsible beings.

We cannot dwell longer on this aspect of the subject, and we will, therefore, close it with the following statement of results given by Dr. Ewald Hering, in the address already referred to: "Millions of the minutest separately existing beings, different in shape and external structure, compose a systematically arranged aggregate, thus forming the diverse organs; and these beings, in spite of the complicated interdependence, lead quite separate lives, for each single being is an animated centre of activity. The human body does not receive the impulse of life like a machine from one point, but each single atom of the different organs bears its vitalizing power in itself."

We must now return to the *ego*, upon which we have been, for some time, turning our backs. What has this multitude of beings to do with it? or it with them? As we very well know, it has no conscious relations with them, though it lives and thinks by means of them. Yet the ego has conscious relations with the body. Its organs are its servants, which it intelligently directs for its uses. In other words, while it does not deal singly with the individuals of its great empire, it does deal with them as organized groups. According to their special functions, the individuals are organized in such manner that each group presents something the same aspect of unity in diversity that characterizes the larger organism. As we have already seen, the individuals that have to do with the sense of hearing are organized in a system by themselves. Those that serve the sense of sight form another system; and those that serve the sense of touch still another. And, somehow, there is a unity of action in each system, — a coördination, by means of which the activities of a diversified multitude are combined for the achievement of very definite ends.

The same appearance of separate yet organized and harmonious action characterizes those bodily functions that are less closely related to our consciousness. The beating of the heart, the movements of the lungs, and other complicated activities we call *automatic*. That is, they seem to take care of their own affairs, without assistance from the central consciousness. The situation is thus described by Mr. G. H. Lewes: "The actions of the organism are many, various, but interconnected. Some are unapparent (to consciousness), others are apparent. Some are the components of combined results not separately recognized; others are groups which seem independent of each other. All the actions which go to form the group respiration are vital actions, though we only consider their result. Respiration is, or seems to be, an action independent of digestion; and locomotion, a group independent of both. It is thus, also, with mental actions. They have a relative independence and an absolute interdependence."¹

It might naturally be expected that the actuality of these seemings, if they have a ground of reality, ought to be traced by anatomy not only to the different sets of muscles that serve the purposes of each group, but further to the separate combinations of nerve-cells, fibres, and ganglia that are the specific brain of each. This, however, can be done only to a very limited extent. The nervous system of man, even to our modern anatomy, remains little better than a maze of unexplained intricacies.

¹ *Mind as a Function of the Organism*, sec. 165.

For an illustration of the greatest independence of nerve centres we have to go to the lower animals. For instance, when certain insects are cut in two, the anterior section will continue to exercise its appropriate function of devouring as if nothing had happened. And others, when treated in the same way, will show as great and as discerning an activity in the posterior half. Praying crickets will pursue successfully the quests dictated by their generative instincts for days after their heads have been removed; and the two halves of a divided earwig will turn against one another and contend furiously with their antennæ so long as strength remains. Anatomy shows that this extreme degree of independence is owing to the existence of separate, slightly connected centres of nervous energy. And in the brains of the higher animals we have what appears to be an aggregation of more or less separate ganglia connected by nerve fibres. The spinal cord seems to be a series of ganglia which have coalesced. That a central organ may be thus composed from a number of more independent ganglia is shown in the metamorphosis of insects. Ganglia that appear in the lava state as separate are found to be consolidated at a more advanced stage of development.

In the human organism, each one of these centres seems like a separate bureau that is superintended by its own head, and served by its own particular staff of officers. The central consciousness may considerably modify and interfere with these separate departments, but it can never assume their functions. It sustains them, defends them; to a certain extent it regulates times and seasons. It can quicken or retard their motions. Some of them it can direct, modify, and educate. But if they stop working, it cannot supply their places by its own skill. It is as if, all along the process of organization, heads of departments were evolved concomitantly with the departments themselves, specialized souls to superintend and regulate special organs and functions. The greatest degree of independence exists in those on which vitality depends, and which we share in common with lower organisms. The external appearance and movements of some of these very strongly suggest creatures with whose independent existence we are familiar. The movements of the intestines have the most remarkable resemblance to the creeping of a worm, the great difference being that the worm propels *itself* forward on its support, while the intestines, being fastened, push along the masses of food and the fæces.

Contrasted, in point of independence, with the foregoing class, are the faculties that have sprung up in connection with the con-

scious purposive efforts of the central intelligence. Certain departments of the nervous organization, while they come to us ready-formed for action, are yet to a great extent dependent for their usefulness upon the education and guidance they receive from the conscious ego. One after another the senses offer their services to the undeveloped soul that has been awakened to conscious life through their intervention. At first the soul has to learn the language which they speak. It is like an infant surrounded by nurses and instructors able to impart far more than the pupil is capable of appropriating. But anon the soul grows, and the former instructors become its willing and faithful servants. Having assumed control, it directs the energies of these skilled dependents in channels that are more or less new and strange to them.

The soul wills that it shall know how to read. Eyes and fingers are there to help it to accomplish this end. But they can do nothing of themselves. The ego must begin the work by intelligently fixing its attention upon the task, while it assumes the rôle of instructor. This it does, slowly at first, advancing by successive steps. But there comes a time when all this painstaking concentration on the part of the central intelligence is dropped because it is unnecessary. A subordinate centre of psychic activity has assumed the whole business, and does it with an ease and quickness that is beyond the attainment of a being less specialized.

It is the same with all our acquired faculties. At a certain stage of conscious endeavor, a beneficent spirit seems to come to our assistance. We are not only relieved of a portion of the labor that formerly rested upon us alone, but the new-comer has a facility that far transcends anything of which the ego gave promise. All the information that flows from different sources into this specialized centre is coördinated with a rapidity that is simply marvelous to the reflecting ego. New situations in the environment are seen to have been successfully responded to before the knowledge of their existence even had reached headquarters.

No less impressive is this diversity of operation when an overgrown, over-indulged subordinate centre has risen to supreme control in the organism, having debauched, on its way to power, all the other centres. We say that a man has lost all control of himself, that he is ruled by a demon; and perhaps we express more nearly than we think, the literal truth. The ego is still the more or less intelligent being that knows, and at times feels, the abjectness of its enslaved position, — that even attempts to recover

its lost sway ; but finds, perhaps too late, that all its servants have become insubordinate and treacherous.

But are we not letting imagination run away with us? Do anatomists find any objective evidence of the existence of such a plurality of semi-independent beings within the organisms?

Vivisection has certainly brought to light some very remarkable facts bearing upon the question, — facts that seem to shut us up to the acceptance either of some form of the above belief, or of an alternative that, to the great majority of minds, presents far greater difficulties. We begin with the assumption that the *brain* is the seat of the central ego, — of the consciousness that each one of us calls *my consciousness*. Now if, in experimenting with a lower animal, whose brain we also regard as the seat of its ego, we find that the phenomena of purposive action continue after all connection with the brain has been severed, we infer either that *the brain is not the sole seat of consciousness*, or that consciousness is only an incidental accompaniment of that which we call purposive action. Professor Huxley boldly adopts the latter alternative. The following is his account of the behavior of a frog whose spinal column has been cut across so as to destroy all connection between the posterior parts and the brain : —

“Touch the skin of the side of the body with a little acetic acid, which gives rise to all the signs of great pain in an uninjured frog. In this case there can be no pain, because the application is made to a part of the skin supplied with nerves which come off from the cord below the point of section ; nevertheless, the frog lifts up the limb of the same side, and applies the foot to rub off the acetic acid ; and what is still more remarkable, if the limb be held so that the frog cannot use it, it will by and by move the limb of the other side, turn it across the body, and use it for the same rubbing process. *It is impossible that the frog, if it were in its entirety and could reason, should perform actions more purposive than these ;* and yet we have most complete assurance that, in this case, the frog is not acting from purpose, has no consciousness, and is a mere insensible machine.”¹ On the strength of this “complete assurance,” Professor Huxley would carry us on to the *reductio ad absurdum* that we are laboring under an illusion when we attribute any of our purposive actions to consciousness.

But what kind of a certainty is this on which such an astonishing conclusion is based? All that can be certainly affirmed is that the central *brain consciousness* of the frog has no part in the pro-

¹ *Science and Culture and Other Essays*, p. 227.

duction of these phenomena. But is it not possible that the consciousness of a subordinate nerve centre has? As we should expect, Professor Huxley has not altogether overlooked this possibility. He says: "If any one think fit to maintain that the spinal cord below the injury is conscious, but that it is cut off from any means of making its consciousness known to the other consciousness in the brain, there is no means of driving him from his position by logic. But assuredly there is no way of proving it, and in the matter of consciousness, if in anything, we may hold by the rule, *De non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio.*"

Now, it seems to me that the whole matter is wrongly stated by Professor Huxley. He says, in the same connection, "It is wholly impossible absolutely to prove the presence or absence of consciousness in anything *but one's own brain.*" But the fact is, one's own brain is just the place where it is least possible to prove the presence or absence of consciousness. We, as persons, know, though we cannot by logic prove, that we are conscious. But we have no *direct* knowledge that our consciousness is located in the brain. All the evidence that tends to the belief that it is so located has been gathered through experimenting on the brains of other animals more or less like ourselves. We assume the existence of consciousness in them, as Professor Huxley has said, through analogy with our own self-consciousness. But, on the other hand, we locate our individual consciousness in the brain rather than elsewhere, through analogy, from what we know of others. But the very same kind of evidence that points to the brain as the *principal* seat of consciousness, points to other nerve centres, situated in the spinal cord or elsewhere, as the seats of a more or less subordinate consciousness and intelligence.

I need not stop to analyze the behavior of the mutilated frog to prove this to the reader. I will only indorse what Professor Huxley affirms with regard to it. "It is impossible," he says, "that the frog, if it were in its entirety and could reason, should perform actions [more purposive than these]." There is just the same reason, therefore, for assuming consciousness in nerve centres outside the brain as for assuming its existence *in* the brain. In short, the scientific conclusion to be derived from these phenomena of vivisection by themselves considered is plainly this: *The brain is not the only seat of consciousness.*

That this view, or one involving similar results, commends itself to eminent physiologists, is well known to those who are acquainted with the recent writings of M. Alfred Binet. His experiments

on hysterical patients have produced in his mind the conviction that, in them at least, "a plurality of persons exists." Speaking of his own researches in connection with those of M. Pierre Janet, he says: "We have established, almost with certainty, in fact, that in such persons (hysterical patients) there exists, side by side with the principal personality, a secondary personality, which is unknown by the first, which sees, hears, reflects, reasons, and acts."¹ And referring to the explanation favored by the school to which Professor Huxley belongs, he says: "When I began my researches I did not hesitate to accept it, even contrary to the opinion of my friend M. Pierre Janet, who adopted the hypothesis of sub-conscious phenomena. But later, according as my observations and experiments became more numerous, I was compelled to abandon the explanation founded upon mechanical acts. This, I admit, cost me a great deal; for it is singular to observe how, despite ourselves and the desire of being impartial, we ever reluctantly surrender a first idea."

The researches here alluded to have been pursued chiefly through experiments on hysterical patients, who in certain parts of the body present a more or less extended region of insensibility. These regions sometimes embrace half the body, sometimes only a small spot, sometimes an entire limb; an arm, for instance, will become insensible from the extremity of the fingers to the shoulder joint. The latter case is a specially favorable one for experiments. The arm, by being passed through a screen, is effectually cut off from the observation of the patient; and its absolute insensibility is established beyond a doubt by sudden painful excitations. This insensibility extends to all the tissues of the limb. Skin, muscles, tendons, and articular surfaces have lost all trace of sensibility.

Into the hand, thus cut off from connection with the central consciousness, a penholder is thrust between the thumb and the index finger. "As soon as the contact takes place the two fingers draw together, as if to seize the pen; the other fingers bend half way, the wrist leans sideways, and the hand assumes the attitude necessary to write." Next, the insensible hand is seized by the operator and made to write a familiar word, the patient's own name, for instance; but in the writing an error of spelling is intentionally made. The hand, now left to itself, at first preserves its attitude, but after a little interval begins to write, and repeats the word, sometimes five or ten times. "But,

¹ *The Open Court*, November 7, 1889.

oddly enough, the hand betrays a momentary hesitation when it reaches the letter at which the error in orthography was committed. If a superfluous letter happens to have been added, sometimes the hand will hesitatingly rewrite the name along with the supplementary letter; again it will retrace only a part of the letter in question; and again, finally, entirely suppress it."

This is only one of many experiments that have helped to establish in the mind of the operator the conviction of a plurality of conscious beings within the organism. The line of reasoning is in substance as follows: The hand that performed the above actions was completely severed from the consciousness of the ego. The penholder was seized, the writing performed, and the mistake corrected altogether independently of the central consciousness, which, at the time, was occupied in receiving and attending to sensations from the other parts of the body. Everything seems to indicate that it is quite another person that has felt the penholder, recognized that it is a penholder, adjusted the fingers and hand for the use of it, written and rewritten a word suggested to it by familiar motions, and finally corrected the spelling of this word. The act seems to involve perception, reasoning, and intelligent adaptation.

But the evidence does not end here. For when these inferences are tentatively accepted and applied to other departments of experience, they receive corroborative testimony by affording a probable explanation of phenomena that are otherwise inexplicable. There are forms of insanity that have every appearance of being the usurpation of power by a personality within the system, — a personality that, in a normal state, would be held in subordination. I cannot illustrate this better than by quoting a few passages from a recent article in "*The Lancet*" on responsibility in mental disease, — an article that has no intentional bearing whatever upon our hypothesis of subordinate personalities.

Speaking of cases in which violent acts are suddenly perpetrated in response to slight provocations, Sir James Crichton-Browne says: "In all such cases a momentary irritation, . . . instead of being inhibited in its nascent state, . . . is, by the diminished resistance of the will, and the consequent overaction of the lower centres, permitted to become fixed, or to express itself in a grossly exaggerated manner." Another form he describes as "a sudden and irresistible impulse, which is often a reversion to mere animal instinct, with vague or imperfect consciousness at the time, obscure remembrance afterward, and under a grave

paresis of inhibitory power." And again he says: "The unreasonable obstinacy of lunatics in insane conduct merely indicates that certain mental functions have escaped the regulation of volition, which is enfeebled, and are acting in an irregular and self-willed manner." I quote these expressions only to show how the phenomena of insanity impress one who has given great attention to them, and who apparently has no particular theory to support. They have reference to the most common forms of insanity.

There are other forms, by no means rare, in which the patient lives in alternating states of consciousness. In these cases the second personality is, to use M. Binet's words, "seen gradually to develop more and more, and to assume the initiative in conduct, instead of the first personality, which is temporarily annihilated."

Much more might be said in support of this view; but we have perhaps already given more attention to it than is desirable in a discussion of this kind. The existence of subordinate beings, holding an intermediate position between the ego and its constituency of cell-beings, is at best hypothetical; and it may be that the extension of the analogy of the ego to the different departments of nerve organization in the body has carried us to a conception that is not the counterpart of reality. There are certainly many difficulties in the way of getting a clear thought of such existences. As the nervous system is all connected, and connected in a most intricate manner, it is impossible to find in it the verification of our hypothesis. And, on the other hand, if we once begin to indulge the fancy of separate intermediate beings, there seems to be no limit to the multiplication of them. Every separate idea and emotion may be personified by the imagination.

I wish, therefore, in bringing this part of the subject to a close, to impress it upon the reader that the reality or the *non-reality* of intermediate beings in the human body does not affect our argument. I have introduced it, and dwelt upon it, to show that there are many reasons for believing that the principle of *being within being* has a vast number of repetitions on different scales, and that the world is perhaps organized on the principle of a hierarchy.

We come back, then, to the view with which we were previously occupied, namely, that the unity of the human ego embraces within its physical organization countless myriads of beings that are somehow the constituents of its being and the servants of its will.

Herein is the great mystery of personality. Call it a double-faced fact if you will; but, if so, a fact both faces of which are veritable aspects of reality, and to be always treated as realities in our constructions of the world of being. Look on this side, and the multiplicity swallows up the unity. Look on that, and the unity seems to annihilate the multiplicity.

We can never grasp the *how* of this combination. A community of beings, howsoever connected, cannot be conceived of as merging their multiplicity in one being. On the other hand, I know that I, as a unity, as an individual, as a person, exist. If I am mistaken about this, I am mistaken about everything. My belief that the constituent cells of my body are living beings is only the analogical reflex of my knowledge of myself as a living being. Yet I cannot locate this personality that I call myself. I can find no room for it in the organism. Shall I suppose that one cell is somehow specialized and differentiated, like the queen-bee in the hive, and that by an exceptional course of nutrition and education it becomes the receiver and coördinator of sensations from countless subordinate individuals? There is no rest for me here; for the cell is a composite being. Its ego rests upon a complexity of atoms that are as puzzling as the multitude of cells. Shall I, then, as a last resort, say: The human soul must be an atom, so connected that it combines and reacts upon the influences that reach it from countless other atoms? But, if so, what kind of an atom is the soul? Is it a specialized carbon atom? or an atom undreamed of by chemistry? This seems to be the vanishing point of inquiry on this line. In short, the mystery of the unity of being is not solved.

But, let us remember, this *unity* is a mystery only as related to other facts. In itself, it remains the essential fact of the world, — the one thing that we are absolutely sure of. But the other fact remains also. The ego rests upon, and embraces within itself, a multitude of subordinate beings. These two realities, then, coexistent but not harmonized in our experience, must stand together, and as *one complex fact* express a characteristic of being as it is made known to us.

In our next article we shall try to trace some of the theological and philosophical bearings of this fact.

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ANDOVER, MASS.

EDITORIAL.

THE RATE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.

THERE is some difference of opinion as to the direction of social progress. There is greater difference of opinion as to its rapidity. The advocates and the opponents of some scheme of social reform disagree more concerning the time within which changes may be expected than concerning the need or even the method of the reform. Critics of the scheme point out obstacles which have been overlooked, and which will prove stubborn. They show how slow human nature is in taking up new ideas and breaking up old habits. They call attention to the impediments which have sobered or even destroyed the enthusiasm of reformers in other times. They show how little of what was hoped for came to pass. Such criticisms merely mean, however, that calculation of the rate of social progress is frequently mistaken, that not enough account is taken of obstacles and inertia which are sure to retard although they may not arrest the movement. For some purposes, indeed, rate is more important than direction, as Mark Twain discovered when he embarked on a glacier to be carried to Zermatt. A difference of degree may amount to a difference in kind. But in what may be called social progress, the direction is of more importance than the rate, for the slowness which discourages is due to the mutual counteraction of interests pulling opposite ways, while as much speed as is consistent with safety would be gained if all social forces moved towards a single goal.

We all look forward to coming times, and are asking what our children will live to see. We have ideas of the coming education, the coming science, the coming economic state, the coming art, the coming religion. The ideal not yet, but, as we believe, to be realized, shapes our aims and conduct. But some persons measure the fulfillment of expectation by decades, some by generations, some by centuries, and we find ourselves in opposite camps, chiefly because some of us think the others are in too much of a hurry. You say, To-morrow at the latest; we say, No, the day after to-morrow at the earliest. You say, All things are ready, let us attack the enemy. We say, Wait till the artillery comes up.

Mr. Bryce, in the new Gladstonian paper the "Speaker," reviews the progress of the century which has passed since the critical year 1789 when the States General met at Versailles, and France attempted so much for herself and for the whole Continent of Europe. The anniversary, he remarks, is less heeded in England, for, by a singular coincidence of dates, that work had been partly done for England just a hundred years before, in the revolution of 1689. The comparison is then made between the actual changes which have occurred in European countries and the extravagant expectations which were entertained a hundred years ago. In some respects improvement has been vast. Mr. Bryce

enumerates the destruction of oppressive institutions, the removal of restrictions which fettered individual enterprise and retarded the growth of commerce, the simplification of laws and legal procedure rendering justice more equal, more cheap, and more expeditious, the remarkable extension of representative government which in 1789 existed only in Great Britain, but is now established in all European countries except Russia and Turkey, the overthrow of clerical ascendancy especially over education, the provision by the state of instruction for the masses, and the growth of nationality in the emergence of Italy which a century ago did not exist, and in the consolidation of the German empire from a number of petty provinces. The actual progress made is, therefore, more than might reasonably have been expected. And yet it is very much less than was expected by French enthusiasts and "the more generous and ardent spirits of England, Germany, and Italy." How well, he asks, does the expression "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," sum up what the century of struggle and revolution has brought with it? Liberty is "still imperfect over four fifths of the Continent; hindered by a too powerful executive or a bureaucratic administration in France, Spain, Germany, Italy (not to speak of the still more backward Austrian dominions), refused altogether in Russia, full-grown only in Switzerland and Norway." Legal inequality has been removed with the removal of class disabilities and class privileges, but the inequalities of wealth, the contrasts of luxury and misery, are sharply marked. Fraternity as between nations seems further off than ever when we think of their armaments and see the mutual hostility, not now merely of the monarchs, but of the peoples themselves. Fraternity as between classes is driven off by the antagonisms of capital and labor. The bulk of the people in Europe care little for using the political power with which they have been invested, the lot of the workingman is almost everywhere a hard one, and in general the millennium, which "to many seemed in 1789 so near at hand, seems still so far off that we feel as if comparatively little progress had been made towards it, as the diameter of the solar system seems nothing in comparison to the distance that separates us from the nearest fixed star." Two reasons are given by Mr. Bryce for the disappointment of those extravagant hopes. One cause was an oversanguine view of human nature, and especially of the effect of education in removing ignorance and prejudice. There was an underestimation of the dullness and indolence of men, and of the power of custom, and an overestimation of the eagerness of men to exercise independence. Another cause was certain external changes which have occurred, and which, some of them at least, could not have been foreseen. Man's mastery of the forces of nature is the chief. The development of manufactures and commerce, facility of communication by steam and electricity, the consequent congestion of population in cities, the piling up of huge fortunes giving enormous power on the one side and awakening dangerous envy

on the other, are some of the results of material progress which, for the time at least, threaten moral and social progress. Mr. Bryce concludes that the chief error of "those who in 1789 expected everything from enlightenment and liberty lay, not in expecting reason and liberty to bear their appropriate fruits, but in expecting these fruits to ripen too soon. A survey of the whole results attained by this century of revolution tends rather to sober than to depress our hopes for the ultimate future of society. . . . If we set the Europe of the eighteenth century beside the Europe on which the twentieth century is soon to dawn, we shall find in almost every department of human life an advance which entitles us to count upon the diminution or disappearance of many of the evils that still remain to cheer the hearts of pessimists." In a word, the direction of progress was recognized with tolerable correctness, and some of the results of progress were foreseen, but the rate was misjudged.

At the present time it may be claimed that there is a growing agreement as to the changes which are needed in the interests of social progress. There are chronic evils which pertain to the economic, the intellectual, and the moral conditions of society, and which should be removed. The political machinery may, indeed, be improved to the advantage of human life, but the removal of its defects is in order that the industrial and in a measure the social interests of the people may be better served by legislation. It is not too much to say that the energy of reform is passing over from politics to sociology. Different persons would not paint the same picture of the ideal society, but the general features would correspond. It would be agreed that what is wanted is not better systems of government so much as better conditions of industry, education, morals, and religion.

Sagacity in respect to progress is shown chiefly by a correct judgment concerning the time required to reach certain results. The rate is not uniform. Periods of preparation are usually prolonged. Epochs of achievement are often sudden. He is the wise man who knows whether existing conditions are crisis or preparation, whether we of to-day are sowers or reapers, whether we are about to enter into other men's labors or others are to enter into our labors. This socialist says that the changes of the last decade from competition in business to combination on a vast scale have been so rapid that society is within a step or two of universal combination. Another, who is a socialist in fact if not in name, says that these combinations are limited to a few industries which can be combined easily, but include only a small fraction of human labor; that they merely shift money from many pockets to one, thus increasing inequality, and that they must force a closer, fiercer competition over the whole area of production. After considerable improvement has been made rapidly, remaining gains, to be perceptible, require great additions of force, as the gain of one mile an hour in the speed of ocean travel when the rate is already high requires more fuel than a gain of five miles an hour when the rate is low.

The earlier stages of progress, having to do with external changes, have a rapid motion. Japan, for example, is in the rapid stage. But as education becomes general, as inequalities are reduced, as public reforms are achieved, the amount of visible startling change will be less. America and England in comparison with Japan are in the slower stage of advance, although moving, or rather because moving, on a higher plane of intellectual and social life. It is sagacity in Japan to expect enormous changes in the approaching decades. The Japan of 1915 will be startlingly different from the Japan of 1890. It is sagacity in America to expect only moderate changes in conditions which constitute progress. The reference to Japan suggests that sanguine expectations of results from foreign missions are not so absurd as many suppose, because if the movement once begins out of heathendom towards Christianity, outward changes are likely to be numerous and rapid. And the supposition that Christian efforts in countries already Christian will produce immediate results is often disappointed, because now there is not a radical change of ideals and standards, but a slow purification of those already adopted. In the former case there is a kind of moral and social revolution; in the latter case there is moral and social growth.

The most important consideration in respect to rate of improvement is the effect on imagination, and therefore on the enthusiasm of philanthropists, reformers, and preachers. It must be seen that real devotion to the good of mankind should not be determined nor very much affected by the time required for complete success. Correct judgment of the rate will aid in determining points of attack, because that judgment recognizes the obstacles to be overcome. But ideal devotion would not be discouraged because there must be a century instead of a decade of toil. Uncertainty of the result is the only real discouragement. And yet, as various kinds of workers are needed in the complex movement of progress, the eager, impetuous, impatient enthusiasts, as well as the calm, broad, and patient organizers, the illusion of nearness is not always dispelled, and some tangible results are realized on the way to the remote completion as if by a beneficent design of Him who guides humanity on its way. Even prophets seldom had perspective beyond their own generation, and apostles for a time expected their Lord to come again in complete triumph before their own generation should fall on sleep. But there are those who are stimulated best by magnitudes of large and distant results which they may not live to see. They are stirred by reviewing the centuries, each of which is seen to have had its own task, and by penetrating the life of the nations to find that each had its function. Thus they learn that their plans may be coöperative with a divine and eternal purpose which through the ages runs, and are more deeply moved than by the hope of snatching hastily what might prove to be the superficial results of mere human contrivances. Jesus Christ was of this

temper, not hastening too fast, but saying more than once, "My hour is not yet come."

The various phases and stages of social progress are comprehensively included in the kingdom of God on earth, an ideal which is realized in part, but is not yet realized in its completeness. It is so various that its wheels within wheels have different rates of motion, although all revolve in obedience to one great motive power. It includes many climates, many civilizations, many literatures, many philosophies, many religions even. At some points outward changes are going on rapidly, at some there is torpid stagnation, at some there is the slow, noiseless influence of custom and character. But the progress of the entire kingdom is not slow as measured by antecedent stages in the evolution of the universe.

It is the wisdom of the Christian Scriptures not to indicate the definite time within which results will be accomplished, but rather to emphasize the nature of the need, the principle of social service, and the certainty of final success. It gives an object, a method, and a prophecy. With this inspiration we may leave precise foresight of the times and seasons with Him who keeps them in his own knowledge, and toil on with patience and enthusiasm to contribute our share to social progress according to our best wisdom of circumstance and method. As the angel in respect to place, so we may say with respect to the time of service and the rate of progress, —

"He did God's will ; to him all one
If on the earth, or in the sun."

"THE OLD EVANGELICALISM AND THE NEW."¹

• SOME of our readers will doubtless recall a household book of devotion in their parental home entitled "Morning and Evening Exercises." The church of which its author, Rev. William Jay, was the pastor for sixty-two years, and which was identified from its beginning with the "Evangelical Revival" under Whitfield and Wealey, celebrated last October the hundredth anniversary of the opening of its meeting-house — the well-known Argyle Chapel in Bath. The sermon delivered on this occasion by Dr. Dale has been published under the title we have quoted, and is one of unusual suggestiveness. Its author draws with a strong hand the characteristics of the great religious movement of which William Jay was an eminent representative, and with equal firmness sketches the characteristics of the Christian teaching and life that have succeeded it in the same churches. Though the view of the author is thus ecclesiastically limited, its range is broad enough, and its penetration into leading principles powerful enough, to interest and profit thoughtful men of every name. Indeed, our attention was first called to it in "The

¹ *The Old Evangelicalism and the New.* By R. W. Dale, LL. D., Birmingham. London : Hodder & Stoughton.

Guardian," a newspaper where one would not naturally expect to find an elaborate and very commendatory notice of a sermon preached in a Congregational chapel on such an occasion.

Dr. Dale first brings into comparison the characteristic *ἦθος* or spirit of the two periods. After noticing briefly the connection of the early pastors of the Argyle Chapel Church with the Revival, he touches upon the wonderful efficiency which it put into preaching and Christian work. Many pastors of Independent and Baptist churches were inspired with "a buoyancy, an ardour, a courage, a zeal," altogether unusual. Old meeting-houses were enlarged, and many new ones were erected; deserted chapels became crowded. The voice of the preacher was heard everywhere, in cottages, farm-houses, barns, by the wayside, and on college greens. It was the hour of birth of what have proved to be great missionary societies and of auxiliary organizations. The millennium, accepted without misgiving as divinely promised, was, with almost equal confidence, believed to be near at hand.

The great glory of this movement was that it "cared supremely for men, for living men, who were to be saved or lost, and on whom it had to press, with tears and agony and prayers, the gospel of Christ in order to save them."

It was, however, Dr. Dale points out, restricted and imperfect in this regard for men. "It cared nothing for building up ideal churches, or for creating an ideal social order; it did not care very much for any development of personal life and character which was not necessary to make sure of eternal blessedness and to augment it; it cared very little for any truth which had not a direct relation to salvation. What it cared for was to save individual men from eternal death. This done, Evangelicalism was apt to assume that everything would come right with them either in this world or the next."

Evangelicalism, Dr. Dale emphasizes, "was the ally of Individualism." He dwells on its failure to recognize any just ideal of the church, the state, or of society at large. And yet without such conceptions it is impossible to discover the true ethical or religious goal of the individual. Dr. Dale makes a yet more serious charge:—

"Evangelicalism was wanting in what I may call a disinterested love of truth. . . . It would not be accurate, indeed, to say that the Evangelicals cared nothing for truth; for the two great divisions of the party, the Arminian and the Calvinistic Methodists, fought for their respective theological positions with great fierceness, and occasionally with great bitterness. But on both sides, as I venture to think, the main, though not the exclusive, source of the controversial earnestness was not the love of truth for its own sake, but the love of truth as a necessary instrument for converting men to God, and placing them permanently in a right relation to Him."

The change in spirit began with the younger men some fifty years ago. "The Congregational Magazine" opened its batteries upon them. They

were charged with surrendering the Faith. Dr. Dale acquits them of this accusation, but recognizes a changed *ἦθος*, or spirit. They "began to care for truth for its own sake;" "to read the Bible not merely for the purpose of collecting fresh materials to use for the conversion of sinners, but to discover what the Bible really meant." Hence the new interest in Exegesis, Biblical Introduction, and Criticism. Dr. Dale commends this spirit in words which well deserve quotation. He says:—

"The gentle — the violent — pressure which used to be put on reluctant texts by theologians and preachers of all creeds to *make* them *say* the right thing or to *prevent* them from saying the wrong, was as bad as the gentle or violent pressure put on obstinate heretics by the Inquisition with precisely the same object. There should be a conscience in the study as well as in the counting-house. To attempt by skillful manipulation to get a better meaning out of a text than it contains, is as fraudulent a proceeding as to attempt by skillful manipulation to get a better meaning out of a cheque than it contains. The text — as a devout soul might say — is more precious when you have put a great Christian truth into it than it was in its natural and original state. No doubt. And a cheque for £10 is more precious when you have added a couple of noughts to the ten and made it a thousand. But the two proceedings are very much of the same character."

Besides the change in spirit, there has been a modification of belief.

The earlier Evangelicals held the catholic doctrines as enunciated in the earlier creeds — "but about some of the greatest of them — as for example the Trinity — they said very little." The tenets which they most used and urged were the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, forgiveness on this ground upon repentance and faith, the nature and necessity of regeneration by the Holy Spirit, and the perdition and eternal suffering of those who die impenitent.

On this last point Dr. Dale recognizes a great change in belief, though no agreement upon "an alternative doctrine." Ultimate and universal restoration, the destruction of all who in this life reject Christ, agnosticism, are all phases of this changed, but not yet formulated belief. It is conceded that one urgent motive to repentance pressed by the earlier preachers is now somewhat withdrawn, yet Dr. Dale contends that "even while the question of the ultimate destiny of the impenitent remains unresolved, there is enough to fill us with a passion of zeal for the salvation of men from the certain doom — whether it be temporary or final — which threatens them if they live and die without God." He deprecates, however, if we understand him aright, the substitution of a conception of life as merely disciplinary for that which regards it as also a probation. The latter conception adds "immeasurably" to "its moral power as a discipline."

The changed view of regeneration does not affect the substance of the doctrine. The modern Evangelicals hold as strongly as their predecessors to the truth that all spiritual life in man is by the Holy Ghost. Yet this truth is seen now in a new connection, or in one more justly

appreciated, namely, its relation to the Incarnation. We should be glad to quote in full what Dr. Dale says on this point, but have space only to give a brief abstract, using mainly his own language.

"The leaders of both movements believe alike that The Eternal Word became flesh in our Lord Jesus Christ, and that to see Christ is to see the Father. But the earlier Evangelicalism regarded the incarnation as a kind of after-thought in the mind of God, or at least as wholly contingent on human sin. We receive the life of Christ and live in Him only because we have not been strong enough ourselves to stand fast in our integrity. The modern Evangelicalism, on the contrary, holds that it was God's eternal thought and purpose that the race should be one with Christ, and should live in the power of Christ's life. This was man's ideal perfection; for it he was created; and if the race had never sinned we should still have said, 'Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with every spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ,' and also, that it was God's eternal purpose that in Christ we should be 'holy and without blemish before Him in love.' Even apart from the sin of the race the Son of God would have shared the life of man, and man would have shared the life of God in Him."

Dr. Dale calls this "a noble faith," says that "it is reorganizing the Evangelical conception of God, of human life, and of the universe," and alludes to its "far-reaching effects on our ethical and religious theory of the family, the state, commerce, industry, literature, science, art." In its light regeneration is seen to be, not "something abnormal," but "the fulfillment of the true idea of human nature." It affects, also, our conceptions of the atonement and of justification. Both doctrines "rest on the deeper truth of the union between man and Christ." "*Christ's relations to the Father determine ours.*" Dr. Dale precedes this pregnant statement, which we have italicized, with the words "According to the divine idea and purpose." If this be taken, as it need not be, as a limitation of the principle to the outward revelation of God, we think there is a yet deeper truth. In the triune existence and personality of God, in the essential Sonship of our Lord, is the ground of the existence of the universe and of all Spiritual Sonship, — though not as though the Eternal Sonship depended on the idea of the world.

Dr. Dale recognizes that in the new movement there is danger of loss as well as assurance of gain. The appropriation of secular things under the conviction that they, too, are sacred, requires constant vigilance lest the line of distinction between the profane and the holy be obliterated. "Are we mastering the world by the power of God, and making it what God intended it to be, or is the world mastering us?" So, in doctrine, we must guard lest our expanded view of the incarnation may be attended with a weakened perception of its specific relation to human sinfulness and guilt. The former, as Dr. Dale remarks, is the larger truth,

but it is the cross of Christ that appeals most powerfully to the human heart, and presents the highest ethical ideal. The truths, however, of the Incarnation and the Atonement should never be stated — Dr. Dale does not so represent them — as though they were in any possible antagonism, the one to the other. The latter is but the carrying out, under the conditions of man's need through sin, of the same purpose of divine love which is revealed in the former and in the creation of the universe. It is the more powerful truth as motive because it is the fullest revelation we have, or can conceive, of the ethical nature of God.

Dr. Dale vigorously combats a tendency to change the basis of justification by faith from Christ's righteousness to that of the believer's personal righteousness through faith. If this tendency should show any great strength, he thinks we should "have to fight the great battle of the Reformation over again." We agree with him in this remark; yet a forensic righteousness can only retain permanently its hold upon Christian thought as it is seen to rest upon what is real in our relation to Christ, and to be itself the realization, and the power which can secure the realization, of the highest moral ideal.

MR. PALMER'S CRITICISM OF "PROGRESSIVE ORTHODOXY."

THE article by the Reverend Frederic Palmer in the February number of the "Review," entitled "Some Criticisms on the Andover Movement," was an unexpected but welcome contribution to our pages. It was welcomed by the editors for what it was in itself — a broad, serious, and trenchant criticism. Mr. Palmer had something to say quite out of the common course of attack, and therefore his words have weight. We think that those who have become accustomed to oppose, in other ways, the views which we have advocated, must take pleasure in reading an argument upon the subject. Certainly, the argument of Mr. Palmer has our hearty respect and appreciation.

The article was also welcomed for the evidence it gave that the large interest in the theological issues centring at Andover was not controversial, but philosophical and practical. The "Andover Movement," as Mr. Palmer characterizes it, had, and still has, its local significance, both institutional and denominational, of which we shall shortly speak, but his own interest in it is representative, in kind and in degree, of that which, we are assured, many feel who have nothing at stake in the "Andover Controversy." The communications which we have received since the publication of the article emphasize this fact.¹

It is not our present intention, nor our intention at all, to *answer* Mr. Palmer. His criticism is worthy of more serious treatment than a "reply." It opens the way for the candid and unvexed discussion of some

¹ One of the first communications received was from President Hyde, of Bowdoin College, written immediately upon the reading of the article, which we publish in the present number of the *Review*.

of the fundamental questions which underlie alike "Progressive Orthodoxy" and his criticism of it, a discussion upon which we hope in due time to enter. In the present editorial we wish chiefly to indicate some of the questions which the discussion invites, and also to show that in this discussion some of the questions which belonged to the original contention of "Progressive Orthodoxy" may be set aside. The discussion as it proceeds may show divergence of opinion, — the degree of divergence will depend largely upon the understanding of terms employed, but it is evident at the outset that there are certain things which entered strenuously into former discussions for which there is now no occasion to contend.

But first a passing reference to the local conditions of the "Andover Movement." Mr. Palmer's description of these conditions and of their effect upon the movement is substantially true in detail and in tone. We should only be disposed to call in question his opinion of the relative permanent value of movements which have a "practical," and of those which have a "philosophical" origin. "Positions taken up under fire with as much order and logic as could be commanded at the moment" have been quite as apt to be held as those which have been taken as "the quiet, natural, inevitable development, clearly seen and ordered of a central thought." The "central thought" of a theological conflict does not always appear in the earlier stages, the issue is more frequently than otherwise forced at the point of temporary advantage to one side or the other, but the conflict, as it advances, is sure to reveal the "central thought" on *either side*, and its value as a unifying and conquering principle.

The "Andover Review" was established in 1884, two years after the desultory newspaper attack upon the Seminary began, and two years before the formal prosecution of certain of its professors before the Board of Visitors. "Progressive Orthodoxy," which was made the basis of the prosecution, was written as a series of editorial articles, and afterwards published as a book. Of the five professors who were the editors of the "Review," and therefore the responsible authors of the book, two had been for a considerable term of years in the service of the Seminary, and three had recently taken their chairs. All had been born and trained under the traditions of the New England theology, but all had become possessed, each in his own way, and in his own field of study or work, of that conception of Christianity which now passes under the general name of the New Theology, but which they chose to designate as Progressive Orthodoxy. The question of a "future probation," which had opened the theological conflict, was not of their choosing as the opening issue. It was not their "central thought." It had been chosen for them by their opponents with a keen eye to the advantage of theological prejudice. The disadvantage of accepting an issue thus made up was perfectly understood at the time, the prejudicial effects were already manifest, but it was considered that the vital question in theological con-

troversy is not from what it starts, but into what it leads, not where it begins, but where it ends. It was felt that a cause must be weak which could not afford to give the temporary odds of position for the sake of joining battle more quickly at the heart of the contention.

We had no more wish then than we have now to deny the relation between the hypothesis of a future probation and the central principle of Progressive Orthodoxy, but it was not that principle. The principle there affirmed and reaffirmed was that of the universality of Christianity, — its universality not in idea or in assumption, but in fact, and not in indirect and in inappreciable ways, but in conscious reality and power. The contention was for the principle rather than for the method.¹ The hypothesis of a future probation was introduced to show that the principle could be applied, that Christianity could find room for its saving work. And the hypothesis seemed to be peculiarly fitted to the further development of that course of theological thought which had found expression in the New England theology, and of which Andover had become largely the representative.² For the doctrine of a universal atonement, which had been established in theory, had been met and neutralized in its *application* by the dogma of the universal decisiveness of the present life. The gospel had been set free from the shackles of an arbitrary election and a limited atonement. It remained to be set free from arbitrary and unscriptural restrictions of time and place. The struggle of New England theology had been to throw off the limitations which had been set up around the purpose of God in redemption. Was it to be allowed that a new limitation of equal effect should be set up around the providence of God in redemption? The question thus raised naturally became a missionary question. For the first condition of a mis-

¹ "A single principle has for the most part guided the development of thought in the series, and this because it is the principle which is dominating more and more regally the intelligent Christian belief of our time; a principle which will no longer be confined within limits too narrow to contain it, nor tolerate the company of theories inconsistent with the truth it expresses. Readers cannot fail to have observed the emphasis we have laid on the universality of the gospel. We have assumed Christianity to be the final and supreme revelation of God to man, a revelation intended for the whole human race, and destined to supersede all other religions; and all the way along our inquiry has been concerning the reality of this principle." . . . "We have not, however, expressed as positive an opinion concerning the circumstances and seasons within which Christ will be revealed to those who do not know Him in the earthly life. But we frankly admit that it seems to us probable that those who in this life have no knowledge of Christ will not be denied that knowledge, with its corresponding opportunity, after death. Still, so much that is perplexing remains in respect to God's dealing with the nations of heathendom that we will not be so presumptuous as to press our opinion on any who are not ready to receive it, nor so vain as to suppose that we have found a complete solution of one of the deepest mysteries of God's government of the world." — *Progressive Orthodoxy*, pp. 237, 243.

² For the discussion of the relation of the principles of "Progressive Orthodoxy" to the foundation and creed of Andover Theological Seminary, our readers are referred to the argument and statements of the professors in *The Andover Trial*.

1 missionary religion is universality. We cannot for a moment entertain
2 the thought of a Christianity which is not as large as humanity. Chris-
3 tianity, that is, in its intention, in its capacity, and in its availability,
4 must cover the human race. Otherwise we must retire the mission-
5 ary conception of Christianity and reassert the conception which pre-
6 ceded it, namely, the sovereignty of God. Just how this universality
7 is to be made real it may not be necessary to determine. The method
8 is secondary to the principle. But every missionary organization rep-
9 represents method as well as principle. It is a means to an end: it is
10 usually presented as a necessary means to the end. It presupposes the
11 insufficiency of existing means. Their insufficiency is the reason for its
12 existence. And as all the missionary organizations of Christendom re-
13 lied upon the presentation of Christ in his person and work, and justified
14 their existence by the necessity of this presentation, it was accepted as a
15 fair inference that the preaching of Christ to the spirits in prison had
16 a place in the missionary method of Christianity.

Thus much for the conditions under which the "Andover Movement"
came into being. These local conditions, as we acknowledge without
hesitancy, gave form and color, direction and spirit, to the movement.
Much of the phraseology employed in discussion was used to make im-
mediate connection with existing doctrines, which it was desired to supple-
ment or apply. And the spirit of the discussion was without doubt
invigorated and intensified by its connection with the practical issues with
which it early became identified. "Progressive Orthodoxy" was not writ-
ten as an *Institutio*. Its inception was theological more than philosophi-
cal. It was put forth as "a contribution to the Christian interpretation of
Christian doctrines." Reference was made to the philosophical faith of
the writers, but the aim of the book was declared to be the endeavor
to Christianize or "Christologize" the doctrines passed in review, and
no attempt was made to disguise the fact that the process was to be
applied to doctrines with which the writers themselves had the most
immediate concern. The special work of others in the broad field of
theological progress, including the philosophical and critical, was pointed
out and acknowledged. It was thought that the best service which
the writers could render the common cause was to meet directly, without
any attempt at evasion, the issue which they were called upon to face,
and we still think that whatever may have been the limitation or "pro-
vincialism" of "Progressive Orthodoxy," its working value was due
largely to this self-imposed restriction.

But that was five years ago. And if in looking back upon that period
it does not seem to have been the appropriate time to philosophize, it
does not follow that the time may not now have come to treat the ques-
tions, which were then considered in their doctrinal aspects, in their more
fundamental, and perhaps more spiritual relations. "Progressive Or-
thodoxy" was not written without a philosophy, though this was not

made prominent. And as the same philosophy will guide us in future discussions, we take occasion to recall the statement of it which was then made : —

"We add a single remark upon the general philosophical conception of God and his relation to the universe which underlies these essays. It is a modification of a prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation (in accordance with the highest thought of the Greek fathers) of the divine immanence. Such a doctrine of God, we believe, is more and more approving itself in the best philosophy of our time, and the fact of the Incarnation commends it to the acceptance of the Christian theologian."¹

Mr. Palmer quotes this paragraph with apparent approval, for the charge which he immediately brings is not that of a wrong philosophy, but of inconsistency in the application of the philosophy adopted. "If this conception," he says, "had been consistently followed out, there might have been a much greater Andover controversy, but the present one, never." But it is evident that one's view of the consistency or inconsistency of the application of a given philosophy *may* depend upon his interpretation of that philosophy. The philosophical position of "Progressive Orthodoxy" was announced to be a "modification of the conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation of the divine immanence." Is this common ground between us and our reviewer, or would he demand a conception of the divine immanence which should minimize the divine transcendence? The somewhat grand alternative which he puts to us at the close of his article, Does the infinite exclude or include the finite? is not decisive. We must get nearer than this to one another and to the question. Does the infinite, which includes the finite, transcend in any degree the finite, or is it simply immanent in the finite? Exclusion and inclusion are not synonymous with transcendence and immanence. We must have closer definitions. Alternatives which are very wide are very easy. The difficulty begins when we try to find the relative place of theories and systems, neither one of which can be excluded, but which seem to be opposites. As Dr. Henry B. Smith has said of the antagonistic systems of the divine and human efficiency, "The way in which antagonistic systems are developed is almost always just this — that what is subordinate in the one becomes supreme in its opposite. The change of relative position is, indeed, all; but then, too, it is quite enough. It is the only logical attitude which related thoughts, *that suggest each other*, can assume even in opposite systems. The contest is always for supremacy, and not for annihilation." The conception of the divine immanence returning upon our age, and reinforced by the new science, has brought with it into religious thought and life a naturalness and reality which had too long been absent. It has struck again the note of joy and hope and triumph. It has given breadth

¹ *Progressive Orthodoxy*, p. 16.

to charity and inspiration to service. It has rekindled the "enthusiasm for humanity." But it is too much to say that it has not called up problems of its own, which it alone cannot answer. It has vastly increased the sense of the sacredness of human nature, not by the old contrast of man with nature, but by bringing man into closer relation with God; but it has also greatly deepened and intensified the mystery of sin. If God is immanent in us, what of that power also in us to neutralize and overcome the divine presence? What is the method and final result of willful separation *from* Him, *in* whom we live and move and have our being? The conception has restored to its fundamental place in Christian theology the doctrine of the incarnation, wider and more various in its application to life than the doctrine of atonement, but can the incarnation be made to take the place of atonement in its sublime assertion of the moral transcendence of God? Was there no peculiar significance in the burning experience of the church from Augustine to Wesley, which flamed out under Luther in the doctrine of justification by faith? The immanence of Christ is an integral part of the conception of the divine immanence. It belongs to the Christian idea of God. But what is its actual meaning and power as related to the salvation of the race? The terms employed to express this immanence are the "potential," the "essential," the "spiritual Christ." What is the potency, the saving power, of the "potential Christ"? To ask this question, it is not necessary to deny that one who is like Christ is saved, under any definition of salvation, or saved by Christ. But what shall we say of those who are not like Christ, of whom Christ said: "I came not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance"? Here is the great question of Christianity, because here is the great need of the world. What the world needs is power, motive, the incentive to righteousness. Where shall we look for it, in the immanent or in the incarnate Christ? These and like questions suggest the nature of the discussion before us. What we want to determine is the actual meaning of the divine immanence, its modes of expression, the ground of difference in its spiritual results, and especially its relation to human personality under the tremendous disturbance and resistance of sin both here and hereafter. We want to measure the significance of the transfer of Christian theology from atonement to incarnation. We want to determine the relative place in the sphere of motive between "immanent" and revealed Christianity, between the "potential" and the incarnate Christ. We want to find the meaning of salvation, its ground and method and end.

It is evident that in such a discussion some of the questions which were uppermost in the contention of "Progressive Orthodoxy" will drop into a secondary place. Possibly they may drop altogether out of the discussion.

We can have, for example, no immediate contention at the point of a

future probation; not because of a change in our opinions, but on account of a new phase of the discussion. For the idea of probation, in the sense heretofore used, is discarded. "The assumption of a future opportunity," Mr. Palmer says, "of the kind it postulates, we cannot but think to have not the slightest warrant in the nature of things, nor in Scripture, *because neither reason nor Scripture asserts that such an opportunity is in this life the gate of salvation*" (the italics are ours); "and to maintain that the conditions of salvation hereafter are other than they are here would be contrary to our belief in the continuity of life and law, and therefore suicidal." There are two parties who are entitled to the logical benefit of a denial of a future probation: those who deny the idea altogether and substitute for it the broader conception of the education of the race, and those who admit the idea but affirm that the race had its probation once for all at the beginning of human history. With neither of these have we been brought into conflict. Our contention has been with those who, adopting and *enforcing* the probationary conception of life, deny an opportunity to those who have had no knowledge of the revelation of the mercy and pardon of God in Jesus Christ, those who were not simply ignorant of Jesus of Nazareth, but ignorant of the very Christ idea in redemption. The logical inconsistency of such a denial is becoming too manifest to call for much farther exposure. It is continually exposing itself. The shifts and subterfuges employed to find out a Christian probation "in some way or other and to some extent or other," outside the revelation of Christ, betray the logical weakness of the position. We quote the opinion of a most competent and disinterested observer:—

"If this life is a probation upon which our everlasting future depends, then in order to have a fair trial and an equitable judgment it is necessary that all should have a true and a complete probation. The lesser stages of probation must lead up to the higher stages until every opportunity has been rejected and the only unpardonable sin has been committed. The doctrine that this life is a probation leads inevitably to the position that the middle state is a still larger field for probation, for the vast majority of our race who have had no probation here, in which we must conceive of a preaching of the Gospel, regeneration, faith, justification, and the entire order of salvation begun and carried on. Those who take the contra-confessional position that this life is a probation have no ground of resistance to the doctrine of the continuance of that probation in the middle state until all have had the opportunity either of accepting Christ as their Saviour, or of committing the unpardonable sin against the Holy Spirit. They cannot hold probation here without following the Andover theory and holding probation there. Christian ethics will inevitably compel every probationist to become an out-and-out probationist for this world and for the next."¹

Neither can we have any *practical* contention about the use of the term

¹ *Whither?* A Theological Question for the Times. By Professor C. A. Briggs, D. D. Pp. 220, 221.

"potential" or "essential Christ," provided it is not coupled with the dogma of the universal decisiveness of this life. We admit unhesitatingly, and with gratitude, whatever of truth and hope the term may express. It has not been our desire to show that no one could be saved, in the popular acceptance of the term, without the knowledge of God's redemptive love in Christ, but rather that those who apparently would not otherwise be saved, among whom we placed not the few but the many, might have the advantage of this knowledge before passing under judgment. Christianity, as we have conceived of it, fulfills, through its redemptive power, a twofold office. It completes, confirms, establishes, character already begun under other conditions. So Peter preached the gospel of a complete salvation to Cornelius. So the gospel of the grace of God in Christ becomes the final possession of all who in any race fear God and work righteousness. We have no wish to minimize in extent or in degree this preliminary work, or to attribute it to any other cause than that of the potential or essential Christ. Here we should agree with Mr. Palmer when he says of one "so saved," that "it must be either that he is saved without the knowledge of Christ, or that in these very things he has the knowledge of Christ. For ourselves we prefer the latter alternative." But it is manifest that the great office of a redemptive Christianity, as we see its workings, is not to complete, but to begin, to inaugurate and carry on, the whole ethical process of salvation. Human nature as it lies before us in its length and breadth invites, in some of its parts, a work of rescue and recovery, in others of awakening and development, in others of subjugation and conquest. Here is the sphere of Christianity as a missionary religion. And here is our immediate and vital concern with it, and also with all theories which are made use of to oppose this conception. Hence our contention with the attempt to set up the theory of a "potential" or "essential Christ" *in place* of the actual redemptive work of Christianity, as the basis for the dogma of the universal decisiveness of this life. We admit and rejoice in all preliminary work which may be attributed to the "potential" Christ, whether defined as the work of conscience, or of the Spirit of God, or of society, but we deny the right, in the absence of proof from reason or from Scripture, to make this work the sufficient ground of every man's eternal destiny.

From what has already been said it naturally follows that we can have no possible contention in respect to the destiny of those who have likeness to Christ. Christ-likeness is salvation here: it must be salvation everywhere. Of course this is a great term to use. St. John speaks of it as the culmination of the Christian character, something to be fully realized in the immediate presence of Christ. But we do not deny its presence here in some real sense, or that it may not exist in reality in unconscious or even unknown relations to Christ. We do not look with suspicion and distrust upon all character that is produced outside the technical methods of Christianity. The more remote the method, the

more we honor any genuine exemplification of the Christ-like spirit. But we do object to the assumption in respect to a great deal of character that it is Christ-like. There is much which manifestly belongs to other schools and shows another spirit. Reduce it to Christian terms, and what is left? Touch its possessor with the spirit of Christ, and then ask him for his own valuation of it. "What things were gain to me," Paul says, and certainly his attainments were large and in their sense honorable, "these I counted loss *by reason*¹ of Christ." Personal contact with Him changed their valuation. Let us not assume too quickly that what seems to us to be character is founded on likeness to Christ and lacks only in degree and quantity. It may be founded on unlikeness — on the very qualities which must be overthrown before a Christian structure can be built.

And we object also to the *laissez faire* kind of ethics which is taught in the theory that "Men are saved by living up to their light." Ethically, a great deal depends upon the light men live up to. Some men, like Saul of Tarsus, living up to their light have made this world a terribly uncomfortable place for better men to live in because of their presence. What they have needed has been that which he received, light out of heaven and a voice in the light saying, "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest." Here again Christ-likeness does not mean a little more growth in character, but a radical change, the whole nature possessed by a new principle, and pervaded by a new spirit.

And still further we must not fail to remember that Christ-likeness is not produced in men, like the original product, by sinlessness, but by repentings and struggles, and by the deep, tender sense of the divine forgiveness. All Christ-likeness has a factor in it which Christ's own character did not possess. And this differing characteristic is one of the chief marks of its genuineness. "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." So that the more we study the mystery of Christ-like character, the nearer we are brought to Christ himself as the producing cause; and the more we see that we need the whole of Christ, his love, his purity, his passion, his power. In accepting, therefore, as we do unreservedly, the principle that Christ-likeness is salvation, or in its concrete form that whoever is Christ-like is saved, we find ourselves confronted still by the question — Whence comes our salvation? We cannot say, "Salvation *by* character," for character of the kind acknowledged is the product, it is salvation. We must look elsewhere. Our search will lead us to the heart of our discussion, as we try to understand the relation of Christ to the human soul, and the nature of his work there.

¹ *Lightfoot on Philippians*, chap. iii. 8.

THE DEATH OF MR. NEESIMA.

THE following letter is from a representative of the American Board in Japan who has witnessed the whole of Mr. Neesima's missionary life there. Its simple, touching narrative needs no further introduction:—

"We have just laid away the remains of our beloved and honored brother Neesima. The professors and students of the Seminary which he loved may be interested to know something of his death,—a death in every way worthy of his remarkable life.

"In October he decided to go to Tokyo that he might push the work of endowing the University among the leading men of the capital. It was just at that time that Count Okuma was assassinated, and the unsettled state of political affairs during the weeks that followed prevented any extended effort there in behalf of the University, so he went for a week or so to Maebashi, seventy-five miles in the interior. Here he caught a severe cold, and was compelled to return to Tokyo in a weakened condition. He was soon at work, however, and succeeded in interesting Count Matsugata, Minister for the Treasury, in the school. His health again failing, he called Principal Kanamori to Tokyo to go on with this work, and went himself to Ōisō, a small seaside resort two or three hours by rail from Tokyo. This was near the end of December.

"His wife, feeling anxious about him, wrote asking permission to go to him, but with that self-forgetfulness which characterized his whole life he urged her to remain at home with his aged mother, meeting her repeated requests to go to him with the statement that "in the olden times the *Samurai* never took his wife with him to battle." Professor Shimomura, who visited him January 10, seeing his lack of comfort, urged his return home, receiving the reply that 'he had a debt of more than \$20,000 which must be paid before he could leave that hotel.'

"On the 11th he had an attack of intestinal catarrh, which before long developed into acute inflammation, and later into peritonitis. His attendant, now thoroughly alarmed, summoned his wife and other friends, including physicians from Tokyo and Kyoto, and from that time till his death on the 23d he had all the help that human skill and devoted love could give.

"As the telegraph carried the news, 'The Teacher's disease is dangerous,' from east and west came pastors, evangelists, teachers, and pupils, eager to render the slightest service, and to catch the last farewell word. Two days before his death he nerved himself for his final messages to his friends and associates—to Mrs. Hardy, Dr. Clark, the trustees, teachers, students, and friends of the Doshisha, and especially to the Japanese Home Missionary Society. He had maps of several provinces brought to him, with the places occupied by evangelists already marked on them, and then, almost with his dying breath, he pointed out to the devoted

young men around him place after place which ought to be occupied at once by the Christian preacher.¹ I hope my young brethren in the Seminary will let this scene — a scene which so vividly recalls William Carey, with his leather globe and the village children around him, pointing to country after country, and saying, 'There are Christians, and there are Pagans' — sink so deep into their hearts that *nothing* can turn them away from the work in Japan for which our brother and fellow-alumnus has just laid down his life. He very peacefully passed away on the afternoon of the 23d, his last words being 'Peace,' 'Joy,' 'Tenkoku' (heaven).

"His remains were brought to Kyoto and buried on the 29th. The body arrived in Kyoto near midnight. The students met it there and carried it on their shoulders through the rain to his residence. At the funeral, too, it was carried by the native pastors and the students, who also dug his grave. At least three thousand people were present, including the governor, the chief justice for this district, and other officials. The funeral was an 'army with banners,' a number of these having been sent in by friends and admirers. One of these from Tokyo contained words recently used by Neesima, which were inscribed on the banner by Count Katsu-awa. The translation of these words is: 'Free Education and a self-governing church (or churches); if these go together the country will stand for all generations.'

"Another banner was inscribed 'From the Buddhists of Osaka.' Indeed, it was touching to see how all classes and conditions lamented him. The students of one government school and one private school occupied a place in the funeral procession. Just before his death Count Inouye telegraphed his friends, 'You must keep him alive;' and a poor *Jinrikisha* man said sorrowfully, 'It is too bad that so good a man should die so soon.'

"It would be pleasant to tell more of his character and work, but I must not weary you. We feel it to have been an inestimable privilege to have known and worked with him. A hundred young Japanese with new devotion will grasp the banner of the Cross that has just fallen from his hands. They ask, and shall they not receive, the support — prompt and strong — of their Christian brethren of America? Pray for us and for our work in this critical hour."

KYOTO, JAPAN, *January 29, 1890.*

THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. LAY—AN INQUIRY.

THE appointment of Mr. Lay, a senior in the Chicago Seminary, by the Prudential Committee of the American Board, is interpreted by the "Congregationalist" as a cheering indication of loyalty to the platform

¹ He arranged for the temporary occupation of two such places at his own expense.

agreed on at New York. Mr. Lay may therefore be supposed to hold views concerning future probation which have not hitherto been tolerated by the Committee. Otherwise his appointment has no bearing on the unfortunate differences which have arisen among the constituents of the Board. We raise the inquiry, therefore, without entering into discussion, whether this action indicates on the part of Dr. Alden, who recommended the appointment, and on the part of the Committee, any concession to the liberal minority in the Board. Mr. Lay's statement, as quoted by the "*Congregationalist*," and presumably his whole statement on future probation, is as follows:—

"I do not see anything in Scripture rightly interpreted which would preclude probation after death. On the positive side, I must say that the Scriptures give no foundation for such a belief. The passages in Peter are not sufficient, to my mind, for the basis of such a theory. The whole trend of Scripture is to lay stress on a salvation for living men to the exclusion of so foreign a thought as salvation, or loss of salvation, taking place after death. So I think of the hypothesis as extra-Scriptural, but not anti-Scriptural. Again, probation after death comes, in my thought, not as an *element* in the plan of salvation, but rather as a period of time during which the plan of salvation may or may not be operative. As such, the theory of probation after death rests on philosophical grounds alone. It is the decision of a matter of fact—will the plan of salvation be operative after death? To me there are no sufficient grounds for such a theory. I see plausible arguments in its favor, but I find also arguments just as weighty in opposition."

This statement makes it somewhat doubtful whether there is any change in the attitude of the Committee or not. Their action is capable of two interpretations. One interpretation is that, as Mr. Lay's conclusion is satisfactory, he was appointed without reference to his reasons. His statement at this point is, "To me there are no sufficient grounds for such a theory." This may mean agnosticism, to which, we understand, the Committee does not now object, or rejection of the hypothesis of future probation, or distinct non-acceptance of it. So long as he does not accept the hypothesis, nor claim that it is a permissible hypothesis, the Committee may have argued that it makes comparatively little difference whether he holds that the Scriptures forbid it or are silent concerning it. Doubt arises, they may say, only in the case of one who reaches what they deem a wrong conclusion, and then care must be taken to ascertain the grounds of the opinion, whether Scriptural, dogmatic, or speculative, and the degree of positiveness with which it is held. If the action of the Committee should be thus explained, the case of Mr. Lay, as respects the settlement of difficulties, is without significance, and we should not find ourselves yet arrived, like the editor of the "*Congregationalist*," at the Three Taverns, thanking God and taking courage.

The other interpretation, upon which alone the appointment has anything to do with the prospect of harmony, emphasizes Mr. Lay's state-

ment, that the Bible does not "preclude probation after death," and that a decision can be reached only on what he calls philosophical grounds. The permission of this opinion may mean that the Committee no longer insists that there is Scriptural proof of the universal decisiveness of this life. It may mean that candidates who think a future probation is possible, or who do not distinctly reject it, will be examined on their speculative reasons, and that if these reasons are held with moderation they will not be refused appointment. Is this action a notice to theological students that the Biblical argument, on which the Secretary and his supporters have exclusively relied, will be pressed no longer, and that they are now encouraged to find in their system of theology such inferences as shall be decisive concerning the scope of Christianity? Does it mean that candidates may turn aside from the Secretary's proof-texts and confer with him on the basis of Christian doctrine? If such a change has occurred, the policy of the Committee is greatly modified, and we therein rejoice. This is apparently the conclusion of the "Congregationalist." We confess, however, that, on the face of the action taken, nothing is clear but that, if the hypothesis of future probation is not accepted for want of sufficient reasons, there will be no bar to appointment. We find no plain indication that a candidate who considers the hypothesis permissible, even if he has not himself accepted it (as in the case of Mr. Covell), might expect appointment, although holding, like Mr. Lay, that the Bible does not touch upon the subject directly. We need to know whether the Committee have accepted Mr. Lay's conclusion only, or are also ready to permit the opinion he holds with regard to the silence of the Bible. On the latter supposition only does this appointment give encouragement to those who occupy the position of Mr. Covell. We should, therefore, be glad to see the entire correspondence published, if it contains anything more on this point, especially as the public will not have, in this case, the advantage of extended explanations from the President of the Board.

The difference between Mr. Lay and Mr. Covell is precisely this, that Mr. Lay says he does not accept the hypothesis of future probation, and that Mr. Covell is not prepared to say that he may not accept it, although he has not as yet accepted it. They hold almost identical opinions concerning the absence of direct Scriptural teaching on the subject, as the following extracts from Mr. Covell's letters show:—

"I did not consider the drift of the Bible to be against such a view as that of future probation, but maintained that the Bible does not touch that subject directly, expressed the belief that such passages as 2 Cor. v. 10, and Heb. ix. 27, had no direct bearing upon the question, cited the two passages in Peter, 1 Peter iii. 18-20, and iv. 5, 6, as favoring the idea of future probation, but based no positive argument upon them, and admitted that the revelation of Christ here referred to might have been limited to those of Noah's time. . . .

The Bible has no explicit revelation on the question of a future probation for the heathen. The Bible I conceive to be a practical book, which does not concern itself with speculations. I do not believe, however, that such a view is precluded by the Bible. The easy and natural inference from the two passages in Peter is that a future probation is possible. At best, the idea could not rise to the dignity of a *doctrine*, but could only be held as a probable *inference*."

He admitted that the opportunity of salvation might be made universal through the essential Christ, or through the presentation of the historical Christ, or in some other way. "I have no knowledge as to the method; I have no *doctrine* at this point; the only *doctrine* which I do hold bearing on the question is that the atonement is universal, that is, that every man will have an opportunity to receive its blessings." He did not even say that he claimed *liberty* to hold the hypothesis of future probation, which he had not distinctly accepted, but only to hold "the same doctrines and hypotheses that I now hold."

The "Independent" (received after the above was sent to the printers) says: "Mr. Lay's first statements on this subject were less full and satisfactory; but a later statement, which he sent voluntarily, cleared up his position and showed that he does not hold this hypothesis of future probation, and that he is not moving toward it in his thoughts. . . . In appointing Mr. Lay . . . the Committee did nothing new or exceptional."

The "Independent" is cheered, as well as the "Congregationalist," and for precisely a contrary reason.

It might help to an understanding of the significance of Mr. Lay's appointment to know what was the statement from him which was "less full and satisfactory," and what effect adherence to it would have had on the action of the Secretary and the Committee. We forbear comment, for the present, on the fresh glimpse the "Independent's" account gives of the unethical and demoralizing policy in the examination of candidates which is now regnant in the administration of the Board.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.

PART II. THE TREATMENT OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL CLASSES.

THE order of the advance of society in the treatment of crime and the criminal classes is indicated in the topics which follow in alternate numbers. *See February number.*

- TOPIC 1. The Improvement in the Means of Justice.
- TOPIC 2. The Definition of Crime.
- TOPIC 3. Gradation in Punishment.
- TOPIC 4. The Reformation of the Criminal.
- TOPIC 5. The Prevention of Crime.

References are given under each topic, and from authorities easily accessible in private and public libraries.

TOPIC 1. THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE MEANS OF JUSTICE.

REFERENCES.

- Ewald. Antiquities of Israel.
- Morgan. Ancient Civilization.
- Maine. Ancient Law.
- Hallam. Middle Ages.
- Stubbs. Constitutional History of England.
- Freeman. The Norman Conquest.
- Stephens. History of the Criminal Law of England.
- Owen Pike. A History of Crime in England.
- Palgrave. The Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth.

NOTES.

1. The earliest conception of crime is that of personal wrong. It is injury to the individual, not to the state. Strictly speaking, there can be no such thing as crime till the state comes into existence. Injury done to an individual in an unorganized condition of society is a wrong, not a crime. Crime is offense against law. Hence the first means of justice are personal. The method is that of *private revenge*, — a method which may be taken up and indorsed by the community, and gradually incorporated into the structure of society. When thus acknowledged and accepted as a method, it is to be carefully distinguished from any wild and lawless expression of it in the midst of a well-organized system of public justice.

Private revenge is a system in itself of which society, such as it is in earlier stages, takes cognizance, and the mark of this recognition is the acknowledgment, usually the appointment, of an "avenger of blood," as among the Israelites, from the next of kin to the person killed or disabled from securing personal satisfaction. It was the distinction of Israel in accepting this method of justice that special safeguards were established, as in the institution of cities of refuge, and in the denial of compensation in money for the life taken or injured. The method is crude, awkward, violent, and subject to much abuse, but it is natural. It is the method into which society easily relapses under any serious disturbance of the system of public justice.

"The avenger of blood is the *redeemer*, he is the next heir; he inherits not merely the goods but the corresponding duties of the dying man. If, then, it is one of the first duties of a living man not to endure any wrong that has been put upon him and to avenge all insult, if, moreover, having been wrongfully murdered, he is himself unable to discharge the duty, then the nearest of kin or his representative inherits, along with his other new duties, the vengeance of blood as the most sacred of them all, and the full burden of infamy rests on him should he not discharge this most burning obligation.

Accordingly, it was a further and natural consequence that the whole family of the murdered man took this duty upon themselves, and however long, or with whatever craft, the murderer might seek to baffle the avenger, this only called for more craft and persistence on the part of the latter. The investigation whether a murder were intentional or not undoubtedly led very early to simple expiation for what was done without purpose; but among many nations, even in the case of intentional murder, it became the custom to compound with *blood-money* for the life which was forfeited to this right of retaliation." — Ewald, *Antiquities of Israel*, pp. 168, 169.

2. With the organization of society into the state, the method entirely changes, taking the character of the organization effected. The administration of justice becomes a *function of government*, in some cases its chief function. And the quality of justice depends upon the quality of the government. The history of the administration of justice among the great governing races, of Rome in the Provinces, of England in the Colonies, shows in the clearest way the formal development of the idea of public justice. The tendency is for the administration to become more comprehensive and more exact in its workings, and more impartial in its results. The first important step taken is in giving *permanency* to the different agencies in the administration of justice, so that crime may be anticipated and restrained or punished.

"The primitive history of criminal law divides itself therefore into four stages. Understanding that the conception of *Crime*, as distinguished from that of *Wrong* or *Tort*, and from that of *Sin*, involves the idea of injury to the state or collective community, we first find that the commonwealth, in literal conformity with the conception, itself interposed directly, and by isolated acts, to avenge itself on the author of the evil which it had suffered. This is the point from which we start; each indictment is now a bill of pains and penalties, a special law naming the criminal and prescribing his punishment. A second step is accomplished when the multiplication of crimes compels the legislature to delegate its powers to particular *Quæstiones* or *Commissions*, each of which is deputed to investigate a particular accusation, and if it be proved, to punish the particular offender. Yet another movement is made when the legislature, instead of waiting for the alleged commission of a crime as the occasion of appointing a *Quæstio*, periodically nominates commissioners like the *Quæstores Parricidii* and the *Duumviri Perduellionis*, on the chance of certain classes of crimes being committed, and in the expectation that they *will* be perpetrated.

"The last stage is reached when the *Quæstiones* from being periodical or occasional become permanent *Benches* or *Chambers* — when the judges, instead of being named in the particular law nominating the Commission, are directed to be chosen through all future time in a particular way and from a particular class — and when certain acts are described in general language and declared to be crimes, to be visited, in the event of their perpetration, with specified penalties appropriated to each description." — Maine, *Ancient Law*, pp. 372, 373.

3. Before passing to the institution which is the basis of the system of modern justice, attention must be called to two methods which seem to us, judged by the standards of ancient or modern law, to be caricatures of justice — *trial by ordeal*, by water, fire or the sacrament, and *trial by combat*. Both methods show a kind of despair of being able to reach a judicial decision through the ordinary means of human justice. Each is in its way an appeal to God. Trial by ordeal partakes more of the religious idea in its superstitious forms, yet it was practically abolished by the church. Trial by combat arose in the Middle Age in

connection with feudalism and the ceremonies of chivalry, and is associated with the rise of duelling. See Hallam, *Middle Ages*, i. 237, 238; Owen Pike, *History of Crime in England*, i, 52-55, 204-208.

4. The fundamental institution of modern justice in the Anglo-Saxon race in the *jury system*. Resemblances to this system appear elsewhere, so that various origins have been suggested, but the fact that it thrives in this race shows that its roots are there. The principles of liberty and equality which belong to the race demand that a man be tried by his peers. The custom among the Germanic tribes is given in the quotation from Stubbs, and the contrast between the English and French systems of trial respectively by jury or judge, in the quotation from Stephens. The Anglo-Saxon institution of the jury system is partly Saxon and partly Norman in its origin. The old Saxon custom of *compurgation* rested upon the testimony or judgment of one's neighbors. Twelve or more neighbors of the accused swore that in fact, or according to their belief, he was innocent or guilty. The Norman custom of *recognition* involved the idea of an inquest, the taking of testimony, the search for evidence. Upon these two customs, the jury system of England was built, but it was not established in any tangible form till the reign of Henry II., 1166. See quotation from Green.

The system has been greatly changed in some of its features, in one or two reversed, but its great intent was the same at the first as now — that a man should be tried by his peers, his neighbors rather than by the officials of the government, that he should have the appeal to fact through the summoning of witnesses, that he should have the right to challenge jurors, and that he should have the benefit of a doubt, through the rule requiring unanimity in the decision.

The essential differences in the system are thus summed up by Wharton: "The old English juries were sworn witnesses of the fact, summoned to tell about it to the king, who in person or through his council entered judgment. Our present juries are sworn arbiters of questions submitted to them on the testimony of witnesses outside of their body. The old juries were committees to report on fact. Our present juries are tribunals to decide on facts reported to them by others. The old juries were not limited to number, and all cognizant of a transaction were summoned. The present jury is summoned by lot, and it is a cause of challenge if any juror has formed a settled opinion; that which was the absolute qualification of the old juror is the absolute disqualification of the new. The juror of the old time was responsible and could be subjected to penalties for a wrong decision. The juror of our time, though his action may be reviewed, and though he may be punished for contempt or disobedience or corruption, is irresponsible so far as the merits of his verdict are concerned."

"We have sketched, in an earlier stage of this work, the formation of the primitive German courts: they were tribunals of fully qualified members of the community, a selection, it might be, from a body of equally competent companions, able to declare the law or custom of the country, and to decide what, according to that custom, should be done in the particular case brought before them. They were not set to decide what was the truth of facts, but to determine what action was to be taken upon proofs given. The proof was itself furnished by these means, the oaths of the parties to the suit and their compurgators, the production of witnesses, and the use of the ordeal: the practice of trial by battle being a sort of ultimate expedient to obtain a prac-

tical decision, an expedient partly akin to the ordeal as a judgment of God, and partly based on the idea that where legal measures had failed recourse must be had to the primitive law of force, — the feud or right of private war, — only regulated as far as possible by law and regard for the saving of life. For each of these methods of proof there were minute rules and formalities, the infringement or neglect of which put the offender out of court. The complainant addressed his charge to the defendant in solemn traditional form; the defendant replied to the complainant by an equally solemn verbal and logical contradiction. The compurgators swore, with joined hands and in one voice, to the purity and honesty of the oath of their principal. Where the oath was inconclusive, the parties brought their witnesses to declare such knowledge as their position as neighbors had given them; the court determined the point to which the witnesses must swear, and they swore to that particular fact. They were not examined or made to testify all they knew: but swore to the fact on which the judges determined that evidence should be taken. If the witnesses also failed the ordeal was used. And where the defeated party ventured to impugn the sentence thus obtained, he might challenge the determination of the court by appealing the members of it to trial by combat. This practice, however common among some branches of the German stock, was by no means universal, and, as has been pointed out, was not practiced among the native English." — Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England*, pp. 609, 610.

"The fabric of our judicial legislation commences in 1166 with the Assize of Clarendon, the first object of which was to provide for the order of the realm by reviving the old English system of mutual security or frank pledge. No stranger might abide in any place save a borough, and only there for a single night, unless sureties were given for his good behaviour; and the list of such strangers was to be submitted to the itinerant justices. In the provisions of this assize for the repression of crime we find the origin of trial by jury, so often attributed to earlier times. Twelve lawful men of each hundred, with four from each township, were sworn to present those who were known or reputed as criminals within their district for trial by ordeal. The jurors were thus not merely witnesses, but sworn to act as judges also in determining the value of the charge, and it is this double character of Henry's jurors that has descended to our 'grand jury,' who still remain charged with the duty of presenting criminals for trial after examination of the witnesses against them. Two later steps brought the jury to its modern condition. Under Edward the First, witnesses acquainted with the particular fact in question were added in each case to the general jury, and by the separation of these two classes of jurors at a later time the last became simply 'witnesses' without any judicial power, while the first ceased to be witnesses at all and became our modern jurors, who are only judges of the testimony given. With this assize, too, a practice which had prevailed from the earliest English times, the practice of 'Compurgation,' passed away. Under this system the accused could be acquitted of the charge by the voluntary oath of his neighbors and kinsmen; but this was abolished by the Assize of Clarendon, and for the fifty years which followed it his trial, after the investigation of the grand jury, was found solely in the ordeal or 'judgment of God,' where innocence was proved by the power of holding hot iron in the hand, or by sinking when flung into the water, for swimming was a proof of guilt. It was the abolition of the whole system of ordeal by the Council of Lateran in 1216, which led the way to the establishment of what is called a 'petty jury for the final trial of prisoners.'" — Green, *History of the English People*, Book II., chap. iii., pp. 167, 168.

"First, then, as to the comparative justice to be expected of trials by jury and trials by a judge without jury. Trial by a judge without a jury may, I think, be made, practically speaking, completely just in almost every case. At all events, the securities which can be taken for justice in the case of a trial by a judge without a jury are infinitely greater than those which can be taken for trial by a judge and jury.

"1. The judge is one known man, holding a conspicuous position before the

public, and open to censure, and in extreme cases to punishment, if he does wrong. The jury are twelve unknown men. Whilst the trial is proceeding they form a group just large enough to destroy even the appearance of individual responsibility. When the trial is over they sink back into the crowd from whence they came, and cannot be distinguished from it. The most unjust verdict throws no discredit on any person who joined in it, for as soon as it is pronounced he returns to obscurity.

"2. Juries give no reasons, but judges do in some cases, and ought to be made to do so formally in all cases if juries were dispensed with. This in itself is a security of the highest value for the justice of a decision. An unskilled person may no doubt give bad reasons for a sound conclusion, but it is nearly impossible for the most highly skilled person to give good reasons for a bad conclusion; and the attempt to do so would imply a determination to be unjust, which would be most uncommon.

"3. From the nature of the case there can be no appeal in cases of trial by jury though there may be a new trial. There can be an appeal where the trial is by a single judge. . . .

"4. Experience has proved that the decisions of single judges are usually recognized as just. . . . As to juries, experience no doubt has shown, and does continually show, that their verdicts also are just in the very great majority of instances, but I am bound to say I think that the exceptions are more numerous than in the case of trials by judges without juries. . . .

"There is another point of view from which trial by jury must be considered, namely, its collateral advantages, and these, I think, are not only incontestable in themselves, but are of such importance that I should be sorry to see any considerable change in the system, though I am alive to its defects. They are these:—

"In the first place, though I do not think that trial by jury really is more just than trial by a judge without a jury would be, it is generally considered to be so, and not unnaturally. Though the judges are, and are known to be, independent of the executive government, it is naturally felt that their sympathies are likely to be on the side of authority. The public at large feel more sympathy with jurymen than they do with judges, and accept their verdicts with much less hesitation and distrust than they would feel towards judgments, however ably written or expressed.

"In the next place, trial by jury interests large numbers of people in the administration of justice and makes them responsible for it. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this. It gives a degree of power and of popularity to the administration of justice which can hardly be derived from any other source.

"Lastly, though I am, as every judge must be, a prejudiced witness on the subject, I think that the position in which trial by jury places the judge is one in which such powers as he possesses can be most effectually used for the public service. It is hardly necessary to say that to judges in general the maintenance of trial by jury is of more importance than to any other members of the community. It saves judges from the responsibility—which to many men would appear intolerably heavy and painful—of deciding simply on their own opinion upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner."—Stephens, *History of the Common Law of England*, vol. i., chap. xv., pp. 568–573.

5. The maintenance of justice as now organized depends chiefly upon the *competence* and *purity* of judges, and upon such *modifications* or *safeguards* of the jury system as will insure intelligent and incorrupt jurors. The points at which the jury system has been proved to be weak are, first, the easy avoidance of jury duty by the busiest but most responsible classes; second, the requirement that a juror shall have no opinion on the matter to be judged, allowing if not necessitating a degree of ignorance incompatible with an intelligent verdict; third, the rule of unanimity, which allows the obstruction of justice through the

obstinacy or corruption of a single juror. A change, however, in this last rule is of doubtful advantage.

The corruption which in special cases attends the working of the system, as exemplified in the riots in Cincinnati in 1884, cannot be met by any change in the system itself. The difficulty is deeper, and must be met by radical methods in the purification of society and the state.

The present working of the jury system, and the need of revision at certain points, was made the subject of the opening address at the last Prison Congress, by President Hayes.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, by J. E. ERDMANN, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Halle. English translation, edited by N. S. HUGH, of the University of Minnesota. In three volumes. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1890.

The philosophic public has had of late its interest aroused by the prospectus of a "Library of Philosophy," promising to cover the field of philosophy in a wholly adequate way. The promise is large and taking. It includes three series of volumes, one containing works upon the development of particular schools; the second, the history of theory in particular departments; the third, original and independent contributions. The names of the writers are an assurance that the execution will be as thorough and critical as the plan is comprehensive. They comprise, in the first series, such well-known authors as Professors Wallace, Seth, Sorley, and Watson; in the second, Adamson, Bosanquet, and Pfeiderer, of Berlin; in the third, Edward Caird, and Ward (the author of the article upon Psychology in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*). When the series is completed, the English reader of philosophy will not cast such longing and envious eyes upon Germany as at present.

The introductory and "inaugural" volume of the series is the one before us. It was, we think, a happy thought to open the series with a general history of philosophy, one giving in a summary and yet comprehensive and reasoned way an outlook over the entire field. Some writer of English might perhaps have been found who would have produced an original treatise as good as the one of Erdmann's. But to have attempted it would have involved taking a great risk. Authors who are competent for such work are apt to fly at higher game. The combination of qualities necessary to produce a work of the scope and grade of Erdmann's is rare. Industry, accuracy, and a fair degree of philosophic understanding may give us a work like Ueberweg's, but Erdmann's history, while in no way superseding Ueberweg's as a handbook for general use, yet occupies a different position. Erdmann wrote his book, not as a reference-book, to give in brief compass a digest of the writings of various authors, but as a genuine history of philosophy, tracing, in a genetic way, the development of thought in its treatment of philosophic problems. Its purpose is to develop a philosophic intelligence rather than to furnish information. When we add that, to the successful execution of this intention, Erdmann unites a minute and exhaustive knowledge of

philosophic sources at first hand, equaled over the entire field of philosophy probably by no other one man (Teller, Benno, Erdmann, and others may excel in periods), we are in a condition to form some idea of the value of the book. To the student who wishes, not simply a general idea of the course of philosophy, nor a summary of what this and that man has said, but a somewhat detailed knowledge of the evolution of thought and of what this and the other writer have contributed to it, Erdmann is indispensable; there is no substitute. Were it not that the book has hitherto been shut up within the confines of a German style, often crabbed and almost always complex, I should feel myself guilty of impertinent condescension in even appearing to commend the book. To those who know the history, it stands for itself in no more need of a word of praise than Ueberweg in his line, Kuno Fischer in his, or Teller in his. Comparisons with the original German of portions of the text selected at random reveal, with one exception, a successful outcome of what must have been a difficult and often tedious task. The editor is to be congratulated that he has reduced to such uniformity of style and rendering the work of the six different hands (two of them, by the way, besides the editor, Americans) from whom the translation proceeded. The exception to the successful result is to be found in the work of the translator of the portion "Since Hegel." This is probably, from a translator's standpoint, the most difficult part of the whole history. It is the more to be regretted that it was not executed by a hand as competent as the other portions of the text found. It is a pity that Professor Hough did not exercise his editorial prerogatives more vigorously upon this part. Examination of pages 72-77 of volume iii. shows nine renderings either incorrect or decidedly unhappy. It is only fair to add that other selections showed nothing like this proportion of error. The editor's own translations are, upon the whole, the most spirited and idiomatic of any. It is to be hoped that the book will find its way rapidly, and that a second edition will soon be called for.

John Dewey.

MORALPHILOSOPHIE GEMEINVERSTÄNDLICH DARGESTELLT. Von GEORG VON GIZYCKI. 8vo, pp. 546. Leipzig: Wilhelm Friedrich. 1888.
The Same. Translated and adapted by STANTON COIT, Ph. D. 8vo, pp. 304. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1889.

The same influence which elicited so many works on ethics in England has stimulated German thought into a like activity. Professor Gizycki betrays evidence that this influence has materially affected his views, which are indicated beforehand by the acknowledgment in the preface that he is chiefly indebted to Bain, Salter, Sidgwick, and Spencer for the ideas which he undertakes to exposit and defend. They are summarized in his discussions upon the criterion of morals, the worth of life, ethics and theology, and the relation of morals to nature. The criterion of conduct which he proposes is, as can be anticipated, utility or universal happiness. The position seems to be identical with the traditional doctrine of his school, but it is interesting to remark that he insists upon a radical difference between *universal* happiness as an ethical norm, and the happiness of the greatest number. In this important distinction he wisely objects to Bentham's form of stating the principle of ethics. He well points out that the happiness of the greatest number is not the moral

ideal of ethics. It may be all that moral effort ever actually attains, but it is not the ideal end toward which it strives. Hence the position that the norm of moral action is a universal one, an ideal that embraces the whole scope of humanity, is a great advance upon the politico-legislative notion of Bentham's, which was good enough for its purpose, but wholly misleading and defective when proposed as the theoretic principle of morals. What we can attain is one thing, and what we should aim at is another. We do not often see this point made against Bentham and his followers, who fail to realize the difference between theoretical ethics and practical effort.

The emphasis which Professor Gizycki lays upon "utility," "happiness," etc., is not to be criticised so much for any error that might be charged to setting up these notions as criteria or ends of conduct, as for the unconsciousness which their treatment betrays of the indefiniteness they possess, and have possessed ever since Plato discussed the idea of pleasure in the *Philebus*. It is strange that philosophers have not been more seriously impressed with the significance of this indefiniteness when occupied with the ethical problem. The author would have taken a profounder view of his subject, if the difficulties implied in the use of pleasure and happiness as the ends of moral action had been more distinctly recognized, and the position qualified by those considerations which common sense no less than speculative ethics has always enforced in order to avoid the predominance of motives which cannot be left without restraint. Yet it is only just to the author to say that his general hedonistic or utilitarian tendencies are somewhat counteracted by two important features of his theory as a whole. They are the universality of the utility which he proposes, and the high place which he assigns to the sense of duty in determining moral conduct. The age has passed by when we can apprehend any serious practical evils from the recognition of utility as the main object of moral action, because nobody questions its right to consideration, and because in the process of development it has become somewhat elevated and spiritualized in its conception: but it is nevertheless due to the purer form of moral theory to see that the historical associations of hedonism do not continue the antithesis they once presented to views which have an important and honorable place in human progress. These views have found it necessary to elevate the sense of duty and to qualify it for acting as a check upon impulses which require direction and control. Any system of ethics which subordinates this principle is defective to the extent of not being ethics at all. Not that conduct under the direction of the desires must always be wrong, but that the only characteristic which can make it rationally moral is the sense of duty, be the object of action self-satisfaction or self-sacrifice. What the author says upon the topic is in the main sympathetic, and supplements the other side of his theory in a way which testifies very distinctly to the immortal influence of Kant, although it is evident that he demurs to the rigidly formal character of Kantian ethics.

But the most interesting feature of the work is the author's uncompromising assault upon pessimism, which is doubly interesting from the fact that his own case is comparable to that of Hartmann. Professor Gizycki has been a sufferer himself. But misfortune has not jaundiced his intellectual vision or distorted his estimation of facts. He clearly indicates with Paulsen that pessimism is a mood, not a philosophy, and so correctly assigns as its most frequent cause the excessive claims which many of its

advocates make upon life, and the absence in them of a proper love for humanity. The terrible amount of evil and pain in existence is not ignored, nor their significance minimized. But at the same time the pessimist is not allowed to disregard the existence of factors which his theory either systematically depreciates or wholly denies. His argument is a huge *ignoratio elenchi*. He assumes the truth of pessimism upon the strength of his objections to optimism. The most crushing blow which can be dealt against it is illustrated in the author's brief reply to the Coryphæus of that theory: "If Schopenhauer does not set up as a moral imperative: 'Help nobody, but injure all as much as you can!' but exactly the opposite: 'Injure nobody, but help all as much as you can!' this only shows that his intuitive moral consciousness was stronger than his craving for logical consistency, or his belief in his own doctrine." Hence pessimism, so far from being a scientifically produced theory, is correctly regarded as a reaction from the optimism of the previous century, and contradicts its injunction to universal suicide by exalting the qualities of pity and sympathy. But Professor Gizycki does not remark that the pessimism of his country and age is a recoil from the idealism which was not only the inspiration of German philosophy, but also the natural characteristic of the race that had given birth to that philosophy. This explanation of its origin would have been an adequate corrective of the tendencies involved in pessimism, because all reactions are as one-sided as the spirit from which they revolt.

The two most remarkable defects of the author's work are his treatment of the relation between ethics and theology, and the relation of morals to nature. We will not quarrel with a man who wishes to keep ethics and theology distinct. But it is one thing to do this, and quite another to imply from this independence that theology is absurd. We can appreciate two positions in this matter; the first, that the two subjects are independent of each other; and the second, that theology is conditioned by ethics. The latter is the position of Martineau. But it is just as possible to be bigoted in opposing as in defending theology, a fact which seems not to have suggested itself to Professor Gizycki. Theology and religion appear to him to be the same, and he assumes them both to be a body of dogmas. He has no conception of his duty to look at religion as a fact, or to speak and think of it as a spiritual phenomenon entitled to the same consideration which Greek and modern speculations receive. He treats it as an obstacle to ethics, forgetful of the fact that the historical method must always give religion at least a relative justification. But the worst incident is that he is obliged to misconceive, and to some extent to misrepresent, theology in order to make out a case in his own favor. This is done by looking at the subject in a purely scholastic manner, thus committing precisely the same error chargeable to the period when theology dominated the world's thought, instead of endeavoring to realize in his own consciousness those conceptions and experiences which are always an apology for the theological phase of thinking. It may be granted that many indiscreet thinkers have founded ethics upon authority, or held the theory that moral principles originate in the arbitrary fiat of the divine will, but it is not just to insinuate either that this was the universal opinion of the theological period, or that it is the general view of the religious mind to-day. The fact is that no respectable theologian holds the views imputed to the school: certainly not in the caricatured form presented by Professor Gizycki. Nor has any

responsible thinker of the highest order founded ethics upon the doctrine of immortality, as the author would have us believe; at least not in the sense insinuated. It is true that much error has existed in regard to the relation between the two, but a writer ignores the facts of history and of experience when he omits to notice the self-sacrifice, love, hope, and faith that have dominated Christian character and conduct without any reference to immortality, except perhaps that such a belief was the consequence, not the cause, of moral conceptions and behavior. Those do not analyze human nature correctly who suppose that the belief is always and consciously the starting point of Christian morals. But not to insist upon this form of criticism, because there is truth on both sides of the question, the offense committed by Professor Gizycki is that of stealing the fundamental elements of Christianity and refusing to acknowledge their ownership. He can look upon religion and theology only as a logician dealing with abstract conceptions. The truth would require him to regard the concrete facts, and at least to recognize, as Ziegler, although a rationalist, so finely does, that Christian ethics, besides being a theory of a scholastic character, has also embodied in a much more effective way than present theories are likely to do, the very elements which Professor Gizycki sets up as constituting the moral consciousness. When men can study the development of Christianity and its ethics in the same spirit in which they study other systems of thought; namely, without the constant insinuation that they are excrescences on the history of human nature, they can do the subject justice, as happily the time is coming for this, and is already present with minds that are not the slaves of narrow thinking and purely formal logic.

But Professor Gizycki's criticism of the theological standpoint is undertaken expressly for the purpose of accepting and defending the alternative of a life representing the "moral independence of man." The Platonic doctrine of a "world plan" and the Stoic view of "a life according to nature" are briefly reviewed and condemned. What is more interesting is that the author is keen enough to observe that "the laws of nature," as formulated by evolutionists, afford no basis whatever for morals, and so he is not guilty of a very common error which supposes that there is no alternative between "nature" and religion for ethics. There is a great gain to ethical speculation in the refusal to recognize the claim of evolution to reconstruct morals upon its principles. But this redeeming feature would have been more weighty had the author's criticism of the religious mind been more judicious and fair, and his reconstruction of ethics upon a moral imperative in the consciousness of man more complete. A book is defective that devotes a hundred and sixty pages to the destructive criticism of theological morals, and only five or six pages to the principle which is designed to supplant them; and particularly faulty when the inference is indicated that there is nothing in common between them. But had the author taken the trouble to study Christianity as a scholar, instead of comparing its faults with the merits of science, he would have seen more to admire in the agency which has preserved to the world, perhaps created, that lofty sentiment of duty and sacrifice which the Greek mind never realized, and which he himself owes to the very system he abuses.

J. H. Hyslop.

THE EXTINCTION OF EVIL. Three Theological Essays. By Rev. E. PETAVEL, D. D., Free Lecturer of the University of Geneva, Switzerland. Translated, with an Introductory Chapter, by Rev. CHARLES H. OLIPHANT. The Preface by Rev. EDWARD WHITE. Pp. 184. Boston: Charles H. Woodman. 1889.

The title of this book indicates the negative side of the doctrine of Conditional Immortality. Those who fail to attain the life which is in Christ cease to exist as conscious persons. The universe is thus freed from the presence of evil, and the chief problem of theodicy is solved. There are two principal motives to the belief that immortal existence is conditioned on character: one, aversion to the thought that any persons suffer endlessly for their sins; the other, relief from the thought that evil and pain continue forever in God's universe. A theory which is defended for such reasons is entitled to the most candid consideration and the most sympathetic criticism.

To say that a new book on conditional immortality offers no new arguments is only what has to be said of nearly all books on the doctrines of religion. But the old arguments may be so grouped and illustrated as to give a new point of view and gain a rehearing; and this is all that is claimed for this translation of Dr. Petavel's discussion. These arguments are, denial of the natural immortality of the soul, interpretation of the predictions of the Bible concerning the fate of the wicked, and the analogies of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest in physical nature. The last of these arguments has most to do with the revival of the doctrine. All these arguments, however, although they have some force, are open to objections so serious that one hesitates to accept them for all they claim to establish. When it is maintained that the soul, by reason of moral failure, may cease to exist, the possibility must of course be admitted, for that which has a beginning may have an end; but on any except a purely materialistic theory of personality, there is only one conceivable way by which it may become non-existent, and that is by a destructive act of God, a positive act corresponding, in a sense, to the equally mysterious act of the creation of personality. But this method of extinction is not accepted by the writer of this book and those who agree with him; it is, in fact, so objectionable to them that they decline to be characterized as believers in "annihilation," and insist on the use of the designation, "conditional immortality." Sin, they say, reduces the powers of the soul, which gradually disorganizes or decays as it is more and more separated from God by sin, until after death or after the judgment it finally ceases to be. Sin is moral disease, and disease if not arrested terminates in death, and death is non-existence. But we have to ask, what becomes of the rational soul, what is it converted into, what receives this disorganizing personality? The rational spirit, capable of distinguishing itself from the natural world as a different order of being, capable of combining phenomena under the laws which bind them together, and capable of knowing God, is a mental and spiritual reality, and cannot be resolved into a part of the physical order. Certainly those who believe in God and a human personality, and in the soul's survival of death, cannot believe that the spirit of man is transformed into some other kind of force in the material world. Is, then, this rational entity absorbed into the universal reason, into the absolute spirit? But, if the universal reason is thought of as unconscious, as a blind intelligence, there is no such thing; it is only a mode of the universe, reaching its highest

point in man. And if the universal reason is the personal God, in whom these writers believe, it is impossible that as a personality he can absorb other personalities into himself, especially personalities which have become incorrigibly sinful. If any force of nature ceases to act, it is only in appearance, for none of its energy is lost. What changes is the form. It is indeed inconceivable that there is any loss of force. Yet the highest force of all is believed to disappear, leaving not a trace behind. The analogies of nature should be applied in any event with the utmost caution to the human spirit, and those very analogies are decisive against the extinction of anything whatever. The transformation of personality into something else is inconceivable. Its non-existence can occur only by a destructive act on God's part, an act of annihilation. The translator quotes with entire approval a statement of Dr. Hedge's in which, having set forth the gradual deterioration of the soul which sins, he says that at last "the soul, as a moral agent and a conscious individuality, is extinct; as a *monad* it still survives. No longer a person but a thing, its condition thenceforth is not a question of psychology but of ontology." I am utterly at a loss to understand what happens when a soul becomes an unconscious monad, when a person becomes a thing, when a rational spirit loses its psychology but retains its ontology. A theory of the extinction of personality, especially if it survives the dissolution of the body, raises so many difficulties as soon as it is questioned, that something better than the analogy of nature is needed to establish it. The fact that the Bible does not explicitly assert natural immortality does not prove the opposite, and does not weaken the implications of its constant teaching that all men are the children of God, and constitute a spiritual order of beings in his material universe.

Only the unmistakable declarations of Scripture that God in the exercise of his omnipotence does literally destroy the wicked could afford sufficient reason to a Christian for believing the doctrine of annihilation. Correct opinions concerning the fate of the wicked must be determined, not by a doubtful psychology, but by the teaching of the Bible as ascertained by a proper exegesis.

Reliance is placed by the author on the Scriptural expressions "death," "destruction," "fire," "lost," and the like, for support of the opinion that the wicked at last cease to exist. But these words are used in many cases to indicate the state of beings which have not ceased to exist. The piece of silver, the sheep gone astray, and the prodigal son were lost, and the word used is the very word elsewhere translated "destroy" and "perish." It is applied to the "lost" sheep of the house of Israel, who not only exist, but are to be saved. The usage of classic Greek could be cited to the same effect. The meaning of the word ἀπόλλυμι, translated "destroy," "perish," "lost," signifies utter and hopeless ruin, but not uniformly nor generally cessation of existence. The word "death" is used to signify a condition past recovery, and is applied to those who were dead in trespasses and sins, that is, those who but for the gospel would be incapable of renewal. Jesus applied the word only twice to the results of sin, once in referring to those who, through believing on Him, have passed from death unto life, and therefore in the state of death were still in existence, and again in referring to those who through keeping his word should not see death forever. The word is employed in the epistles of Paul and John to indicate the absence of spiritual life, and to designate those who are alive and vigorous but in a state of deadness to

that which is holy, as the believer is dead unto sin — that is, impervious to it, out of sympathy with it. There is no intimation that sinners will be any more dead by and by than they are now.

The word "fire" signifies the completeness, the irrevocableness of punishment rather than the extinction of being; and it is, especially by Christ, so often declared to be eternal and unquenchable that the impression is that the punishment continues, not merely that the instrument of punishment continues. Moreover, as believers in annihilation suppose that sinners are destroyed by inner forces or discords, by the inevitable consumption of moral life from within, and not by any external agency, the fire must be an inner fire, a fever of the soul, and cannot be called eternal or unquenchable if the sinner after a time is utterly destroyed. Other passages of Scripture so distinctly emphasize the eternity of punishment, and so closely associate it with the eternal blessedness of the righteous, that they prevent a literal interpretation of those passages which describe punishment as "death" and "destruction."

This book is unsatisfactory in its explanation of statements concerning the endlessness of punishment. It also fails to explain the presence of all souls at the final judgment, which comes only at the close of the dispensation of the gospel, for annihilation is supposed to occur in some cases with the death of the body, in others at various points, near or remote, after death.

The author is emphatic in his rejection of the theory of the ultimate restoration of all men to holiness, a theory contradicted by the Scriptural representations of death and destruction, which, however interpreted, signify utter and hopeless ruin.

The alternative, on Scriptural grounds, is between the endless punishment and the annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked. The former is more consistent with the entire teaching of the New Testament than the latter. Both theories agree that the doom of the wicked is hopeless ruin, and that the ultimate blessedness of all men is not taught in the Bible. Which theory furnishes the stronger motive to repentance cannot be determined. It must be admitted that, probably with intention, the warnings of Jesus leave the fate of the wicked involved in a degree of mystery as to its actual conditions, and are emphatic chiefly as to the finality of the judgment and the inexpressible sadness of the fate of the lost.

George Harris.

THE BEGINNINGS OF ETHICS. By Rev. CARROLL CUTLER, D. D., formerly President of Western Reserve College. New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son. 1889. Pp. xiv, 324.

The characteristics of this manual are adequateness, moderateness, distinctness, and healthiness. The author stands on the level of the Christian intuitions, and views the field of duty from that. He assumes the freedom of the will as a postulate resting in the general consciousness of mankind, without thinking it necessary to argue it, or to consider minutely how much may be retrenched from it without overthrowing Moral Science. He assumes the reality of the Soul, in the sense of the distinct personal being, capable of surviving the initial and grosser apparatus of its activities, as a conquest which, once secured by developed thought, has no need to be thrown again into a caldron of tentative indetermination. He regards both obligation and duty as essentially intuitive

and unanalyzable. Religion and ethics he regards as distinct, but essentially interfused and incapable of completion and perfect intelligibility without each other. Under each branch of duty, or description of those appetencies of the being which determine its various forms, the author gives succinct but clear accounts of all the principal theories that have been held respecting them. He treats the evolutionist theories of ethics cordially, as supplying much valuable material, though incapable of explaining either the nature or origin of ethics truly so called. He shows atheism to be incapable of explaining morality, but does not make the sense of obligation to rest on the present perception of its ultimate ground, and necessary objective correlative. He rightly denies that the uniformity of statistics of crime contradicts freedom of will. It merely shows that, compared with the great whole, each one's possibilities of choice and moral variation are small. The exact opposition of two ultimate choices which is possible can, under a given social pressure, only manifest itself within a limited range of acts.

The theory of the nature of virtue the author regards as including too many factors to be exhausted in any one statement. "The realization of the end of our being in all its manifold relations" is as specific as he conceives it possible to make it.

Dr. Cutler remarks that at present the pendulum of thought is at that extreme of its era where "many are laboring to establish a morality 'based exclusively on indubitable facts of natural knowledge;' that is, on the facts of life viewed in the shallowest manner and the most superficial relations,—a morality without God and independent of religion; and we are even hearing of a morality without obligation and without sanction." But he welcomes all ethical attempts. They show the universality of the ethical feeling, and contribute their share to the science, though only in God and Eternity does this find final explanation, justification, and rectification.

Charles C. Starbuck.

THE KINGS OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH. By GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A., Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford. 12mo, pp. xii, 238. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1889.

To be without a bias in writing history is neither possible nor desirable. The reader can complain only when the bias is unworthy or unconfessed. Professor Rawlinson makes it clear that his bias is for the chronicler and against Ewald as an original source of his little volume, "The Kings of Israel and Judah."

At the same time the author draws much and well from Ewald, and more from Ewald's admirer, Dean Stanley. The antidote to possible poison is in the form of running criticism. So far as I have observed, this criticism is sane and helpful. Dogmatism is no more to be accepted in the biographer than in the theologian. There is no historical ground for Jeroboam's overt rebellion against Solomon prior to his flight into Egypt. It is well that Ewald's assumption to the contrary should be exposed.

Modern scholars differ respecting the origin of the calf worship in the Northern Kingdom. Was it the old bull worship of the Judges restored and nationalized? Was it the cult of the Asiatic ox-headed God familiar to Israel through the Canaanites? Each view has its champions.

Professor Rawlinson traces the new departure to Egypt. Jeroboam's Egyptian sojourn determined it. Bulls were worshiped as incarnations of Deity both at Memphis and Heliopolis; and as at the time of the Exodus the bull form presented itself most obviously to Aaron when a visible God was wanted, so now to Jeroboam there recurred the same idea. Jeroboam even openly connected the two occasions by his address (1 Kings xii. 28): "Behold thy Gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt." This is one of several instances where the author's familiarity with Egyptian studies leads him to the right standpoint, and enriches his handbook.

We are glad to see, also, a free use of the Assyrian Eponym Canon. The chronological worth of this dated list of officials on the Tigris is just beginning to be recognized. As the discovery of his illustrious brother, Sir Henry Rawlinson, it is peculiarly in place in the footnotes of the author's chapter on Hezekiah. Without question, King Hezekiah was the man the author paints. Was King Sennacherib? I think not. He bore the same relation to Sargon that Cambyses bore to Cyrus. The reckless revenger of the Inscriptions was anything but "a worthy successor of his father."

That the royal sketches should be of unequal merit was inevitable. Jeroboam and Jehu are easily first. The chapter on Ahab is lucid, lively, and philosophical, commending itself to the reader by a most interesting account of the Phœnician religion. As one nears the end, signs of haste and perfunctoriness appear. If Josiah were to be named, the occasion of his reformation should be emphasized. But the Deuteronomic law, on whose discovery by Hilkiah modern criticism lays crucial stress, is entirely in the background. Such an omission is without excuse.

The aim of the "Men of the Bible" series is reality. In this book it has hardly been reached. Contact with the prophetic Scriptures has been mechanical rather than chemical. Concerning Professor Rawlinson's competency to treat his theme there can be no dispute. Actually, the threescore and nine sovereigns defile past the reader wrapped in an arid style, or reflected in a superficial analysis. They do not live as they might and should under the hand of the author of the "Five Great Monarchies." The book is not to be named beside Driver's "Isaiah" and Farrar's "Solomon."

John Phelps Taylor.

NOVUM TESTAMENTUM GRÆCE, ad antiquissimos testes denuo recensuit, apparatus criticum apposuit, CONSTANTINUS TISCHENDORF. Editio octava critica maior. Volumen III. PROLEGOMENA: scripsit Casparus Renatus Gregory, additis curis †Ezrae Abbot. Pars Altera. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1890.

It will gratify Biblical students to learn that the above Second Part of the Prolegomena to Tischendorf's "eighth larger critical edition" of the Greek Testament was published at Leipzig at the close of January. The First Part appeared, it will be remembered, nearly five years ago (see "Andover Review" for June, 1884, p. 676 f.); and, after giving a sketch of the life and labors of Professor Tischendorf, was occupied with an account of the several classes of critical helps and the correct method of using them, the orthographical and grammatical peculiarities of the ancient texts, the sequence of the New Testament books, and their various

subdivisions ancient and modern, an account of the printed text from the Complutensian edition to that of Westcott and Hort, and in its closing pages (pp. 337-440) with a detailed description of the several extant manuscripts written in uncial characters.

The former volume, accordingly, left the interest of Biblical specialists at its height. With this new Part that interest will suffer no abatement. The first ten pages are given to supplementary information respecting the uncials in which fragments from the Archduke Rainer's Egyptian treasures find mention, as well as the phototypic reproduction of the Vatican manuscript now in progress; and then the remaining 350 pages are occupied with the cursive manuscripts and the lectionaries. For trustworthy information about both these classes of documents students have long been impatiently waiting. What they now receive will gratify and surprise them, as the mere mention of the members catalogued is enough to show. The roll of manuscripts of the four Gospels Dr. Gregory has swelled to 1273, of the Acts and Catholic Epistles to 416, of the Pauline Epistles to 480, of the Apocalypse to 183, an aggregate of 2352 numbers. Of the lectionaries he has enrolled "Gospels" 936, "Apostoli" 265, in all 1201; thus making a grand total of 3553 numbers.

From this total, however, must be deducted those documents in the current lists which have secured a place there by some mistake (such as those occupied with patristic rather than Biblical matter); those containing, at the most, only a few verses of the New Testament; those which, after appropriating different numerals, turn out to be only dislocated parts of one and the same original volume; those inadvertently counted and numbered more than once; and others which were formerly known but have now disappeared from view. Yet after all the required deductions have been made, the total foots up to 2800, and Professor Gregory intimates his ability to add at least 200 more.

The gain thus accruing to our critical resources may be appreciated by recalling the fact that by far the fullest enumeration of the cursive manuscripts previously given, viz., that in Dr. Scrivener's "Plain Introduction," etc., 3d ed. 1883, p. xxx. (cf. the "Critical Appendix to the *Adover Review*, Vol. III." p. 5), makes the aggregate, everything reckoned in, fall short of 2000. Nor does Professor Gregory merely swell the list; he sifts it as well. Once and again (see, for example, pp. 758, 774, he declines to count whole groups of manuscripts probably containing New Testament material until they can be more thoroughly examined. More than half of the whole number registered he has personally inspected, and he gives an account of them which for definiteness and accuracy far surpasses any previously existing. The narrow limits to which the proportions of the volume confined him imposed the severest condensation; but by employing abundant abbreviations he has recorded the designation, locality, age, size, material, contents, peculiarities, history, of each document in surprisingly little space, besides references to collations and facsimiles, if existing, to the descriptions by previous critics, etc. Even a glance at the record impresses one with the amount of research and learning which has entered into it. A curious catalogue of particulars interesting to students of patristics, archæology, history, geography, natural phenomena even, might be gleaned from its pages. To the Biblical student it brings an embarrassing accession of riches. Dr. Gregory is himself forced to repeat the words with which Dr. Scrivener closes a list now superseded, but of

which in its day he was justly proud : "The harvest is plenteous but the laborers are few." The work of the reapers, however, has been greatly facilitated by the first-hand descriptions and judgments which Dr. Gregory has frequently given. It is to be hoped that scores of those who, from time to time, may run their eyes along the pages and see against one manuscript and another the remark, "deserves to be collated," "contains noteworthy readings," and the like, will eagerly enter upon the researches thus suggested. For the result can hardly fail to make valuable additions to our critical evidences. Indeed, manuscripts wholly without distinction in the list may prove on examination to be of exceptional worth, like No. 892 of the four Gospels, the collation of which by Professor Harris (to appear in the next issue of the "*Journal of Biblical Literature*") shows its text to be remarkably akin to that of the oldest authorities. In short, the work of discovering and registering having now been performed with reasonable completeness, it remains to ascertain by thorough examination the real worth of our treasures.

Professor Gregory retains on his title-page the name of the late Dr. Abbot, although the latter's participation in this part of the work can hardly have gone beyond sundry memoranda and suggestions. The retention is nevertheless alike just and commendable. For Dr. Abbot was mainly instrumental in securing the fund which has enabled Dr. Gregory to examine for himself almost every manuscript in Great Britain, and the majority of the accessible treasures of the sort in Germany, France, Italy, Greece, and European Turkey. The result not only does credit to the enterprise, persistency, and scholarship of the author, but is a monument to the wise liberality of far-sighted friends of Biblical research of which every American may be proud, and one which will insure, it is to be hoped, like liberality towards similar undertakings in time to come.

The Third (and final) Part of his work Professor Gregory is sanguine enough to encourage us to expect within the year.

J. H. Thayer.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

H ΔΙΑΘΚΑΙΝΗ ΗΚΗ. NOVUM TESTAMENTUM, CUM PARALLELIS S. SCRIPTURAE LOCIS, VETERE CAPITULORUM NOTATIONE, CANONIBUS EUSEBII. ACCEDUNT TRES APPENDICES. Oxonii, e typographeo Clarendoniano. M DCCC LXXXIX.

It is gratifying to the Biblical student that amid the elegant reproductions in these days, at a moderate price, of the various masterpieces of literature, ancient and modern, the Christian Scriptures are not overlooked. Besides the more expensive editions of the Greek Testament suited to the scholar's study, we have received within a few years the neat "school edition," so called, of Westcott and Hort (1885), Dr. Scrivener's renovated edition (1887), the *editio stereotypa minor*, or pocket edition, of Tischendorf's text by Gebhardt (1887), and others; to which the Clarendon Press has now added a reproduction, under the title given above, of the exquisitely printed edition prepared by Bishop Lloyd sixty years ago.

In typography and size the volume closely resembles its prototype; but the page is slightly wider, and delicately ruled; this permits the marginal references to be a little more openly printed, while the whole num-

ber of pages in the body of the book is fewer than before by forty-three. In its present form, bound in limp morocco with gilt edges, the volume may well become — to borrow the figure of a quaint divine — the pocket-pistol of every captain in the church militant. Certainly, its accurate spacing, even press-work, thin yet firm and opaque paper, make it a joy to the eyes of every lover of good books, and may well abridge the sleep of American paper-makers and printers.

The text of the Lloyd's Testament of 1828 was that of Mill, though not quite identical with it, — as Reuss has pointed out, and as is recognized in the new edition by the change of the "*idem profecto*" of the former Preface into *idem fere*. The text of this reprint, as we are told in the Prefatory Note, has been conformed to Stephens's edition of 1550. This statement, however, holds true only in the general; for not only has the liberty been taken of substituting the smooth breathing for the rough over *αυτός*, even in cases where the edition of 1828 followed Stephens in retaining it (for example, Rev. vii. 14 *bis*), but parentheses and other changes in the punctuation have been occasionally introduced, as well where they may be regarded perhaps merely as an aid to the reader (for example, John vii. 22; Rom. vii. 1, — why, then, not retain that of 1828 chap. ii.?), as even where they materially affect the interpretation (for example, 1 Thess. i. 4; Gal. ii. 20).

The reproduction at this day of an antiquated recension is defended on the ground of the remnant of disagreement respecting the primitive text which still lingers even among experts. But the book brings with it its own ample apology in the shape of three admirable Appendices, of 199 pages in all, edited by Professor Sanday. The First Appendix contains a collation of the text of Westcott and Hort with that of Stephens; the Second gives in their order the more noteworthy variants affecting the sense, together with a summary of the authorities on both sides in each case; the Third, a selection of readings from the less accessible Oriental versions. The collation in the First Appendix gives evidence of having been made with care (even to the recording of a misprint — *ἐντός* for *ἐντός*, Matt. xxiii. 26 — to be found in the earlier issues only of the marvelously accurate editions of Westcott and Hort); yet in some particulars it may perplex, not to say mislead, a student. He will wonder, for instance, why in the first list given on p. 2, such words as *κακοηθία*, *κακοπαθία* (yet see on Jas. v. 10), *μαγία*, *πραγματία*, are not included; why in the fourth list *εἰδέα* (yet see on Matt. xxviii. 3), *ἐπαρχεία* (yet see on Acts xxiii. 34), *ἐπιπόθεια*, *πανοικεί*, *ραββεί* (cf. Matt. xxiii. 8), *τραπεζίτης*, find no mention; why — to select one more illustration at random — it is stated on p. 3 that Westcott and Hort uniformly write *Ἰωάννης*, when exceptions are found in Acts iv. 6; xiii. 5; Rev. xxii. 8, and are noted by the collator himself at the first-named passage and the last. The fact, further, that significant diversity of punctuation is recorded, for instance, at Acts xviii. 6; Rom. ii. 27; xi. 12; Heb. i. 8, might lead the user to expect a record of Westcott and Hort's omission of the comma after *ἀληθινόν*, John i. 9, and before *ὅτι*, Rom. viii. 20, their variant pointing in Mark i. 1-4; Rom. xi. 24, etc. But evidently such niceties must be held to lie beyond the scope of the collation.

The Second Appendix, from the master-hand of Professor Sanday himself, is evidently prepared with the amplest resources and extreme care. The patristic testimonies have been re-verified in the best editions, and even the recently discovered work of Priscillian is recognized (at

1 John v. 7, 8), and Wehrich's edition (1887) of the "Speculum;" the readings from the Vulgate have passed under the eye of Bishop Wordsworth (the first fascicle of whose critical edition has recently gladdened New Testament students); those from the Peshitto have been revised by Mr. G. H. Gwilliam (who is now engaged in editing the Gospels in that version with the aid of more than a score of MSS.); and finally, a very welcome digest of readings from the Memphitic, Armenian, and Æthiopic versions is contributed by Messrs. A. C. Headlam and D. S. Margoliouth.

These Appendices have their own independent paging, which encourages the hope that they may soon be published apart from the present Greek text. In a separate volume they will furnish a very convenient critical *vade-mecum*.

J. H. Thayer.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

HAND-COMMENTAR ZUM NEUEN TESTAMENT. Bearbeitet von PROFESSOR DR. H. J. HOLTZMANN in Strassburg, Geh. Kirchenrath Professor Dr. R. A. Lipsius in Jena, Lic. P. W. Schmiedel in Jena, Prediger Lic. H. v. Soden in Berlin. Erster Band, Die Synoptiker. — Die Apostelgeschichte. Bearbeitet von Holtzmann. Erste bis dritte Abtheilung: Synoptiker.

The authors of this succinct commentary on the New Testament represent the school of German criticism whose opinions diverge most widely from evangelical standards. Professor Holtzmann of Strassburg, the most distinguished of them, fitly begins the series by a volume treating of the first three Gospels and the Acts. This is published as German books often are, in parts. That before us (making three sections of volume i., as the title-page carefully says) treats of the Synoptic Gospels. It is eminently a critical commentary; it is intentionally preëminent among commentaries in the relative amount of attention it gives to critical problems. This is because the author thinks that the questions which start up in reading the first three Gospels are chiefly critical ones. The exegesis, he says, is, for the most part, easy; but an intelligent reading of these books requires more than knowing what the separate sentences mean. They are parallel accounts of the same facts, and evidently have a close mutual literary relationship. Really to know them we must know which of them is original and why the other or others diverge from it. This implies examining each Gospel as a whole and finding out the relation in which it stands to the others. It also implies a comparison of the parallel narratives in detail, and an inquiry into the *motif* of each divergence; *e. g.*, Holtzmann would say that a commentator was stupid who should remark on the separate accounts of Christ's baptism, respectively given by Mark, Matthew, and Luke, but should not ask how and why these separate accounts differ from each other. For he would say, one cannot hope to know what relation the narratives bear to the facts until this question has been asked and answered. The critical aim accordingly determined the structure of the commentary. The Gospels are not examined separately, as if they were independent narratives; but the life of Christ, of which each professes to give an account, is taken up section by section, the narrative covering each section being examined in the divergent forms furnished by each Gospel. The order followed is that of Mark, whose arrangement Matthew and Luke both adopt; though each enlarges the common framework by insertions

from the Logia made after his own judgment. In placing this inserted material common to the first and third Gospels, Matthew's arrangement is followed; for example, as Matthew inserts the Sermon on the Mount between Mark iii. 19 and 20, the pericopes which compose it are set there in the scheme, and Luke's corresponding material brought thither for the comparison. A commentary so arranged can evidently give its readers unequalled and invaluable help in gaining that conception of the life of Christ as a whole which the Evangelists had. It has on the other hand the disadvantage of depriving them of the individual view of our Lord's person and work taken by each Evangelist.

The introduction to the commentary is largely a reproduction of what is said about the Gospels in the second edition of Holtzmann's "New Testament Introduction." The main critical positions taken there are that Mark is the oldest of the Synoptic Gospels and preserves the tradition which Papias says Peter gave to John Mark; that our second Gospel was chiefly made by weaving excerpts from Matthew's Logia into Mark; that Luke used, in making his Gospel, Mark, the Logia, and the Canonical Matthew. Holtzmann seems still to be undecided whether our second Gospel is the original Mark, or a recension of it. He is convinced that the Synoptic Gospels "have their common root in Mark's (our Canonical Mark) text," and goes through this Gospel to show that its arrangement of the common material must be original as regards that of the others. And he describes our second Gospel as if it were Papias' Mark.

But in another place he uses language implying that the *Ur-Marcus* theory is not unlikely to maintain itself. In the second section of his Introduction, under the heading "The Tradition concerning the Life of Jesus," Holtzmann has some interesting thoughts about the influences to which the Gospel tradition was in his opinion subjected before it was written down, and about the reasons which led the disciples to put it into literature, — reasons whose influence he believes he sees in their written treatment of it. These cannot be stated, much less discussed here. Thus much may be said, that while he emphatically asserts that "the kernel of the Synoptic Gospels contains nothing but the genuine, and in its main features plainly recognizable portrait of Jesus of Nazareth," he holds that their authors were influenced in their representation of the events and acts of Christ's life by an idealizing motive. They felt the necessity of taking away "the offense of the cross" by proving from Jesus' career that he was the predicted Messiah.

"Our Synoptic Gospels are therefore a deposit not only of the earliest historical recollection, but also of the earliest dogmatic work in fashioning the picture of Christ. The problem of historical inquiry lies just in this blending of fidelity to tradition with religious reflection."

Of course this goes for nothing unless specific assertions of the Evangelists about Christ are shown to be probably not true. The details of criticism cannot be entered into here. Let it merely be said that Holtzmann seems to betray a skeptical disposition, an eagerness to find evidence that statements made in the Gospels are unhistorical, and a disposition to minimize the evidence for their trustworthiness. A general statement made by him concerning one of the Gospels may be cited as an illustration of this tendency. In discussing the composition of Mark, after admitting that our second Gospel contains the recollections of Peter, said by Papias to have been delivered to John Mark and written down by him, he goes on to say: "Between Jesus' public life and Mark's

writing there intervened at least about a generation." Why does he say this? The Gospel need not in his opinion have been written long after the destruction of Jerusalem, and Peter probably lived until within a few years of that event. Why should we not believe that Peter talked with Mark in his last years about Jesus' life? Papias seems to believe that Mark's writing was closely connected with Peter's recital to him of the tradition. "Mark, being Peter's interpreter, wrote down accurately as many of Christ's words or deeds as he made mention of, not indeed in order." Why then may not one believe, even if he thinks that Mark was written after 70, that not many years elapsed between its composition and Peter's conferences with Mark about the life of Jesus? At any rate, Holtzmann might have found in his doubt whether our Mark be the original one, a possibility that fewer years than make up a generation intervened between Peter's telling and Mark's writing.

While we take exception to what seems to us Holtzmann's prejudice against the evangelical view of the historicity of the Gospels, we must admit the thoroughness of his criticism and its solid power. Christian teachers who think that the battle for evangelical views of the sources of the life of Christ has been fought out have only to read this book to find that they are laboring under a delusion. Orthodox New Testament scholarship has enough to tax its present resources in meeting these arguments.

Of the exegetical work of the commentary we have only space to say that it is lucid and compact in a rare degree. The author does not undertake, like Meyer, to give a history of interpretation. Nor does he much discuss views which conflict with his. By thus curtailing, and by omitting the text, he has been able to compress his critical and exegetical examination of the three Gospels into about three hundred pages, without sacrificing thoroughness or lucidity to brevity.

Edward Y. Hincks.

THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT. Herausgegeben von R. A. LIPSIVS. Achter Band, enthaltend die Literatur des Jahres 1888. 8vo, pp. x, 560. Freiburg i. B. : J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

This annual survey of theological literature appears for the eighth time. The editor, Professor Lipsius, contributes, as in the preceding volumes, the review of Dogmatics. In other departments he has in the main the same able co-workers who have given the "Jahresbericht" its standing. Among the new names we notice that of Professor Krüger in Giessen, who writes on Church History from the Council of Nice to the Reformation. The value of the work increases from year to year with the experience of the writers; it is indispensable to all who would follow the progress of theological science. The present volume has a new publisher in the firm J. C. B. Mohr in Freiburg, from whom we have had so many good things in the last few years. Another change, which will be appreciated by many, is the issue of a subscription edition in four parts, which can be had separately. This will in future make earlier publication possible, and will enable those who may not want the whole work to provide themselves with the part in which they are especially interested. The last division, Practical Theology, has not been in the hands of the reviewer. The order and precision of classification are worthy of the highest praise. Few cases of repetition occur; some of these not with-

out assignable reason. If the present mention seems one-sided, the writer has largely confined himself to his own field, and to books which have passed under his own eye.

I. Exegetical Theology, by Siegfried and Holtzmann. — The year brought two little English books of the first order in the Old Testament department, S. R. Driver, "Isaiah, his Life and Times," and T. K. Cheyne, "The Book of Psalms." The first is addressed to the whole circle of the educated, without diminution of its scientific worth. The second is a new translation in the light of modern learning. The notes are full of fine observation, and interesting for the literary parallels drawn from a wide range of sources. — Students of Josephus will be grateful for the exceedingly convenient *editio minor* of Niese, of which two volumes have appeared. — A monument of English learning and enthusiasm is J. Drummond's "Philo Judæus, or the Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy," two vols. The first volume, the introduction to the whole Philonian question, is unrivaled. — On the history of Israel there is an unusual number of books to notice: Kittel, "Geschichte d. Hebräer," I. Halbb.; Stade, "Geschichte des Volkes Israel" (which is now completed); a translation of Renan's "History of the People of Israel," two vols.; and Strack, "Geschichte Israels," in Zöckler's Hbd. Bd. 1, 318–373.) Kittel is cautious in the last degree in the use of the sources, lacking, perhaps, in proper historical criticism. Renan's method is, as Kuenen has said, that of intuition. He does not trouble himself much about the sources. They are uncertain. So much the better. Thereby the artist wins freedom for his historical picture-painting. Stade's is in all respects a remarkable work. Extremely valuable is the investigation of the change in the whole religious apprehension which the fall of Jerusalem and the Exile brought about. — F. Baethgen, "Beiträge zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte," contains valuable and in large part new information as to the religion of the heathen Semites, especially from the inscriptions. — The beginning of the fourth edition of H. Schultz, "Alttest. Theologie," is noted; the completion falls in the year 1889. See Siegfried in Th. Lz. 1889, No. 14. — Cheyne's "Jeremiah" should have been included; see Budde in Th. Lz. 1889, No. 31; also, Kautsch u. Socin, "Die Genesis, mit äusserer Unterscheidung d. Quellschriften," note of which may be interesting to American readers, especially in the light of the question raised in the O. T. St., June, 1889, 312–319. — Students will be interested in the survey of the origin and progress of Oriental studies in this country by G. F. Moore, "Alttest. Studien in America," in Stade's Zeitschrift, 1888, 142, ff. — In the department of New Testament Introduction is to be noted the translation of Weiss, by A. J. K. Davidson. Meantime the second edition has appeared in Germany (1889), leaving the translation in the usual position of such works; also the admirable work of G. O. Salmon, "Introduction to the Study of the New Testament," third edition. — Th. Zahn, "Gesch. d. N. T. Canons," I. Bd. I. Hälfte, is a model of skill in evading facts which do not agree with a theory. — The fifth edition of Cremer may be noted, and the third of Wilke-Grimm. The last leaves Thayer's work of unchanged, independent worth. — The third and fourth editions of Weizsäcker's "Uebersetzung d. N. T." show both the progress within the work and the reception it has had. — The third edition of Weiss, "Leben Jesu," eliminates, not without advantage, some polemic matter. — All the books of the year which touch the matter show the interest in the discussion of the sources

of the Acts. — Sabatier, "Les origines littéraires et la composition de l'Apocalypse de St. Jean," with Schoen, "L'hypothèse d'une apoc. juive," are perhaps the most important contributions to the question of the origin of the Apocalypse, though hardly seriously affecting the measure of acceptance which Vischer's hypothesis has already won.

II. Historical Theology, by Benrath, Krüger, Lüdemann, Nippold, and others. — It was an excellent idea of Krüger's to reproduce in German Réville's work, under the title, "Die Religion zu Rom unter den Severern." Special interest attaches also to C. F. Arnold's "Die Neronische Christenverfolgung," a thorough investigation of the passage, Tacitus, Ann. xv. 44. — There were a number of contributions within the year to the discussion as to the text of the *Pastor Hermæ*; for the most part against Hilgenfeld's division. — Nöldechen, "Die Abfassungszeit d. Schriften Tertullians," has made a valuable contribution to the study of Tertullian. The weight is laid not so much on the dogmatic as on the purely historical moment in the various writings. But the results are in some cases, to say the least, astonishingly precise. — A. Harnack, "Der Pseudocyprianische Tractat de Aleatoribus," seeks to show that this is the oldest Latin Christian writing, and a work of the Roman Bishop Victor I. The work is done with all of Harnack's marvelous method; and yet in spite of one's self, the basis for so precise and positive a conclusion will seem slender. — One of the interesting things of the year was the attempt of Massebieau, "Le Traité de la vie contemplative" (RHR. 170-198, 284-319), to reestablish the Philonian authorship of that writing, against Lucius, whose conclusion has been all but universally accepted — on the principle, I presume, which is not without justification, that when things have become universally conceded, it is time to question them again. — Harnack's "Grundriss d. Dogmengeschichte" is not exactly an abridgment of his epoch-making "Lehrbuch," — the second volume of which has also appeared in a second edition within this year, — but was designed primarily to take the place of the "Dictat" in his lectures, and will prove very valuable to many beside students. — The publication of Paul Ewald's long-promised "Gregorii I. Papae registr. epistul." falls after the author's death, and Wattenbach's Preface gives no great assurance that the work will ever be completed. — That Alzog's "Grundriss d. Patristik" should, after eleven years, have been published in a fourth edition without material change proves only how great is the need of a better book. — Of Wattenbach's "Geschichtschreiber d. deutschen Vorzeit," Bd. 12, Gallus u. Otmar, Bd. 13, Willibald's Bonifatius, etc., Bd. 14, Willibrord u. Willehad, fall within the year, and carry on that admirable effort to bring the sources of the history of the early Middle Age within the reach of every student, and within the use which even scholars have learned to make of translations, for example, of the Fathers. — It is curious to note how interest centres, and not always for an apparent reason, as, for example, in a shoal of smaller writings on the *Donatio Constantini*, and again upon the history of Frederick II. — Harnack translates Hatch, "Grundlegung d. Kirchenverfassung Westeuropas im frühen Mittelalter." The third edition of Hatch's earlier work, "Organization of the Early Christian Churches," is not greatly changed from the second. The author's untimely death, December, 1889, is a great loss to learning. An interesting parallel from the point of view of canon law rather than of church history is Loening, "Die Gemeindeverfassung d. Urchristenthums;" see a sharp review by Harnack in the *Th. Lz.*

1889, No. 17. — Ranke's *Weltgeschichte*, VIII. Bd., "Kreuzzüge u. päpstliche Weltherrschaft," was pieced together from Ranke's papers by Dove and Winter. W. R. W. Stephens, "Hildebrand and his Times," is a representation in marked contrast with the poise and impartiality of Ranke's 7th vol. — Karl Mirbt, "Die Stellung Augustins in d. Publicistik d. gregorianischen Kirchenstreits," throws a new light on the immense influence of Augustine upon the Middle Age. — E. Fromm, "Zur Streitfrage d. Imitatio," ZKG. X. 54-91, makes the solution of the question of authorship seem as far away as ever. — Schönbach, "Altdeutsche Predigten," shows plainly that there was more preaching in the language of the people in the Middle Age than it has been the custom to assume. — We have still no satisfactory book on the history of the monastic orders; least of all v. Bertouch, "Kurzgefasste Gesch. d. geistlichen Genossenschaften u. der daraus hervorgegangenen Ritterorden." Prutz, "Entwicklung u. Untergang d. Tempelordens," brings a great deal of new material, especially from the archives of Paris, Marseilles, and Barcelona, to shake the conclusion of Schottmüller, which has been pretty generally accepted, as to the innocence of the order. — Kaufmann, "Die Gesch. d. deutschen Universitäten," I. Bd., has its own place beside Denifle. — In L. Keller, "Johann v. Staupitz u. d. Anfänge d. Reformation," one feels throughout the want of anything like scientific method in the investigation, and consequently uncertainty as to the results. — H. C. Lea, "History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages," three volumes, is conceded to be the greatest work in any language upon the subject, and masterly in every particular. It is an inspiration to American students of church history to see that such work can be done in this country. — Ph. Schaff, "History of the Reformation; Vol. I." The German Reformation contains no contribution of new material, the result of original investigation, and hardly a new combination of the old materials, but is a charming delineation, and shows familiarity with the most recent literature. — The mass of correspondence between Martensen and Dorner ("Briefwechsel," u. s. w. 2 Bde.) may some day become a mine of a certain sort of material for the church history of this century. Very valuable for the collection of materials is Ph. Schaff, "Church and State in the United States." Mr. Talmage would probably be surprised to hear of himself as a Baptist preacher in Boston (JB. p. 279). The information would probably confirm his opinion of German learning. — It strikes one of us to note the deep interest aroused in Germany by the translation of the Life and Sermons of Frederick W. Robertson ("Lebensbild nebst Anh. relig. Reden"). It seems a revelation on the possibilities of preaching. — Weingarten's "Zeittafeln u. Ueberblicke zur Kirchengeschichte" is, in the third edition, almost an entirely new book and nearly indispensable to the student. At the same time, what I may call the mechanical difficulties of such an undertaking are impressed upon the reader upon almost every page. A number of recent essays of Dollinger will be the more interesting in view of his recent death, December, 1889.

III. Systematic Theology, by Lipsius and Marbach. — Attention is called to the completion of the second edition of Herzog's "Real-Encyclopädie;" also, to the progress (so far six parts, to *Irving*) of that invaluable little book, Holtzmann u. Zöpfel, "Lexicon für Theologie u. Kirchenwesen." — W. Vatke's "Religionsphilosophie, oder allg. philosoph. Theologie, herausg. v. H. G. O. Preiss," is now perhaps mainly interesting because it represents in the speculative development the inter-

mediate step between Hegel and Biedermann. — On the whole, justice is done to the most important English book of the year in this department, J. Martineau, "A Study of Religion, its Sources and Contents," both as to the critique of Spencer, and notably Kant, and also as to the more successful argument against Mill and Comte. In detail, the book is full of acute physical observations, parallels, etc., but the boundary between what is strictly capable of proof and what is mere analogy is nowhere sharply drawn. — The reviewer lays his finger, with like precision, upon the fatal weakness of McCosh's, "The Religious Aspect of Evolution." — The attention of English readers is called to the completion of A. Menzies' translation of Otto Pfeiderer's "The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History." — One of the most stimulating little books of the year, to the writer, was M. Carrière, "Jesus Christus u. d. Wissenschaft d. Gegenwart." — In the department of Apologetics, notice is had of G. P. Fisher's admirable little "Manual of Christian Evidences." — The year saw the completion of the third edition of Ritschl's "Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung." Ritschl is since dead (March 20, 1889). But the conflict which he so long led with spirit is by no means dead. Almost all the writing of the year in this part of dogmatic theology, in Protestant Germany, and much in Holland, France, and even England, has been virtually polemic for or against Ritschl. The most significant work was perhaps Stählin, "Kant, Lotze u. Ritschl, eine kritische Studie," against which a pupil of Lotze, who was no adorer of Ritschl, might find some things to say. The future will decide how far Ritschl has been really epoch-making, and how long the school will hold together, now that the master has been removed. — J. Kaftan, "Die Wahrheit d. christlichen Religion," also "Das Wesen. d. christlichen Religion," 2. Aufl. The latter is not greatly altered from the first edition, of 1881. The former is the promised expansion of the ideas then put forth. The conscious purpose of the work is nothing less than a revolution in dogmatic method. With the historical part of the second volume there will probably be substantial agreement. Some of the philosophical objections which Lipsius urges against the constructive part, the writer confesses that he does not understand. He might also add that he did not understand the original work, having found it one of the heaviest which it has been his fortune to read for some time. See, however, the review by Lobstein in the Th. Lz. 1889, No. 16. — Perhaps, after the Ritschl controversy, the most eagerly debated topic is that of the Divine Providence, discussed by Beyschlag, "Zur Verständigung über d. christl. Vorsehungsglauben," and Erich Haupt, "Der chrl. Vorsehungsglaube," BG. 201-227. — It is worthy of note that the discussion of the question of inspiration was mainly English and American. G. T. Ladd, "What is the Bible," is a popular revision of his larger work, "The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture." With all the wealth of material, and despite one's assent to the general point of view, it remains true of the smaller, as of the larger work, that with the best will, it is more than difficult to get a clear impression. Upon the height of modern science, characterized by the most transparent clearness, and by the most reverent spirit in the treatment, is that charming little book of R. F. Horton, "Inspiration and the Bible."

Edward C. Moore.]

PROVIDENCE, R. I.

INDIVIDUALISM. *A System of Politics.* By WORDSWORTH DONISTHORPE, Barrister at Law, author of "*Principles of Plutology*," etc. 8vo, pp. 393. London and New York : Macmillan and Co., 1889.

The range of subjects covered by this treatise is very wide, though there appears to be little needless discussion. Individualism is not only a system of politics, it is a system of economics. It almost necessarily involves the consideration of property, capital, and labor, as well as the functions of the state.

One serious fault in the method of the author lies in singling out particular advocates of opposing theories, and carrying on the contention with them. The author states that he does this by design, according to his usual habit, and adds : "I have deliberately adopted a tone rather polemic than apologetic, in the belief that dull and mealy-mouthed disputation is less calculated to rivet the attention and impress the memory than a more vigorous and uncompromising style of criticism." The polemic style has its advantages. Any book is readable which deals in sharp and witty antagonisms. But the general discussion is quite sure to become localized by this method. Undue attention is given to points which are incidental and transient. And in the present case the author evidently has wit enough to carry on the discussion on his own account. Some of his sayings are very forcible and sententious.

"Minorities mean action ; majorities, as a rule, do not."

"Most people prefer to prove the inadequacy of objections before stigmatizing them ; but socialists will be socialists."

"'How,' asks Mr. Gladstone, 'is the time of the House of Commons to be economized ?' The answer is simple : Let the House of Commons mind its own business — thoroughly and exclusively."

The chief interest of the book centres in the chapters upon *The Functions of the State*, and *The Capitalization of Labor*. The gist of the author's contention is to be found here. Mr. Donisthorpe's opinion of the functions of the state may be inferred from his answer to the question of Mr. Gladstone about economizing the time of the House of Commons. After enumerating a few of the functions of the state about which all are agreed, he affirms that "the spirit of the individualist movement is one of resistance to any overstepping by the legislature of its normal boundaries." And the latitude with which he would apply the principle is to be seen in his sarcasms upon state interference in the field of morals, and even in the field of sanitation and the public safety. Corporations, he argues, can be trusted to make proper regulations for the safety of miners, and the seaworthiness of ships is best left to ship-owners. "If absolute, unquestionable seaworthiness of ships is insisted upon the lower-class seaman is ruined." Seamen of this class do not take the risks of life from ignorance, but from necessity. They enlist on rotten ships because they can do no better. If the state interferes too rigidly for the sailors' safety, it does so through a "false economy." "Where the line should be drawn is a nice question, and must be settled between the shipowner and the sailor."

Of course the author is still more sarcastic in dealing with the assumption by the state of what might better be left to private enterprise, — examining poetry and choosing the best poet as laureate, studying astronomy on its own account and appointing an astronomer royal, and vying with private enterprise in its endeavor to get at the North Pole ;

yet even these things he would allow, because more national in their object than much that is done in the way of benefiting classes through public gardens, baths, and the like.

If the tendency of English politics, even of the Tory party, is so displeasing to our author, one wonders what he would say or think if it had fallen to his lot to be a citizen of Germany. Parliamentary legislation may seem meddlesome, officious, superfluous, but what of military paternalism. What, rather, of the popular necessity which underlies each? Why is the English Parliament concerning itself more and more with economic questions? Why is the German Emperor pushing beyond his leader in the direction of state socialism? Naturally, the ruling classes in England and Germany are individualists. Lord Salisbury, for example, whom our author takes to task for his position on the subject of artisans' dwellings, is no socialist by nature, or sympathy, or political training. Why should he allow himself to take one step toward socialistic legislation? In other words, with individualism, as a system of politics, in possession of the field, why does it dally with socialism in any form? Why does it not preclude all demands for socialistic measures? Why does it not deny all concessions? Mr. Donisthorpe's answer to this question is straightforward and thoroughgoing — because individualism is not carried far enough.

"Whatever conclusions we arrive at as to the morality of the existing system of labor payment, with respect to employees or employed, there can be little room for doubt that a nation which tolerates a distribution of wealth so glaringly disproportionate to intelligent individual effort as the present system entails, is guilty of a national sin. On this one point, at least, socialists and individualists can agree. Something must be done, and done quickly, to rectify the anomaly, and the question of the day is, What? Socialism says, Smash up the existing social fabric and start a new one. Individualism says, No; first try the effect of liberty — *more liberty*."

This paragraph occurs at the close of the chapter on The Capitalization of Labor, in which the author propounds his theory of relief. In the preceding chapter on The Labor Question he had exposed some of the fallacies of socialism, and had shown the inadequacy of existing methods of reliefs, like profit-sharing and coöperation. The capitalization of labor, which he now advocates, and which is to supersede wagedom as wagedom superseded serfdom, "proceeds on the assumption that laborers are themselves a form of capital, because their value depends on the demand for them as an element in production. It follows that if we knew the market value of the laborers, and also the market value of the capital contributed by the capitalist, we should know in what proportion the net profits on the combination ought justly to be divided. At present I have grounds for believing that the employer pockets *more than half* the workmen's just share. . . . That he (the workman) has a right to the whole profits of his labor is the contention of the capitalizationist." Farther on the author says in definition of the scheme, "Now it is clear that if instead of accepting wages — letting themselves out for hire by the week or the hour — the workers entered into the venture as capitalists and free men, receiving instead of a fixed wage a certain prearranged percentage of the gross produce (a percentage at first based on a calculation of the amount paid in wages over a number of years), the receipts of the hands would vary like the profits of other capitalists with the success of the venture and the state of trade." This is all the explanation which is

given of the working of the system, the rest of the chapter being taken up with an exhibit of the moral advantages which would result from its adoption. No one questions the disciplinary advantages of such a scheme, but in the absence of details it eludes criticism as to its practicability. All that can be said is that it makes a tremendous assumption in regard to the capacity of the average workman. The scheme might work admirably with the workman of the higher average, but then he is well enough off as he is. The unsolved problem is how to reach the workman of the lower average, the unorganized workman, who has as little sense of capital in himself as he has possession of capital in money. Here is where the strain falls upon individualism as a system. It has elevated the able, the capable, to a high level. Does it follow that it can do a corresponding work as it goes down? Can it individualize the mass at the bottom of society? Thus far it has proved unequal to the task. Is it altogether because society has not had enough of it, or is there something in the other and opposite method which socialism is trying to express, and is perhaps at present best expressing through its own crudities and failures?

The book before us is suggestive and stimulating. It is broad in its outlook and fearless in its statements. It is not a book of ample resources or of careful information, or of the most satisfying method. The author argues like an advocate. And one finds himself so often unsatisfied with the conclusion that he comes to distrust the method of the argument. But the book has a special value in calling attention to the changes which are going on in the facts and ideas which determine political parties. The old terms may remain, but they do not express the present contention. Politically, we are becoming individualists or socialists. As our author says: "The question of to-day is, What ought the government to *do*? Whatever the form of the government may be, the question still remains to be answered, What are its duties? Are we to adopt socialism, or are we to adopt individualism? Statesmen must class themselves in accordance with their answer to this question." Mr. Donisthorpe has spoken a bold, at times a rash word for individualism. We doubt if he has spoken the sufficient word against socialism.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Grundriss des Systems der Philosophie als Bestimmungslehre. Von Ludwig Fischer (mit graphischen Darstellungen). Pp. iv, 122. Wiesbaden: Verlag von J. F. Bergmann. Mrk. 3.60. — The author is impressed with the chaotic condition of philosophy. While all are convinced that truth is one and the same for all, we find very little agreement among the numerous schools and the foremost investigators; tremendous activity and no fruit. There is no accepted principle of investigation; there is no common terminology for an interchange of thought. Mathematics and natural science have signs, figures, and formulæ, but the empire of words is inhabited by philosophers. Progress in philosophy is possible only through a general agreement in method and symbol.

The universe gives us the principle of the method. The present volume is an effort to state this fundamental principle in its different forms of development. The result is a mathematical method, with signs and formulas that place philosophy upon a strictly scientific basis. Dr. Fischer finds encouragement for his effort in Ammonius Saccas, Leibnitz, and Kant. The work is exceedingly interesting, and represents the general thought of many readers of philosophy.

Platons Phädon philosophisch erklärt und durch die späteren Beweise für die Unsterblichkeit ergänzt. Von Dr. J. Baumann, Professor in Göttingen. Pp. vi, 208. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes. — A work of extraordinary value, and without doubt the most satisfactory history of the philosophical doctrine of Immortality which has been given. This doctrine was both founded and perfected by Plato, yet it has been the subject of most earnest speculation of the best philosophical minds. Dr. Baumann has presented the history to the time of Kant. The first seventy-two pages are given to a logical arrangement of the *Phædo*, accompanied with historical and critical reflections. The author, throughout, indicates phases of thought which may strengthen or modify the doctrine; for instance, recent tendencies in zoölogy and physiological psychology. After Plato, Plotin framed his celebrated argument, which was taken up in modern times by Descartes and Mendelssohn. Then came Augustine's "*De immortalitate animæ*," which furnishes the pantheistic proof. Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas show two phases of scholastic Aristotileism. The Sixteenth Century, indeed the modern history of the doctrine, was introduced by Petrus Pomponatius, who declared: There is neither strong nor probable proof of immortality, it is simply a matter of faith. His work made such an impression that it was regarded by many as a new starting point, notably by Descartes and Locke. It was reserved for Mendelssohn to do for modern philosophy what Plato did for the old. Building upon Plato, Plotin, and Leibnitz, he established his so-called ethico-theological proof, which was reinforced by Kant after his own method. In our own day, Fechner, the psychophysicist, in his work, "*Life After Death*," 3d edition, 1887, gives a very ingenious proof, in which Platonic and Neo-Platonic elements are noticeable. Dr. Baumann finds only a formal progress in the doctrine since the time of Plato. It is found that two thoughts are of special force: body and soul are different, and the human spirit demands immortality. Professor Baumann's work is a model of clear and precise thinking as well as of method.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

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
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
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THE

ANDOVER REVIEW:

A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XIII.—MAY, 1890.—No. LXXVII.

THEISTIC AGNOSTICISM IRRATIONAL.

I TAKE an editorial note in the "Popular Science Monthly" on the religious attitude of the students of Harvard University as a point of departure.

A certain number were said to be agnostic, and a certain other number were said to be theistic in various grades. Though the number of the agnostics was small, it was claimed that they could maintain calm indifference on theism so long as the theists were so divided against themselves in their interpretations of theism. When one theist said he *knew* that God existed in three persons, and another that he *knew* that God existed in only one, it was claimed that the agnostic might well say the whole subject was beyond the range of his own *knowledge*, and that he might well be excused from paying any attention to it till theism could show better agreement.

It seems to me that a leap into entire theistic nescience is not warranted by the discordance of theistic definition. The disagreements of the various classes of theists are not as to theism *per se*, but, beyond what comes from the vastness of the subject, they arise out of the difficulty of interpreting a document or documents which are supposed to have authority in definition. If a Trinitarian says he *knows* God exists in three persons, radically you will find that he means that the defining terms given in the Bible compel him to reach that conclusion. The Unitarian says he is not compelled to put such construction on the language of that book. Joseph Haven used to say in paradox, we should have no difficulty about the modes of the divine existence if it

were not for revelation. Men divide as to the purport of the language of the Bible, but they are at one on the great fact which the Bible language covers.

On any other subject it would not be wisdom to set aside interest in the matter lying behind similar differences. The difficulty between Unitarians and Trinitarians is psychologically like the one between states-rights and nationalist theories of the government of the United States. Both alike are questions of the construction of language. Men speak intensely on both subjects. They say they *know* such language means so and so because somehow it has made such and such a case with their minds. But it would not be a scholarly attitude for one to say he would pay no attention to the Constitution of the United States, till states-rights theorists and nationalist theorists reconciled their differences; in fact, that he would free himself from entertaining the idea that there is any government at all, while such a contest is going on as to its principles and modes of existence and operation. Either contestant may be right, neither may be right, both may be partially right, and yet a government after all be actually existent, of which all its citizens and the nations of the earth are bound to take notice and to which to pay reverence.

The baselessness of such an argument for theistic agnosticism can readily be seen. Suppose Trinitarianism to set aside all its distinctive differentia, and to fall back on the theism of Channing or that of F. E. Abbott: such a combination would be entitled to something more than indifference from any thoughtful person. Yet the real strength of the theistic position is at least as great as would be apparent on such a combination. Of course counting heads is a poor way to settle the truth of any matter. But when one finds an overwhelming majority of really thoughtful minds settling substantially to one conclusion, it is something besides scholarship that leads him to toss off, with disdain, attention to the common possession, because of even wide differences of conceptions concerning the nature and character of that common possession.

Then in this article followed a statement which I carefully copy because I take it to be if not *the* creed, yet *a* creed of agnosticism. Upon this statement I will make a running comment.

"The agnostic ground is that religion, in so far as it is supernatural, transcends human intelligence, so that men can really know nothing beyond the phenomenal and the finite."

To begin with the last clause first. I do not think that Chris-

tian theism claims to *know* anything beyond the phenomenal and the finite. It does claim that certain transactions have taken place, and do take place, in the phenomenal and the finite which are of immense, of supreme importance to the thought of man. It is not what is outside of the phenomenal and the finite with which it concerns itself, but it is just exactly what has taken place and is taking place *here*, inside the phenomenal and the finite, and to indications to which these transactions point, with which it is concerned.

It draws inferences from its phenomena just as the mind of man in every other department draws inferences from the phenomena there apparent.

Scientists, from certain indications in the phenomenal and the finite, infer the existence of an ether, and that, too, practically infinite, and also infer its elasticity.

Religion and, mark well, science too, from certain indications in the phenomenal and the finite, infer the arrangement of the phenomenal and the finite by intelligence, and as they find no limit to the phenomenal and the finite, — that may be a curious sentence, but it may stand, — and no place where intelligence seems wanting, they infer the unlimitedness of this intelligence, or, what is equivalent, an Intelligent Governor of the Universe.

Religion, from a certain datum in the phenomenal and the finite, to wit, the moral nature of man, and from certain facts which have transpired in the phenomenal and the finite, to wit, human history, infers a moral control of man by a higher moral power than himself; and as this control seems everywhere present, and seems to have an intelligent end in view, it infers a Moral Governor.

If you put the inferences from the detection of *intelligence* in the management of the universe with those arising from the detection of *moral control*, you have (*pace* Matthew Arnold) an Intelligent and Moral Governor of the Universe, — or God, — a result reached entirely by contemplation of the phenomenal and the finite, and by inferences seemingly justifiable therefrom, — inferences as justifiable to most minds as the elasticity of the ether, which no man hath seen nor can see, — or the derivation of the horse from the eohip and the miohip and the pliohip, which no man *knows or can know*.

If religion claims a *revelation*, just what it claims is that this revelation has taken place in the phenomenal and the finite as the sphere of its demonstration: and so that it is subject to human

cognizance and submitted to human judgment. If *revelation* be not equivalent to *phenomenon*, it will be hard to get a conception of the term. If there is anything about religion which transcends human intelligence, it may be safely said that Christian theism has nothing to do with it. Its burden is something which it finds submitted to human intelligence.

To return to our quotation, "The agnostic ground is that religion, in so far as it is supernatural, transcends human intelligence." The truth of this statement depends upon the signification of *supernatural*. If you mean by the supernatural something which has no sort of connection with this system in which we have place, the assertion that religion in meddling with such matters is transcending human intelligence is a truism which nobody wants to dispute. But if you mean by the supernatural something pertaining to the Intelligence which seems to be over and in and through the operations of this system, then it may be asserted that religion, in canvassing such matters, is not meddling with that which transcends human intelligence, but is concerned with that with which it has capacity to deal.

In this sense of the term "supernatural," and I am certain this is the prevalent sense in Christian theism, science and religion are both concerned with the supernatural, their fields often interlocking, but religion having under purview the rather matters of moral concern. At any rate, both alike are concerned with what has transpired, does transpire, and will transpire, or is likely to transpire in the phenomenal and the finite in its department.

Science can relieve itself from being concerned with the supernatural only by limiting its inquiries to the questions What? and How? If it refuse to ask for *meanings*, then it passes over to religion or to philosophy, a department it might retain for itself. In any case the department will be worked.

"The position of the agnostic, in short, in regard to other worlds or spheres of existence beyond time and space and the course of nature is briefly this, I know nothing and you know nothing, we neither of us can know anything, and we had better modestly confine our thoughts to the universe which we can know."

Concerning the above the question may be asked, How much theism has to do or has had to do with "other worlds or spheres of existence beyond time and space and the course of nature"? Try the matter historically. Take the religious system of Israel, which lies behind Christianity. There is not much question but

that this religion is a system which had, and still has, a hold on the human mind. Now how much of that religion is to "other worlds or spheres of existence beyond time and space and the course of nature"? So close does that religion cling to *this* world that we know that it is a grave question whether the idea of the soul's immortality is in the writings, so called, of Moses at all. At any rate, from Genesis to Malachi "other worlds or spheres of existence beyond time and space and the course of nature" have no appreciable effect in determining the character of the religion. That is mainly a regulation of the moral conduct of men *in* "the course of nature." We have in the Old Testament a religion whose philosophy is geocentric and whose morality is mundane. When we come to the New Testament even to that much misinterpreted book of the Revelation, we find very little more that can be construed as relating to other worlds than we do in the Old Testament. We certainly find nothing that is nailed down as declaration in reference to "other worlds or spheres of existence *beyond time and space and the course of nature.*"

The Sermon on the Mount is as hard and fast to *the here and the now* as Euclid's geometrical demonstrations or Newton's laws of motion. The Sermon on the Mount is a pretty comprehensive charter in religion. The Signal Service gives prophecies of weather to which experience has not yet come up. It is true that Jesus seems to subsume the continuity of conscious existence in that process *in* nature which we call death. It will hardly do for agnosticism to say that it *knows* that that process is a termination of existence, and a termination, too, in nature. Mr. Ingersoll in his last utterance in point is very careful not to take ground. Perhaps a wide induction from the practice, and application in the being, of the principles of the Sermon on the Mount may operate as a moral signal service, and give to us the portion of existence. I do not offer this as proof of such continuity of existence, but as showing that religion, if it is concerned at all in such matter, lays a hard and fast foundation, for its projection being beyond death, *in a moral induction laid in this system of life in which we now exist, — as hard and as fast as that to which the Signal Service is bound in its prognostication of the weather of the morrow.*

Religion refuses to be dumped out in "an unknown, impalpable, and inane." Its business is *here*, primarily pertains to *the here*, and its matter of fact, the history of the line of thought which lies be-

the present Christian theism shows that it has paid close attention to its business. I do not know that religion has *any stock any way* "in other worlds or spheres of existence beyond time and space and the course of nature." Who knows when the course of nature ends? Who knows what time and space include? The old and crude conceptions of heaven and hell certainly located them in time and space. If later views make less account of locality in space and more of moral conditions, yet those conditions are conceived of as *in* time; and it is hard to imagine how the exercises of a finite mind could occur otherwise than in time. A background of time is required for succession in thought.

As to space, *we* are *here* now and religion claims to deal with us here. On the *where* we are next to be deployed religion has no deliverance. For aught we know, or it has to say, it may be on the granite of the dark companion of Sirius. As to the course of nature, if there is any one thing that religion insists upon, it is that the continuity of existence can be but a continuity of the course of nature, moral nature; hence its anxiety about the course of nature here. So "other worlds or spheres of existence beyond time and space and the course of nature" may pass. They are a windmill against which any one may take a tilt at his pleasure, to the entire indifference of religion.

The agnostic creed goes on, respecting such other worlds or spheres of existence: "I know nothing and you know nothing, we neither of us *can* know anything, and we had better modestly confine our thoughts to the universe which we can know." That is a good article of faith as well for religion as for science. Religion can say that it expects to confine its thoughts to the universe which it can know, and with some degree of modesty, both now and forever. But when it is said that we "neither of us *can* know anything about such supposed worlds or spheres of existence," it may be said that that statement is so good positivism as to be bad agnosticism. Nobody knows what there *is* to be known yet, — nobody knows yet what man *can* know.

"Now as there are only twenty-six (26) that take this ground, it is only fair to suppose that the other nine hundred and forty (940) take other and opposite ground, — that is, they claim to *know* in regard to religious matters of which they profess belief, claim, indeed, that their religious knowledge is the most clear and certain of all their knowledge."

In the main I think that a fair statement. I would not, indeed, claim that all which passes under popular speech as religious

knowledge is knowledge to the last degree and would assert that the content of a religious notion is wit, certainties founded in this system of things deduced from them, just as the content of a science of its certainties and probabilities.

I do not care to be pugnacious on a punctilio. If certainties of religious knowledge are more certain than other knowledges or not, they are certain to be so. The business of balancing the certainties and probabilities in this department of our knowledge over against those in the other department is incongruity any way. What I object to in this is the attempt to put religion out of the universe and to stay. It is here with its certainties in knowledge and its probabilities of greater or less degree, as science is footed on, this system of things as science; in the *of the moral relations and experiences of man and outlook.*

To take the lowest ground with an agnostic, is to subsist in belief and hope alone. That would be agnostic in ignoring religion. Not all beliefs are vain. Not all hopes are vain. If man denuded himself of all action which come from beliefs and hopes, his life would be being. Nine tenths, if not nine hundred and ninety tenths, of our activity springs from belief and hope. Rebellion, partially justifiable, against making religion the distribution of awards in religion. If religion is anything certain, the prizes in practical life are determined. If we are not saved in religion by hope, as Protestants are so saved in the struggle for existence, then the quest of the certainties of science. Principles of religion where might not possibly be worthy of contention. Much by way of comment on our agnostic creed.

The agnostic in religion becomes the positivist in religion as to positivism in general, considered as a system. It seems to me to break down everywhere. It cannot establish itself according to the utmost demands of mathematics or logic or the retort, what then? It leaves a margin in our life to which such certainties are added. That the order of development is, first, the metaphysical, and finally the positive. I

issue with this classification. There are aspects of truth, profound truth, in it. But this is to be said, that it is not apparent how the theological stage could have come first unless there were some very apparent phenomena — please bear in mind *phenomena* — to set it first before the mind of man.

I think it is true that in the race and the individual the attempt to find the last verities, those which will stand every scrutiny, does come last. But if one says he will admit nothing to his mind at *first* except what comes last, except what can be verified, to the last degree of certainty, by some of the sciences, or any or all of the sciences, he would seem to be in the Hibernian or the sophomore, and not in the philosophical stage of existence at all.

Every now and then you will hear some thriving teacher or departmental professor lamenting the partialness of our knowledge, and exhorting to more thoroughness and certainty. He is right from his point of discipline for the mind of the youth. It is better for that purpose that the mind be held fast to almost any statements of knowledge, or supposed knowledge, that may be made. But really when we come into the domain of philosophy and say we want the last certainty in anything, where are we? When I was a boy I learned about oxygen in the chemistry. I was very much pleased with the exactness of my knowledge as compared with the dull days when phlogiston was in the ascendancy. But now comes Mr. Lockyer with experiments and deductions which somewhat lower my pride in the exactness of my knowledge concerning oxygen. Mr. Lockyer makes it look very much as though all the hard and fast elements were only phases of one and the same element (that term is only a passing accommodation), which appear at various stages of condensation or sublimation. I do not know but that I have as comfortable a hope of the existence of God as I have of the existence of an element called oxygen.

If the positive stage does come last in history and life, it widens the realm of uncertainty far more than that of certainty. I am not so certain about oxygen as I used to be; feel less pity for those who were certain about phlogiston than I used to feel. I have thought much on the atomic theory. But under excellent scientific guidance I go out to where matter resolves itself into centres of force, and then I come back glad enough to be a brother to "the clods of the valley," and not quite so certain about my material atoms as when I set out.

It is not to be said that knowledge is valueless under processes of ultimate analysis; there is scarcely a principle of science, which, pushed to the limit, does not bring us into difficulties, contradictory and conflicting features of affairs so impresses J. S. Mill, the agnostics and agnostics as he is, that somewhere two and two make five. In the case of the ultimate uncertainty, the puttings have the merit often of being what they would otherwise be unnoticed. It was a religious philosopher who said a truth which will bear examination must acknowledge: "We have no limited realm where man's knowledge is to be put; parts yet to come in, — where, in fact, there is no such realm. This same philosopher, if he had certainty he would take his stand on the ground closed by religion rather than in the open air where there be knowledge it shall be a failure."

The truth is simply this, that knowledge consists not in certainties, but in degrees. To insist on positive knowledge (and there are uncertainties about that), or to insist on logic, would reduce life to pitiful poverty, denude it of the main truths and truths of life. Daniel Webster saying: "Our knowledge, our life, are all measured by that high standard short of mathematical certainty, upon which every daily transaction is based, beyond our power of demonstration, but which have validity. We should be careful not to discard them. Our grasp on truth is not complete by reason of our limited knowledge in the whole (if any such knowledge is likely to be quite unimportant). Knowledge alone would give us knowledge would be infinite knowledge beyond our capacities. We have, therefore, partial knowledge, knowledge not complete, doubt."

We live on knowledge not arranged on the circle of certainty, closed on itself, but set on a parabolic or hyperbolic curve of probability, with lines of uncertainty stretching away to infinity, never to meet. The man who waits to close his circle might as well not be. He must act on the indications of his curve with all their involved uncertainties. Any such hard and fast scheme as that to which positivism proposes to confine religion would be a breakdown in practical life wherever it might be tried. Men are always acting ahead of knowledge which they can definitely formulate. They would make a poor demonstration in life if they did not live in and by the adumbrations of "the about to be."

The successes in life are won by taking courses of action which men cannot justify to themselves by the known laws of any science, least of all which they can justify to others. Doubtless there are certain high probabilities or certainties in the system of things to which they trust lying behind their action. But if they waited to define and formulate these, failure would be the result. The men who originally bought property at Denver on the banks of the Platte had as warrant for their action something less than the certainty which positivism demands of religion. Yet the speculative eye of those early pioneers was not deceived in the probabilities. You can now bring forward proof that you may call positive that they must succeed, but you could not do it when their action was taken.

With the weather Signal Service we now say we have reduced hay-making to a strict science. Yet there was a great deal of good hay made in the world before the Signal Service was established, and much will still be made not only without the aid of the Signal Service, but sometimes in spite of it. Yet a successful hay-maker a generation ago would have had a worse job on hand than haying to formulate definitely to his own consciousness the reasons why he concluded he was to have a fair day, and a worse job still to demonstrate the certainty of his conclusions to his neighbor. Even the Signal Service has never claimed certainty in its conclusions. Its first practical operator was called "Old Probabilities," and it modestly puts forth its bulletins now under the title of "Indications." The Signal Service has a wider range over the probabilities, and so can make a closer curve than the old farmer could, but it cannot close the curve into the circle of certainty. The heaviest storms sometimes come contrary to the advice and consent of the weather bulletins.

Take handwriting. The lover trusts his letter, and the busi-

ness of the world is done on the any one particular piece, no man challenge it, and you can get at its spuriousness or genuineness. than handwriting. Yet over all uncertainty. It is quite possible formulating, according to the laws and probabilities to its own construction is clumsy in such an exercise. But let such mind take such a friend and formulate to itself to of its genuineness, and then *let another mind the force of its own* that it had as hard a task as existence of God, or the continuous agnostic comforts his mind and probabilities of handwriting.

Now it is not only true that it live and move and have our being no warrant of certainty, but the tions of science. The successful business man, is not he who hugs who puts boldly to sea in the relative tainty punt its scow after him. this system, his power of comparison runs the deductions of logic or the

The pioneer speculator, with its ties, is as necessary to science as by putting its foot out in the air science makes any advance at all of course. But it is a great rule business of science is with this if it lives to any purpose, ahead even this work to do if it did from Helmholtz's lecture on Force highest degree to see what a large methodical deduction of which mathematical analysis, he has found the security of instinct, without formula."

It was by that kind of psychology his success and his fame in mag

Clerk Maxwell went over his ground and found that there were mathematical demonstrations of his conclusions. Before Clerk Maxwell's work was done, however, Faraday had an immortal position in science. But the same rules which agnosticism prescribes for religion would have ruled Faraday out of science altogether. He absolutely had nothing better than a *strong belief* behind the most significant results of his life-work. He had indications and he made inferences, and that is the best you can say for his science. It will be some time before science will dismiss Faraday, his processes or results.

Now the farmer makes hay, the lover trusts his letter, and the merchant his check, and Faraday posits principles in electricity on an insight into probabilities; and I think the Christian theist is entitled to the use of *processes* which are the main constituent of practical and scientific method and thought. The Christian theist has his indications, and is entitled to draw his inferences. God and immortality may be great hopes, and yet hopes that rest in wide and profound intellectual and moral inductions. Heaven and hell may be as probable future moral conditions as the total dissipation of the sun's energy is a probable future physical condition.

But I do not want to spend all my force in criticism of agnosticism. If I argue the irrationality of agnosticism, it is because I hold to the rationality of theism. On theism I wish to put some substantive thought. I have a conviction of the existence of God satisfactory to myself. That conviction rests primarily on the experiences of my moral nature.

I find with Kant the "Categorical Imperative" within; or rather with Coleridge I recognize the fact that the Categorical Imperative finds me. The sense of moral obligation is a perpetual presence. I did not make this sense. I cannot get rid of it. It often leads me whither I would not. And yet one thing I always know full well, the pressure and the tension of this sense is always toward the right. Matthew Arnold finds this fact "verifiable," if any knowledge whatever is. I find the "power, not myself, making for righteousness;" or rather, again, I recognize the fact that that power finds me.

These conclusions from philosophy find their equivalent, their explanation and development, to me in the realm of religion in such statements as: "He, the Spirit of truth, shall convict of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment," and shall "guide into all truth," or in "Behold, I stand at the door, and knock: if any man

hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me."

But this, the familiar ground of ethics and religion, I pass without further elaboration. No uncertainties of agnosticism can outweigh the certainties that come to me in experience on this ground; and I cannot understand the psychology of the human spirit that in sanity is agnostic here. But I shall pass the "burden" of ethics and religion. That "burden" is the constant theme in the instruction of religious teachers.

I propose the rather to go upon the ground traversed by science itself. One way in which I have reached my theistic conviction is through the perception that theism is implicitly involved in all the intellectual processes of science itself. We speak of the inductive philosophy. Strictly speaking there can be no such philosophy. You may make a collection of facts, but you get no philosophy from them till you begin a deductive process. Now this deductive process rests on this foundation,—*the assumption of an intellectual system in which the facts are presumed to have orderly place.* The scientists say their processes are of question, answer, and verification. Says Professor Huxley: "Men of science are eternal children always asking questions of mother nature." Question of what? Of that which has no intelligence with which to respond? Chase up a little closer this method of question which the scientists say they employ. Behind it is the projection into the unknown of so much of human intelligence, so much hypothesis, so much preconception. Then the question is: Is this plan which I have put out into the unknown really there? There follow tests, attempts at verification, the sole intent of which is to determine whether the intelligence put in nature by the hypothesis or preconception is really there or not. There is not a fructifying process of science which is not just this: an attempt to superimpose the intelligence of man on a subsumed intelligence in nature, to see whether or not they coincide and form one and the same straight line. It is idiocy for intelligence to question what has no intelligence from which to reply. The scientific method is simply this: This is *my* intelligence, will you own it, O Intelligence Supreme?

"Hypothesis," says Asa Gray, "is the precursor of every fruitful investigation in physical nature." You make a deposit of so much hypothesis, that is, of intellectual system, in the unknown, then you check out in sums to suit your exigency, and if you can pay nature's bills with your checks, you say you have established

a principle of science. Now why deny the banker who is nothing less than Intelligence in the system upon which requisition is made? Every operation of science starts from the basis of this assumption of intelligence in the system which it questions. That is the very fulcrum under its lever. If there be any such a thing as a science calling itself atheistic or agnostic, its very processes are an open confutation of its negation of theism, or even of its silence respecting it. "*Dum tacent cum clamant.*"

Stanley Jevons gives the following as the intellectual process of scientific investigation, or the logic of science: —

- (1.) Preliminary observation ;
- (2.) The making of hypothesis ;
- (3.) Deductive reasoning ;
- (4.) Verification.

So long as that stands as the law of the mental operations of science it is submitted that science is estopped from agnosticism. If you try to guess the riddle of the Sphinx, then you admit there is a Sphinx to have a riddle. If you assert the intellectuality of your processes, then you are not in position to deny the intellectuality of the problem the Sphinx has set.

In his review of the advance of science in the last half century Mr. Huxley writes: "The object of science is the discovery of the rational order which pervades the universe. A great condition of its advance has been the invention of verifiable hypotheses." Again, that statement of the end in view and of the method of science works estoppel of theistic agnosticism. One is not permitted in logic to deny what in the same breath he has assumed.

To take up an illustration, suggested by Lotze, are thinking minds mirrors of that which does not think? If the photograph is systematized knowledge, what is the original? If the letterpress copy which you take off from nature and call science is a system of thought, what is that nature itself from which the copy is taken? You reach the end of the argument on the statement of the case by science itself.

The argument to design in nature is grounded ultimately in the processes by which you *examine* nature. You will never be rid of that argument until you abolish all scientific processes. *Per se, they involve design — they are an admission of it.* Over us truths

" Which we are toiling all our lives to find
Brood like the day, a master o'er a slave,
A presence which is not to be put by."

Out even from the nescience of John Stuart Mill the mission of the validity of that argument. It is to mention the name of Asa Gray to show the confidence in that argument, even when evolution is the mode of operation in nature.

The argument to design will shift its bearings as it goes on, because, like all human conceptions, it will move. We may assert with less positiveness even to specific ends, we shall certainly with more hesitation to the ultimate ends in view of the Great Intelligence, *to the fact of such Intelligence itself, and to the view of such Intelligence, the processes of science seal.*

The result of the pursuit of science in any department to me, will bring a whole-minded man to the question about the position of Watson, the astronomer, and about his having a right to express an opinion. He bagged worlds as a hunter does game. The foreman of the Arbor, I am told, used to call him "The foreman of the works." He said: "It is impossible for a mathematician to be an atheist." A system of mathematics is something like intelligence embodied, it is its very spirit.

The study of nature brings you everywhere in contact with the substratum of pure mathematics. Nature is everywhere on a mathematical line. It is everywhere an ultimate fact. If matter fades out into centres of force, even mathematics shall lead you and its right hand hold you. The thing you can learn about matter is mathematical relations. In other words, the thing ultimate and true in science finds its expression in intelligence. Faraday's affairs made its case with Watson. Now take Faraday. There is no method of accounting rationally for his process except as the communion of intelligence with Intelligence. Faraday looked at in the light of positivism the most of Faraday's notions were simply guess-work. The significant thing about Faraday's guess-work was right, that he trusted it. What was the conviction that mind, trained to interpret nature, would go a long way on the supposition that it would meet a great system lying before it. Faraday seems to have walked out into matter and force, and to have walked out into mental relations alone.

Science is working out now not only organic and

ideal chemistry, confident that subtler perceptions and processes will yet fill out the ideal. Before such attitude of science it would seem that whatever might be one's doubts about matter or force, he could not well doubt through the universe the presence of mind. Matter may be sublimated before sense, and vanish from before perception, but intellectual relations still abide. "Over space the clear banner of mind is unfurled."

From an article in the "Fortnightly Review," on Comte's definition of life, I take the following sentence: "Erudition is the collection of special concrete facts in a more or less methodical way. Science is the discovery of the abstract generalities which underlie those concrete facts, and which, when fully grasped, enable us to foresee how new arrangements of facts will behave. . . . The true note of science is this ability to foresee where we cannot see, to measure where we cannot touch."

That seems to me to be true; but I cannot bring my mind to bear on a clause of that statement without seeing theism involved. What *are abstract generalities* which underlie concrete facts? And how came the facts superimposed on such generalities? How can we *foresee* how new arrangements of facts *will* behave unless they are rationally arranged and will *behave rationally*? How came this rational order to be? The answer seems as clear to me and as certain as any of the facts or principles I have conquered respecting processes in physics or chemical combination.

Here it may be said to an agnostic that it is not quite the demolition of an idea to pronounce over it the word "tradition." On the contrary, if theism is a strong tradition, that fact is a challenge to respect. Traditions do not survive unless there be *something* in them which men think should be handed along. Then it may be that acceptance of a tradition may not be out of pure thoughtlessness. Theism is a tradition. But individual acceptance of theism may be the result of a wide personal induction from various departments of observation and knowledge,—an induction whose conclusions and conclusiveness oftentimes could not be imparted short of the transfer of the totality of experience or of the communication of being itself. To ask for scientific proof of such comprehensive conclusion, or for a syllogism inclosing it, is idle. Science has no forms into which it can run, and logic does not grasp it.

Certain logical forms, certain scientific processes, may have been used in making it up, but it is greater than any processes out of which it has arisen; and to try to make it amenable to

their grasp is to say that a pa
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of induction respecting anyth

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Study of any department
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ments together, and to ask o
the whole ongoing of nature,
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tution and operation, the an
old: "The heavens declare t
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our being!" "For we are a

If the processes of science
every step of progress it mak
ligence by human intelligence

I can notice only a few m
that the universe is natural
that is the reason why we "re
springs before us the *bête noi*
But let us not be frightened
lies behind science as well as

says: "The *humanity* of nature is its clearest utterance and its surest reality."

All religion, science, and philosophy are, ex necessitate rei, anthropomorphic. The sole question that can be raised in regard to anthropomorphism in any department is not whether it is exhaustive of God, but whether it is creditable and honorable to man, and, as far as it goes, interpretative of its subject.

John Stuart Mill said, if he were to be sent to hell for maintaining that what was justice in man must be justice in God, to hell he would go. After such eminent example of anthropomorphism in reference to theistic morals, one is not easily unhorsed by a charge of anthropomorphism in reference to his theistic conceptions in science.

Every hypothesis out of which every scientific discovery has come has assumed a plan in the universe and the identity of the human hypothesis with the divine plan *pro tanto*. What a man has to look out for, and only what, in regard to his anthropomorphism in any department is to see whether or not God responds to it.

A few sentences, the utterances of Benjamin Peirce, will furnish a fit conclusion. A scientist, is he not? He is dead, but it is better to say *is*. "The whole domain of physical science is equally permeated with ideality. You cannot escape it if you would. It illumines the remotest star and the first-born of the nebulae. There is no obscurity which it does not penetrate, no resistance which it does not overcome, and no magnitude which it does not embrace. Call it by whatever name you will, the spiritual eye recognizes its omnipresence. If you ascend into heaven it is there; if you make your bed in hell, behold it is there. If you take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall its hand lead you and its right hand shall hold you. If you say, 'Surely the darkness shall cover me,' even the night shall be light about you. Yea, the Spirit of Ideality. 'The darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day;' 'and the darkness and the light are both alike to thee.' By what more satisfactory name can we approach thee, — Spirit of Ideality, — than by the awful name, Jehovah."

C. Caverno.

BOULDER, COLORADO.

EDUCATION IN GREECE.

It is pleasant to note that however much modern Greece has asserted herself against the conservative sense of European statesmen in other respects, there is one department in which she has won deserved praise from every side — the department of education, especially elementary education. Surrounded as she has been for centuries by a belt of educational darkness, — Tripoli, Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, Turkey in Europe, Southern Italy, and Sicily, — the little Hellenic kingdom has, in the few years of her independence, managed to throw off Oriental and mediæval chains, and is to-day fairly abreast with the times. Throughout the nation there is the stir of popular aspiration, an enthusiasm for knowledge, and an overmastering desire to get on which form at once the virtue and the vice of contemporary life in Greece. Her quick-witted and zealous people have caught the Western fever for education. The idea has permeated the masses, and although her immediate neighbors are still slumbering on, and although she is denied railway connection with Europe, Greece is doing as much, in proportion to her population and her wealth, to instruct her youth of both sexes in elementary studies as any country in Europe.

The Hellenic kingdom embraces a territory of about 25,000 square miles, and has a population of 2,200,000 Greeks and Albanians. Scotland has nearly the same amount of territory, and almost twice as many people. As for wealth and natural resources, Greece is proverbially the poorest country in Europe. Her rugged mountains and barren shores are fitted, for the most part, for only the scantiest vegetation. Her commerce is still undeveloped, and she is cut off from Europe by the treacherous Adriatic, and by the inhospitable strip of Turkish territory that promises to keep her for an indefinite future from opening her railway connection to the north. In Greece to-day it is the universal custom to speak of "going to Europe," just as Americans do, with the stormy Atlantic before them. Add to all this the fact that this barren little kingdom of only 2,200,000 inhabitants has a public debt of \$80,000,000, and supports as large an army as that of the United States, and we begin to realize the odds against which she has been struggling. Athens is to-day a busy hive of educational institutions; in all the cities and villages there are thrifty schools, and a compulsory law is carried out with more and more vigor as the years come and go.

A careful study of the educational problem in modern Greece will reveal the true inwardness of the discontent her hot-headed people, who are fairly consumed with patriotism, feel over the treatment she has received at the hands of the great Powers. The claim is that only a part of the oppressed nation enjoys the privilege of free government, and that a minority. By far the larger part is still under what they call the odious and barbaric government of the Turk. Greece can never go smoothly on her way until Europe allows all Greeks to live under the same banner. Her ardent patriots are compulsorily kept from aggressive physical measures, and so are driven to use other weapons which, in the end, may not be less effective. There is a *visible* Greece and an *invisible* Greece, and the *visible* Greece is a hot-bed of propagandism. Education is the weapon she is using with immense power in every bit of territory which she hopes to call her own. There are large schools carried on vigorously at Smyrna, Constantinople, Salonica, Mount Athos, Jannina, Kozana (Macedonia), in Crete, and in many of the islands of the Mediterranean. The Greeks are well aware that intelligence wins the day. When the crisis comes, educated men will control matters. These schools have been established and are supported mostly by Greeks who have grown wealthy outside the limits of Greece proper. They are so many frontier fortresses, which are all the more powerful because they employ weapons of peace. The Turk has no counter weapon except that kind of oppression that gives more character every day to the *invisible* Greece. It is needless to say that this propagandism has an immense reactionary effect on the *visible* Greece, and all over the land may be heard the ring of new-forged weapons in her intellectual armory.

A word or two concerning the genesis of this modern educational movement in Greece seems appropriate. We may say that there has never been a time when Greece has been absolutely destitute of educational facilities. Even during that long period of abject oppression under Turkish rule — which lasted from the opening of the sixteenth century until the war of independence in 1821-29 — the rudiments of an education had been taught by the clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church. However poor this instruction was, however irregular and unfruitful, it was cherished as the only glimmer of hope for better things in this land of Plato and Sophocles.

Even in the fire and blood of the terrible Revolution which issued in the protocol of London of February 3, 1830, when deso-

lation was spreading over every portion of that land dedicated to freedom, when priest and peasant gladly suffered and died together, new schools were being covertly organized in every region the patriots could get control of; and when the country came out from its baptism of blood, the national mind, roused only as a great war for freedom can arouse the mind, turned its immediate attention to putting its schools on a sure foundation. It was necessarily a most difficult undertaking. The country was bankrupt. The greater part of the children of Greece was orphan. The rich had given their all for the common cause. The desolation of the Southern States after the late civil war in America was not a circumstance to the condition of Greece in 1830. King Otho ascended the throne in 1833. Under his influence schools began to be instituted after the German pattern. The university was established at Athens. A helping hand was stretched forth from France. Queen Amelia took great interest in the education of girls, and a large orphanage at Athens to-day bears her name. Rich Greeks outside the kingdom began to take pride in building up the institutions of their native land. Gradually the country recovered from the desolation of war. The legislative powers began to act. American and English influence and direct offer of aid came in as strong incentives.

The present king, George I., came to the throne in 1863. Under his reign educational affairs have moved on faster than ever, until to-day there are more than 2,000 elementary schools for boys; about 300 schools of the same grade for girls, with over 2,500 teachers, male and female, most of them holding certificates from normal schools; 331 secondary schools, with 1,400 teachers, and more than 15,000 pupils; 35 gymnasiums, with 216 instructors, and, in round numbers, 5,000 pupils; a university with four departments, 100 professors, and 2,500 students; a half-dozen normal schools; a polytechnic school at Athens, with 24 instructors and 500 pupils; and a large number of private and ecclesiastical schools. The effect of all this combined effort has been that illiteracy is rapidly disappearing, and the next generation of Greeks, almost to a man, will know how to read and write.

The forces that helped to bring the educational affairs of Greece to their present hopeful state may be summarized as royal, legislative, local, and private. The kings and queens have always promoted education enthusiastically. The Boulê, or Chamber of Representatives, has acted, especially of late years, with zeal and wisdom in this particular. Local authorities, and the popula-

tion in general, have followed willingly the initiative of those over them, and private individuals have come liberally to the aid of the young kingdom. M. Arsakes, a wealthy merchant, originally from Epirus, left a fortune of 500,000 drachmai to found a girls' school at Athens. M. Barbakes established a gymnasium at Athens. M. Haggi Kosta and his wife left nearly half a million drachmai for a boys' orphanage, which has a capacity for 400 pupils. M. Zappa, of Epirus, has founded a large institution for the purposes of a permanent national exhibition. The polytechnic school at Athens was erected and endowed at a cost of over a million drachmai by three gentlemen from the north of Greece. M. George Sina, a Macedonian, left 3,000,000 drachmai with which to build an academy, which is the architectural gem of modern Athens. The university has been the recipient of large sums from almost every section of the Greek world. A monk at Mount Athos left a million drachmai to it. M. Constantine Belios, a Macedonian, left a fund of 200,000 drachmai to the university to be at the service of Macedonian youth who aspired to a higher education. The list of private benevolences for educational purposes might be indefinitely increased. In proportion to her size, population, and wealth, the little Hellenic kingdom surpasses even open-handed America in this point.

The technical name for the elementary schools of Greece is Demodicon Scholéion. Seventy-two thousand boys and 20,000 girls (out of a population of 2,200,000) receive instruction in these schools from 2,500 teachers. The system of elementary schools is well developed in all the towns, and in many of the villages the schools are quite equal to those in cities. In regions where the population is sparse it is impossible in Greece, as in England or America, to reach a high proficiency. But to-day, practically, the whole population between the ages of six and twelve is at school and taught by well-trained teachers. The regular course of study, covering four or five years, takes the pupil from the alphabet through an extended reading course in Greek, geography, arithmetic, grammar, writing, sketching, music, sacred history, catechism, and Greek Testament. Needlework is prominent in the girls' schools, and gymnastics in all the schools.

Above the elementary schools rise the secondary — the Hellenicon Scholeion. The first institution of this kind in Greece was established in the old capital, Nauplia, in 1833. There followed a slow growth, accelerating as the years went on, and fairly leaping ahead since 1880. These schools are all under government

supervision. The course covers three years, generally taking the pupil from the age of thirteen to sixteen, and prepares for the gymnasium beyond. At the fourth secondary school at Athens the writer found two teachers who had the doctorate of philosophy, one from Erlangen and the other from Athens. The three years in secondary schools are spent in the following manner : —

(1.) Greek grammar, translation of ancient into modern Greek, learning by heart sections from standard authors, orthography, arithmetic, geography of Greece, history of the Old Testament (generally under the eye of a priest), and gymnastics.

(2.) Higher Greek, derivation of words, arithmetic, geography of Europe, zoölogy, ancient Greek history, French [“]begun, New Testament history, music, and gymnastics.

(3.) Greek syntax, translation into ancient Greek from modern, Latin begun, French continued, geometry begun, Greek history of the Middle Ages, physics, chemistry (elementary), geography of the world, declamation, and gymnastics.

Taking Greece as a whole, more than half of the teachers in the elementary schools are women, and this is the more remarkable from the fact that through the centuries of Turkish oppression the education of woman was almost entirely neglected. But to-day womanhood is coming to the front in Greece. The highest class of women teachers in elementary schools receive a salary of 140 drachmai per month, with an allowance of from 30 to 40 drachmai a month for rent, making a total of about \$25 a month. The second grade receive \$20 a month, and the third and lowest about \$16 a month. The government also has a system by which retired teachers receive a pension proportionate to the amount of salary received during the period of service. This has made teaching a vocation. The men teachers receive salaries larger by at least one fourth. All secondary schools are taught by men with salaries running from \$35 a month down to \$30, \$25, \$20, and \$15. They have now no system of “pupil teachers.”

Normal schools have received very careful attention in Greece and in the outlying Greek-speaking regions. The oldest school of this kind was in Turkish territory at Salonica. At Serreea, in Macedonia, is another. Others are found in Constantinople, Philippopolis, Smyrna, Jannina, and Athens. At Constantinople and Smyrna there are normal schools for ladies, and the Arsakeion, at Athens, stands at the head of the list in importance. Its founder, M. Arsakes, has already been referred to. It is by far the finest girls' school in Greece. The property to-day consists of

nearly a whole square in the best part of Athens, and the buildings accommodate 1,500 girls in daily attendance, 90 of whom are residents in the boarding department. As will appear later on, this school is the legitimate outcome of the American school for girls at Athens, which for so many years was cared for by Dr. and Mrs. Hill. The government is especially interested in the Arsakeion, recognizes its diplomas, gives teachers' certificates in return, and contributes 20,000 drachmai annually toward its expenses. The institution is graded carefully from the kindergarten to the normal department, taking a girl from the age of four or five up to eighteen or twenty, and will compare favorably with the same kind of schools in Germany, England, and America. Rich and poor are found together. There is a matriculation fee of \$75, and after this payment the pupil can stay at pleasure at an expense of about \$16.50 a month. It is a custom for far-away villages to select their brightest girls, collect money for their expenses, and send them to the Arsakeion, so that they may have efficient teachers for their village girls. Many interesting and romantic stories were told the writer of such cases, which show that the modern Greeks are in earnest in their ambition for a higher culture. Since its start this school has scattered over Greece and Greek-speaking lands over 2,000 graduates, a very large proportion of whom have engaged in teaching, more or less. Wherever in Greece the writer went, he found these teachers at work with great intelligence and success.

The normal school for men at Athens has been a pronounced success since its organization in 1878. Its object is to prepare teachers for elementary schools throughout Greece "visible" and "invisible." The government pays all expenses, and special scholarships have been founded by wealthy men. Fully one third of the students at the time of the writer's visit (1888) were from outside the kingdom. The course of study is rigid, and comprises three years. The requirements for admission are exacting. There must be testimonials of character and a medical examination. No one younger than sixteen or older than twenty-four can gain admission. The mental equipment demanded for entrance is equivalent to that demanded for the second year of the gymnasium course. The schedule of work includes a most thorough study of Greek literature and philosophy, ethics, mathematics, geography, history (secular and ecclesiastical), the whole range of the natural sciences, pedagogics, sketching, music (vocal and instrumental), hygiene, gymnastics, military drill, and practical gardening. A

"pattern school" (elementary) is connected with this and great emphasis is laid on practical instruction. and character are carefully looked after. Since 1880 school has graduated over 350 men, who are scattered Greek-speaking regions of the Levant.

There are the beginnings of a system of government of schools. Little advance has, however, been made pressure in other directions. There is a compulsory law effort has been made to carry it out rigidly in the base. As a whole, there is such a general sentiment in favor that few children are kept from school. Everywhere the desire to get on, and the impetus is so great towards that the farms are suffering. The Greek, be it said credit, scorns manual labor, and cannot see the full dig service short of the professions. Ancient Greece had to every freeman, and was sure to be dragged down to the fate she afterwards experienced. Modern Greece must be replaced or ruled by those who will work. She is present in that doubtful state in which the reigning seems to be centred upon the career of a petty, intriguer.

In Greece, as in most countries, agriculture occupies the attention of the majority of the inhabitants. There are cities that can boast of more than 10,000 people. Fifty (from Athens 84,903 to Missolonghi 6,324) contain only inhabitants, or about one ninth of the whole population. Counting in every town that approaches the dignity of a city shall find that full seven eighths of the people of the country be classed as rural. Nearly ten per cent. of the inhabitants of Greece are shepherds, and as many more are seafarers. A glance briefly at the rural schools. These humbler schools and land are the surest tests of national zeal for education. reformers meet their hardest and most stubborn problem. spontaneity of the people is most severely tried.

The educational problem in rural Greece is somewhat increased by the presence of 100,000 Albanians scattered throughout the kingdom. They began migrating southward over four years ago, about the time of the Turkish conquest. Those who still speak their unwritten language, have become Hellenized, yet are easily distinguished from the Greeks. They are found mainly in Attica, about Thebes, on the coast of Corinth, throughout ancient Argolis, in the southern

of Eubœa, and in a few of the neighboring islands. This illiterate race are, as a rule, stolid conservative, and not as ambitious as their Greek neighbors. Happily, most of them are in the regions most accessible to progressive influences, and are being brought into line with marked success. Wherever you go in Greece to-day the schools are larger, more cheerful, better ventilated, and more impressive than the churches, and the school-teacher in a village is the intellectual leader.

The subject of religious instruction in Greek schools is of special interest. During the Revolution over 400 monasteries were destroyed; 150 remain. There are four nunneries. All these "religious" institutions flourished better under Turkish rule than under the Greek. The government seems inclined to encroach more and more upon the property of the monasteries. The land granted by the Greek authorities to the American Classical School was taken, not without some demur, from the grounds of the neighboring convent of the Astomaton. No school can be opened in Greece which is not open to the clergy of the state church (Greek Orthodox), and stated catechetical instruction is given. From the early days of the new kingdom, and very largely due to the influence of American workers in Greece, the New Testament in the original has been used as a daily text-book in all the elementary schools of the kingdom. Modern Greek is so near the original Greek dialect of the Gospels that all the children can understand them. Large portions of the Gospels are learned by heart. It is certain that religious instruction is far more thorough in Greek elementary public schools than in the same grade of schools in America.

We have already spoken briefly of the normal schools of Greece. A condensed statement should be made concerning higher education in general. It takes a much longer time for a country emerging from a state of foreign misrule, as has been the case with Greece, to put its higher educational institutions upon a satisfactory basis than it does to do so with its elementary and secondary schools. No mere gift of money or collection of a complete apparatus can make a successful university. It must be a thing of slow growth. In fact, it must base itself on the lower schools, and so must come after them. Certainly this has been true in the case of Greece and her single university at Athens. In elementary education, taking all her conditions into consideration, the success of Greece has been phenomenal. It could not be otherwise than that her higher schools should lag, even though

every muscle should be strained to put them upon a level with similar institutions in other countries. Yet we cannot find any words but those of commendation for modern Greece in this particular when we think of her youth, her inexperience, and her poverty. England had her Oxford and Cambridge seven hundred years ago. Italy for a still longer time has boasted of her Bologna and Padua. Greece will find her time, too, when she will contribute to the world's wealth of knowledge as she did of old.

The higher educational institutions comprise the gymnasiums, the polytechnic institute, the normal schools, and the university, some of which have already been dealt with. The first gymnasium was established at Nauplia in 1833. The greatest development has taken place during the last fifteen years. To-day there are in Greece 35 gymnasiums, 216 instructors, and 4,772 students, scattered through the four years' course as follows: The first (lowest) year, 1,757; second, 1,285; third, 962; and the fourth, 770. These high grade schools are found in all the centres of population. There are four of them in Athens, and, being directly under the university influence, they show their best. The four years' course is distributed as follows: (1.) Ancient Greek orators, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Latin prose, Cæsar, Nepos, French, theoretical arithmetic, geometry, physics, zoölogy, botany, beginning history of ancient nations, catechism, and lessons in religion. (2.) Thucydides and Demosthenes, Sallust, French, religions, ethics, geometry continued and algebra begun, history of the Middle Ages, experimental physics, and zoölogy. (3.) Homer, Plato, Herodotus, Virgil, French, religion, algebra, history of the Reformation era, physics. (4.) Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, Horace, and Virgil, French, algebra and trigonometry, and astronomy begun.

One of the most interesting gymnasiums in Athens (visited by the writer in 1888) is the Barbakeion Lyceion, so named from M. Barbakes, a wealthy and patriotic Greek (previously mentioned), who left his fortune to found the school. It occupies a fine large building in a pleasant part of the city, is attended by 332 students, and is entirely free to the youths who attend, with the exception of a nominal matriculation fee of less than fifty cents. They come from all parts of the Levant. More than one tenth of the number are Turkish subjects. The two lower classes are subdivided for convenience. The system is German. There were at the time of the visit fifteen professors, all men of thorough training and excellent ability. The lowest grade of instructors in

the school receive a monthly salary of \$40 twelve times a year. After five years of service this is raised to \$50. The Director receives from \$55 to \$60. After twenty years the professor may retire on a half-salary, and when he dies his family receives a pension for a certain number of years, in proportion to the time he has served.

The Neopolis Lyceion is a smaller but more select gymnasium, having 250 students and eleven professors. The terms of admission are very strict, and the brightest students in Athens are found in this school. Students passing the final examinations of these gymnasiums go directly into the university classes without further examination. The government has been experimenting on what is called a "practical gymnasium," which is something like a German "real" school. It prepares men for the military school, which is located at the Piræus. At the same port there is also a naval school, with nearly a hundred students.

The polytechnic school, mentioned before as a gift from three patriots from northern Greece, is an imposing building on Patissa Street. It is a large structure with wings, entirely of Pentelic marble, and is used in part for galleries of paintings and sculptures. This school has extended courses in architecture and engineering. There are twenty-four instructors and nearly 500 pupils.

The university — technically the Panepistemion — was founded under royal patronage in 1837. It was organized on the German plan, with four faculties — theology, philosophy, law, and medicine. An observatory on the Hill of the Nymphs, to the west of the Acropolis, is connected with the university. This observatory was built and fitted up by M. Sina, who has already been referred to as a generous patron of higher education in Greece. The philosophical department has three divisions, — art, physics, and mathematics, — all of which lead up to the degree of Ph. D. The course in these lines occupies four years. The medical department has two divisions, — medicine proper, requiring four years, and pharmaceutics, demanding three years. Law and theology require four years of study each. While the secondary schools and the gymnasiums are in session from September 15 until the end of June, the university is in session from October 1 to June 1. The university since 1837 has graduated more than 2,000 students. Law has claimed the largest number, medicine comes next, art next, and theology last. In fact, the theological department is very small. It has but forty students out of the 2,500 usually in

attendance. There are about 100 professors in the university, none of whom have achieved a European reputation. The university buildings are imposing, with their glistening marble and classic regularity. They were designed by Hansen the elder. They contain the various class-rooms, a library with 150,000 volumes, a collection of coins, a cabinet of natural history, and an anatomical museum. The exquisitely designed "Academy," probably the finest imitation of ancient Greek architecture in existence, stands next to the university on University Boulevard. It is to be used in time as a resort for the literati of Greece.

A large number of young Greeks still go to the universities of Germany and France to complete their education. The French influence seems to be the stronger, and the French language is more common than any other foreign tongue in modern Greece. Many French educational books have been translated into Greek. The Gallic mind has much in common with the Hellenic. In fact, the early Greek colonies at Marseilles and Nice and up the Rhone, paved the way for the entrance of civilization into Gaul, and there has been ever since a certain community of sentiment between the two races.

The outlook for higher education in Greece is flattering. The great base of the pyramid, popular education, is solidly laid, and soon the superstructure can be carried to its completion. When the restlessness incident to the present unsettled state of Greece shall have been quieted by a legitimate extension of the Hellenic kingdom to embrace all Greek-speaking lands, and when a strong political organization shall develop and control popular aspiration, Athens will once more take her old place as the educational centre of the Levant. Her quiet academic shades will be far better suited to scholarly pursuits than the whirl of traffic in Constantinople or Alexandria.

No description of education in Greece would be complete without a statement of American influence that came in strongly at the earliest stage of the development of the modern educational movement. This influence was most powerfully felt in a direction that might otherwise have been overlooked. There is no surer test of the quality of the civilization of a country than the condition of its women. There is nothing more astonishing in the educational developments in Greece than the development of schools for girls alongside of those for boys. Our astonishment increases when we stop to consider the condition of women in Greece during the centuries of Turkish oppression. Wretched as were the opportunities for Greek boys, the condition of the girls was worse.

They were, for the most part, confined to the house, and when abroad were compelled to conceal their faces from the gaze of the rude soldiery, and always to be under the protection of some responsible person. It became the fashion to think little of the sex as intellectual companions; and yet when the battle for freedom came, the women of Greece were not far behind the men in their bravery, as signalized in many a struggle.

Few people are living to-day in the United States who can remember the widespread interest taken by Americans in the struggle for freedom in Greece. The writer has before him a faded pamphlet of eight pages, entitled "Intercourse with the Greek Government on the Subject of Education in Greece," a reprint from a magazine for February, 1830. It embodies the letters written by J. A. Capodistrias, the President of Greece, to Secretary J. Evarts and Rev. Mr. Anderson of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and to the President of the Society for Elementary Instruction at Paris. From these communications we learn that at that critical hour in the nation's life the influence of English, French, and American sympathizers was a large factor in starting the whole long and interesting development of educational affairs in Greece.

Very shortly after the visit of Mr. Anderson, two Americans went to spend their lives in the newborn nation of Greece. Dr. Jonas King was sent out by the society Mr. Anderson served, and Dr. John Henry Hill by the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States. Of Dr. Jonas King it is not necessary to say more here than that he worked faithfully all his life against great odds. He was a typical American, who pushed his way zealously, and of necessity came into conflict with many prejudices which he never could overcome. All that is mortal of him lies buried in the little Protestant cemetery at Athens, and the "Evangelical Greek Church," with its score or more members, is the most tangible result of his life-long labors. It is doubtless owing in part to the indirect influence of this Protestant movement that the Bible is studied in all government Greek schools.

When Dr. and Mrs. Hill were leaving Boston in 1830 they received careful instructions from the Episcopal authorities, under whose auspices they went forth, to establish schools and to do nothing "which could justly give rise to the impression that another church or another form of Christianity would be introduced, but to labor to restore to that people the holy simplicity and glorious purity of that very gospel which St. Paul preached among them."

With this end in view Dr. and Mrs. Hill settled down in Athens, then only a wretched hamlet. In 1832 Mrs. Hill opened a school for girls, not far from the half-ruined "Tower of the Winds." A girls' school up to that time was an unheard-of thing in Athens, and, in fact, in all Greece. Its beginnings were very humble, but the idea that girls as well as boys were fit subjects for education began to spread. Soon the number of pupils ran up to fifty, then to 100, then to 300, and after that for many years the average was 700. As the work went on Dr. and Mrs. Hill were more and more on pleasant terms with the people, the priests, and the government. In 1845 Dr. Hill was made chaplain to the British Legation at Athens. Mrs. Hill continued to conduct the girls' school for forty years, and then handed it over to Miss Marion Muir, who is still successfully carrying on this most important work.

In 1869 Mrs. Hill was urgently requested by several of the leading Greek families in Athens to open a school for the higher education of girls. The result was the "Hill Institute," a school working on an independent basis, and which has exercised the mightiest influence on the higher education of women in Greece and in all Greek-speaking lands. "The Greek mothers of nearly all our homes were educated at the Hill Institute," said the Greek orator at the open grave of Dr. Hill in 1882. Every one in Greece recognizes the importance of this school. It made possible the Arsakeion, which has been previously mentioned, and has furnished teachers for girls' schools all over the land, and effectually opened the eyes of the Greeks to the importance of educating their girls. The Hill Institute, under the control of Miss Bessie Masson, a niece of Mrs. Hill, is as flourishing as ever. There are 64 boarders and 190 day scholars. The young ladies come from all parts of Greece, from Crete, Egypt, Asia Minor, and the Balkan region, and returning carry back a thorough Christian education.

With this topic of the education of women our subject finds the proper climax in importance and interest. The Greek home is being elevated, and that speaks volumes for the future of the nation. Many trials are before the ambitious little kingdom, and hot-headed leaders may involve her in many a catastrophe, but with her present educational system we believe she will come out in the end to be a mighty civilizing power in three continents.

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FOUR CENTURIES OF CHRISTIAN SONG.

MANY years ago an English university professor, in the course of the delivery of a lecture from his chair at Oxford, held in his hand a copy of "The Golden Treasury of Songs and Lyrical Poems" and of "The Book of Praise." Of the one he said that it contained almost nothing that is bad, of the other that it contained almost nothing that is good. The criticism, so far as it concerned lyrical form, as distinct from devotional feeling, was not unjust; the fact was, to that extent at least, inevitable. For praise, so far as it is surcharged with utility, must ever be lacking in the purest art, and the "Book of Praise" is of necessity utilitarian, as the "Golden Treasury" is of necessity artistic. This special feature of the two collections is accentuated by the fact that Lord Selborne is by birth and habit himself a utilitarian, and Mr. Francis T. Palgrave by birth and habit himself an artist. Had these compilers exchanged their tasks, the jurist would have produced a lyrical treasury whose indifferent merit would perhaps have been only less marked than that of a practical hymn-book produced by the lover of art. The resultant would in each case have been a dissonance, a neutral gray.

But while Lord Selborne, in a measure, did to sacred song a disservice in appearing to sever it from the highest poesy, other writers have shown that the adoration of the Christ is worthy of the loftiest effort of the lyric muse. There has, indeed, hitherto been no sacred anthology comparable in critical excellence with the "Golden Treasury," in which are enshrined the most fragrant blossoms in the garden of English song. It is, therefore, a matter of peculiar satisfaction that Mr. Palgrave himself should have resolved to commemorate his tenure of the Chair of Poetry at Oxford by the publication in his ripest years of "A Treasury of Sacred Song."

This garland, which has been issued by the Clarendon Press in a form for which all book lovers will be grateful, possesses an even greater value than would belong to a course of lectures on religious poesy. For before criticism must ever come the gathering of the materials for criticism, and these, so far as concerns our subject, have until now been scattered over the wide domain of lyric poetry. But now that a systematic selection is in the hand of the general reader, it will be of interest to survey the main incidents in the development of sacred song.

The absence from the florilegium before us of much of the best-
 oved verse in Christian praise suggests an inquiry into the
 standard by which the choice has been governed. In a prefatory
 note, marked by scholarly moderation, Mr. Palgrave says : —

“ To offer poetry for poetry’s sake has been my first aim and
 leading principle. Hence it is probable that many poems which
 would be justly expected when the object of a selection is direct
 usefulness, spiritual aid and comfort, or (to put it in one word)
 edification, will here be found absent.”

This principle accounts fully for the general exclusion of
 didactic verse, which is one chief form of the hymn used in pub-
 lic worship, and at the same time redeems it from inferiority on
 the score of its defective art. For “ secular verse covers many
 provinces : manners, incidents, love, landscape, — the vast sphere
 of drama, — in a word, all the many-colored romance of life.
 Sacred verse can hardly go beyond one province ; to expect
 masterpieces in our field approximately numerous as those in the
 secular lyric is unreasonable.”

Mr. Palgrave’s aim, moreover, has been to present not a collec-
 tion of sacred verse, but a collection of so much of sacred verse
 as is touched with the lyric spirit. One looks in vain for the ma-
 jestic hymns to the Deity sung by Milton, Thomson, and Cole-
 ridge. And although a place is found for Henry Vaughan’s
 “ Retreat,” the Ode upon “ Intimations of Immortality,” which it
 suggested, is, though immeasurably finer verse, excluded because
 it is wanting in lyrical form. Where a selection is thus limited in
 scope and extent, the personal taste and discernment of the editor
 must hold sway, and the assumption towards so competent a judge
 of a critical attitude would be pretentious, even if it were not for-
 bidden by his pathetic citation, —

“ *Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi concede laborem.*”

Yet so difficult is it, as, indeed, Mr. Palgrave freely concedes, “ to
 keep perfectly true the balance of the soul,” that we will venture
 to poise against some of his judgments considerations which, be
 it confessed, owe any cogency they possess to the influence of his
 own literary labors.

“ The Treasury of Sacred Song ” contains four hundred and
 twenty-three lyrics, drawn from the works of about a hundred
 English singers of the last four centuries. Of these one hundred
 and seventy-one appertain to an early period, extending from the
 later years of the fifteenth century to the year 1680. A middle

period, from 1680 to 1820, is illustrated by seventy-four poems, and there are one hundred and seventy-eight specimens drawn from authors of modern date. Each period roughly coincides with an era in religious evolution, — the first with Protestant reform, the second with Evangelical reform, the third with Tractarian reform. Each period has its culminating point in the work of twin singers, — the first in George Herbert and Henry Vaughan, the second in Isaac Watts and Charles Wesley, the third in John Keble and John Henry Newman.

The book begins with the "picturesque mediævalism of Dunbar's 'Nativity,'" of which this is the opening stanza: —

"Now gladdeth every living creature,
With bliss and comfortable gladness,
The heaven's King is clad in our nature,
Us from the death with ransom to redress;
The lamp of joy, that chases all darkness,
Ascended is to be the world's light,
From every bale our boundés for to bliss,
Born of the glorious Virgin Mary bright."

There is about this lyric an aureole of simple gladness which is typical of the spirit in which the "Sacred Treasury" has been compiled. Christian devotion is trinal in its aspect; it is expressed in the yearning wistfulness of Hope, no less than in the unwrinkled calm of Faith, or the quenchless ardor of love. The Elizabethan may perhaps be described as in the main an age of renascent Hope, as the Georgian was of renascent Love, and as the Victorian is of renascent Faith. But in every age devotion has been vivified by the threefold spirit. To each man of us the sisters present a different charm; not all the Three, but one of them only, has in general the power to stir within each heart the vibrant chord. If Mr. Palgrave has been, in a way, insensible to the wooing of the Grace at whose shrine some moderns have offered up their choicer lays, must it not be because there has been cast over his own spirit the jealous witchery of faith? Not otherwise can we explain the admission of large centos from Vaughan and Keble, to the exclusion of other verse.

It should also be said that the objects of Faith and Love lend themselves more readily than the subjects of Hope to lyric treatment. There is not more music, though more song, in Henry More's —

"Sing aloud, His praise rehearse,
Who hath made the Universe,"

than in Lord Tennyson's —

"Strong Son of God, Eternal Love."

And, indeed, Song lifts its voice the sweetest when its theme is divine, when inspired by the tender incidents of the Incarnation, or when, in a minor key, it tells of the tragedy of the Cross.

The sacred verse of Dunbar's time was of three kinds: Latin hymns, which were rhymed compositions, and were inserted in the breviaries, were generally doctrinal, sometimes even evangelical, and appealed to the lettered classes. In them lyricism was sacrificed to practical usefulness. Popular songs having Scriptural themes — such as the carol "When Christ was born of Mary free," which had a Latin refrain — were sung by wayfaring minstrels, and strongly influenced the popular mind. Sacred poetry, whether in the form of the sonnet, or in lyric and epic verse, was intended for the private delight and comfort of such as had access to the manuscript literature of the day.

Printing scarcely came into vogue when Luther arose, and endowed his native land with a hymnody which in its development has been the glory of the Reformed Church. A chain of circumstances led to the introduction, at first into Geneva, and soon after into this country, of a metrical version of the Hebrew psalter, which was at once eagerly accepted by the Protestant world as a substitute for the earlier Latin hymnody, now held to be pervaded by the taint of heresy. The distaste for change which rightly marks the attitude of men to the usages of religion caused English and Scottish praise, for a century and a half, to hold rigidly by the metrical psalms. Hence the sacred song of the Tudors and the Stuarts proceeds from men who were unshackled by the special requirements of congregational worship. The one hundred and seventy-one sacred compositions of this period which have passed the lyrical touchstone include only thirty-two suitable for adaptation to church praise. Some of them, but only a few, were penned with special reference to this particular need. Such are Dr. Donne's "Hymn to God the Father," Jeremy Taylor's "Hymn for Advent," and John Mason's "My Lord, my Love, was crucified." Others, which at first were intended mainly for private use, have achieved a place in modern hymnody, as Richard Baxter's "Lord, it belongs not to my care," Samuel Crossman's "Sweet place, sweet place alone," and John Austin's "Blest be Thy love, dear Lord." It is significant that of the many hundreds of metrical psalms which sprang up in the seventeenth century, scarcely one finds a home in the "Sacred Treasury." Yet George Sandys (who is omitted altogether), Milton, Herbert, and Sidney wrote some versions which possess, within their own limits, the

lyric ardor. For instance, Richard Crashaw's "Idyll of Christian Life," —

"Happy me ! O happy sheep !
Whom my God vouchsafes to keep,"

is a fine rendering of Psalm xxiii., but it is written from the poetic not the hymnic point of view.

In the Elizabethan age, with its strong faith in the Creator, there was no place for the lyrical, for every event in the world of fact, every discovery in the world of thought, was dramatic. And — in the narrower sense — the chief actor in that age wrote nothing more tuneful than this : —

"Poor soul, the centre of my sinful earth,
Fool'd by these rebel powers that thee array,
Why dost thou pine within and suffer dearth,
Painting thy outward walls so costly gay ?"

Edmund Spenser wrote "An Hymn of Heavenly Love," which in stately music is equaled only by Milton's "Hymn of the Nativity." Sidney, Gifford, Bolton, Barnes, each claim a place for a single lyric ; Southwell, for two. As the new century begins, men whose youth was nourished on the robust intellectualism of the Armada time grew to maturity, and amongst them were some whose joyousness overflowed into their verse, and imparted to it a lyrical turn. Such are John Donne and Thomas Campion, Ben Jonson and Drummond of Hawthornden, Christopher Harvey and William Habington. But it was reserved for George Herbert, whose Celtic fervor was chastened by the quiet courtliness of his culture, to gather up into his own quaint verse the lyrical aspirations of his time. Nearly one half of the first book of the "Sacred Treasury" is drawn from George Herbert, who contributes thirty-four, and from his disciple, Henry Vaughan, who contributes thirty-eight lyrics. Mr. Palgrave has probably given this large preference to Vaughan because no edition of his works has yet taken the popular fancy, and his poetry is less familiar than that of writers whose scantier verse has been better represented in general collections. If Vaughan filled as large a place in the public esteem as Herbert, — and the "Sacred Treasury" should do much to achieve that end, — there would be less need for giving him space sorely needed for others.

To mention the names of the writers of this age who find a place in the book is to enumerate the poets who filled Stuart England with their quaint musical verse. As the century closes, the coming dawn in hymnal praise, faintly discernible in Crashaw and

Herrick, Marvell and Wither, is heralded by Browne and Austin, Mason and Shepherd. It is interesting to discover in the verse of this date phrases which were to acquire a more enduring renown in later years. Thus Crashaw has the verse, "Eternity shut in a span;" Vaughan, "The Rock of Ages;" Westmoreland, "The Great Physician;" Quarles, "Jordan streams;" Wither, "Precious in His sight." Herbert's

"E'en Eternity's too short
To extol Thee,"

is altered by John Wesley in his epoch-making Charlestown Hymn-book of 1837 to

"For e'en Eternity's too short
To utter all Thy Praise,"

while the same book includes a hymn of Watts's, which has for its final couplet, —

"But oh! Eternity's too short
To utter all Thy Praise."

In fine, a careful study of this first period proves that the dearth of good hymns arose from the lack of opportunity, not of lyrical power.

At length the hymnal dawn arrived. The supremacy of Daye's Psalter was undermined by the publication of newer versions, and Isaac Watts, who began by paraphrasing the psalms in language consonant with the ideas of the New Covenant, ended by pouring forth a volume of hymns which lie at the fountain-head of modern devotional song. Hence it is not surprising that of the seventy-four compositions which were, in the main, the immediate fruit of the Evangelical movement, only eight are unsuitable for public singing, and of these six are from the pen of Thomas Ken, to whom belongs the glory of having produced the best-loved Morning and Evening Hymns in the language. Little need here be said of the individual elements of the sacred song of this middle period. It is satisfactory to have the countenance of the soundest lyrical critic of this generation, for the general admiration accorded to some of the verse which, less because of its form than of its feeling, has enshrined itself in the hearts of men. Mr. Palgrave's comment on Isaac Watts is indubitably fair: —

"As with C. Wesley and other good men, fluency, want of taste and finish, the sacrifice, in a word, of Art to direct usefulness, have probably lost them those honors in literature to which they were born. But they have their reward."

After all, there is a lyric temper which does not depend on mere verbal finish for its strength and beauty. Emotion counts. Spenser is lyrical, for all his fanciful allegorization. Herbert's lyricism shines forth translucently even through the hard mathematics of his rhythm. And there is much of Charles Wesley's song whose militant doctrinism is burnt through and through with lyric fire.

This leads us to remark on a certain absence of true perspective, of sensitiveness to poetic *chiaroscuro*, discernible in the composition of the "Sacred Treasury." "The manner of one age," as Mr. Palgrave acutely observes, "is always the conventionality of the next, . . . and the styles which seem natural to us will probably, under the same law, seem artificial to those who live in the 'summers we shall not see.'"

That in one of its aspects the manner of evangelicalism has not survived is true, but it has been replaced, in England at least, by what, for lack of a better phrase, may be called the Ecclesiastical manner, and this, even now, is falling under the operation of the same law of decadence. There is no likelihood that the hymnody of the Tractarian movement will survive in England in a greater degree than that of the movement which preceded it, and were it not for the unconscious foreshortening due to their nearness to the present, John Keble would scarcely claim space for forty-two compositions, and John Henry Newman for twenty-two, in a garland to which Wesley contributes eight only. It is true that to those whose hearts are still attuned to the spirit of the Oxford revival, the poetry of the "Christian Year" and of the "Lyra Innocentium" will present no discordant note. But there is amongst us a growing number who are reading dimly in the sky the premonitions of a new revival, which will transcend in intensity each of those of the past, because gathering into itself the strength and fervor of all. It is these who are best fitted to appraise the value to the modern time alike of Herbert and Wesley, Watts and Faber, Cowper and Keble.

These considerations arise out of a leisurely study of the lyrical wealth of the Victorian reform, as presented in the attractive dress of the "Sacred Treasury." Let us examine, for instance, Father Faber's "Oh come and mourn with me awhile!" or those lines of Keble's which, on the testimony of his wife, were in his dying thoughts:—

"Lord of my heart, by Thy last cry,
Let not Thy blood on earth be spent—

Lo, at Thy feet I faintly lie,
 Mine eyes upon Thy wounds are
 Upon Thy streaming wounds my w
 Wait like the parchéd earth on Ap

Verse with these associations may be help
 spirit of the modern ecclesiastical moveme
 sensuousness in it, less of the morbid, less
 in word and feeling, than in some last cent
 rightly faded from men's memories? Or
 blemish in the purest lyric art which is th
 grave's destructive criticism. Here is a st
 the "Catechism," which, though not witho
 its very essence an argumentative homiletic

"Oh! say not, dream not, heaven
 To childish ears are vain,
 That the young mind at random
 And cannot reach the strain."

Is there less dogmatism in this than in
 happy efforts? Far be it from us to say
 of a very high rank in the work of Ke
 When much of it has perished, — and in
 lot of the poet to be remembered only b
 lyrics of theirs which will claim an endur
 garland of song that men will ever weave

This is no place for reviewing Mr. Palg
 general religious poetry of England durin
 ent sovereign. The difficulty of pronoun
 verse which has not yet lived long enough
 in the sacred choir is peculiarly great.
 sented only by the baptismal hymn, "In t
 fear;" Dean Stanley only by the Ascensi
 — beyond the skies;" Mrs. Alexander or
 are lifted up;" John Ellerton only by
 whose eyes;" Miss Procter only by "I
 life may be." One of Miss Christina
 passingly lovely: —

"Give me the lowest place ; not th
 Ask for that lowest place, but
 That I might live and sha
 Thy glory by Thy sic

"Give me the lowest place : or if
 That lowest place too high, m

Where I may sit and see
My God, and love Thee so."

But Miss Rossetti is responsible for introducing to Mr. Palgrave's notice a volume of verse published two or three years ago by a Mr. Henry S. Sutton, of which this is a characteristic specimen: —

"How beautiful it is to be alive !
To wake each morn as if the Maker's grace
Did us afresh from nothingness derive
That we might sing 'How happy is our case !'
How beautiful it is to be alive !"

The editor's encomium on this writer reminds one irresistibly of Nahum Tate's lines to the elder Samuel Wesley, on reading some of his poetry: —

"Even we, a numerous but a feeble host,
Are gladly in your morning lustre lost."

Mr. Palgrave has himself done better work, which will live when "How Beautiful" is forgotten.

Alfred Tennyson has the honor of the final word. It goes without saying that "Late, late, so late!" is inserted. There are two cantos from "In Memoriam," — those beginning "When Lazarus left his charnel cave," and "Her eyes are homes of silent prayer." There is the stanza, "O man, forgive thy mortal foe," and the narrative — surely no lyric in the straiter sense — entitled "In the Children's Hospital," a pathetic ending to a joyous book.

This desultory survey of the lyrical product of four centuries reveals the direction and force of the main current of English sacred song. The simple winsomeness which marked the age before intellectual criticism passed into the courtly grace of the age of the cavaliers. This was succeeded by a century whose distinctive religious habit was experimental, and this, again, has been followed in our own day by a period whose dominant note is one of trustful aspiration.

This natural history of sacred lyrical poetry is exhibited with great general fairness in the "Sacred Treasury," and all lovers of Christian song must ever be grateful for its publication. With its aid the worshiper may step within hearing of the choir of English singers, who for four hundred years have labored, age after age, to build up a Temple of Praise to the glory of the Christ of God.

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THE CASE OF REV. ROBERT BRECK.

ONE of the best ways to gain a vivid and correct impression of the manners and opinions of our forefathers, and of the institutions under which they lived, is to explore the history of some single event, important enough to have connections with a large number of people, in various stations of life, and of various opinions. Such an event was the controversy which arose in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1734, and continued for two years, in respect to the settlement of Robert Breck as pastor of the church in that town ; an event which had a certain importance, in its time, for the people of Springfield, but which interests us mainly on account of the light it casts upon the way of life of the people a century and a half ago.

The town of Springfield was then one hundred years old. There were about a thousand people living within the present limits of that city.¹ Mr. Breck was the fourth pastor of the church. The average length of the pastorate had been thirty years. The number of members of the church was sixty-seven. The valley of the Connecticut was already full of thriving towns and villages. We read in the pamphlets of that time of Longmeadow and Westfield and Hadley, Northampton, Hatfield, and Deerfield, among other places in the vicinity. The Hampshire Association of Ministers was a vigorous organization, made up of thirteen pastors, among whom were Jonathan Edwards, of Northampton, Isaac Chauncy, of Hadley, William Williams, of Hatfield, Stephen Williams, of Longmeadow, Samuel Hopkins, of West Springfield, and Ebenezer Devotion, of Suffield. This association, though organized for the mutual improvement of its members, like similar bodies in our own time, was accused of seeking to control the action of the churches in the selection of their pastors. It was alleged that some of these pastors were Presbyterians, and that they took it for granted that an association had powers like those of a presbytery. Their theological views were, for the most part, those of the earlier Puritans, which are moderately stated in the Westminster Confession of Faith. It was before the time of the "Improvements in theology" set forth by President Edwards. But even then, as we shall see, there was a difference in theological opinion among the pastors, and a still greater difference in their views of Christian liberty. For the

¹ Judge Morris's *Historical Address*, 1875.

most part they were devoted to their religious work. The years 1734 and 1735 were the years of the Great Awakening at Northampton, and Mr. Edwards was too fully absorbed in his work at home to enter very fully into the affairs of the church in Springfield.

The ministers and churches of Massachusetts were profoundly affected by the connection of the church with the state. The laws of the *Colony* of Massachusetts Bay had limited even the right of suffrage to members of the church. The charter of the *Province* of Massachusetts, which was granted by William and Mary in 1691, extended the suffrage to all male freeholders who possessed an estate worth two pounds a year. This provision of the charter opened the way for giving to those who were not communicants a voice in the selection of their ministers, and in the direction of the pecuniary interests of the parish. All this tended to liberalize the spirit of legislation. The General Court of the Province never enacted a law for the punishment of heresy¹ by fine and banishment, such as that under which William Pyncheon was summoned to appear before the General Court in 1650 to answer for his book entitled "The Meritorious Price of our Redemption."

Still, the legislation of the provincial period of our history was designed to bring the church under the fostering care and protection of the state. The basis of this legislation was a law passed in 1692, at the second session of the General Court, under the provincial charter, for the settlement and support of ministers.² It requires the inhabitants of each town to be constantly provided with "an able, learned, and orthodox minister, or ministers, of good conversation, to dispense the word of God to them." The minister was to be chosen by the church, "according to the directions given in the Word of God." The inhabitants of the town or precinct "who usually attend on the public worship of God," were to be called together to accept or reject the candidate whom the church had chosen. If they accepted him he became the legal minister of the town or precinct. If they rejected him, the church might still refer the matter to a council of neighboring churches, and if the council approved the choice of the church, the minister, accepting the call,³ and duly installed, became the

¹ *Andover Review*, September, 1886, p. 248.

² These laws may be found in the *Province Laws*, i. 62, 102, 506, 216, 597 ; and ii. 58 ; iii. 288.

³ The first law gave the choice to the people of the town. This was amended at the next session so as to give the church the right to lead in the choice.

legal pastor, and was entitled to his salary. The amount both of the "settlement" and of the "maintenance" of the minister was fixed by a contract before his introduction to his office, and the people were required to pay toward his settlement and maintenance, "each man his several proportion thereof." The Court of General Sessions of the county was required to see that the contract was fulfilled. If any town or precinct should neglect to provide itself with a suitable minister, the Court of Quarter Sessions was required to "make order upon them speedily to provide themselves with a minister." If this order was disregarded, it was the duty of the court to procure and settle a minister, and order the charge of such minister's settlement and maintenance to be levied on the inhabitants of such town. At a later time, it was made the duty of the General Court itself, on receiving notice from the court of any county that a town or precinct was destitute of a minister, to provide and send to every such town or precinct an able, learned, and orthodox minister, of good conversation, and to provide for his support by adding to the taxes of such town or precinct so much as they should judge sufficient for this end.

These laws assumed a definite method of procedure on the part of churches and congregations, such as is marked out in the Cambridge Platform. This Platform had a quasi-legal authority, having been commended to the churches by the General Court, and it was constantly appealed to as the standard in the discussions of those days.

Thus the churches of the olden time were accustomed to depend on the authority of the state for raising the money to support public worship. In the course of time they learned to follow legal forms and precedents, and to transact much of their most important business in a legal spirit and environment. There would sometimes be a doubt whether a council called to settle a minister had been legally called, and whether its proceedings were regular and valid; whether a minister had been "duly settled according to law;" whether a minister was "orthodox, able, learned, and of good conversation," within the meaning of the law; and whether he *continued* to possess all these excellent qualities. On the decision of these questions would depend his right to his *salary*, and also the right of the town, or parish, to assess a tax for his support. Sometimes the question would be raised whether a *town* which was supporting a minister had such a minister that it was not liable to be presented by the grand jury, and pros-

ecuted as a destitute town. These discussions and litigations were among the most characteristic things relating to the life and manners of our fathers.

Robert Breck, of Springfield, was the son of Rev. Robert Breck, of Marlboro', of whom the "Boston News-Letter" said: "He was an able minister, a man of great learning in the original languages of the Bible, and in philosophy, and also a man of great courage and prudence." His grandfather was Captain John Breck, "a very ingenious and worthy man." His great-grandfather was Edward Breck, a man of wealth and influence in England, who came to this country in 1636, and settled in Dorchester.

Robert Breck was born in Marlboro', Massachusetts, July 25, 1713, and entered Harvard College at the age of thirteen. His rank as a scholar is indicated by the fact that the President and Fellows awarded to him the honorary prize of thirty pounds as a "sober, diligent, and promising student, and candidate for the ministry." He was graduated with honor in 1730. It has been stated that he studied theology with his father, but as the father died the year after his son was graduated, it is probable that he continued his studies without an instructor. He began to preach while he was very young, according to the custom of those times. He was hardly more than twenty when we find him preaching in Scotland, a parish in Windham County, Connecticut, and at various other places in that colony. The young and untrained preacher was very free and bold in his utterances, and very early subjected himself to the charge of heresy, a charge which some of the pastors of the vicinity were disposed to press to his injury.

Some time in May, 1734, the First Church in Springfield invited him to preach as a candidate for settlement. He came, and preached to the acceptance of the people, so that after about three months the church and parish gave him a call, and proposed terms of settlement. He had then just passed his twenty-first birthday.

Soon after he came to Springfield there were reports passing from one to another that he was not sound in the faith. The people listened to his sermons, but failed to detect anything that savored of heresy. So far as the pamphlets¹ which were pub-

¹ *Narrative of the Proceedings of those Ministers of Hampshire County that have disapproved the Settlement of Mr. Robert Breck.* Boston, 1736.

Answer to the Above. Boston, 1736.

Letter to the Author of the Answer. Boston, 1737.

lished at the time, on both sides, give us claimed that there was anything unsound in his views after he came to Springfield. The Connecticut. A letter was received from the college, which stated that "Mr. Breck was to be employed in the ministry," and named him as one of the persons who were responsible for the charges put into the hands of Mr. Breck, who were to confer with Mr. Clap in respect to the charges. Mr. Breck was not satisfied with the result of the conference, and wrote a long letter to the Hampshire Association, in which he set forth the four charges against the pastor.

1. That he had denied that the passage in John viii., concerning the word "I am the light of the world," were of divine inspiration.

2. That he had also denied the necessity to divine justice for sin, and had said that it was consistent with his justice, forgive sin without punishment.

3. That he had preached that the heathen, who were in the light of nature, would be saved. Clap had said that they would be saved by the way revealed to them; or they would be saved by the way.

4. That there was a general report that he had been expelled from the college library, while a student, and that he had been expelled from college for this offense; and that Clap had informed him of these reports, and that he had denied them, and that his denial which was now known to be false.

In addition to all this it was stated that Mr. Breck had said publicly, that "if the deists were to be tolerated, he saw no encouragement for men to do what they would, they could do as they pleased; and that we were not under obligation to them; and that we were not under obligation to them; and that we had power."

These charges were the basis of the opposition to Mr. Breck. In reply to the charges, Mr. Breck said that it was unjust to use against him expressions which he had used in his earliest sermons, at a time when he was young; that these expressions did not express his matured views; that some of them had never been used

in oral discussion with pastors with whom he was discoursing, for the sake of clearing his own mind ; and also, that some of these statements were not inconsistent with the Confession of Faith. He asked to be judged, not by these early sermons, but by the sermons he had preached in his present pulpit, and he repeatedly invited those who questioned his orthodoxy to satisfy themselves by an examination as to his views in theology.

In respect to the charge of taking books from the library, he admitted that there had been a technical offense, which gave some color to the charge, but claimed that the offense, such as it was, was the fault of a boy of thirteen, and that it was so trivial that the faculty did not make it a matter of formal discipline, and that his subsequent deportment had been so exemplary that they had selected him as the student most worthy to receive the honorary prize. Mr. Breck also stated that he had never denied that there had been some foundation for the story, but had only denied it in the exaggerated form in which it had been reported. These are the leading points in the case as it is presented in the pamphlets and in the manuscripts which have been preserved.

Mr. Breck was informed that these reports had excited a degree of prejudice against him among the ministers of the vicinity, and that if he were to accept the call they might refuse to ordain him. He was also informed that they had exerted more or less influence with some members of his congregation. He therefore decided to refer the matter again to the people. He knew that he had the confidence of a large majority of his congregation, and that some of the pastors of the vicinity were satisfied as to his integrity and his orthodoxy, so that there would be no serious difficulty in securing ordination. "If one council will not do it," he said, "another will." With these views, he stated, in his reply to the call, that while he was disposed, on some accounts, to accept their invitation, he did not think the provision for his temporal support was sufficient, and that he could not accept the call unless they should see the way clear to increase it. The people were not quite agreed in the matter, and did not think it expedient to increase the salary. So that Mr. Breck finally declined the call and returned to his friends in Boston.

But the people were not satisfied. The records of the parish show that the majority believed that his settlement had been prevented by the intermeddling of "some persons of note who had sent writings to some of the ministers of this vicinity." The parish, therefore, appointed a committee, November 8th, to find

out how much ground there was for the charges against Mr. B. and also to learn more definitely the views of the ministers. response to their inquiries six of the pastors, among whom was the name of Jonathan Edwards, signed a paper, which read follows:—

“Upon consideration of the case of Mr. Robert Breck, presented to us in some letters from Windham and Norwich, we think it advisable that the people of Springfield do no further receive their application to him.”

The committee reported, and the people considered the advice. Six weeks later the freeholders and other inhabitants assembled according to law, voted “that application be made to the town of Mr. Robert Breck to preach the word of God to us in this parish in order to a settlement.” This vote was passed by a decided majority, and a committee was chosen to proceed to Cambridge to make investigations, ask advice, and act according to their judgment. The result was that Mr. Breck returned to Springfield and began to preach again. This open disregard of the advice of the ministers of the vicinity seems to have been unusual, and had the effect to lead them to enter more directly into the case. A majority of them seem to have thought that it would be an infringement of their rights to settle a minister within the town in opposition to their advice. The next stage in the business was the effort of the association to investigate the charges against Mr. Breck. They entered into correspondence with various parties in Connecticut; and also induced Mr. Breck to write to Mr. Clap, endeavoring to make his peace with him. They invited Mr. Breck to attend the meeting of the association in April, 1735, and made such statement as he thought proper with reference to the charges. He seems to have accepted their proposals in good faith. He wrote a letter to Mr. Clap in which he made such acknowledgments and concessions as he thought proper, but he failed to satisfy that gentleman. He also read to the association a paper which was quite satisfactory to some of the pastors, but not to the majority. Six out of thirteen ministers now took his part, and remained his friends to the end. He next asked the association to satisfy themselves as to his theological views by an oral examination. The majority declined to do this, on the ground that charges were already pending against him. At this stage of the business a committee from the First Parish appeared before the association to inquire “what impediment, if any, there was to the settlement of Mr. Breck; and if such impediment existed, how it could be removed.”

This was designed to open the way for a formal examination of the charges of Mr. Clap and others from Connecticut. Mr. Breck and his friends were prepared to welcome such an investigation, but they asked to be permitted to name one or two of the persons who were to pass upon the case. The association appointed seven of their own members to hear the whole case and to give their judgment. It was pointed out to them that several of these gentlemen had already prejudged the case, and expressed their opinion publicly. Mr. Breck offered to go on with the investigation if one of the committee would retire, or if, that gentleman remaining, he might call in two unprejudiced persons from outside the county. These propositions were declined by the majority, and so the proposed investigation failed.

At this stage of the business the First Church in Springfield, on the 17th of April, renewed their call to Mr. Breck, and one week later the parish voted to concur. It appeared that a decided majority of the church and congregation were very earnest to secure the permanent settlement of the young preacher as their pastor. It remained to be seen whether the minority of the people, aided by the majority of the association, would be able to prevent it. Mr. Breck, made wiser by the experiences of the year, acted with a degree of prudence and foresight which he had not before shown. He first sent a communication to the people, in which he said that, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, he should seek advice from his friends before he gave an answer to their call. He went soon after to Boston, and requested the pastors of that city, who were well known throughout the Province, to examine him as to his views in theology. This they did, and as a result gave him a certificate¹ that they had found him sound in the faith. They say: "These may certify that on the 8th day of May, 1735, we discoursed with Robert Breck, M. A., to our good satisfaction, concerning his orthodoxy in the great doctrines of Christianity, as believed and professed in the churches of Christ in New England, agreeable to the Westminster Confession of Faith; and so recommend him to the grace of God, and are his brethren in Christ."

With this indorsement he returned to Springfield, and on the

¹ This was signed by Benjamin Coleman, Joseph Sewall, John Webb, William Cooper, Thomas Foxcroft, Samuel Checkley, Joshua Gee, and Mather Byles. One of them said afterwards: "I can assure you that his examination was not a slighty one, if the ability and fidelity of the eight ministers that were concerned in it can be relied on."

vation. It was also claimed that they had a right to go outside the county for members of the council, as there was nothing in the Cambridge platform to forbid it; and that in this case it was necessary in order to secure an impartial council.

It is not easy to understand, at this distance of time, the intense interest which this case excited, not only at Springfield, but in other parts of New England. The members of the council from Boston went to Springfield a week in advance of the meeting of the council, in order to consult with the ministers of the vicinity, and learn from them directly the grounds of their opposition. How abundant the leisure of those pastors of the olden time! It is a hundred miles from Boston to Springfield, and the stage-coaches, or ministerial chaises, of those days would be more than one day on the journey. Yet they went from town to town in the Connecticut valley, and tried to induce the pastors to submit their complaints against Mr. Breck to the council. When the time for the meeting of the council came, the ministers of the county were present in Springfield to watch the proceedings, and to use their influence to prevent the ordination. The President of Yale College was also there, as the champion of orthodoxy, to direct the measures of the opposition. Rev. Thomas Clap and a number of other pastors from Connecticut were there, with documents to be presented to the council. It was confidently asserted by the opponents of Mr. Breck that whatever the council might do, "there would be no ordination."

In order to secure the fulfillment of this prediction, the dissatisfied members of the parish had induced three justices of the Court of Sessions to come from Northampton to Springfield, with the purpose of using the authority of the court, if necessary, to prevent the council from completing the service for which it had been convened. It was afterwards proved before the General Court that it was at first intended to arrest all the members of the council who had come from outside the county, and lock them up in jail, on the ground that their attempt to sit as members of a council in Hampshire County was an unlawful act, — an usurpation of power, — to the great injury of the minority. Warrants were actually made out for their arrest, but as one of the justices was doubtful as to their right to issue them, this plan was abandoned. The second plan was to arrest Mr. Breck, and hold him in custody until the council should adjourn.

We may well suppose that when the day for the meeting of the council came business was suspended in Springfield, and that the

people were eagerly watching the proceedings in the morning, not in the church, but in the house of Mr. Brewer, the widow of the last pastor. Several invited were represented by pastors and laymen from Hatfield, of which the venerable Willis Hatfield declined to respond, on the ground that the proceedings were and illegal. The council organized by Mr. Cooper, of Boston, Moderator. Their first business was to read the facts in the case before them. Two papers were read. The first was a remonstrance against the right of the church "to call itself a council" to ordain Mr. Breck, a Unitarian, Jr., Esq., and others of the minority. The second was a protest against the right of the church to do so, signed by six pastors of the county. After considering these papers, and the reasons in support of them, voted: "That the elders of the First Church in Springfield to join in the ordination of Mr. Breck, and are read in the case."

The council next called upon those who wished to present the evidence in support of the charges against him. This they declined to do, on the ground that they could not recognize the body then in session as a council. The Moderator next asked Rev. Mr. Kirkland, the authors of the charges, to read the evidence, whatever they knew against the candidate for the ministry. Mr. Clap proceeded to read the documents, most of them sworn to before the ordination of Mr. Breck while he was in the pulch. These papers cover the whole case, and contain all which the minority based their opposition upon. A full copy is in the pamphlet published by the Hays. As Mr. Clap finished reading the papers, a Unitarian commenced his reply, an officer entered the room for the arrest of "Robert Breck, gentleman," and took him forthwith before the court then in session. "To answer for such things as should be answered," Breck was taken by the officer from the court-house. Proclamation was made that the council was about the principles or the character of Mr.

ward and give testimony. Mr. Clap and Mr. Kirkland came forward and presented the evidence which they had just read to the council, with some additional statements. Mr. Breck was also examined by the justices as to his theological opinions. The evidence tended to show that he was not sound in the faith, and also that he had charged various persons with misrepresentation and falsehood. The old charge of taking books from the college library was also referred to in the testimony as a matter of common report. The proceedings seem to have been of the nature of an inquiry into the character of the candidate and his fitness to be a settled minister under the laws of the Province.

These proceedings of the secular power had the effect, of course, of suspending the session of the ecclesiastical court. Before adjourning, however, they sent a vigorous protest to the court, in which they say that they "consider it a duty not only to the church in Springfield, but to the churches which they represent, and to all the churches of Christ throughout the Province, to inform the court that when they sent their officer to apprehend Mr. Breck they were regularly and legally convened in council, at the desire of the church in Springfield, for the regular carrying on the ordination of said Mr. Breck, according to the order of the gospel in the churches of New England, and were actually hearing the charges against him when the court saw fit to wrest the case out of their hands." Having sent their protest, the council waited for the result. Mr. Breck was held in custody until night, and the justices gave orders to their officer to hold him till the next day. But certain members of the council gave their word that he should appear when called for, and he was permitted to go to his lodgings.

The council reassembled early in the morning, and continued the hearing of the case. Mr. Clap and Mr. Kirkland made oral statements as to the additional testimony they had given in court. The justices soon sent for Mr. Breck, and held him until late in the afternoon, when they made out a warrant which directed the sheriff to take him to Windsor, in the Colony of Connecticut, and deliver him into the custody of the County Court, "there to answer for those things which might be objected against him." He was taken to Windsor, and delivered to the officers of the court. He was permitted to give bonds for his appearance at a subsequent time to answer to a charge concerning the doctrines which he had preached while within that colony.

These proceedings increased very much the excitement among

the people at Springfield. The church gathered to attend him, "in token of respect as their people gave evident marks of their affection through the town." The next day they assembled at his house to pray for his safe return. There was a large and weeping assembly." A day or two later he returned to Springfield, and the council resumed its consideration more fully the charges and the testimony against him, and listened to his reply. The decisive act was a Confession of Faith which he drew up for the council, as a statement of his mature opinion concerning the leading truths of the gospel.¹ It is a serious and plain declaration following substantially the Westminster Catechism, renouncing most of the errors which had been prevalent in preaching in Connecticut. After reciting his personal belief, he said: "This is the scheme of Christianity which I have learned from the Holy Scriptures, and which I am now self obliged to teach others in the best manner. At the same time I put them that profess to be Christians on edge of these things may be enlarged, my faith may be strengthened, and that I may be enabled always to keep a true faith in a pure conscience." This confession was read to the whole council. It was then read to a great assembly gathered in the street in front of the house which was holding its sessions; and was subsequently read to the congregation at his ordination.

¹ In this confession, which is too long to insert in full, he declares his belief in one God, who is also triune; in the Holy Scriptures as the authority, and which have been preserved by God's providence; in the decrees of God, by which, whatsoever is to befall, has been foreordained from all eternity, — "yet so as to be for the best of His creatures, or make Himself the Author of all evil"; in the government of the world; in the first covenant with Adam, and his first estate, which involved the race "in his guilt"; in the covenant of redemption, and the vicarious sacrifice of Christ, which satisfied divine justice for the sins of the elect, and in the work of the Holy Spirit, "who makes effectual application of Christ's redemption to the souls of men;" in the necessity of holiness, which is spiritually good, and the necessity of the work of the Almighty Spirit; in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ; in the justification; in the work of sanctification; in the perseverance of the saints; the eternal separation of the righteous from the wicked for life eternal, and the wicked for everlasting punishment.

full consideration of the case, came to a Result, in which they said, that they found that Mr. Breck had been regularly called by a very great majority of the church and precinct of Springfield ; and also that he was sound in the faith, and of good conversation ; so that they advise the people " to continue their regards for him." " Nevertheless," they say, " having met with an unusual interposition and hindrance in carrying on the work upon which we were called, we do not think it advisable to proceed further herein at this time, but that this council be adjourned " to meet in Boston, October 21st. The Moderator remained in Springfield over the Sabbath, and read this result to the congregation.

The object of the adjournment was not only to allow time for the excitement to subside, but also to test the legality of the interference of the secular authorities with the work of the council. Two weeks later the church appointed a committee to bring the matter before the General Court. This committee presented a memorial to the General Court on the 25th of November, in which they stated the fact of the call of Mr. Breck by a very great majority of the church and precinct, and the convening of a council for his ordination, and say that " on the day appointed for that solemnity John Stoddard, Ebenezer Pomeroy, and Timothy Dwight, Esqrs., his Majesty's justices of the peace for the County of Hampshire, had caused him to be arrested and taken from the aforesaid ecclesiastical council, and brought before them, and that they examined him touching divers points of doctrine ; and, further, that by a warrant from the said justices, he was sent to Windsor, in the Colony of Connecticut, where he was bound over by the County Court to answer to a charge touching his doctrines." They ask the General Court to decide whether these proceedings have been according to law, and if not, to grant such redress as the case admits.

The journals of the General Court show that the case was very fully considered by that body. It was first assigned to the 5th of December, at which time the papers were read. It was voted to inquire into the matter of complaint, and to appoint a committee to report what action ought to be taken. Notice was sent to the justices at Northampton, and to other parties interested. The General Court heard not only the committee from Springfield, but Mr. Breck, and the Moderator of the council, and various other persons. The matter was before the Court December 5th and 6th, 9th, 24th, 26th, and 27th. The decision was, first, that the council was duly called, and was properly and legally a coun-

reference to the case in the records of the parish, it is probable that it never came before the court for trial.

These proceedings were followed by a number of pamphlets, which are the authentic sources of information concerning these matters. The first was published in Boston, 1736, a few months after the ordination had taken place. It is entitled "A Narrative of the Proceedings of those Ministers of the County of Hampshire that have disapproved the Settlement of Mr. Robert Breck." It is a vigorous pamphlet of about one hundred pages. This was followed the same year by "An Answer to the Hampshire Narrative." This also contains one hundred pages. It is said to have been written by Rev. William Cooper, of Boston. The next year appeared another thick pamphlet, with the title, "A Letter to the Author of the Answer to the Narrative."

While these proceedings in court and this war of pamphlets were going on, the young pastor set himself to conciliate the opposition among his people. He gave himself to the duties of his office with exemplary fidelity. It is said of him, that if he wished any favor he would ask it from some one of his people who had been unfriendly. Such an expression of his confidence won their good will. He chose his wife wisely also. He married, a few weeks after his ordination, Eunice Brewer, the daughter of his predecessor, who had been universally loved and revered. He invited Rev. Stephen Williams, of Longmeadow, who had been one of the most decided of his opponents, to perform the marriage ceremony, and this act of courtesy is said to have modified his opposition. In a few years he was accepted by his brethren in the ministry, as well as by his people, as a minister "able, learned, orthodox, and of good conversation."

Mr. Breck was the pastor of the church in Springfield forty-eight years. The church grew with the town, and its minister became a man of great influence in the Connecticut valley. It is more than a hundred years since his death, but the traditions concerning him at Springfield are still fresh, and he is held in great esteem and veneration. His funeral sermon was preached by Dr. Lathrop, of West Springfield, who had been a student in divinity under him. In this sermon he said: "His intellectual powers were naturally superior, and were brightened by his education, and enlarged by an extensive acquaintance with men and books. He accustomed himself to a close manner of reasoning and thinking, and filled up his time with diligent application. History was his amusement, divinity his study; he excelled in

both, especially the latter. He was an accomplished gentleman and an exemplary Christian. His attendance on the duties of his profession was constant, his preparations for the sermons were mature, his public prayers were deliberate and solemn, his sermons were full of thought, — dressed in the most proper language, and communicated in the easiest manner. His sentiments were formed on a careful examination of the scriptures, without servile attachment to sects or systems. His mode of thinking was liberal yet Scriptural, exalted yet humble.

Such was the man as he seemed to his contemporaries at the close of a pastorate of half a century.

Ezra Hoyt Byington.

WORCESTER, MASS.

REVIVAL OF HINDUISM.

INDIA is to-day the scene of remarkable changes. Not since the advent and conquest of Buddhism, twenty-five centuries ago, can compare with it. The Buddhistic movement was religious in its character, while the present convulsion is threefold — intellectual, political, and religious. No country, it be Japan, has waked from its ignorance of ages to a more insatiable thirst for knowledge than the India of to-day. Western education is the present craze; and nearly all Hindus, from the intellectual Brahman to the vulgar crass menial, aspire to it for their sons, at least, the rudiments of an English education, and thousands now flock to the high schools and colleges, and are found all over the land, and freely imbibe Western thought and culture.

It is true that even to-day there is in India only one pupil in a hundred for every sixty-five of the population; and the 10,000 students of the eighty-two colleges of the land are a small number. Comparing this with the past, however, and remembering the powerful and extensive influence of natives of Western culture and university training, — how their *ipse dixit* is revered as law in the communities in which they live, — we may somewhat appreciate the influence of this movement.

From this, in great part, has been wrought a great transformation also in the political conceptions and aspirations of many of the people. The great mass of the natives have even yet no high

ambition than that of being well governed by a strong hand. To them a benevolent despotism is the ideal government. But there is a very influential and noisy class of men, — mostly graduates and undergraduates of the three universities of India, — the goal of whose ambition is political freedom and equality through representative institutions; whose motto is “India for Indians,” and who have already learned the value of agitation and the power of organization. In the hands of these political reformers and agitators the ignorant masses are plastic, and are too often, at a rehearsal of their supposed wrongs by orator and editor, roused to a pitch of excitement against a government which compares favorably with that of any other land, and which is incomparably the best that India has ever enjoyed. The National Congress — a most interesting political machine — is one of the offsprings of this movement; and its power is already felt even in the English Parliament, and its reflex educating influence upon the people is very marked.

But the greatest of these convulsions in India to-day is the religious one. Brahmanism is exercised as never before in view of the mighty conflict which has been thrust upon it by enemies such as it never met before, and such as have led vast hosts of its devotees to desert it, and to laugh at its superstitions and ceremonies. Devout Hindus have thus been driven, as never before, to bestir themselves in defense of their faith, and in manifold efforts to remove the cankering doubts and unbelief of the people. Their chief concern, however, has been to meet in some way the deadly attacks from without, and to readjust their faith in such a way as to adapt it to meet the demands of growing knowledge, advancing intelligence, and scientific methods. It is this panorama of successive effort and ever-varying reform that is denominated the “Revival of Hinduism.”

The occasion of this religious activity is threefold — Western education, Western civilization, and Christianity. Few can appreciate the inroads which occidental thoughts and habits have made into the religion of this land. A glimpse of it may be enjoyed by observing the changes which have recently overtaken caste, that most powerful and subtle institution of Brahmanism. Without the cementing, conserving influence of caste Hinduism would probably not survive this century. Caste fosters ignorance, breeds superstition, creates schisms, and perpetuates all manner of divisions. It is the tyrant which enforces all the mean and petty mandates of ancient custom, and mercilessly crushes every infant

aspiration and faint yearning for independence. And yet how transformed is this institution fifty years ago! The leaven of Western civilization has worked mightily within it. There which Western civilization has introduced its avowed enemies of the hydra-headed modern these agencies — the railroad — it has been done more to level the distinctions and to caste than any other agency known. It much towards obliterating from the public special sanctity belongs to the body of even a well-dressed Pariah's person is the of ceremonial impurity.

The chief function of Western education is to foster discontent with, and complete separation of, ideas and customs. In this work they have shot light on vulgar superstitions; they have shot light on Hindu mythology, exposing and making of the past; they have even opened to sealed Vedas, and have done more to enlighten these than did the occult wisdom of India. They can now learn that these books, which they thought them to be, — the pure gold of India, — such as contain "a few gems in a great mass," the consequence is that the people have learned to question puerilities, inconsistencies, falsehoods, and books, and question more and more the scriptures "to guide them into saving truth and to elevate and transformed the Hindu's conduct and dignity and authority of conscience; in with a lofty ideal of noble manhood, of only the faintest glimmerings.

Above all, Christianity, which is the soul of Western civilization and culture, has been the land. While holding aloft its gospel of universal love, claiming to all Christ, the Saviour of the world, the building up a flourishing church in India more than any one fully appreciates its power over religion and childish superstitions of the present religious ferment throughout the world is not measured simply by the millions who have broken with their idolatrous past and to re-

life. To many its best work and chief glory lie in its leavening influence upon Hinduism itself, and in the movements which it has inspired, if not created, among the most enlightened and devout Hindus towards reforming, Westernizing, and, in part, Christianizing their own religion. Chunder Sen said, "It is Christ and not the British Government that governs India. Our hearts have been conquered not by armies, not by your gleaming bayonets and fiery cannon, but by a higher and different power; and that power is Christ." The most able and conspicuous Brahmist now living, Mr. Mozoomder, recently confessed that the Brahmist movement is the direct offspring of Christianity. And the leading Hindu reformer in South India, Dewan Raganatha Rao, has recently framed a new creed of Reformed or "Vedic" Hinduism, which is theologically almost an exact duplicate of the Westminster Catechism!

The manifestation and working of this new religious life is twofold. It is directed both to efforts among Hindus to reform their religion from within, and to organized endeavors to protect it from enemies without.

Among the former class India has witnessed the rise and progress of several distinct movements during the last quarter of a century.

The Brahmo Samaj had its origin in Bengal. Like Buddhism, it is a protest against the inane polytheism and coarse idolatry of its day. It is in no sense a popular movement, and has little tendency to percolate from the high intellectual and moral stratum whence it originated to the lower tastes and yearnings of the people. Characteristically enough, the Brahmists have already become divided into at least four different *samajes*, or sects. And these represent men of every shade of religious thought, — from those who part company with only the grossest evils of Hinduism to those who, like the late Chunder Sen and other members of the "New Dispensation," bow only to a dim shadow of an ideal Hinduism, exalt Christ above all in their affections, and breathe their religious aspirations in a right Christian manner! They, indeed, use the terminology of the East, but are more than enamored of the spirit of the West.

Encouraging though this movement be in its intellectual and spiritual aspect, it seems doubtful whether even the most progressive division of this movement — the "New Dispensation" — has really been emancipated from two of the greatest evils of modern Hinduism, idolatry and formalism. For they are now torn asun-

Samajes of India have done anything as yet towards popularizing their doctrines. Oblivious to the teaching of history, as also to the dictates of sound wisdom, they fain would prove the divine origin and superior character of their religion by pointing to its ability to gratify the intelligence of the few, rather than by showing its power to draw and satisfy the spiritual yearnings of the many. Thus far they have indulged too freely and exclusively in ornate public prayers and grandiloquent addresses — all in English; so that the movement savors more of an intellectual and moral renaissance than it does of a religious revival.

In South India the religious quickening is slightly visible in a few branches of the Brahmo Samaj. It appears mainly, however, in an unorganized, but energetic and earnest, body of intelligent men under the leadership of Dewan Raganath Rao. They do not hesitate to denounce, in unmeasured terms, the corruption of the popular Hinduism of the day, and to propose and proclaim "Vedic Hinduism" as the only heaven-born religion. The Dewan, with his party, believe in the full inspiration of the Vedas, and are confident that they teach monotheism and universal brotherhood. But while they base "Vedic Hinduism" upon the Vedas, they do not hesitate to accept almost all the sacred books of Hindus as a part of their "Scriptures," including those very books which sanction and enforce idolatry and caste, those prime evils which they profess to fight! This movement does not outwardly break with Hinduism. Its object is to reform the ancestral faith from within, and to refashion it after the ancient simplicity and purity of "Vedic Hindus." It is a habit of Hindus to indulge in platitudes concerning the golden age of the remote past, — a thing which, fortunately or unfortunately, they can do without much fear of contradiction, as they have no written history of the past, which they therefore paint with the glory and beauty of an imagination which is disgusted with the present.

The task of this party is a very hopeless one. It reminds one of Sisyphus and the stone. The good which they place before themselves is a very questionable one, as Western savants who have studied the Vedas clearly show. Moreover, they have already separated themselves so far from orthodox Hinduism as to be suspected by conservatives in much that they do.

Some time ago the Dewan, at the invitation of the writer, visited Madura in order to deliver a couple of lectures on social reform, for he is an eloquent speaker on this subject also.

On this occasion he sought opportunity for discussion with the

orthodox priests and conservative pandits. But after no little preliminary parleying they found it impossible to settle a basis of discussion. The question arose on the threshold of their discussion, What shall we regard as our Scriptures or authority on the subject? Under the Dewan's definition of Scripture were included seven classes of authorities, including commentaries on their "inspired" books, and also the human conscience! The priests insisted upon adding astrological works also — a class of books whereby, as both parties well knew, they could prove anything they pleased. The Dewan demurred to this; and after three hours' fighting on this point they abandoned every hope of discussing the great question; and the Dewan left the town with very vigorous expressions of contempt for the ignorant and bigoted priests.

The Dewan is an excellent old gentleman, and eloquent in his pleas for a purified Aryan religion. But like all his fellow "Aryans," he is wanting in the religious strength and heroism necessary to exemplify his teaching and enforce his beliefs, even in his own family. In Western lands a reformer is preëminently a man of convictions, and of unswerving allegiance to the same. In India few of the myriad "reformers" ever dream that their vocation calls them to do aught else than to preach — practice is what they eloquently urge upon their audiences! One true reformer — a bold man of action — could do more good than ten thousands of the parrot reformers of India; and for such a man the land is yearning. And yet this Hindu reform movement is doing much good in South India. It is judiciously vague in its teaching, and yet most of the educated men of this Presidency, who take any interest whatever in religious matters, side with this reform party as against orthodoxy; and the best and strongest native paper in South India is pledged to its hearty support.

In addition to the above-mentioned efforts there has been initiated recently in South India a movement by the orthodox Hindu community for the defense of their faith, or, more correctly, for the destruction of the great enemy of their faith — Christianity. This work is almost exclusively supported and conducted by men who are wed to Brahmanism for good or for evil in all that it inculcates and practices. They uphold idolatry, and endeavor to prove its excellence; they glory in caste as a divine institution. The Hindu Tract Society and Preaching Society of Madras are the result and embodiment of this movement. Thus organized it has shown much more vigor and push than all the other move-


ments put together. Being conservative, and inspired by an active hatred of Christianity, it is a grand rallying point to all who oppose Western ideas and innovations of any kind.

The work done is twofold — the printing and distribution of tracts, and the training, commissioning, and support of preachers. Branch societies have already been established in several other cities of the Presidency ; and the movement is actively supported in nearly all the important towns of South India. In its methods it is purely polemic, in its aim destructive, and in its spirit grossly abusive. Neither in its tracts nor in its preachers does it condescend to attempt any defense of Brahmanism. The writer has read nearly all its eighteen tracts, and is familiar with some of its preachers, and has yet to discover in all the first argument in defense of their faith. It is all one long tirade — a scurrilous abuse of Christianity, Christ, and Christians, — especially missionaries. Their literature and addresses are unrelieved by any appeal to reason or recourse to sense. Consequently their object of arousing the blind passions of the people against Christianity and its adherents has in several cases been realized in persecution and riot. In Madura these tracts and preachers led, last year, to riot and abuse of our Christians. Some of the rioters were subsequently tried and imprisoned, and the principal emissary of the society was practically expelled from the town by the civil authorities.

Another method pursued by the president and agents of this society is that of clandestinely working among the students of mission institutions, painting before them supposed grievances, rousing their prejudices against the “wily padre” and his institutions, expatiating upon the supposed evils of Christianity, and working them up generally to a state of revolt.

The Madras Christian College rebellion of last year would have been impossible but for this society ; and the several insurrections of the last two years in other mission institutions had the same origin. Their most violent abuse is heaped upon the devoted head of the Christian street-preacher and upon mission schools. The Christian critics of mission educational work might study this movement with profit as revealing a conviction among the Hindus themselves that mission schools are a potent factor in leading the people to Christ.

It has been interesting, even amusing, to the missionary to see the Hindus, during the last few years, courting theosophy as an ally in the work of opposing and defaming Christianity in India.



example and teaching, are exerting a powerful influence in this direction.

Through this revival Christianity will enjoy a more dignified work and a more speedy triumph in India. Formerly the most discouraging thing which missionaries had to meet in this land was stolid indifference — that well-known smile of assent and nod of approval which, in nearly all cases, meant rather an absence than the presence of serious thought. Hitherto we have also had to battle hard with deep, deep ignorance and pachydermatous superstition. By this religious movement the people are led to think, to inquire, and to reason. They are beginning to resort to argument as well as to custom as an arbiter in religious matters. All this means success to missions and a triumph to our religion, which needs only to have its sweet reasonableness understood in order to be loved and embraced.

These very results are already appearing. Even the bitterness and irrationality of many of the attacks of Hindus upon Christianity is a confession of the weakness of their own cause and of their want of faith in its rationality. And when we see many Hindus seriously thinking on these things, and know of such men as Mr. Joshee (who recently visited America with his wife, now deceased) publicly abjuring their ancestral religion and confessing Christ, we understand its significance and rejoice in the assurance that these are but the first fruits of this new sowing — the first trophies of the mighty conquest which Christ is beginning to enjoy over all this great land.

J. P. Jones.

MADURA, INDIA.

EDITORIAL.

THE WASTE IN PREACHING.

CANON TWELLS, in one of his racy Colloquies on Preaching, introduces his readers to the following conversation between the rector and vicar in the study of a country rectory. The vicar, as he enters the study, finds the rector surrounded by manuscripts and proof-sheets:—

“What learned work is shortly to electrify the world?”

“I have made up my mind to publish some sermons.”

“I am delighted to hear it. Somehow I am not often pleased or edified with published sermons, but I am quite sure that it will be otherwise with yours.”

“What do you think I am going to call my intended volume?”

“I cannot guess. Most titles, more or less obvious, have already been appropriated. Of ‘Questions of the Day,’ ‘Problems of the Age,’ and so forth, we have had enough and to spare. ‘Village Sermons,’ ‘Parish Sermons,’ and ‘Plain Sermons,’ are commoner still. Have you hit on anything new?”

“I am going to call it ‘Lost Labor.’”

There is a great deal of seriousness, as any one will see by reading on, under the sarcasm of this title. Sarcasm about themselves is the way in which some men express their seriousness. Interpret the pleasantry of some ministers about their own sermons, and you have at the bottom of it the complaint of their souls. “Lost labor” is the refrain of many a good preacher in the sober afterthought of his work. And the genuineness of the complaint lies in the fact that it is an expression not so much of intellectual as of moral regret, not that the man has made a failure, but that the truth has lost a chance.

Of course it is to be conceded at once that very much of dissatisfaction may follow as a reaction from the best preaching—the better the preaching the greater the reaction in some temperaments. Of course it is to be conceded that a preacher is not to judge of results by his moods or by his knowledge. He works in the region of the unseen and the unknown. Of course, too, it is to be conceded that it requires a vast expenditure of power in preaching, and in very good preaching, to maintain things as they are. The fact that the church holds its place amid the forces of modern society, which are so largely brain forces, can be explained on no other ground than that of the present power of the pulpit. But after these and like concessions have been made the conviction remains, supported, we believe, no less by a preacher's own consciousness than by general observation, that a part of preaching fails because it ought to fail. It would be unnatural, contrary to reason, confusing to the last degree to all ordinary working principles, if it should succeed.

Not a little of preaching, as we conceive, is wasted through the failure

of the average preacher to make sufficient *moral* use of his personality. We are persuaded that the majority of preachers do not appear to be half as much in earnest as they are — the impression does not do justice to the fact. The art of preaching, like the morality of it, consists in making the communication of truth correspond precisely to the apprehension and experience of it. When the attempt is made to communicate more truth than one has in personal possession, or when feeling is simulated, preaching becomes unmoral, and if persisted in, immoral. But this is not the danger of the majority. Their danger is that they will not really communicate the truth they have, or express the feeling they have about it. The truth they utter lacks the full moral support of their personality, and to the degree in which it lacks that fails of impression. For the law is, which one readily can test as he listens to others, that the impression of a truth follows not the truth itself, but the manifestation of its power over the one who utters it.

There are various reasons for this failure of the majority of preachers to make full moral use of their personality, apart from the inability of some to do it. There are men who cannot express themselves.

One reason specially operative at the present time lies, as it seems to us, in the false application of the idea of power in reserve or under repression. The idea is right. Nothing is more effective than the sense a speaker may give of thought in reserve or of feeling repressed. But the fact is always necessary to the effect. Power in reserve naturally gives repose of manner, but we cannot reason back from repose to power. The one sign of power under all conditions is vitality. One man reads his sermon without gesture, hardly with uplifted eye, but his words, how they burn and smite. The action is in the style. Another man stands and talks, but his whole personality speaks. Assume either man's manner and you must have the equivalent of his power in style or personality. In some way the preacher must make himself felt. That is his first and last business. The truth we can get elsewhere. What we want of him is inspiration, convincement, incentive, and persuasion. Vehemence we have cast out of the pulpit, but the repose which even suggests indifference or the want of spiritual vitality can never fill the vacancy.

Another reason, operative with some temperaments, appears to be a certain want of timeliness in the preparation for preaching, by which we mean that the intellectual and the emotional are not always made to act in conjunction. As a result, when the time comes to preach the intellectual element is found to be immature, or the emotional element has become a spent force. To be able to utter a truth in heat, and yet when it has taken form and shape and reached its great conclusion — that is preaching. But what preacher has not felt the fires burning low or dying out under the process of elaboration? The truth wrought out in the sermon, — that is not the truth that laid hold upon the heart and

cried out for utterance. Of course the greater experiences in are the reverse of this, when the truth grows warmer as clearer, when it flames as it expands, and finally comes forth radiant in its own light, but touched with the emotion it has. Touched with emotion — that is the touch which makes the old the common fresh. As a quaint old commentator said after Paul's words to the Philippians, "I have told you often and you *weeping*," "Ah, Paul, that makes it a new truth! You said just that before."

But the chief reason, we are convinced, why preachers do enough moral use of their personality grows out of their failure to render themselves absolutely to those truths which have most power to possess and master them. A preacher can, if he will, declare but not the whole truth, or rather the whole truth will best get through him as he preaches that truth most real to him, with the most might. Mere completeness is only another name for the common. Why should we expect more of a man than of an age? In every age the church some truth has gathered up into itself pretty much the motive which had any effect upon the age. Motive does not lose its equilibrium of truth, or in the consistency of its parts, or in its completeness, but in the truth, whatever it may be, which is most appropriate to the most felt, most fitted to the present need and the present use. The truths which are gathered up all other truths which the preacher has use at all. The characteristic of the great preachers has been a comparatively small range of their working truths. Some ruling conception of God, carrying with it the appropriate view of human life in its history and destiny, has been their constant theme. And their surrender to that conception, whatever it may have been, has given them their power. Their preaching has had about it one unmistakable mark — the quality. They never repeat themselves, their theme yields in variety, but they are always repeating their truth. It appears again and again in all their utterances. They blaze their way through their time by the truth which masters them, "the master light of seeing." We can retrace their steps not by the marks of style but by the ruling ideas and motives. Let no one say that this means the restriction of truth, or a one-sided presentation of it. It means simply the inexorable condition of preaching. When the preacher ventures beyond that, be his range large or small, he is as weak as any other man whose strength has departed from him. Reality is restriction, that is all that is allowed, but it is the straitening of a man to his task. Of the measurements of truth, the preacher may have length and breadth, the more territory he can own the better, but he must have height and depth, the possession of the truth which lifts him to God, which makes him also at the heart of humanity.

We pass to a waste which is much more evident to the public.

that which comes from the failure to utilize the moral power of personality, a waste which often calls out in a very brusque way the public criticism. The charge is that sermons are not conceived under conditions sympathetic with the thought and feeling of many whom they ought to reach. The deficiency charged, it is to be noted, is in sympathy not in love, a distinction which can be easily understood, as a preacher very soon comes to learn that it is not enough to love men in order to reach them. There must be sympathy, the fellow feeling, the feeling with one's fellow where he feels most, or with the class of one's fellows where the feeling is deepest. No one asks, so far as we know, that preaching should be secularized. Certainly the secularized classes do not ask for it. Neither do men ask that the preacher should discuss the subjects of their daily concern, or to any large extent even their grievances. What they do ask for is that truth should be conceived from their point of view and of feeling. Is the demand unreasonable?

In what does the unselfishness of the ministry consist? Does it not consist in this, that the preacher shall endeavor to put himself in the place of other men, to understand and interpret them, to get their view of life, of truth, and of God, or if they have no intelligent views about these, that he shall try to feel about them as they feel? We grant the educating power of the ministry, the power it has to train men to think and feel religiously; but that assumes contact already made. Suppose we wish to enlarge the constituency of the church, to extend the work of Christ among men through the pulpit, not simply through charities and missions, what is the first condition of success? Is it not in some cases intellectual sympathy, in others moral sympathy?

Let us take one or two illustrations. We are just emerging from the conflict of Religion and Science. The position of the pulpit during this conflict has been a very trying one. Its own unscientific training, the fear of the church, the arrogance of some scientists, all combined to provoke in some preachers the spirit of denunciation or hostile criticism. On the whole, the restraint of the pulpit has been more than could have been expected. But we can now see, now that the church has caught the scientific spirit and has begun to apply the scientific method, — we can now see how much the more Christian scientific minds have been obliged to endure at the hands of the ministry in its want of appreciation of their view of truth. Not that they asked the ministry to accept their theories, much less to promulgate them, but that they have craved intellectual sympathy. Men self-centred in their Christianity, like Asa Gray, could maintain their own Christian position, but how many minds more uncertain, less reverent, easily offended, have been alienated from the church and from Christianity we may never know.

An illustration more pertinent is at hand. We are entering upon a period of most serious agitation in respect to social problems. The present demand upon the pulpit is more comprehensive than in the case just

cited. The scientist asked only for intellectual sympathy. The socialist asks for intellectual and moral sympathy. The scientist had no grievances. The socialist has, yet he does not want charity. He wants sympathy — the understanding of his point of view, the appreciation of his social position. And now, what is the condition in which this new demand finds the ordinary ministry of the country, and especially of New England? Most preachers, even some who have endured no little personal hardship, have become accustomed to a religion of prosperity. They have preached to prosperous people. They have tried to study their temptations, they have tried to teach them their duties. And these people who fill the churches, though sharing in the materialism of the time, are yet by inheritance possessed of generations of mental and spiritual culture. Meanwhile the people who make the present demand upon the ministry are different at every outward point. They are a new people, without a past. They are the exclusive product of industrialism. Whatever their nationality, they date to a common origin. Each generation is born into the atmosphere of materialism. As it learns to think it is trained to think away from the church and outside Christianity. Mr. Huxley said, in apologizing for appearing before a Young Men's Christian Association, that he lived in an extra Christian world. Here is another extra Christian world, peopled with what we now fitly call the masses. They are in the stage of rights, not of duties. Their temptations are born of their condition, their struggles, the alternations of depression and hope. And their views of life, of duty, and of God are bounded by their horizon. What has the average preacher amongst us to say to these people? How shall he get a hearing? Does he know their language? Evidently all preaching must be a waste until the ministry is able to get into sympathetic position. Nothing is so remarkable in the ministry of Christ, nothing would be so remarkable were it not his ministry, as the fact that He at once got into position for it, where He could work up and not down. "This man receiveth sinners and eateth with them." And whence from that time to this Christianity has reached with its truth into the classes outside whenever its own natural inheritance, it has been through some one who has gotten into position amongst them. It is not for us now to say, or even to suggest, how this is to be done in the particular case before us. We are speaking altogether in the way of illustration, and of the large fact that as often as any just demand upon the pulpit for intellectual or moral sympathy arises, until that demand is satisfied preaching is an absolute waste.

We touch with some hesitancy, because of its indefiniteness, upon another waste which has to do with the tone of preaching. But we think that most preachers, and many laymen, will understand us and agree with us, when we say that all preaching has more or less waste about it which does have the unmistakable and irrepressible tone of a great hopefulness. Dr. Hopkins has said that theism implies optimism ;

and we may add, if theism, much more Christianity. Not an easy optimism. We do not want jaunty preaching. It would be useless for the pulpit to prophesy smooth things, for men would not believe it if it did. The best safeguard of a serious orthodoxy is the common sense of mankind. Things are not smooth, they are not right, and men know it. Every man, at some time, feels the discord, the pain, the penalty of sin within him and around him. But that feeling is not his salvation. We are saved by hope. This is not only the utterance of the Bible, this is its method; and it is also, so far as we know, without exception, the method and tone of the great Biblical preachers. The twofold characteristic of their preaching is seriousness and hopefulness. And this twofold characteristic of tone in their preaching ought to characterize all preaching. The pulpit can in no wise allow men to overlook any fact of temptation or sin, but it must never fail to teach them to look up. Men everywhere want preaching which will make full account of all that is against them, of every spiritual foe lurking in their path, of every spiritual foe lurking in their heart, and yet which is always saying to them — nevertheless. This is the outcome of the Christian interpretation of the world. Make the world as bad as it is, overlook nothing and underestimate nothing on the side of evil, and then put Christianity into it, and the result is plus on the side of man.

We have said that the pulpit cannot beguile men with an easy optimism, if it would; but a pessimist in the pulpit, that is as much a contradiction as a Christian cynic. What good can preachers do with their complaints? Complaints are of their own hearts, not of Christianity. Christianity never complains. But he is a rare preacher who does not at some time in his ministry fall into that tone. Preachers complain of their times, of the church; they make, it may be, their prayer-meetings, which ought to be an inspiration, a burden. And whenever this is the case what does it mean? It always means the loss of spiritual nerve. Nothing more, nothing less. If an engineer on a swift train on the great roads loses time, they take him off for a time and put him on a freight, that he may recover his nerve. Would that there were some place to which preachers could be retired, when they begin to lose heart and faith, faith in God or in men, till they, too, could recover their spiritual nerve, and keep time again in the march of Christianity.

We offer one more suggestion of a very practical sort. We know not how much preaching runs to waste for failure of the man to follow up the preacher. One of the most serious questions which a preacher can ask himself is this: What am I doing when I am not preaching? Where are my thoughts, my plans, my inspiration, desires, and longings? Towards what ends am I pushing out with the constant energies of my nature? Preaching is not an end, but it is very easy to make it an end. Most preachers do make it a chief end, in that they make it the climax of their energy and thought and spiritual purpose. The strong tides of

their spiritual being do not underrun their preaching out with it into the great life toward which it points. Dr. Pentecost has told this of himself: As he was preaching at one time in the presence of Dr. Bonar, enjoying, as a man will, the luxury of proclaiming the gospel, Dr. Bonar came to him at the conclusion, touched him on the shoulder, and said: "You love to preach, — don't you?" "Yes, I do." "Do you love men to whom you preach?" That was a much deeper question, and it is worth every man's asking of himself, when he finds himself more in love with the truth, or with the proclamation of it, than with men to whom, and for whom, the truth has been revealed. There is a love of men which the sermon cannot satisfy, and the right to preach to men carries with it other rights in their behalf. Preaching is simply the acknowledged sign, the warrant of what Bushnell calls "the property right we have in souls." The man, therefore, as he follows after the preacher, is not a spiritual impertinence. He may, of course, make himself such; but not if he act wisely, tenderly, and, above all things, manfully. It is the habit of some preachers to follow the sermon with the personal letter, others with timely conversation, others with the opportunity of the after-meeting. In some cases these personal methods may not be necessary. Preaching may be so quickening as to create of itself an office practice for the preacher. Those who have listened to his words may be so awakened and stimulated that they will come to him to ask him for further help in the life of the soul.

Our readers have noted that what we have said about the waste in preaching has had to do almost entirely with the preacher himself — first with the moral use of his personality involving his grasp upon the truth; then with the use he may make of his sympathies for getting into position for preaching among those whom he would not otherwise reach; then with that elevation of spirit, that certainty and assurance, that glorious affirmative condition of the soul, which comports with the genius of Christianity; and now with the love of men, that enthusiasm for humanity, not in the mass alone, but for individual souls, of which preaching is the sign, but never the end. The whole question is almost entirely personal. We do not get on far by estimating the number of sermons preached every year by the ministry at large, and then trying to calculate the greater results which ought to follow. Great results do follow the preaching of the gospel, else the church would not be what it is to-day, nor the world. We have no patience with criticisms of the pulpit which assume its decline. The pulpit never was at work in more various ways, or toward higher ends. And, to our thought, the preacher never had a better chance. There was never so much of the truth of God within his reach. He never had a readier access to the hearts of his fellow-men. We think that the preacher of our time ought to stand in awe of his opportunity. And we think, too, that in his personal endeavors to make his preaching do its legitimate work with the least waste, he is

entitled to the full advantage of the known and the unknown results of his preaching. We refer to the unknown results, for he may be sure — we say he may be sure — that the unknown always exceed the known. That goes with the nature of his work. And sometimes a glimpse into the unknown, a message from the unexpected, though it be of another's work, tells him what to believe of himself and of his own work. In the conversation to which we referred at the beginning of this discussion the tone grows more and more serious as it proceeds. At one point the rector falls into quite a desponding mood, like Bunyan's Christian. And the vicar plays the part of Bunyan's Hopeful. The Colloquy closes with this incident out of the personal knowledge of the vicar: —

"A friend of mine, a layman, was once in the company of a very eminent preacher, then in the decline of life. My friend happened to remark what a comfort it must be to think of all the good he had done by his gift of eloquence. The eyes of the old man filled with tears. 'You little know! you little know! If I ever turned one heart from the ways of disobedience to the wisdom of the just, God has withheld the assurance from me. I have been admired and flattered and run after; but how gladly I would forget all that, to be told of a single soul I have been instrumental in saving!' The eminent preacher entered into his rest. There was a great funeral. Many pressed around the grave who had oftentimes hung entranced upon his lips. My friend was there, and by his side was a stranger, who was so deeply moved that, when all was over, my friend said to him: 'You knew him, I suppose?' 'Knew him,' was the reply, 'no; I never spoke to him, but I owe to him my soul.'"

MR. CHAMBERLAIN ON THE ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN's recent address on the causes, results, and responsibilities of the English occupation of Egypt, is of unusual interest. It was given at West Birmingham in response to a resolution of welcome to himself and Mrs. Chamberlain on their return from an Egyptian tour, and is very largely a report of conclusions to which he has been led by this visit.

Mr. Gladstone's government, it will be recalled, entered with great reluctance upon the occupation of Egypt. Mr. Chamberlain yielded to it only as a matter of necessity and in the hope of a speedy evacuation. His own unwillingness, he intimates, was shared by every member of the cabinet. In view of what he has seen in Egypt he has changed his mind, and he gives some cogent reasons for this modification, or rather, reversal of judgment.

Ismail Pasha's government, Mr. Chamberlain alleges, was the worst known to Egyptian history. He was forced to abdicate, and his son, the present Khedive, received assurances from France and England that if

he would follow their advice they would stand by him. Political changes caused the French government, against Gambetta's urgent remonstrances, to withdraw from all responsibility. This was certainly fortunate, as respects Egypt, for a dual control would necessarily have lacked, at least to a high degree, the qualities which have proved effective and beneficial. Mr. Chamberlain draws a vivid picture of the deplorable condition of the country when the English assumed leadership. There was an onerous debt, a deficit in the treasury, oppressive taxation, dishonesty and extortion in collecting the revenues, imminent bankruptcy. The courts were inefficient at best, and saturated with corruption. 'Torture prevailed almost universally. The bastinado (kourbash) was used upon every occasion — to extort payment of taxes, confession of crime, respect for authority and for the position of every village tyrant and every provincial governor. There was a system of forced labor, called the *corvée*, that was intended originally to maintain works of irrigation, to keep clear the canals, by which the great system of watering the country was carried out. This had been abused, as everything else had been, and hundreds and thousands of men were taken from their own work, taken from their fields at a time when the harvest ought to have been proceeded with, or the fields ought to have been tilled, in order to labor on the land of others, and without prospect of any direct advantage to themselves. There was a conscription, a forced conscription, which was open to the same objection as the *corvée* — that is to say, while it pressed very lightly upon the rich, it pressed very hardly indeed upon the poor; the rich escaped by means of bribes, but the poor could not escape. The ambitious purposes of the Khedive required an enormous army. Service in it was for life. The men were sent in chains to the Soudan, then the equatorial province of Egypt. There they perished like flies. Besides all this the irrigation of the country, upon which its welfare almost depended, was allowed to get into bad order. In the supply of water the rich benefited at the expense of the poor. So that the unfortunate peasant was in this position — that while the exactions upon him were increasing almost beyond the power of a human being to sustain, the only means by which he could obtain a bare subsistence, let alone meet the claims upon him, were being taken away or doled out to him by corrupt officials.'

Mr. Chamberlain adds: "After having inquired into this matter on the spot, after having consulted not merely the official persons, whether Egyptian or English, but having taken the opportunity of conversing with every native with whom I could come in contact and with representative men who were well able to express their opinions — I say to you that the state of the fellahen of Egypt was more miserable than the condition of any similar peasantry on the face of the earth."

The change wrought in eight years under English control is a bright chapter in history. There is a surplus in the treasury, and were it not

for the unworthy opposition of the French, the conversion of the debt would have secured additional relief. *The courts have been reformed, a just code established, and corruption practically banished. An equitable and feasible system of taxation is established. The *corvée* has been done away with, and conscription restricted. The army is cut down three fourths, and service is for a short term. Irrigation is improved, and in its terms is made equally available to the poor with the rich. A cabinet minister said to Mr. Chamberlain in Cairo, "This is not a reform, this is a revolution and a new birth."

It is interesting to notice with how small an expenditure such great results are working out. Mr. Chamberlain says that they are "due to the influence of a mere handful of your fellow-countrymen, a few scores of Englishmen acting under Sir Evelyn Baring, our Minister at Cairo." At the close of the year 1888, — we have not at hand later statistics, — the English army of occupation numbered only 3,490.

Although so much has been accomplished, it cannot be thought that Egypt is now able unaided to care for its own affairs, nor do its best men desire this. For uncounted centuries its government has been a despotism. The withdrawal of England would mean either a relapse into the old misery, or the intervention of some other European power.

Mr. Chamberlain returns from Egypt fully persuaded, contrary to his earlier opinion, that England should not merely set up a government in Egypt and look after her own immediate interests, but seek to secure the conditions there of permanent prosperity. The hand that has raised Egypt to her present hopeful position has been pure from bribes, honest, just, merciful. The only politics that can secure her welfare must be clean, true, and righteous. All this is required in the interest of those who, under the old dual control, or later, have embarked in financial enterprises there. So that from the point of view of commercial politics, and with regard solely to what many suppose was the chief motive in the original occupation of the country, a continued ascendancy of Englishmen in the Egyptian government is demanded. A policy leavened with morality has proved itself to be the best fiscally. But Mr. Chamberlain's contention is broader and higher. England has a "duty" to Egypt, responsibilities and obligations that grow out of the results which have already been secured. Her task has widened with this experience. She can help recover a land to permanent prosperity, a people to the blessings of civil order, equal laws, freedom, and self-government. Let her complete a work which is the fruit of what she has done, and worthy of her greatness.

DENOMINATIONAL NEWSPAPERS.

ADDRESSES on the ideal religious newspaper were recently delivered in New York before the "Presbyterian Social Union," by Rev. Dr. Dexter, editor of the "Congregationalist," Rev. Dr. Wayland, editor of the

"National Baptist," and Rev. Dr. Prime, editor of the "New York Observer" (Presbyterian). For the most part the descriptions were very general, but Dr. Dexter advocated the more definite opinions that the religious newspaper should be denominational, and under individual ownership and control.

It is gratifying to observe, as it would be, if our space allowed, to repeat, the excellent theories these editors have adopted in respect to the proper objects of a weekly religious newspaper. And, in general, we have no doubt that the journals they edit are conducted according to the principles they laid down. We are not disposed, either, to question the usefulness and importance of papers which are denominational. The activities and interests of every great denomination furnish material enough to fill a weekly paper, and in no other way, perhaps, can Christian people be kept informed concerning the work and progress of the several religious bodies to which they belong. Interests which are common to all denominations will not be entirely overlooked. And undenominational papers may find room by the side of those which have a more limited scope.

Individual control is also in many respects preferable to denominational management through elected editors, especially in the more loosely organized religious bodies. Strictly speaking, journals conducted by private enterprise are semi-denominational, but they are quite as likely to be representative as those which are under ecclesiastical control. We are not therefore prepared after deliberation to say, as we have sometimes, it must be confessed, been tempted, like the Psalmist, to say in our haste, that denominational newspapers are a curse to the churches.

Assuming that they have a legitimate and even useful place, we are frequently, nevertheless, troubled with a suspicion that they are in danger of falling below the ideal, so well described by these editors, in the very field which they have chosen, by failing to extend themselves to the actual breadth of the denomination. If a paper professes to be the organ of a denomination, adopting, it may be, the denominational name as its own title, it may fairly be expected to represent the whole denomination, and not a party inside the denomination.

This is the more important because, as no one can fail to observe, the principal religious and theological movements at the present time are going on *within* the denominations, rather than, as formerly, by antagonisms and rivalries without. With the Presbyterians it is revision of the Westminster Confession, an internal conflict between two wings of one church. With the Episcopalians it is ritual, an internal issue between two parties in one church. With the Congregationalists it is a conflict between narrowness and comprehensiveness in theology, materialized in the specific cases of their oldest missionary society and oldest divinity school, a conflict between conservatives and liberals in one church. These movements, as might easily be shown, are really different phases of

one tendency, so that there are in fact two great parties, both of which are represented in all the denominations. Therefore one needs to know what is going on in both wings of the religious communion to which he belongs, where he has a relation and a responsibility to the local form of a general movement. If he is identified in opinion with one wing, there is all the more reason why he should have correct information of the motive, strength, and purpose of the other wing. And he naturally looks to the paper which professes to be the organ of the whole denomination to report with as much fullness and as careful accuracy the one wing as the other. A journal may do this and at the same time hold and advocate decided opinions on matters in issue. But its support of one side as against the other should not go beyond argument and appeal to employ suppression, reduction, or coloring of facts. The report of a public discussion or legal argument which to the hearers was by no means all on one side should not give ten inches of a column to the side the paper favors and one inch to the other side; should not slip over or omit the strong points of an opponent's argument and cover up or ignore the weak points of argument on the side it supports; should not announce that the decision of a committee or a court has a bearing which it does not have; in a word, should not exclude or explain away facts which make against the position of the editor, nor magnify and misinterpret facts to gain support for his own view. If such a course should be adopted one party would be deceived and the other irritated. The strength of a new opinion and of its support being minimized or sneered at, those who do not accept it would think it unworthy of attention, and would be taken by surprise when it shows its power in some unmistakable way. And those who favor it would feel that if they were correctly reported they would be treated with more respect, or even that their opinions would not be looked on with so grave suspicion and as dangerous departures from the truth. We would not deny that there are real differences of opinion which are important, but it is a pity they should be exaggerated. We are unable, for example, to hold theories of the composition of the Bible held by some persons in our own denomination, but we should thank no one who tried to make us believe that those theories are of a purely mechanical, verbal inspiration under which the writers were merely penholders. It should not be a possible occurrence that an acquaintance, after a sermon heard or a conversation engaged in, declares that he had had a wrong impression of the opinions held, and admits that he got his information from the denominational newspaper, or that of a misinformed person it has to be said, "Oh, he reads only such a religious paper." From daily newspapers which are organs of political parties one does not expect to learn the true state of affairs, even of the party represented. He will be none too well informed if he reads papers of both parties. But from a religious newspaper one has a right to expect reliable information, and a fair presentation of important

movements which affect the welfare of his denomination and religion. It would certainly be a reproach upon the religious newspaper if people generally should feel that there is greater accuracy and fairness in the secular newspaper. It would be especially unfortunate if the impression became general that the denominational newspaper cannot be depended on in the representations it makes of the wing to which the editor is opposed. It is evident that the temptation to suppress or distort facts is much greater than with the undenominational religious newspaper. An editor who is gathering facts, reports of debates, and ecclesiastical action from many quarters, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Baptist, is not likely to be a partisan in respect to so many interests, and will give a fair account of what is actually going on in the various religious bodies. But an editor whose paper is the organ of his own denomination is in danger of trying to bend facts to the support of the opinions he advocates. And when doctrinal development is from within the denomination the danger is greater. We mean, in a word, that the responsibility of an editor in the conduct of a denominational journal is measured by the fact that vital issues are at stake within the close and limited sphere of each religious communion; that these issues are joined as between wings, to one of which the editor will probably and may properly belong; that progress in knowledge of the truth depends in no small degree on his conscientious attempts to help each party understand the actual opinions and the actual success of the other; and that he needs to guard himself especially concerning the statements he publishes to his multitude of readers relative to facts and persons.

There should be no serious difficulty in combining earnest advocacy of his own opinions with fairness of representation. A Presbyterian journal may advocate or oppose revision of the Westminster Confession, and yet give an impartial report of both sides of the debate in the various Presbyteries. An Episcopal paper may oppose ritualism without misrepresenting the arguments and feelings, or concealing the power, of the High Church party. A Congregational newspaper may sustain the policy of a missionary society without ignoring objections which are urged by ministers and churches, and may oppose the views of a theological faculty without the imputation of wrong motives or withholding and reducing the facts concerning the sympathy and support they receive. A denominational newspaper should be careful not to form the habit of putting an unfavorable construction always on the acts of the opposing wing, and a favorable construction always on the acts of the party it favors, so that it shall come to have a reputation for partiality.

Two of the speakers to whom we have referred mentioned the accountability of religious papers to their subscribers, one of them very plainly declaring that a paper controlled by private enterprise is more sensitive to the demands of the religious public than one controlled by the denomination, because the subscription-list, in case of a private enterprise,

must be kept at the highest point to make the paper profitable. We should be reluctant to infer that the policy of a denominational paper is determined by the consideration of popularity rather than by the interests of the denomination and of the Christian religion. But even if that were the case, no mistake could be greater than to suppose that partisanship spreading from the editorial to the reporter's column is more popular than fairness of statement. There is a large and increasing number who wish to hear from both sides, and who value most highly a journal which is impartial and complete in reporting what is going forward in all branches and parties of the denomination. And also, for the comfort of editors, the fact may be recognized that many persons subscribe to a religious paper with which they are not in agreement, because it furnishes one thing or another not to be found elsewhere, as items of church news, ministerial changes, and the like.

The *tone* of a religious newspaper should be Christian. The spirit of candor, of charitableness, of toleration, should pervade all its utterances. One does not like to rise from reading the paper with a bad taste in his mouth. There should not be an autocratic spirit, as if the editor were a judge whose decisions on all denominational, not to say social, political, and religious matters are final. A certain secular journal which always speaks *ex cathedra* has been called the "judgment-seat." The impression is sometimes made that editors of religious journals fancy they are clothed with a kind of ecclesiastical authority. Like the preacher, only in a greater degree, both because his audience is larger and is not before his very face, the editor, knowing that he is not likely to be challenged or disputed, is in danger of assuming a dictatorial tone. And when, withal, there is a patronizing air, as if the editor could tell you precisely what movements and methods are to be approved and what are to be looked on a little askance, if the paper claims infallibility even in its prophetic utterances, frequently reminding the reader that in its issue of eighteen months ago it told him so, and never correcting a mistake except under compulsion and grudgingly, and if, also, the editor seems to recognize certain persons as the *élite* of the denomination, to whom at every mention of their names the censor is to be swung, he himself, of course, belonging to the charmed circle, while others receive no more than civil treatment, if indeed they are recognized at all, then the tone of the paper is not Christian, and one is more than doubtful whether he cares to have it coming week after week into his house. If by the side of these deliverances there is column after column of unimportant items about the external happenings of parishes east and west, a sensible reader has a feeling of humiliation when he lays the paper aside, as if he had been listening to the gossip and oracular opinions of a company gathered at the corner store, or of the village sewing society.

It is but fair to say, however, that editors devote as much space as they do to local items only as a necessary evil. It is a sad but true

consideration that religious papers secure and retain a large portion of their subscribers by publishing a mass of ministerial and parish items. The chances are that in every issue mention will be made of some person whom the reader has known or seen. He takes up the paper expecting to find a paragraph which has a personal interest. As he finds that people he knows are prominent in different parts of the country, prominent enough at any rate to be noticed in the great denominational organ, he feels as if he were identified with important persons and events. Before the year is out his own name or his own church may be mentioned. As one is more interested in photographs of places he has seen than in those of places he has not seen, so many readers are chiefly interested in the doings of persons and places already known to them. But as people learn to have a more vital concern in religious principles and progress, in doctrinal development, and in social reform, editors may be able to reclaim some of the space now wasted on news of the churches, to the large interests of the denomination in its service to the kingdom of God.

The opportunity of the denominational newspaper is unsurpassed in the field of journalism, because the most important religious movements are an evolution at close quarters within denominations. A journal which, while having the courage of its convictions, is above partisanship, is candid, impartial, tolerant, straightforward, and, in a word, Christian, is capable of rendering an invaluable service to truth and righteousness.

THE "ADVANCE" ON AGNOSTICISM RESPECTING FUTURE PROBATION.

A CONGREGATIONAL pastor in Nebraska is reported to have resigned his office and accepted a call to a Unitarian church. Such changes usually pass with but little comment, since they involve questions of personal experience which are outside the sphere of journalism. Not long since a new mission of the American Board was seriously embarrassed by a similar change of faith on the part of one of its members, a graduate of a Western Congregational Seminary. It was passed over without public comment. No one, so far as we are aware, ever thought of making theological capital out of it.

In the case before us the "Advance" has seen best to adopt a different method, and in a leading editorial endeavors to "improve" the event in the interest of the old theology and the missionary policy it is advocating. The pastor in question, early in the year 1886, applied to the American Board for appointment as a missionary. After a suspense of nearly eleven months he was refused a commission because of his agnostic position on the question of future grace for those who die without knowledge of a Redeemer. The "Advance" quotes from his language at that time — his "I do not know" — and connects with it as the natural

sequence his present action. Its argument, if such it may be called, is: Doubt or ignorance respecting the decisiveness of this life, for those who never hear in it of a Redeemer, leads to a renunciation of evangelical faith.

We have no knowledge of the particular transition from which it draws this sweeping inference, beyond its own statements, and these contain no words from the clergyman who is thus used for admonition and rebuke. But, assuming the case to be wholly as represented, it is obviously a very premature and hasty process that accepts a single experience as typical and normative. The missionary to whom we have referred, we may safely assume, from his appointment by the Board, was no agnostic on the question of future probation or on any other of the articles of Dr. Alden's memorandum, yet he relinquished the doctrine of Christ's divinity while engaged in missionary work.

The only question is, whether agnosticism respecting a future probation contains in principle the alleged development, or at least has such inward affiliations as to predispose to it. So far as this can be determined by observation of its workings, as we have said, a single case is quite insufficient for any safe inference. We are at present left, therefore, to our knowledge of its contents and intrinsic affinities. Now there are evidently many sorts of agnosticism on such a subject. Properly the present discussion should be limited to an agnosticism which starts in a mind which accepts the doctrines commonly held in our churches—the divinity of Christ, Atonement, etc. And the "Advance's" contention, if at all relevant to the situation, must be, that doubt or denial of the universal decisiveness of this life is the natural premise in such a mind of a conclusion which sweeps away its evangelical beliefs. But, without insisting upon such a limitation, is it not plainly necessary first to decide what sort of agnosticism is intended? There may be a spirit of doubt which beginning at one point passes on to another, not through any logical connection in the successive rejections of commonly accepted beliefs, but simply in accordance with its own inward motive and law. Or there may be an agnosticism which is logical, but is governed by premises which contain concealed but inevitably developing antagonisms to the whole evangelical system of belief. Agnosticism respecting God's purposes of mercy concerning the heathen in both these cases is merely a method or a symptom, and its application to the particular tenet of probation has no special significance as respects the importance of this dogma to the Christian faith. But obviously there may be an agnosticism which is rooted in the fundamental virtues of the Christian character—in humility, deference to the authority of sacred Scripture, patient waiting for light, and supreme love of truth. Such an agnosticism cannot be regarded as the natural premise of a Unitarian conception of Christ, except upon the presupposition that this conception is more reverent and Biblical than its opponent. There may, indeed, be a peril and loss

attendant upon such an agnosticism. We think that at the present time this is very near, and deserves special attention and avoidance. It is the loss which always attends injustice to the contents of one's real faith, to the implications and necessary issues of any true and living conception of God. We cannot but think that some of our brethren, in their reaction from past beliefs and overstrained or unscientific methods of Scriptural interpretation, are falling into precisely this mistake. They are slighting elements in their own convictions, leaving without use implications in their own faith, overlooking germs of knowledge and suggestions of truth which ought to be cultivated and heeded. There is more light in sacred Scripture than they see. There is a veil before their eyes which hides from them the full glory of Him who is the Lord of the living and the dead and the Saviour of mankind. There is a reticence in the pulpit to-day, or a vagueness of utterance, or a loss of tone and authority, which is not of faith but of fear, and the agnostic temper may easily become an intellectual and moral habit which is neither religious nor scientific. For nothing can be more unscientific than neglect of any source of information, and a genuine faith has rational and dogmatic contents that ought to be explicated. And it is unscientific to slight intimations of truth because they are not yet assurances, or to ignore seemingly exceptional texts and unexplained remainders of fact, instead of finding in them incentives to further thought. Agnosticism in eschatology is largely to-day a reaction from assumptions of knowledge and arbitrary dogmas, and truth is stronger for every error that is rejected. But its light is also weaker for every ray that is excluded. Reactions are as one-sided as their causes. There is a limit to their beneficent working. Agnosticism passing beyond the impulse of a simple love of truth and the method of scientific investigation, made a principle and petted as a discovery or a sign of superior intelligence, is already tottering over a precipice. If the "Advance" will minister to the cure of this sort of agnosticism, if it will save it from a fall into inertia and indifference and expose its lack of courage and peril of loss of conviction, it will render a timely service. But it can do nothing on this line by merely warning against the moral dangers of not adhering to traditional dogmas — it has abandoned too many such itself, as have all our churches, for such a method to produce any effect. Nor can it cure agnosticism by requiring a faith that goes beyond what an intelligent and spiritual interpretation of Scripture shows to be revealed, nor by defending beliefs which are discordant and incapable of assimilation with a living and progressive Christian faith. Agnosticism has its rights, and it will always ride into the field and couch its lance wherever dogmatism blows its brassy trumpet.

The "Advance" evidently realizes somewhat the intrinsic weakness of its plea, for after presenting the single agnostic premise for the conclusion it would draw, it proceeds to identify with it the state of a mind

that starts "with the idea that old faiths are dissolving, that they cannot stand the test of scholarship and advanced thought, and that progress points to a wide departure in the future." After broadening in this fashion its premises it is easy to reach any conclusion of doubt and disbelief which is desired, only the warning has, at the same time, lost all its point.

The "Advance" adds: "To-day it is a new theology, a progressive theology, but to-morrow it is Unitarianism, and Unitarianism is neither new nor progressive." Does the "Advance" mean to affirm that a progressive theology leads to Unitarianism? If so, will it deny progress to theology in order to avoid Unitarianism? And, in that case, will it explain why it reproaches Unitarianism with being "neither new nor progressive"?

The "Advance's" speculation — for it is nothing more than this — on the effects of agnosticism, respecting a particular point in eschatology, upon evangelical belief in general suggests several interesting inquiries.

As the matter now stands one clergyman, a missionary of the Board, who may be presumed to have accepted the eschatological dogma of the Home Secretary, subsequently became, or is supposed to have become, a Unitarian in his belief respecting Christ. Another clergyman, an applicant to the Board for appointment but rejected solely because he could not accept that dogma on account of his agnosticism, has become a Unitarian, or is presumed to have become one. Will not the "Advance" extend its inquiries, and see if it cannot discover a number of applicants to the Board, or of missionaries of the Board, who have taken neither position respecting Dr. Alden's dogma, but have thought that there are reasons, Biblical and Christian, for supposing that He who came to seek the lost will find a way to the heathen as well as to others for whom He died, and who, holding this hypothesis, have believed all the more tranquilly, if not more surely and steadfastly, in his true divinity and atoning sacrifice, and in the kingdom which is to be set up by preaching these truths? And if it can find a way out of the puzzle created by the first two cases we have cited, and also a way of adhering to its conclusion gained by the second, will it tell us, after investigating the third class of cases, why its reasoning from cause to effect does not oblige it to commend the hypothesis of future probation as a special safeguard from the dangers it discerns?

Is it not illogical, and, if we may be pardoned, a bit absurd, to think that doubt or denial of the dogma of the universal decisiveness of this life necessarily exposes a man to a similar doubt or denial of Christ and his redemptive work? As we have said, it may be part and parcel of such unbelief, but then it may exist without having the slightest tendency to produce it, or affiliation with it. And this is especially true where the rejection springs from a conviction of the universality of Christ's person

and work, and the dogma of a limitation of his saving agency is set aside because it is inconsistent with such a faith in Him.

And this leads to another question. Supposing that agnosticism is as dangerous to faith as the "Advance" supposes, will it maintain that an acceptance of the hypothesis of future grace is equally hazardous? That it offers no immunity from danger goes without saying, nor, if one and another or many of those who one day accept it should afterwards be found in other ranks, would this determine the question of its validity. We will not, therefore, for argument on this point, recall the names of men, eminent as defenders of the faith and as earnest and devoted servants of Christ, who in ancient and modern times have espoused this hope. We rest the case on its intrinsic merits, on the contents and necessary connections of the grace it trusts in, and we ask, is it reasonable to suppose that an enlargement of the realm in which the motive of the Cross may be operative, and an extension of the personal relations of Jesus Christ so that all mankind are seen to stand in connection with Him as a revealed Saviour, is something unfriendly to faith in his divinity and atonement? Let it be remembered, further, that this hypothesis does not spring up as something wholly extra-Scriptural, still less as anti-Scriptural, or as a mere matter of human speculation. It finds place because of supposed encouragement for it in the inspired Word, because it seems to lie at the very heart of Christianity and to be implied in its sublime revelation of the nature and being of God. It cannot therefore be charged with being a mere rationalizing treatment of Scripture. It is indeed only pitiable ignorance that can honestly suggest such an explanation, in view of the men who in the past have cherished this view, and are crowned as leaders in theological science and as saints.

We are not yet done with our questions, if the "Advance" will be patient with us.

Will it join in the present endeavor to draw a line, as respects candidates for appointment as missionaries, between men who are agnostics and men who find some warrant in reason and the gospel and Scripture for the hope to which we have referred? For ourselves we know of nothing that is more to be deprecated than the method of treating young men now patronized in influential quarters, — the method of paring down statements that reject the cherished dogma of the "little memorandum" to a residuum of mingled agnosticism and meaninglessness; of conceding that the rejected dogma is not to be insisted upon and yet treating it as though it were still a standard of belief; of permitting a candidate to say that he does not regard it as Scriptural and then cramping his language into limits for which all Biblical authority is abandoned. We can have some respect for men who believe that the Scriptures teach the universal decisiveness of this life, and make it a "great" and "vital" doctrine as the Home Secretary and the Prudential Committee started with maintaining. We can understand also and sympathize with

those who, though retaining in their own creed this doctrine, do not think that it is their duty to require it of others either as a condition of ministerial fellowship or of missionary service. But we have not a particle of respect — we will not now refer to persons — for a method of reasoning, or a rule of practice, which waives a dogma as authoritative and requisite and then undertakes to prescribe limitations in the field from which dogmatic authority has been withdrawn. If liberty is allowed to say that the Bible prescribes no dogma on the subject, what is it but usurpation, at a point where usurpation is an affront to reason and religion, to add, “but you are not at liberty to find in the Scriptures any dogma but the one which is no longer required. You may be an agnostic, and you may even entertain a hope, provided it is sufficiently vague and you cannot give a reason for it, — and this because, having abandoned the line of Biblical authority, we propose to set up one, on our own account, as a safe-guard to Christian missions!”

And we would further respectfully inquire whether, after all, the “Advance” is not itself, perhaps more than it is aware, somewhat agnostic in eschatology, and friendly to those who take this turn? Does it hold, with the fathers of the American Board, to the universal, or at least general, perdition of the heathen? Does it approve or disapprove of the appointment of Miss Judson? Would it recall Mr. Hume? Does it hold the disputed dogma to be “vital,” or would it modify the earlier position of Dr. Alden and the Prudential Committee? What does it think of the appointment of Mr. Lay? He wrote: “I do not see anything in Scripture, rightly interpreted, which would preclude probation after death,” and with these words in his statement, at a meeting at which Dr. A. C. Thompson presided, Dr. Alden advised his appointment, and he was unanimously accepted. Does the “Advance” approve of this action?

COMMENT ON CURRENT DISCUSSION.

THE FORMULA FOR THE RESULT OF AN ORDAINING OR INSTALLING COUNCIL.

It has been customary to embody in the result of an ordaining or installing council (after Congregational usage) some expression of approval of or satisfaction with the doctrinal examination of the candidate. Cases, however, are continually arising in which some members of a council do not altogether approve, or are not entirely satisfied with the doctrinal statements of the candidate, and yet are willing to proceed to his ordination or installation. They object to any term of approbation as if it committed them to the views advanced by the candidate, and whenever objection is made by them to the usual formula some one is generally ready to move some modification of the customary form to the effect that the council *so far* approves, or is *so far* satisfied, as to proceed to ordain or install. But this proposal is quite sure to call out the counter objection

that such a qualification places the candidate in a wrong light before the churches. It is argued that he is or is not entitled to Congregational fellowship; that he cannot be partially ordained or installed; and that the qualification really signifies nothing so far as the validity of the rite is concerned. And it is further argued that the original formula was not intended to express complete satisfaction, much less the commitment of a council to all the views of a candidate, but only such approval as would warrant fellowship. Still, as this answer is not satisfactory to all, the question has arisen, why not drop the expression which causes the contention. It is needless. The act of ordination or installation expresses all the approval that is necessary, and commits those who participate in it to nothing more than is involved in Congregational fellowship.

A formula embodying this view was prepared by a most competent committee, and unanimously passed by a recent council in a neighboring state. We copy the formula, and are prepared to accept it as a solution of the difficulty, *provided it be uniformly adopted*. Otherwise its use will call up the same objection as that of a qualified indorsement; that is, if used only in certain cases it marks them as exceptional and casts a doubt upon the heartiness of fellowship. It is possible to gain unanimity at too great a cost. There are cases in which it may be better to have a minority vote.

"Resolved, That this Council, having heard the record of the action of the — Congregational Church and Society of — in calling — to the pastorate of the said church, and his acceptance of the same; and having examined the candidate's credentials, and heard his account of his religious experience and call to the ministry; and having listened to his statement of Christian belief and doctrine; do hereby approve him for ordination to the Christian ministry and for installation into the pastorate of this church, and will proceed with the services of ordination and installation in accordance with the following programme," etc, etc.

CANON PRESCOTT ON THE CAMBRIDGE MISSION TO DELHI.

CANON WESTCOTT, whose consecration as Bishop of Durham is set down for this month, writes to the London "Times" an interesting letter concerning the condition and prospects of the Cambridge Mission in India. He says: —

"The mission was established twelve years ago through a widespread feeling in the University that Cambridge ought to undertake some characteristic missionary work, and that India offered a field in which all that is best in the traditions, the influence, and the spirit of academic life might find fruitful exercise, if concentrated in a small community of friends devoted to the service of the gospel.

"This expectation has been amply fulfilled. The outward progress of the work of the mission is necessarily slow. A long labor of preparation must be accomplished before the more thoughtful classes in India can be won to the Christian faith. For this work of preparation the mission has unique advan-

tages. By a series of most unexpected events the higher education of the Southern Punjab has been intrusted to their hands, and the calm, patient, hopeful confidence which is everywhere shown in the reports of those members of the mission who are principally engaged in educational work leaves no doubt that a rich harvest will follow the seed-time. Meanwhile the laborers themselves are guarded from the perils of isolation, which is one of the sorest trials of missionaries; the continuity of their methods of working is secured; they offer in an impressive form an embodiment of Christian brotherhood, in which we may see hereafter the transfiguration of caste; they are sustained and illuminated by common devotion; and it is a source of great encouragement to the friends of the mission that observers as widely different in their experience as Sir C. Aitchison, Sir W. W. Hunter, Sir M. Monier-Williams, Dr. Phillips Brooks, Dr. Jex Blake, and Mr. Caine, M. P., have borne spontaneous testimony to the excellence and promise of their work. Perhaps, too, I may add, in order to indicate the trust which is placed in those who guide the mission, that its first head, the Rev. E. Bickersteth, was appointed Bishop of the English Church in Japan, and that his successor, the Rev. G. A. Lefroy, was chosen for the Bishopric of Chota Nagpore, but was unwilling to leave his charge at Delhi."

This mission, Dr. Westcott states, has received grants from the "Society for the Propagation of the Gospel," which have met half of its regular expenses, and the balance has come from subscribers. Its staff is now full, and its appropriations must for this reason be increased. It is also "building a new college," and planning an extension of its work through a "branch mission." The need of increased funds, which it is the object of Dr. Westcott's letter to present, is an indication of the success and growth of the enterprise. We have been for some time satisfied that the conditions of missionary success in Turkey as well as in India require that the methods of the Board in these countries should be more assimilated to those which have secured its marked success in Japan — in a word, that more attention should be given to the higher education. *Why should there not be a vigorous Theological Seminary in Constantinople?*

MR. INNES ON LIBELS UNDER AN ANCIENT CREED.

A. TAYLOR INNES, Esq., of Edinburgh, an accomplished student of Scottish ecclesiastical law and a recognized authority, has been moved by certain attempts to prosecute Professors Bruce and Dods for heterodoxy under the Westminster standards to raise the question of the constitutionality of such proceedings while the Confession is under revision. He does not dispute that libels may be entertained and determined during such a process, but intimates that the church should rely in its judgments on its supreme rather than on its subordinate rule. As to the latter he affirms unqualifiedly that "the church cannot, either constitutionally or honestly, find a man guilty on a libel for merely deviating from its Confession: it cannot, whether the deviation be on one point or along the whole line. For the one point may be precisely the point which is to be

revised out." The centre of doctrine having shifted, Mr. Innes suggests, every point in the circumference is in a new relation, — is held "with a difference." He points out, with special force, the abuse of a libel when employed respecting questions that are under investigation. "It was always an odious remedy, to be made by a reluctant but united Church, upon the understanding that it was united." Mr. Innes incidentally expresses the opinion that were Dr. Robertson Smith's case to come up again in the Assembly "it would almost certainly be decided on the side of freedom and by a much larger majority."

LETTERS AND LIFE.

This Department of the "Review" is under the editorial care of Professor
A. S. HARDY.

I.

THROUGH what changes in form and purpose fiction has passed since the days when Scheherezade beguiled the Sultan of the Indies, and Boccaccio wrote the novels which Burton classifies as honest recreations among the dietetical cures of melancholy; or even since that more recent epoch whose popular romances Macaulay tells us no lady would have written or without confusion own that she had read. It is no longer content with simple externals, the customs, manners, follies, dress, conversation, of a social order. It has forsaken the work of the chronicler, the accidents and incidents of life, for that of the historian and biographer, dealing with objective phenomena in order to portray the inner workings of the human mind, the development of a character; to show forth the organic structure of society, and the continuity of social progress. In this new rôle of reformer and educator of the race, what department of learning — history, philosophy, theology, social economics, — has not the novelist invaded and absorbed! No question is too abstract or prosaic for his pen. He hesitates before no social wrong, and even though he has no remedy to propose, no theory to maintain, he will state the case and paint the picture.

The tone of superiority in current references to this sphere of the novelist's influence would seem to imply that he has recently assumed a new robe of honor, one which his predecessors, the mere amusers of humanity, have never worn. Should we attempt, however, the classification of romance, how few would be the volumes falling under the head of *For Amusement Only*. Exalted conceptions of duty and devotion underlie the "Chansons de Geste" and the "Romances of the Round Table." In scarcely any form of fiction, indeed, is the moral held so persistently before the mind, as if the narrator feared it should be lost in the interest excited by the rapid succession of the adventures which he related; and

it is a curious spectacle to see these once powerful conceptions of duty and virtue prevailing in later periods carried down, as it were, on the tide of the absorbing human interest and literary charm of the mediæval romance, into epochs which had outgrown them, and surviving with a force which required the ridicule of a Cervantes to expose them. The use of fiction for didactic purposes begins with fiction itself; the chief distinction, in this respect, between the primitive and modern novelist being the former's frank reliance upon incident and marvel to hold the flagging attention.

Plutarch presses the story into the service of morals, and the early Christians made it the carrier of their views on the meaning and conduct of life. In all ages, from Lucian to Voltaire, the satirist and the philosopher have borrowed the mantle of the story-teller, making the novel the channel for their thought on deep and weighty questions of philosophy, art, and social science, as did Sydney in "*The Arcadia*." Richardson wrote "*Pamela*" "to promote the cause of religion and virtue," though employing a machinery as artificial and a style as sentimental as those of the improbable romances which he sought to displace. Doubtless there is a waste of ethics, philosophy, and science, thus conveyed through the medium of fiction. There will always be those who read "only for the story." But in books, as in persons and in nature, we read sermons which were never consciously preached; and in estimating the influence of fiction, it would be necessary to take into account this power to draw a moral outside the conscious purpose of the artist, a power which has perhaps more than made good his wasted effort.

Of the novelist's right to deal with problems of theology, political economy, and the like, there can be no question, inasmuch as he has proved his ability to deal with them effectively. "*The Pilgrim's Progress*" is a story, although an allegorical one. Of "*Pamela*" Pope affirmed that it was destined to do more good than twenty volumes of sermons. If we read "*Pamela*" to-day, however, it is not for the sermon which it contains. Boccaccio has lost none of his beguiling power, but we omit the tales' concluding moral, because the day when truth was best conveyed in such a vehicle has passed. Indeed, it is a question whether the lessons presented in frankly artificial representations of life, as those of the stage, for example, with their forced situations and surfeit of improbable incident, possess the power to modify conduct to any such extent as is often claimed for them. Certainly they are not as effective as formerly, and in this respect the sceptre of influence is passing from the drama, as it has passed from the arts, into literature. It is the delineation of actual life, — a delineation modified perhaps by artistic instincts, even exaggerated for the production of effects ardently wished for, yet withal founded on the real — like that of "*Uncle Tom*" or the "*Mémoires d'un Seigneur Russe*," which are more cogent than theses or sermons; and the more so as they really delineate life. They may not

always solve the riddles they propose, or answer the questions they raise; they do not always create strong intellectual convictions; but they serve a purpose in awakening interest, in concentrating attention, and in forcing reflection. They are so real, so graphic, that they stand for actual experiences, and like the sight of a suffering face, or the sound of an appealing cry, gain the heart which feels and acts, when statistics, logic, and moralizing would scarcely reach the mind which thinks and forgets. It is well, however, to note, in view of all that is claimed in this direction for the modern novel, that fiction invades other departments of literature to supplement, not to usurp, their usefulness. He would be very imperfectly informed on the problems of religious thought whose sole source of information was "*Robert Elsmere*;" Gogol, Turguénieff, and Tolstoi will not suffice for the student of Russian civilization. Furthermore, while the novelist is bringing to many minds questions which under other literary forms would remain beyond the range of vision or interest, this popularization of the gravest and most perplexing of social and religious theories has often been attempted by ignorance and incompetency, and with results similar to those which followed the recent movement for the popularization of science. A shallow philosophy, in company with stirring incident, and dressed in a brilliant style, will gain a wide hearing for the simple reason that of itself it could gain none at all. Even when well done, this work of the novelist is but half done if it does not compel recourse to bureaus of information over which he cannot preside, except as he ceases to be the novelist. Vivid pictures of life are not sufficient for sound views of life, and appeals to the heart are not always productive of safe rules of conduct. Moreover, it is easier to teach than to preach well, to impart information than to inspire and regulate conduct. It is even easier to teach than to amuse. The power to instruct is vastly more common than the power to divert, console, and cheer. And to do this for the nineteenth century, harassed by the competitions of a complicated social order, in bondage to the factitious wants of a complex civilization, more weary through reflection than experience, is a greater task than ever before. There is the difference between diverting the man and the child. The book which so combines the ethical with the diverting as to produce the good effects of a homily without being one is rarer than that which combines instruction with amusement and yet escapes pedantry. Such a book is like a friend whose power lies in his unconscious rectitude, and if we cannot define genius, we should not be far out of the way in saying that such a book is its product.

As the helper of humanity fiction has gained in power by its recognition of the fact that the natures which influence us most are those most richly endowed with our common human qualities. The underlying attraction is that of a common nature; all the sympathetic affections vanish with its disappearance. Lessons, it is true, may be drawn from

dogs and horses, but only as they exhibit human qualities. Virtue is expressed in terms of the resistances it overcomes; evil is measured by the influences it repels. Angels and devils without possibilities of fall or regeneration are mere abstractions; they inspire awe or terror, but they have nothing to teach us. Fiction is full of these splendid figures, products of a more or less absolute separation of the good and the evil and their concentration into single personalities, — imposing types, but not of human nature, and powerless to move us in proportion as they are false to it. Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde as distinct individuals are lay figures; as one personality they affect us profoundly. For the hero of real moral grandeur, conveying to us the idea of the complete man, is one of our own stuff, whose self-government implies that he has a self to govern. Faust is our brother; with Mephistopheles we have no affinity. There are many so-called *characters* of fiction whose masterly portraiture has made their very names synonyms of the qualities which they typify, which are so true to nature in one particular as to be absolutely false to it on the whole. They belong to the fiction which has discarded the mythical and the miraculous, which has come down from the clouds upon the earth, deals with men and women, but which has not yet condescended to employ motives adequate to the action, which neglects consistency of character for striking effects, and whose transformations never recognize the laws of growth. These are the characters which strut upon the stage, the reward of whose virtue and the discomfiture of whose villainy the gallery always applauds, yet is none the better for it; which flatter a moral sense that seems to be satisfied by the mere act of applauding the flatterer. The moral is palpable, but lifeless as a maxim. For they are not the people we know, complex aggregates of various qualities, impulses, habits, and aspirations, and they illustrate the working of no principle of real life. Vastly more simple in their make-up than the people we know, the succession of events in which they figure must be correspondingly simple when compared with the sequences of even ordinary lives. Neither the internal forces nor the external pressures of which character is the joint product have any play in the puppet. The most complicated of plots is in reality far less so than the network of circumstance through which we individually move. The relations between crime and punishment, virtue and reward, are infinitely more subtle than is implied in that simple theory of cause and effect under which heroes and villains move through plots of supernatural ingenuity, with many tantalizing delays perhaps, yet so surely as to forbid anxiety, to their foreordained heaven or hell. Combinations of events marvelously in accord with the moral exigencies of the story are rare in life, and their adjustment is a mechanical labor whose sole concern is to preserve the integrity of the puppet through all the trials for which it is scheduled by the author of its being. Punch and Judy have no lesson for us after we discover that they possess no control over the wires and strings.

And the modern scientific and experimental school of fiction is liable to the similar error of formulating in a single character the law which it has discovered by the observation of many. The novel cannot imitate the scientific text-book which, for the purposes of statement, disengages the single law from others with which it is always practically associated, and at the same time paint what it claims to, — pictures of actual life.

Pictures of actual life! This is the trade-mark by which we are to know the genuine article. Genuine it undoubtedly is, and if life were only long enough to see all that is genuine, if we could but profit by or enjoy everything real to the same degree, if we had no sense of perspective, no realization that while everything is important some things are more important than others, if we had no ambition to rise above the dead levels and were content to take things as they come, — genuine were enough. But there are realities and realities, and we have a discriminating faculty. Sections of real life transferred to paper *en bloc* are not necessarily instructive or amusing. There is a great deal of the commonplace, the mean, the trivial, and insignificant, whose reproduction is of no profit or interest to any one. The faithful copy cannot rise above the original, and just because in life there is so much that is insignificant and insalubrious, discrimination and selection is imperative. These are not to be neglected because they have been abused. If too much art gives us the artificial, too little gives us the incomplete and fragmentary. Whether the object of the artist be to amuse, or to instruct, or to improve, there is no life nor series of events from whose narrative he is not bound to omit what is neither amusing, nor instructive, nor elevating. So long as we can hold communion with the invisible and pass a large share of our time in a world where sensible data vanish, so long as we have beliefs and hopes as well as knowledges and convictions, so long as we feel our present powers to be but the feeble measure of those to which we aspire, so long as we acknowledge instincts of worship and presages of immortality, — so long shall we crave something more than the faithful report of the sayings and doings of those who know and care the least for these things.

We have just referred to the scientific and experimental school of fiction. Mr. Spencer has said that science, by its discovery of new facts and their relations to others already known, is ever suggesting new explanations of things, and is thus continually remodeling our ideas of things, and effecting a more complete adjustment between what we think of things and the things themselves. When we recall the immense amount of harm which has resulted from the presentation in romance of false views of life, how often fiction has lighted its misleading beacons on the headlands which first greet the eager eye of immaturity, working against every true principle of education, and, if not leading to ruin, then necessitating the bitter corrective lessons of that stern old teacher Experience, into whose hands we early fall and from whose school we never gradu-

ate, one cannot rejoice enough over the thought of the artist's serious purpose to help us understand life as it is, to restrict the use of his imagination to the portrayal of what is in terms of what should be instead of what cannot and should not be. A school of fiction which is scientific in this sense, which takes account of the laws of heredity and growth, which recognizes that the sequences of life *are* under law and not whim, works towards the goal of all science, — the rational interpretation of phenomena and the right understanding of our relations to the universe. Such a school may destroy some illusions, as science has done. *Illusions* is only another name for *limitations*, and when they disappear we are like a captive bird whose cage door is opened, — doubtful, timid, and afraid to try our wings in the new spaces open to us. The Egyptian astronomer would doubtless have rebelled against the shattering of those eight crystal spheres on whose revolving vaults he had fixed the stars; perhaps, too, the poet sighed at the passing of that splendid system, until his vision, accustomed to the greater splendor of the new order of things, saw how infinitely richer were its resources. For the artist the resources of truth are always greater than those of illusion, because all permanently beautiful forms belong to truth's domain.

The word *scientific* is so suggestive of the word *experimental* that the second adjective of M. Zola's "Scientific and Experimental Novel" almost escapes notice. We understand perfectly well what "*Le Roman Expérimental*" is, but we do not in the least understand why it should be called so. The experimental novelist, M. Zola, says, "Should work upon characters, passions, human and social facts, as the physicist and chemist work with organic bodies, as the physiologist works with living organisms . . . showing by experiment how passion exhibits itself in certain social surroundings." Now the chemist in conducting an experiment must be able to control the conditions under which it is performed. Otherwise he is a simple observer. Limit his rôle to that of observation, deprive him of the power to eliminate every condition which he does not understand or cannot regulate, and he can no longer interpret the accompanying phenomena. His inferences are drawn from determinate data and conditions, data at his command and conditions which he can reproduce. *This follows that*; but if *that* is an unknown quantity, or but imperfectly known, inference is inconsequential, if not impossible. There are three principles in the scientific method, — observation, experiment, verification; the second is the first under specific limitations; the last the repetition of the second. M. Zola did not experiment with the Abbé Mouret in the sense that M. Pasteur experiments with rabbits. Granting that he knew the Abbé and his parents, that he watched his development and studied his life, he was still obliged to observe the sequence of events as he found them. He observed, but he did not experiment. He recorded what he saw, and under the most favorable conditions of observation conceivable he was very imperfectly acquainted with what was

passing under his eyes. Under what tremendous disadvantages we make up the record of another's life! The facts observed are far more complex than any with which the chemist is concerned, for they include new factors, moral, social, psychological. Laws of heredity and the like are involved, of which we know little. Did we know far more of them than we do, our knowledge would avail us little. For the bare statement of a law is nothing if we are ignorant of the specific conditions under which it is operating. And this is the case. The life we observe stops at the critical point, where the causes are at work. Infancy, prenatal existence, remote ancestry, all this is night and mystery. We have only an imperfect record of broken observations, — observations too which can never be repeated, and are not, therefore, subject to verification. We have admitted the existence of an Abbé Mouret. But it is not pretended that the facts as related have not been drawn largely from the imagination. We have what the Abbé actually did in certain circumstances mingled with what he is supposed to have done in imaginary cases. As for what the Abbé thought and felt, who shall tell us? Then as to the personal equation growing out of the sympathy, emotions — all, in short, which does not disturb the judgment of the chemist — of the observer of the human drama, we have said nothing.

And this is what M. Zola calls a scientific experiment. In writing "*La Faute de l'Abbé Mouret*," what experiment after all did M. Zola make beside that of writing a novel?

Arthur Sherburne Hardy.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS. SECOND SERIES.

VIII. POLYNESIA.

THE London Missionary Society has had for nearly fifty years, on the island of Rarotonga, a training school for a native ministry. The Earl of Pembroke, writing of it some years ago, said: "One glimpse of that most lovely Mission House would make the Duke of Devonshire let Chiswick fall into instant ruin from mere hopelessness of competing with it." "In 1841 the first student was sent forth to preach the gospel. During the forty-seven years which have since elapsed, about two hundred and fifty young men have been admitted as students. Of this number one hundred and fifty-six have died in the fever-stricken islands of the Western Pacific, and especially in New Guinea; five with their unsuspecting flocks were kidnapped, sold into slavery, and — affecting to relate — perished in Peru; and twenty were martyred in the New Hebrides and in New Guinea. Many are still doing good work for the Master in the Hervey Group and in New Guinea." — "A normal school is also conducted in these mission premises. This, however, could not be kept up without the aid of students. In the event of sickness, the

native pastors all round the island know where to apply for a pulpit supply."

The "Chronicle" for October, 1888, gives a full account of the causes which have led the government of the French Republic — persecutingly atheist at home, and persecutingly Romanist abroad — to expel from the island of Maré the Rev. John Jones, who had been for almost a generation the most beneficently influential missionary in that part of the Pacific. We give some of the main points.

Maré is one of the three chief islands of the Loyalty Group. It has about 4000 people. The Loyalty Islanders were among the most degraded in the whole of the Pacific, living in a state of nature, without any sense of shame; wild, untamed savages, and withal most ferocious cannibals. In 1841 two Samoan evangelists settled among them, to whom, for eight years, the people gave little heed, until, in 1849, there was suddenly a large acceptance of the gospel. The heathen tribes took up arms, and for many years the whole of the east side raged with war and cannibalism. Lifu had been meanwhile wholly and suddenly Christianized, and after Mr. Jones and a companion came in 1854 Uvea was converted. The three islands have three languages, enormously increasing the labor of translation. After the cannibals of Maré had warred ten years against the gospel, they finally gave way, and accepted it.

In 1864 the French occupied the group. French priests settled in Maré, among a small tribe that had remained heathen. There, as on the other islands, they arrived too late to take the lead. "Protestantism had taken firm hold, and had made rapid progress among the natives. Feeling that they had the French Government and army at their back, and that the islands were now French, they determined to obtain predominance among the natives. The officials boldly acknowledged that their promotion came from the priests, and were therefore ready to help them all they could against us. The difficulties with the French Government and with the priests commenced first on Lifu by the French soldiers attacking and destroying the Protestant settlement, and were closely followed by similar troubles on Uvea. There being no European missionary on the latter island, the Maré evangelists were unable to cope with the priests. They kept the island in a continual ferment by threatening the arrival of French men-of-war and soldiers, as at Lifu." Finally, the priest having threatened the chief Wabalu that unless he became a Roman Catholic he and his principal men should be deported to New Caledonia, he gave way, and began a sharp persecution of his Protestant subjects.

In Maré, their progress was slower. The priest, having urged his chief to kill the main Protestant chief, was laughed to scorn, as the predominance of power was with the Protestants. He did not rest, however, until he had stirred up war, himself going into battle. The result was a complete Protestant victory, and the priest, tearing off his long gown, fled with the foremost. An excellent opportunity now offered itself to the French authorities to secure a single government in the island, as Hnaisiline, the victorious chief, was unanimously acknowledged by the others as their superior. But the French preferred Catholic anarchy to a Protestant peace, maintained by English missionaries. Having themselves no conception of religion apart from political schemings, they could not apprehend the loyal acceptance by Jones and his colleague of the French sovereignty as being anything but hypocrisy. However, the

priests, in despair of success, carried off their thousand converts to the Isle of Pines.

"They remained away five years. During that time all was peace on Maré. At the end of five years they returned, now only 750 strong, the rest having died. On their return the Protestants received them with the greatest kindness, giving them their houses to dwell in, and their plantations to provide them with the necessaries of life. Nevertheless, as soon as they had fairly settled down in their homes, the priests again set their converts to seize the Protestants' territory, to rob their plantations, to kill their livestock, and to attack the people. They appealed to the French Government, but instead of obtaining redress the Protestant chiefs were imprisoned for so appealing, and were banished, some to New Caledonia, and some to Tahiti. The English missionaries of the London Missionary Society acted as mediators, writing respectful letters to the authorities, begging justice to be done to the Protestants. The French appointed an official, called a Resident, a man who was one with the priests, and whom they left to do pretty much as he pleased. His object appeared to be to join with the priests and their co-religionists in irritating by unjust acts the Protestant population so as to provoke them into retaliation. This, unfortunately, they succeeded in doing. One chief, Lali, at the south end of the island, said: 'I will bear it no longer. We ask the French, who are our rulers, to protect us, but they give no heed; we must defend ourselves.' The two parties had a pitched battle, which resulted in a complete rout of the Catholics, and victory to the Protestants. Again the faith of the former gave way, and they were about to become Protestants, and renounce their confidence in the Roman Catholic religion, when the priests bought them back with large presents, and the French Resident used his influence and power to keep them attached to them. Instead of the French Government stepping in and punishing the originators of the quarrel, they, as usual, turned upon the Protestants. Their chiefs and leaders were exiled to Cochin China, fifteen in number; eleven died there, and four only returned. Notwithstanding all these trials and injustices which were inflicted on the Protestants, the priests could not increase their converts. The Protestant faith and love for the Bible was too firmly rooted to be easily destroyed.

"The French now changed their tactics, and became zealous defenders of the *Protestant faith*, but *this* must be under their fostering care. The London Missionary Society must no longer exert its benign influence over the people. They therefore obtained a French Protestant evangelist, whom the government set up as head over the Protestant Church, and deposed the English missionary. The people formed themselves into an independent church, looking neither to the English nor French missionary for direction in their ecclesiastical affairs. This the government would not allow. Therefore, they were forbidden to conduct religious worship other than family worship, unless they would place themselves under government control in religious matters. Only a few submitted to this new order of things; the majority remain under the ban of the French Government.

"I, the only English missionary on the island, while doing nothing more in religious work than revising the Maré Scriptures, was, on the morning of the 9th of December, 1887, expelled by the French Government at half an hour's notice from the island, where, with my wife, I had labored to elevate the natives for more than thirty-four years. All my goods, books, medicines, and other stores, together with the church and mission station, which is the property of the Society, had of course to be left without direction or arrangement."

The editors of the "Chronicle" add: —

"From reliable sources we have learned that since Mr. Jones left the island the great bulk of the natives have given up their homes in the villages, and have retired to their inland plantations. There they live in a quiet and peaceful manner, conducting daily family worship, and meeting in groups for Sun-

day services. They act thus to avoid being coerced by the chief and other supporters of M. Cru, the Protestant representative of the French Government, to attend the state church. For this they are accounted rebels by the Government, but, as yet, no steps have been taken to force them back to their homes. The adult population, we are told, are God-fearing and intelligent Christians, but the young people are becoming fearfully dissolute. They go to Noumea as servants, and there acquire habits that lead to drunkenness and the most shameless profligacy. Altogether the outlook is for the present dark and gloomy. But 'the Lord reigneth,' and doubtless brighter days are coming."

Mr. Jones sums up the work of the London Missionary Society in the Loyalty Islands as follows:—

"The *whole* of the people, who so lately were wild and savage cannibals, have embraced Christianity, no trace of heathenism being left. There are more than 3,000 church members. The churches are self-supporting, and contribute largely to the spread of the gospel to the regions beyond. Almost all the Protestant natives can read and write. The Scriptures are nearly all translated into the Lifuan and Maréan languages, and the New Testament and Psalms and other portions into the Iaian. There is now only one missionary of the Society remaining on the group; but there are about forty native pastors.

"The island of Maré is now left to sustain the work which the London Missionary Society is no longer permitted to carry on. It is hoped that the Protestant churches in the island will prove themselves equal to the task of self-government and self-support. It is remarkable that the latest of the Society's missions in the South Seas to receive European missionaries (except New Guinea) is the first, in the case of Maré, to become independent, and to carry on church work without foreign direction."

The readiness of even the French Protestants to subordinate themselves to the policy of their government stands in discreditable contrast to the energy of protestation with which the missionary magazines of Germany have opposed themselves to all proposals that they should in any way treat missionary interests as ancillary to German interests, or in any way implicated with them. They energetically maintain the absolute distinctness of the two. French Protestantism, in this respect, still carries in its veins the poison of Gallic arrogance and unscrupulousness, though in other respects it is perhaps the most beautiful of the various developments of Christianity.

The "Chronicle" says of the Society Islands, where the French, having long held Tahiti, are now endeavoring to annex the lesser members of the group:—

"Desolation is said to reign in every village of Raiatea, Huahine, Tahaa, and Porapora. The process of bringing these islands under the French flag has been characterized by a maximum of mismanagement and a minimum of success. Since the bombardment of two villages on Huahine in November last, a feeling of intense hatred against the French has been manifested, and the destruction of houses and plantations there has made a peaceful solution of their troubles well-nigh impossible. It is pitiable to hear of little bands of natives, a few hundred strong, arming themselves to fight against French men-of-war; but so strong is the feeling, that they will hear of nothing else. In spite of the earnest entreaties of our missionary, the Rev. W. E. Richards, who has spared no pains to try and induce the natives quietly to bow to the inevitable, they persist in their attitude of open hostility. We trust that wiser counsels will soon prevail."

Later advices represent the French as showing themselves more con-

ciliatory, and the excitement as subsiding on some of the islands. Raiatea, however, was still hostile, the mountain fastnesses giving courage to the people, and Huahine, although, as appears, not so strong, was even more hostile. The Society has decided on soliciting French Protestant missionaries to take the place of the English, throughout both the Society and the Loyalty Islands.

All the sins in the Pacific, however, against the best good of the natives are not committed by the French. The "Chronicle" says:—

"The Hervey Islands are now under British rule, we trust to the moral as well as the material gain of the islanders. But caution and care are needed if this is to be so. The petitions sent by the various islands emphasized the fact that they owe all to the missionaries of the London Missionary Society, who saved them from heathenism by bringing them the gospel. There is one thing we ought to try and guard against, that is, the introduction of spirituous liquors into these islands. Rarotonga is a very good example of the evil that may be wrought by the introduction of liquor, drunkenness and immorality having become sadly prevalent there. On Aitutaki, Mangaia, and the Windward Islands, on the other hand (with the exception of Atiu), very little liquor is landed. One or two bottles in the course of a year may be smuggled ashore, but that is all. What the missionaries are afraid of is, that it may be forced upon them now that they are under British protection. If Great Britain leaves the people to administer their own laws, they will have little fear. One who knows states that he is convinced that such a prohibition clause would be the salvation of Rarotonga."

Christianity, which in Europe is slowly but surely subordinating hereditary nobility to the higher principles of Christian society, is doing the same in Polynesia, where hereditary nobility, in the pagan days, prevailed in an extravagance and oppressiveness outgoings the worst days of Europe. The Rev. Arthur E. Claxton, describing the boys' boarding-school in Samoa, says:—

"It has struck at the root of one of the great hindrances to Samoan progress. In this school a high chief's son if ignorant and lazy has found his ignorance for the first time in his life a drawback; and, unless he has stirred himself to gain knowledge, has practically (though not literally) worn the dunce's cap. It has been a salutary shock to the complacent self-importance of his excellency, and has helped him to realize that the days of influence through mere family rank are numbered. One or two of my smallest boys spend many of their evenings 'coaching' full-grown chiefs of importance who happen to board in my school-houses with them. That is the advantage of my having them all board on the premises. If they boarded away, these chiefish pupils would not be able to take lessons thus from their fellow-pupils; it would be as much a violation of native etiquette as of their individual self-esteem.

"I have seen shiftless, idle boys, without self-respect, become bright, industrious, respectful. One of the youngest boys, who did nothing to bring him into notice for the first few months, suddenly found himself capable of leading the school. He mastered what I taught, even some of the intricacies of English grammar, so that, though I put searching questions in the last examination, some of which demanded independent thought, he carried off the chief prize with ninety-one per cent. of possible marks. These things are very encouraging, but, like the photo., they are only the best side. The lower half of the school sometimes gives me a feeling of despair. Did you ever try to make a flock of wild goats sit on a form and learn lessons?

... "I cannot help feeling it a very sad necessity that we should have to stint this mission just now instead of strengthening it in the most generous manner. The people are passing out of their childhood, and under the forcing process of the present political crisis are being suddenly and bodily lifted out

of their past. When they recover from their bewilderment they will find themselves struggling in the stream of the great world's unbenevolent competition. I often wish that a large band of missionary day-school teachers could be found to come and make a new great effort to give the coming generation 'a better bringing up' than they are getting now. I am sure there are thousands of Christians in England who, if they came and saw the evils threatening Samoa, would call themselves selfish and faithless for not making a great effort to ameliorate these. The political circumstances, and especially the late fearful disasters in Apia Harbor, have brought Samoa rapidly into notice. More strangers have been here this year than for many years together in the past. We have five mail steamers calling here every month. Foreign influences are multiplying. Political and commercial pioneers are coming fast enough. Are Jesus Christ's messengers and teachers to retire and make room for them?"

America has no missionary responsibility for Samoa; but she may be permitted to entertain a seemly pride that the results of her diplomacy have secured for the island kingdom a stable guarantee of her self-government under the protectorate of the three great Protestant powers, and the arbitration of Protestant Scandinavia.

Now that the exiled king Malietoa has been, through the temperate but unyielding representations of the United States, restored to his throne, it is interesting to make a nearer acquaintance with him. We extract the following from the "Chronicle" for November, 1889:—

"KING MALIETOA AT A MISSIONARY MEETING.

"The native churches connected with this Society in the immediate neighborhood of Apia, Samoa, held their Annual Festival in the mission grounds, on Wednesday, August 28. An awning of canvas and cocoanut leaves had been prepared the day previous, under which a large and gayly dressed crowd of natives assembled. A good sprinkling of Europeans were also present, amongst whom were Captain Bosanquet of H. B. M.'s ship *Opal*, several other officers, and ladies and gentlemen. An interesting feature in the audience was the presence of over one hundred students from the Mission College at Malua, all neatly dressed alike in white shirts and 'lavalavas.'

"The chief interest, however, naturally centred in the presence of the lately exiled king, Malietoa, this being his first public appearance since his return to Samoa." After addresses and reports in Samoan, and one in English, "Malietoa Laupepa . . . then spoke. He said he was thankful to see so large an assembly. It was a plain proof that God had not forsaken Samoa, when such an assembly was possible in these troublous times. The object of the meeting was that the blessings they enjoyed might be extended to other places. One of the blessings they enjoyed was the Bible. Let no one disregard its power and influence to inspire and elevate. It had been to him a source of true strength and help in 'days that were past.' They must remember not only to read the Bible, but the duty and privilege of prayer. Prayer was better than all the weapons of war. A good Government and Kingdom was that of Jesus Christ. He rejoiced to be once more with them. He had not expected ever to be there again."

The voyages of the Brassey family over the world in the yacht *Sunbeam* are well known. Lord Brassey, presiding over one of the recent annual meetings of the London Missionary Society, made the following remarks:—

"In the report which is under consideration to-day, reference is made to the splendid success which has attended the work of your Society under those illustrious missionaries, Lawes and Chalmers, in New Guinea. We have very interesting details with reference to the progress of the work in India and in China; and as a most remarkable instance of the success of our work, let me

refer once more to that devoted zeal which is shown by the native missionaries who are recruited from the South Seas. I do not know any evidence more impressive of the good results of the work which is done by this Society than this most telling fact, that the work which is being carried on by these 160 devoted men and women who have gone forth from this country, is being supplemented and carried forward by no less than 1,000 native ordained ministers, and 5,000 native preachers. And looking to another and perhaps a not less impressive circumstance, is it not exceedingly gratifying to observe that the statement of income which this Society has at its disposal for its good work contains an item of no less than £17,000, which is subscribed by the native people from their limited and narrow resources to carry forward the missionary work !”

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

(To be continued.)

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

No sign of our times is so full of promise as the growth of the settlements of cultured men in the midst of our metropolis. In memory of Arnold Toynbee, the philanthropic high-souled Oxford tutor, the Universities Settlement in East London, with Toynbee Hall as its local habitation, was started about six years ago ; it has been mainly supported by the liberal or broad-church section of the Church of England, and its work has been successful, especially educationally ; for its library, lectures, and university extension classes have attracted hundreds of those who otherwise had only the saloon, the music-hall, or the cheap press to occupy their time. By taking active part, also, in the local government of the district, the residents of Toynbee Hall, almost all of whom are graduates of either Oxford or Cambridge, have done much to improve the neighborhood, both sanitarily and socially ; thus they have become members of the Poor Law Guardians' Board, and managers of the Public Elementary Schools. In Bethnal Green there is Oxford House, a settlement of a somewhat similar nature, under the auspices of the High Church party, which naturally makes the religious and ecclesiastical aspect of its aims more prominent. South of the Thames there is in London yet another “settlement” started and carried on by several prominent Wesleyans and, though only recently founded, full of promise and energy. The Congregational body are also meditating a London Settlement, which would work in connection with Mansfield College, and give the students a change from the academic atmosphere of Oxford to the more stirring and troubled life of the metropolis. There is yet another settlement, which will soon be started in London ; for — to show that the movement, of which the novel “Robert Elsmere” was the popular expression in literature, is not to be without a distinct outcome in the social life of the day — a number of persons have determined to start a hall in London, from which the work of social reform and theological liberalism may be carried on in the spirit which Mrs. Humphry Ward described so fascinatingly in her famous novel. Two extracts from the circular, which has been put out as an explanation and advertisement of the scheme, will make this amply clear. . . . “The Hall will endeavor to promote an im-

proved popular teaching of the Bible and the history of religion. To this end continuous teaching will be attempted under its roof on such subjects as Old and New Testament criticism, the history of Christianity and that of non-Christian religions. A special effort will be made to establish Sunday teaching, both at the Hall and by the help of the Hall residents, in other parts of London, for children of all classes." . . . "The new society will aim rather at representing a school of thought than any particular religious body of the present day, and the friends of it hope that by such an endeavor they may ultimately succeed in drawing together many who now know too little of each other's ideals and work, and may so help to prepare the fuller and wider religious organization of the future." . . . This is enough to show that a new experiment in religious work is to be tried: even those who cannot wish it "God speed" will not fail to watch it with close anxiety, and to hope that it may win from indifference and worldliness some of the many thousands among us who have no care for religion of any kind.

The "Down-Grade" controversy, which arose from the charges brought by Mr. Spurgeon against the orthodoxy of some of his fellow dissenting ministers, and which was waged with so much spirit for some time about eighteen months ago, seems to be breaking forth in new quarters. In the Presbyterian Church some utterances of Dr. Marcus Dods, well known as a scholar and a preacher in Glasgow, and of Dr. A. B. Bruce, the eminent Hebrew Professor of the Free Church College, Edinburgh, have excited a great deal of comment and dispute, and proceedings in the Presbytery of a very exceptional kind have been initiated.

More recently the Anglican party of the Church of England seem to be about to be subjected to a similar controversy in consequence of the publication of a remarkable book of essays under the title of "*Lux Mundi*." This work is edited by the Rev. Charles Gore, Principal of the Pusey House at Oxford, an institution founded and fostered to disseminate among the youth of Oxford the principles and practices which are associated with the name of Dr. Pusey, and which are variously known as "High Anglicanism" and "Ritualism." But there is no doubt whatever that the great Dr. Pusey would never have approved the attitude which the writers of "*Lux Mundi*" adopt towards the traditional theology of the church. Indeed, strong exception has been taken by some eminent churchmen against the theory of the inspiration of the Scripture herein put forward, namely, that there is a possibility of historical inaccuracy in the records of Scripture, and of divergency of view in the doctrines of the various books of the Bible; and Archdeacon Denison, the Nestor of the old High Church party, has spoken of this book as an "attempt to overthrow the one remaining prop of Christianity — Scripture as the written word of the living God." This is all profoundly significant, because the writers in this volume are distinguished young divines of the High Church party, who avowedly write "to put the Catholic faith into its right relations to modern, intellectual, and moral problems." That this attempt should ever be deemed needful is remarkable, considering that the two foundations of the Anglican position are the faith once delivered to the saints and the continuous and inviolable tradition of the church. It is another proof that even those very movements, which are reactions against the liberalizing spirit of the age, are not free from the progressive spirit which they attempt to counteract.

The "Labor Movements" culminated a few weeks ago in a strike of the coal miners throughout nearly the whole of England. The recent advance in prices and renewed activity in trade and manufactures had resulted in the value of coal going up from seventy to ninety per cent. Meanwhile the wages of the miners only advanced thirty per cent. The men contended when they struck that they were in common fairness entitled to a further advance of ten per cent. The masters' answer was, that coal had been worked for the last two or three years without any profit to the owners of mines, and in the time of prosperity the owners were entitled to compensation for their past abstinence; they also urged that the present "boom" might not long continue. After a very short strike the men's demands were granted. Though all's well that ends well, it was a most serious crisis that seemed impending: hundreds of thousands of miners were on strike together. The coal is not only our largest industry, but also the foundation and food of all our manufactures, our steamship, railway, and iron interests, and peril to these meant peril to the prosperity of England. It is no wonder that chambers of commerce are desirous to establish Boards of Conciliation to bring capital and labor into closer harmony, and that some are looking more and more to the interference and control of Parliament in commercial and industrial concerns.

The Labor Conference at Berlin convened at the initiation of the German Emperor, and at which representatives of Britain took part, is generally considered a laudable attempt in the right direction, but as far as our own country is concerned, the recommendations of the conference go very little beyond what is already recognized by usage or by law, and generally practiced in the factories and employments of our country.

Among recent works of literature, there is one which should be recommended to all students of political and social problems. Sir Charles Dilke's "Problems of Greater Britain" (London, Macmillan & Co., 2 vols.) is by a man who was once a front-rank politician and administrator. Since he retired from public life under very painful circumstances, he has for a second time traveled over our empire, and has devoted his great abilities and energy to literature. This work is the chief result, and is an admirable instance of how travel and politics, statistics and description, history of the past and problems of the future, may be united into a readable standard book of reference. English readers going through these two solid volumes will frequently feel that in many ways our colonies have advanced more quickly than their mother country; for example, they have solved many of our still-vexed questions — free education, church disestablishment, and public control of railways. American readers will find in this book an opportunity of understanding some phases of society which have much in common, and something to contrast, with the life of the United States.

Joseph King.

HAMPSTEAD, LONDON.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY. By DAVID A. WELLS, LL. D., D. C. L. Pp. 493. New York : D. Appleton & Company. 1890.

This volume is largely made up of papers that appeared in "The Popular Science Monthly," and in part in the "Contemporary Review," but so perfect is the unity of treatment and logical progress that one would never suspect it. The somewhat lengthy title has the merit — unusual in titles — of exact appropriateness. Mr. Wells takes the reader up on to the tower of observation, and spreads before his astonished gaze economic facts and movement in perspective. If there is any one field of activity in which men drift under momentary impulses, it is in the field of industry. Here the past is quickly forgotten and the future little heeded. This is particularly true at the present time, when inventions are so startling and changes so rapid that yesterday's wonder is forgotten in the greater wonder of to-day, and both regarded by the next generation as things that have always been. Therefore a view of our progress, not from the car window, as things seem to us, but as obtained by a distant observer, is at once interesting and instructive, especially when the observer is a man of Mr. Wells's vast and accurate information combined with equal insight and power of statement. The resources at his command are astonishing: government reports and statistics in all languages, boards of trade reports and trade journals, corporation accounts, magazine articles, and economic treatises yield him their secrets — only, we may be sure, as a reward of vast patience and industry. But we are impressed less by his knowledge of facts, than by his power to get at the meaning of facts and make figures interesting. Indeed, his power to make statistics live and speak is unequalled. The style is not brilliant, but it is clear and to the point. He will be disappointed who expects to find here philosophical discussions, sentiment, or social quackery. If Mr. Wells is an economist who compels the statistical Nereus to prophesy, he is yet concerned only with facts.

Economically the purport of the book is to show that the cause of the universally low and falling prices that have prevailed since 1873 is to be sought almost entirely in the wonderful mechanical inventions which are constantly cheapening the cost of production, and, in agriculture, in the development of millions of acres of fertile and cheap land in America, Australia, and India. To our minds the proof offered by Mr. Wells is conclusive, and to lay the blame any longer upon an assumed scarcity of gold and silver is to champion a fallen cause. Mr. Wells's description of the economic results of the new inventions reads like a fairy story, and except to those immediately engaged in the industries concerned will be a complete revelation. To give a few examples. In 1867 the cost of stamping and washing a ton of copper in the Lake Superior mines was \$5.50, while in 1885 it was only 47 + cents. Bessemer steel rails fell from \$58 per ton in 1880 to \$28.25 in 1884, and presumably left a profit to producers. Silver has declined 30 per cent. since 1873, while its production has increased 111 per cent. In the manufacturing of jewelry, formerly one skilled, highly-paid workman could make but three dozen pairs of sleeve buttons per day, in which time one boy can now make

nine thousand pairs. Steel ships cost now \$33.95 per ton as against \$90 in 1873. Though higher wages are paid now than in 1870, a railroad costing \$40,000 per mile then can now be built for \$20,000. In one of the large steel works in Pittsburg which uses natural gas, three men — each on duty eight hours — do the work in the boiler-room which formerly required fifty men. It is estimated to take the labor of but three men for one year to produce in Dakota 5500 bushels of wheat, grind them in Minneapolis, and lay them down in New York as 1000 barrels of flour, *that is*, a year's bread for 1000 persons. A few more cents per barrel carries the same flour to the English market in eight days.

These are but a few of a thousand facts which in the author's skillful hands show us how vast has been the increase in production and consequent lowering in price of most articles of commerce. After proving that the world is producing vastly more than ever before, and that consumers are getting much more for the same money than before, the author demonstrates the fact that wages are uniformly higher than ever before. It cannot be doubted that the manual laborer has more to spend, and can buy more with each dollar that he has now, than at any previous time, nor has the advance in wages shown any tendency to cease. At the same time there has been a constant fall in rate of interest, that is, the capitalist is in a less favorable position than before the industrial movement began. In a word, the enormous increase in product and in wealth which follows and attends machine and collective work is being appropriated in ever increasing rate by the laborers. Or, so far from the pessimistic views of the "Nationalists" and other sentimentalists being true to facts, in reality the poor, that is, manual laborers, are growing richer, while the capitalist, living upon his interest or dividends, is continually worse off. That a few are getting enormously rich through perfectly preventable corporate and governmental folly, and a few at the other end, in the cesspools of our cities, are starving, ninety per cent. of them from preventable causes, does not in the least affect the general proposition that men of all classes are to-day better fed, clothed, and cared for than ever before in the history of the world. Statistics are bad food for sentiment, and just now, when everybody is trying to make everybody happy by taxing everybody, there can be no healthier reading than such a book, which proves beyond question that prices are lower, hours of work shorter, trade greater in volume, comforts more accessible, *wages higher and interest lower* as time passes; changes which, by the way, are most marked in England, where industry is freest.

In discussing hours of labor, Mr. Wells says: "Thus far in the history of industry, all that has been achieved in the way of diminishing the hours of labor has been the result of conditions rather than of legislation" — a remark capable of universal application. Unless in harmony with existing conditions, legislation is never wise or strong enough to make its own conditions. A chapter from this work should be taken as an after-dinner tonic by all social dyspeptics.

D. Collin Wells.

Unto the Uttermost. By James M. Campbell. "With the Lord there is mercy, and with him there is *plenteous redemption.*" Psalm cxxx. 7. New York: Fords, Howard & Hulbert. Pp. 254. 1889. — This book might be crudely designated as Restorationist. But the author

expressly declares the possibility, and not merely an abstract one, that a soul may sink into such a habit of evil as to lose all heart or will of turning to good. He therefore appears to hold the ultimate conversion to God of all rational beings as *an article of hope*, but not as *an article of faith*. He is sound and central as to Christ, as the Eternal Word, and also as to the divine implacability towards sin, and towards the sinner while persisting in sin. He criticises the Andover theology as exaggerating the function of knowledge, and himself essentially underestimates the truth that the perfection of character can only come through motive, presented in intelligible apprehension. He is so unwilling to grant full force to the law of habit for evil, that he fails to establish it for perseverance in good. His Scriptural interpretation is sometimes forced, but never slipshod. Indeed, he is thoroughly accurate, alike in his casual allusions and in his habits of thought. The only literary blemish in his little book lies in his quotation of some of Mr. Joseph Cook's violent comparisons and hideous images. But his quotation from John Pulsford is a supererogatory merit far beyond this one fault. The book deals with the divine antinomies of Retribution reverently, and is the production of a Christian thinker who shows that he has a right to treat of it.

The Permanent Elements of Religion. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the Year 1887 on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M. A., Canon of Salisbury. By *W. Boyd Carpenter, D. D., D. C. L., Bishop of Ripon*, Honorary Fellow of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge. London: Macmillan & Co., and New York. Pp. lxiv, 423. 1889. — Bishop Carpenter here treats Religion, not exactly in answer to modern Positivism, but with prevailing reference to it. His main inquiry is, whether Religion may be expected to survive, and allowing this, whether Christianity will be its form. The former question he decides by the *consensus gentium*, rendered more decisive by every new fact reported from tribes once supposed to be without religion, and by a sufficient *consensus philosophorum*, ancient and modern, believing and unbelieving. As to the former point, it is curious that the negroes of Australia, universally allowed to be at the bottom religiously, have been discovered not only to worship, but to worship God as Father, carefully concealing the fact from whites whom they so confided in otherwise that they had made them chiefs!

As to the probable survival of any one of the now existing religions, the author very reasonably confines himself to the only three that have even the appearance of being universal, namely, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. Islam is easily dismissed, for, although aiming at universal domination, it has not even the appearance of being anything more than a fierce, rigid Arabism. The bishop lays down as the marks of fitness in a religion for universal prevalence, that it illustrates Dependence, Fellowship, and Progress. Islam, as its name implies, is absolute Dependence, and nothing else. It abhors the thought of Fellowship between God and Man, and makes not the slightest provision for Progress, either in the individual or in the race. The author remarks that under every religion, tendencies will develop themselves seeking the supply of all these three necessities of the religious nature, but that a religion must be judged according as it makes provision in itself for them. Thus, in Islamism, Persia, in the form of Sufism, has made a vigorous endeavor to answer the demand of Fellowship between man and God, but genuine

Islamism abhors Persian theology in all its forms, and with the best right, as mere heresy. As to Progress, the author points out (quoting abundantly from Kuenen and Renan) that the brilliancy of the Cordova caliphs was merely a transmission and elaboration of Greek thought, implacably opposed from the beginning by the clear-sighted instinct of genuine Islamism, which, acting as a steady brake upon the scientific movement, brought it ages ago to utter and remediless stagnation. Islam has been well described as, in the most eminent sense, Mortmain, the Dead Hand, which holds fixedly every pulse of life, spiritual, moral, intellectual, personal, and national, until at last it brings it to its own sepulchral stillness.

As to Buddhism, the author points out how, in its strange attempt to realize Fellowship, without a divine object of fellowship, it has partly sunk gasping into the void, longing for a reconciliation of the individual existence, yet, in defect of a loving union with God, finding no alternative except the blank negation of individuality, and how Northern Buddhism has made so many attempts to meet the need of Dependence, as to have become a very distinct thing indeed from Southern Buddhism, which remains much nearer to the real type of the system. As to Progress, of course, neither school has done anything, or can do anything for it.

As to the modern competitor with Christianity, namely, Positivism, besides its artificiality, its temporal character, the author remarks, is fatal to it.

One of the best parts of these lectures is the author's energetic defense of the value of Personality, and the impossibility of revering an impersonal God. He shows, as a German author puts it, that Suprapersonality always turns out in the end to be Infrapersonality.

The author implies the imperishable worth of the consummated human personality, in ethical union with the divine personality, but mainly dwells upon the realization of the kingdom of God on earth, in view of the antagonisms which he has principally in mind, describing it, however, as a kingdom from which, ultimately, death is banished.

The author rightly describes Arianism in the early church as an attempt to exalt Dependence at the expense of Fellowship, and Sabellianism as so strong an emphasis on Fellowship as ultimately inclined to Pantheism, which by abolishing the distinction between the two terms abolishes both Dependence and Fellowship.

Bishop Carpenter quotes most largely, and very appositely, from Kuenen, also from Renan, Herbert Spencer, Rhys Davids, Max Müller, Goldwin Smith, and many others, especially in the sixty-eight pages of Notes.

The most serious defect of the Lectures is, that the author, after insisting on the dignity of the personality that is built up by ethical self-control and self-assimilation to the Divine Personality manifested in Christ, then uses language, in his commendation of Sacrifice, which speaks, not of the surrender of selfishness, but, after the Buddhist style, of the surrender of the Self, a mode of speech which is assuredly the very antipodes of Christianity, and would reduce both Fellowship and Progress to a meaningless illusion. Love, as taught by Christ, and realized in Him, is not a natural force which dissolves the personality, but an ethical force which proceeds from personality, and perpetually and mutually reinforces personality. Love is infinitely careless of itself because it is

infinitely secure of itself in the God who is Love, and any other exposition of self-sacrifice is a mere usurpation of its name by a veiled despair. The gospel, and that alone, correlates the two declarations: He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall find it. Both appear to be implied in Bishop Carpenter's book, but the former seems to be disproportionately urged.

Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States in the Formative Period, 1775-1789. By Graduates and former Members of the Johns Hopkins University. Edited by *J. Franklin Jameson, Ph. D.*, late Associate in the Johns Hopkins University, Professor of History in Brown University. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. Pp. xiii, 321. \$2.25. 1889. — More of the grand work of Johns Hopkins. There are five Essays here. The first, by the Editor, is: *The Predecessor of the Supreme Court*. This he finds, under the Confederation, in a body of whose existence we have hardly been aware, namely, the Court of Appeals for Cases of Capture, which heard no less than 118 cases, brought from the state courts, and, as the author remarks, could hardly have failed to have an important educative effect on the people, in familiarizing them with the thought of a judiciary superior to that of the states. The old court bequeathed its archives and some of its pending cases to its illustrious successor.

The second essay is: *The Movement towards a Second Constitutional Convention in 1788.* By *Edward P. Smith*. This proposed Convention, as the author shows, was the rock on which the new-formed frame of polity came near splitting. All the power of Patrick Henry's eloquence was put forth to secure it; Rhode Island and North Carolina held out of the Union for many months in hope of it; New York only ratified the Constitution after preparing a circular letter urging the second Convention, which would have set everything afloat again; and Virginia went back on herself by concurring in this. Happily, however, Massachusetts suggested "the tub to the whale" in the form of the Ten Amendments, which once ratified, "all notes of opposition were lost in the chorus of admiration that resounded from every quarter."

The next paper is: *The Development of the Executive Departments, 1775-1789.* By *Jay Caesar Guggenheimer*. This development appears to have been most gratifyingly in keeping with the note of melancholy ineffectiveness stamped on the Confederation generally. "It is positively pathetic to follow Congress through its aimless wanderings in search of a system for the satisfactory management of its executive departments." Yet it is shown that there is, "after all, a thread constantly present which makes their development continuous. . . . When the Continental Congress retired in favor of its Federal successor, the thread was in no way severed. Of the various steps in the transformation from committees to boards, and from boards to secretaries, it is to be noticed that the lines of advancement were soon very definitely marked out. The number and scope of the departments necessary for the conduct of the public business was early determined by the Continental Congress. Subsequent progress was entirely confined within the bounds thus fixed."

The next essay is: *The Period of Constitution-making in the American Churches*, By *William P. Trent*. Mr. Trent shows that the constitutional movements in the States and the Union had a noticeable effect on the politics of the various churches, and argues that it is reasonable to believe that there was a considerable reflex influence from the churches

upon the state, especially from the Episcopal Church, whose constitution, settled during the Confederation, is extremely federal, and yet compact, and to which so many of the founders adhered. Madison and Jefferson seem both to have been greatly interested in its settlement of its government. The consolidation, also, of the rising Methodist Church can hardly have been without effect, if not on making, at least on strengthening, the Constitution, as on the other hand its division before the Rebellion was the parting of a mighty cable of general unity. These reflex influences are not very distinctly marked, but seem, as the author suggests, to be worth looking into. The essay gives accounts, interesting in themselves, of the definite organization, not far from the same time, of Episcopalianism, Presbyterianism, Methodism, the Baptist bodies, Roman Catholicism, and other systems.

The fifth essay is: *The Status of the Slave, 1775-1789*. By Jeffrey R. Brackett. The subject of this is comparatively familiar, but the paper contains many interesting facts. The proportion of whites to slaves in various colonies about 1775 is given as being, in New Hampshire, 100 to 1; in Massachusetts, 60 to 1; in Rhode Island, 20 to 1; in North Carolina, 2 to 1; in Maryland, 5 to 3; in Virginia and Georgia, 1 to 1; in South Carolina, 1 to 2. In New York and New Jersey there were about eight whites to one slave; in Delaware not quite so many. The Bill of Rights, Mr. Brackett remarks, would probably no more have abolished slavery in Massachusetts than it did in Virginia, except that slavery had so faint a hold that it was likely to die out of itself. The same is true of New Hampshire. In Rhode Island, where slavery was three times as strong as in our State, an act of gradual manumission was needed, as in the greater part of the North. Vermont honorably barred out slavery from the start. "In the South, there were doubts as to whether the two free races could live together. This question became one of the many influences, especially in Virginia and Maryland, which pulled the Gordian knot of slavery so tight that it could not be untied."

These Essays, as the editor remarks, are intended to bring home to us that the instrument which we call the Constitution, and to which we limit our political studies too rigorously, is really only the central part of our Constitution. The institutions of the States, and a great many points of interpretation and usage, are just as really a part of it. Then, also, as Dr. Jameson remarks, it is an error to imagine, with Mr. Gladstone, that even our documentary Constitution was struck out at one blow. Mr. Gladstone's strong point is hardly to be found in his appreciation of foreign affairs, whether he praises Jefferson Davis for having "created a nation," or takes to praising the polity which Davis failed to break up. "With the progress of historical science, great national acts of settlement, which have solved deep-lying difficulties or successfully laid the bases for national advancement, are being found, in increasing numbers, to have been preceded by numerous steps of tentative solution, or prepared by a long course of slow and gradual development in the nation."

Bible Studies from the New Testament, covering the International Sunday-School Lessons for 1890. By George F. Pentecost, D. D., author of "In the Volume of the Book," "Out of Egypt," etc. Copyright, 1889, by A. S. Barnes & Company, New York and Chicago. Paper covers, pp. x, 390. 60 cents. — This continuous popular commentary on Luke i.-xxiv., with its easy flow of thought and devout feeling, in thor-

ough union, is well calculated to be an effective antidote to the jerky, fragmentary superficiality of our present Sunday-school system. It is at once so attractive and spiritually profitable, that it ought to be easy for teachers to make sure that it is read through by all their scholars, lesson by lesson, and then it would be the foundation of a real and fruitful Scriptural knowledge. In the Temptation we are glad to see that the author emphasizes strongly the distinction between the *posse non peccare*, with which the Saviour begins, and the *non posse peccare*, which marks his consummation, as it does his people's. In the Transfiguration, he rightly emphasizes the truth that the shining forth was natural, the "muddy vesture of decay" with difficulty restraining it at other times. "for us men and for our salvation," to whom through Him is granted such an inward transformation as that we too at the last "shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of our Father."

New Points to Old Texts. By James Morris Whiton, Ph. D., author of "The Law of Liberty," "Beyond the Shadow," "Early Pupils of the Spirit," etc. New York: Thomas Whittaker, 2 and 3 Bible House. Pp. 255. \$1.25. 1890. — The third series of the author's Summer Sermons in England. They are, Reconciled to God; Better than a Book Religion; Life and its Incarnations; Life to Come; Of Prayer; In God; Elijah the Prophet; Elisha, Seer and Politician; The Gift of the Spirit; Miracle and Life; The Gospel according to Jonah; Usury Ancient and Modern. The reputation of the distinguished author of these Sermons as one whose freshness and insight engages attention on both sides of the sea needs no particular words of remark from us. The discourses have not so deep an interfusion as Robertson's of the Scriptural foundation with present applications, nor have they their noble distinction of style. But they seem to stand in the same general class, and they are more penetrating in many points of treatment, especially as respects the relations between Nature and the Supernatural, the Seen and the Unseen. They do not appear to us to mark the line at which, in a great many of the matters handled, the readjusted consent of the church will finally stand. But many of their thoughts will undoubtedly have to be incorporated into that final consent. The noblest sentences in this series appear to us to be these: "While Christian controversies, past and present, have all been about the Bible, it is a significant fact that they all hush the moment that the Master rises in the midst, saying, *Peace be unto you.* When all eyes are fixed on Him, and all hear Him saying, *Believe in Me,* there is peace at once." And in the first sermon, as in the last, the author preaches a gospel for the times, that will not leave the rich ruler undisturbed in his conscience, nor pass by the poor man that has fallen among thieves,

The Three Germanys: Glimpses into their History. By Theodore S. Fay. "Noctes atque dies patet atri janua ditis." Published for the Author, 65 John Street, New York. Pp. xix, 1281. For sale by A. S. Barnes & Co., 111 and 113 William Street, New York, and 263 and 265 Wabash Avenue, Chicago, Ill. — These two large volumes, whose easy print allures to the reading of them, are the fruits of a diplomatic residence of twenty-five years, from 1833 till 1858, in Switzerland, London, and Berlin. The author disclaims all pretensions to original research. And, indeed, almost all the time-honored inaccuracies of statement and judgment of character seem to be reproduced. The mediæval popes, in particular, have the good old-fashioned Protestant

measure dealt out to them. The author even reproduces that curious misapprehension of the Jesuit rule which makes *obstrictio ad peccatum* signify, Obligation to commit sin! — a misapprehension, it is true, into which even Ranke fell in his first edition, and from which even Hase, though he does recede, is evidently unwilling to recede. Yet Mr. Fay, though somewhat hyperbolically Protestant, is, as becomes so thoroughly Christian a writer, essentially charitable. And a good staunch Protestantism is a fundamental qualification for writing a true history of Germany. The book is thoroughly popular in its tone, thoroughly readable, casts aside the endless intricacies of German history, and following its main stream, gives both a just and an exceedingly vivid presentation of the meaning and course of the Holy Roman Empire *deutscher nation*, especially as embodied in the character of its great Kaisers; of its decline under the Hapsburgs; its virtual break-up between 1517 and 1648; the horrors of the Thirty Years' War (too revoltingly described, as well as other various horrors of the past); the surviving shadow which was all that was left of it, until in 1806 the last Roman Emperor gave up the German crown, and ended the First Germany; the helplessness of the Second Germany, between 1806 and 1866; the slow and sound growth of Prussia from the time of the Great Elector until, in 1870, she brought Barbarossa back, and created the Third Germany. Incidentally, the author gives a portraiture of Napoleon, which is worth a thousand of these philosophical attempts to make over the godless Corsican brigand into a benefactor of mankind. He was one, indeed, but as Nebuchadnezzar and Sennacherib were. The author's heart is where it should be, with the Hohenzollerns, but he is alive to the dangers of repression, and sees brooding in the depths forces of unbelief and anarchy which may possibly overthrow Christian society, but with confidence that what is of God shall revive. We wish the book could be widely read, for its faults are circumstantial, but its merits are essential. And as we are becoming an Anglo-German nation, we ought to know, in its general features, the history not only of our mother England, but of our grandmother Germany. It will help to keep us from subsiding into a mere westward extension of County Galway.

French and English. A Comparison By Philip Gilbert Hamerton, author of "The Intellectual Life." Boston: Roberts Brothers. Pp. xxii, 480. \$2.00. 1889. — This does not compare in depth and unity of impression with Mr. Brownell's book, but it is various, entertaining, and very instructive. He shows that neither the English nor the French national character is any such constant quantity as it is usual to assume, and that the degrees of mutual approximation have varied wonderfully in different ages. There has been a constant opposition, but it has rested fundamentally on the opposition of two neighboring powers. He remarks that each is called a power of the first rank, but that neither is such in such a sense as Germany or Russia. Man for man, he allows, what is patent to view, that the English are a much more vigorous race, and he allows that moral feeling is much stronger in them. He evidently enjoys the more pronounced irreligion of France, but has high hopes of England in this regard, especially under the coming lead of Mr. John Morley. His only conception of "intellectual emancipation" is absolute freedom from religion. Justice of thought is to him exemplified in the author of "The Irreligion of the Future," and "Morality without Obligation and without Sanction." That there can be justice of thought

which shall lead to exactly opposite results, he nowhere intimates or implies. He objects to the English custom of family prayers, on the ground that it makes it so much harder for the boys, as they grow up, to profess atheism courageously. He clears away various misconceptions of fact which have exaggerated the present extent of atheistic persecution in France, but is himself too thoroughly in accord with its essential purpose and spirit to bring out the real depth and steadiness of its operation, as attested by all sorts of facts. This underlying enthusiasm of irreligion is the real principle of unity in the book, and gives it a much more serious rank than that of a bundle of essays by a mere man of letters.

His description of the London and Paris nationalities, as so distinct from the French and English, is a revelation. The war of the Commune, he shows, was really an attempt to establish Paris as a nation. He rightly speaks of the Parisian Communards, not Communists, since the movement for a virtually independent government of Paris had nothing to do with Communism.

The rancorousness of civil divisions, an always smouldering civil war, in France, the implacability and immense social influence of the aristocracy, the slowly growing self-control of the democracy, the slow decay in France of morality, religion, and population, the worship of Lubricity, which he at once denies and proves, the cheerful patriotism, at once intensified and sobered by the late war, the growing dislike of the democracy to war, unless for a certain reconquest of the two provinces, the comparative moral soundness of the peasantry, — all these contradictory currents, and many more, are shown with profoundly intimate knowledge, and without any eager attempt to suppress one class of facts in favor of another. And regarding religion as exalted poetry, divorced from all objectivity, he nevertheless lights up his book by a few intense sketches, for England and France, of pure and wonderful sanctity.

Charles C. Starbuck.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, Boston and Chicago. The Puritan Spirit. By Richard Salter Storrs, D. D., LL. D. An Oration delivered before The Congregational Club in Tremont Temple, Boston, 18th December, 1889, and published by their request. Pp. 72. 75 cents.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. American Men of Letters. Edited by Charles Dudley Warner. William Cullen Bryant. By John Bigelow. Pp. vi, 355. 1890. \$1.25.

D. Appleton & Company, New York. History Primers. History of Egypt. By F. C. H. Wendel, A. M., Ph. D. Pp. 159. 1890. 45 cents.

The Baker & Taylor Co., New York. National Needs and Remedies. The Discussions of the General Christian Conference held in Boston, Mass., December 4, 5, and 6, 1889. Under the Auspices and Direction of the Evangelical Alliance for the United States. Pp. xiv, 331. 1890. For sale by W. B. Clarke & Co., Boston. — Trade Organizations in Politics, also Progress and Robbery. An Answer to Henry George. By J. Bleeker Miller. Pp. viii, 218. 1887.

Funk & Wagnalls, New York and London. The Calvary Pulpit. Christ, and Him Crucified. By Robert S. MacArthur. 12mo, pp. 294. 1890. Cloth, \$1.00. — The Seven Churches of Asia, or Worldliness in the Church. By Howard Crosby, Pastor of the Fourth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York. Pp. 168. 1890.

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
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
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ANDOVER REVIEW:

A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XIII.—JUNE, 1890.—No. LXXVIII.

THE WORKING POPULATION OF CITIES, AND WHAT THE UNIVERSITIES OWE THEM.

EAST LONDON is a place where a man would not choose to live if he could help it. It is an oppressive place, with many people who are emaciated, pale-faced, and lifeless. The houses are like the tenements of Ivy Lane which Walter Besant has described. "They are mean and squalid houses. The doors and door-posts are black for want of scrubbing; the oldest inhabitant cannot remember when they were painted last; the windows are like the windows in Chancery Lane for grimness; in most of the houses, the balustrades and some of the steps of the narrow stairs have been broken away for firewood; the plaster of the ceiling has long since cracked and fallen; the street is slovenly and uncared for."¹ Nobody knows the people who live in East London, although there are hundreds of thousands of them; until recently no one cared to know them. Even the Lord Mayor has cast them out utterly. "As for the people in the slums," he said, "they are miserable by taste and idlers by profession. London must expect to be the centre of crime as of everything else."

But lately, in this heart of the world's misery, two notable things have sprung up. Arnold Toynbee, a man not quite of the old English university type, one for whom the world was not wholly books, feeling a new throb of kinship for all humanity, left the sunlight and went to live in the midst of this million or two of unknown human beings. The result was Toynbee Hall, a place where cultured, educated men go to live and work with the "masses," a university settlement.

¹ *Children of Gibeon*, pp. 65, 66.

In a very central place in the East End of London stands the other considerable phenomenon of this dead sea of humanity. It is the Palace of Delight, the People's Palace. The justly famed book, "All Sorts and Conditions of Men," has made the conception of this palace common property of the world. The great hall, large enough for six thousand persons, and the nucleus of the not yet completed palace, was opened by the Queen, in the presence of a vast crowd, on the 14th of May, 1887.

The inspiring thought of it is, that the great, neglected body of London working people, nerveless and attenuated in frame and spirit from present and ancestral overwork and underfeeding, repellantly, brutishly housed and homed, with no place of resort but the gin-shop and play-houses of demoralizing character, can be reached best, if not solely, through their craving for recreation and amusement. Do you think worn-out, woe-begone people would be attracted by lectures on astronomy, chemistry, or the beauties of Italian literature, nay, by any benevolent announcement of yours that you were prepared to provide instruction and profit for them at your own expense? The women would ask what use they had for such things; the men, if they but knew the phraseology, would request you to supply them first with the brain energy to enable them to be instructed and improved. But these same people may be touched if wisely approached. Their natures are wistful for some better nutriment than they get. Furnish them with entertainment on their own grade of development; ask no effort of them; have boxing, dancing, billiards, negro minstrels, gay shows, lively concerts, shooting-courts, bowling-alleys, gymnasiums, games of every kind, bars with soft drinks, everything that can, without detriment, attract those from whom the world has withheld opportunities for culture.¹ But these things shall all be avenues to something higher. There shall be parlors, libraries, reading-rooms, lectures, classes, superior music, pictures, technical teaching, cooking and sewing schools. The growth of the *whole* nature is to be provided for here. It is not to be a place for the elimination of the physical, as so many of our colleges are. All that can delight and develop every quality and capacity of man, woman, and child, and every phase of human character, shall be supplied.² People may come and box

¹ It would be better for those in all grades of society if they had more of these pleasures, and it is an error to call them "low pleasures."

² In the London People's Palace it has, however, been found that a certain degree of separation must be maintained between old and young. "Youth

merely, and no one shall ask about their souls or offer tracts; they shall watch plays suited to their degree of taste, with immunity from the temperance pledge and dissertation on thrift. But a finer atmosphere surrounds them; well-mannered people without reserves¹ are there to mingle with them and be friends; there are on every hand stimuli far more potent than spoken words to elevation of character and improvement of faculties.

A most significant characteristic of this enterprise is that it rests on the lately born idea of philanthropy. The people are not approached as paupers upon whom some great good is to be conferred; they are treated as self-respecting personalities, capable of helping themselves, and willing to do it. They are required to pay for all they receive, but the fees are so small that they can be readily met. They are not even treated as inferiors. It is true they are to be taught and improved, but so are boys at school, and if their parents are on our social level we do not, or true teachers do not, pain them with the intimation that they are common or incompetent on account of their uncompleted development.

If we followed some American writers of indisputable eminence and respectability, these enterprises would have for us the interest that the non-scientific man accords to problems of spectrum analysis or the convolutions of his own brain, an interest merely speculative, and no more. The authorities to whom I refer are those who think that this fair continent of ours basks in the perpetual smile of Providence, and harbors no woes that do not spring from the incompetence, the mismanagement, the willful misconduct of the people who suffer them. But the time is not far distant when the most jubilant optimist will awake to the fact that the sun is going down on the golden period of our country's life, and that a new day comparable to the one that is fading out

will not consort with age; the lads of sixteen refused to sit down in the same rooms with men old enough to be their fathers. With this warning before them, the trustees resolved on making admission to the Palace; first, a privilege, which, to be prized at all, must be paid for; and next, a privilege to be limited by age. The members of the Palace must be, therefore, not under fifteen, and not over five and twenty." But "the members do not enjoy anything like exclusive occupation." Walter Besant, "The People's Palace"; *North American Review*, July, 1888. This difficulty is to be met by having certain rooms set apart exclusively for the young. But one of the aims of these institutions is to break down the artificial barriers between the different ages and sexes.

¹ If there is any suggestion of patronage the good is undone.

will not dawn until moral principles that are now derisively relegated to dreamland shall have permeated and remodeled all our business and industrial relations.

Follow me to the slums of our own cities for proof of this. Trusting that we are all guests of some fashionable up-town hotel in New York, that we have dined sumptuously, that we have been sitting awhile before the warm grate-fire in the spacious parlors, that we have thanked God for his wonderful goodness to the children of men, let us proceed to Forsyth Street of that city. It is evening, and a light rain falls, making an uncomfortable paste of the Bowery and Rivington and Forsyth sidewalk dirt. But the rain does not prevent a German band from playing in Forsyth Street, nor children of all ages from dancing together to the music on the slippery walks. 'Tis a sight not to be forgotten. You become conscious that some lives are barren. You have heard that God loves all equally. The dancers, some of them mere babes, with wet feet and dripping hair, must be pushed aside if we are to make progress. Glance into the dark, cramped hallways as we pass; notice how they are filled with young men and young women talking and laughing together familiarly. Have you heard of tenement-house morality?

The basis of the University Settlement was first in tenement 146, between Rivington and Delancey streets. In the Forsyth tenement houses between these two boundaries, the length of a block merely, it is estimated that upwards of two thousand people live. Some one has compared this place to a country village of the same population. In the village there would be several churches, there would be parks, school-houses, perhaps a library, and how many yards with trees and flowers, while the broad, tender country would stretch near and far on every side. In this New York village there are a few tall brick houses, touching one another, and fronting a street that is scarce ever clean, and never without a repulsive odor when the sun is warm. If all the people of lower New York tried to go to church of a Sunday in the churches that, through the providence of God and the charity of their fellow-men, they have down there, some forty or fifty seats might possibly fall to this village of two thousand as its quota. This is comparatively a good village, but some of the houses are famed for the mortality of their occupants. Such is the one nearly opposite 146, where scarlet fever, diphtheria, and typhoid fever often break out; and where apparently strong persons have a habit of going off suddenly with consumption. A

promising young friend whom I left "not very well" in the late spring of last year was dead at the end of the summer. He told me that in rainy weather the walls of his sleeping room flowed with water. "I have never found anybody who could explain why our rooms are so damp," he said, with curious unconsciousness of the vital relation of the matter to him. His mother died of consumption a year or two earlier.

The house that we are especially interested in has two basement rooms for stores, and suites of apartments for sixteen families, allowing three rooms to each family. Of these three rooms one has natural light from two windows; the second, which is the kitchen, and contains a sink that is always worthy of suspicion, is lighted by windows into the first; the third gains some dim daylight from a well or aperture between the side walls of the houses, open only at the top. The sun never enters from these windows, and the air in the cavity is always damp, heavy, and impure. If the cork is taken out of an empty flask the ventilation is still poor. There must be some means of circulation, an opening at the bottom as well as the top. The bed-rooms of a tenement house can never be well ventilated. But the older houses have not even the well; their only provision, if they have any, is a shaft going from the basement store to the top of the house, or a small window into the close, black hall. The shaft is a great improvement over nothing, but the air that enters it from below — if the ventilating aperture is ever open — comes from vegetables and kerosene if it is a grocery, from a dozen or twenty pairs of lungs if it is a tailor shop, or probably from another closed bedroom, may be the one occupied by the shop-keeper's family. It is, therefore, only a slight departure from reality to say that these inner sleeping rooms of the earlier tenements are lightless and airless.

Mr. Stanton Coit, a graduate of Amherst College and Berlin University, went to live in a place of this kind some three years ago.¹ He had resided in Toynbee Hall, and studied its methods. The name given to the new undertaking was the Neighborhood Guild. It was non-sectarian. Jews, Catholics, Protestants, and

¹ Father J. O. S. Huntington took residence in lower New York, in a similar manner, about seven years ago, and has lived and labored effectively there since, gathering the working people about him in religious and social and club life. But as his admirable enterprise is directly connected with the church, and we are considering efforts that aim to bring the universities and the people together, it lies out of the scope of this paper to describe it.

Liberals mingled there, both as members of the guild and as workers. Mr. Coit, at the outset, gathered some of the boys of the neighborhood about him, formed them into a club, and hired one of the shop rooms in the basement, which he fitted for club purposes. There followed other clubs, and non-resident workers came from up town to assist. There was a small girls' club, conducted by a graduate of Smith College; a small boys' club, a club for large girls, and one for large boys, the limiting age of the last being twenty-two years. Two young women, both of whom were trained for the work by special study in Germany, organized a kindergarten, which they taught from nine until twelve o'clock five mornings of each week. In the course of time, three other educated men had come to reside with the guild, and not less than fifteen persons, men and women, were coming at stated intervals to do regular work. To-day the enterprise is in the hands of Charles B. Stover, a graduate of Lafayette College, of Union Theological Seminary, and a student of German universities, who was assisted until recently by Elmer S. Forbes, an Amherst graduate. During one summer Mr. Thorp, also of Amherst, had sole management. Already, therefore, five college men have been residents, and the name University Settlement may be justly applied to it.

The thought that has animated this movement is that nothing effectual can be done at arm's length, — "with a fishing-pole," as Dr. Parkhurst said of the mission chapel of his own church, where an overworked man was paid a small sum by his affluent congregation "to go down and love the people for them." Those who have lived in Forsyth Street feel that class distinctions can only be broken down by actually breaking them down, — by going directly to the people and living with them, by learning first-hand what their wants and needs are, by giving them sympathy face to face, by accepting sad facts without disguise or honey, and helping in that great coming miracle, mass emancipation. There seems to be one best way of doing the work that lies before humanity now, and the key is given in an attractive passage in one of Walter Bagehot's works, which I will quote: "I do not know," it runs, "if many of my readers happen to have read Father Newman's celebrated sermon, 'Personal Influence the means of Propagating Truth,' if not, I strongly recommend them to do so. They will there see the opinion of a great practical leader of men, of one who has led very many where they little thought of going, as to the mode in which they are to

be led ; and what he says, put shortly and simply, and taken out of his delicate language, is but this — that men are guided by *type*, not by argument ; that some winning instance must be set up before them, or the sermon will be vain, and the doctrine will not spread. I do not want," Mr. Bagehot continues, "to illustrate this matter from religious history, for I should be led far from my purpose, and after all I can but teach the commonplace that it is the life of teachers which is *catching*, not their tenets."¹ There may be manifold gifted conversations about the brotherhood of man and lectures to promulgate the opinion, Sunday sermons on visiting the poor and praying with them, learned dissertations before economic associations on ways to improve society, with statistics that will insure the author of them a high seat in the synagogue of science, but these do not scale the separating class wall. Much superior to any or all of these will be a perceptible number of persons who actually break through class lines, and who do not relapse from their revolt against castes when they leave the slums for a ten-course dinner.

Let us see if the work accomplished in Forsyth Street justifies the adoption of the principle that men and women must live among those they intend to help. During the period of which I write three suites of tenement rooms, such as have been described, were rented and furnished by the three workers already named. Was it not a matter of the utmost importance that the boys were always welcome to these rooms ; that they often came by special invitation, and often upon their own impulse ; that they read the books, looked at the pictures, had little lunches, held committee meetings there ; that these were the places for private classes, for lessons in elocution, for training in wood carving, for copying songs ? The basis of all that was done was friendship. Much of this, the best of it, must have been lost had one come daily from another part of the town. Three working boys also resided in the Settlement, sleeping in Mr. Coit's rooms. Upon this foundation of intimate friendship the more formal work of the clubs was established and developed. There was a piano in the hall, and songs were learned, college songs for the most part. The older girls and boys were taught to dance, and young gentlemen and ladies came from up town to mingle and dance with them. They had theatricals, gymnastic exercises, games, and boxing. The more serious efforts came in the form of business meetings,

¹ *Physics and Politics*, p. 90.

debates, essays, readings, declamations and classes.¹ The boys were taught parliamentary rules, and conducted their meetings according to these principles, an older person being present to suggest and assist. The debates were made a means of instruction on topics of especial concern to boys living in their conditions. Before a debate the subject was discussed with them by some of the leaders, and they were coached for the occasion. "Strikes," the "Eight-hour Question," "Should Workingmen join a Labor Organization?" were argued, and at the close the leaders mingled in the discussion, stating facts familiar to them, and giving their own opinions. A public debate was held last spring on the healthfulness of tenement houses, and Mr. Charles F. Wingate, a well known sanitary engineer of the city, was present by invitation, and delivered an address on the subject after the debate. It has been asked why, if the people are worthy of anything better, they do not make themselves heard in continual protest against the criminal condition of the houses they are compelled by necessity to inhabit. A well known leader of reform in New York expressed his surprise at their seeming quiescence, before a public audience. I believe that after the debate on the health of the tenement house the charge of apathy would not hold of those who heard it. But had this reformer lived a while in Forsyth Street he would not have asked the question. He would have learned things that a man who gets his information from books and articles and casual journeys into the unlovely regions cannot in any wise comprehend. Let me inquire, however, how they are to make themselves heard when they have no organs that respectable people read, no friends, and when nobody that is anybody listens to them. Some one has said, if you wish to know what is

¹ The following circular was lately issued by the Guild, describing the objects of one of the clubs: "A club for young men, come and join it! It meets at 146 Forsyth Street. This is not an ordinary 'Pleasure Club;' yet you will find its meetings extraordinarily pleasant. It never holds balls in public halls for the benefit of any of its members. Its benefits are more sure and lasting than a benefit ball, and may be shared by all its members at every meeting. But even in dancing it is not outdone by the ordinary 'Pleasure Club;' for, together with a kindred club for young women, it spends an evening every other week in dancing in its own clean and cheerful rooms, away from all the damnable allurements of dance halls. Besides the pleasures of 'the light fantastic toe,' you may here enjoy a Gymnasium, Reading Room, Library, Monthly Entertainments, Lectures, Debates, Singing, Banjo Playing, and evening classes in Arithmetic, Writing, Reading, History, Literature, English Speech, etc. The Club invites young men between the ages of 16 and 22 years to its rooms."

to be thought and done in the future talk with the young. I submit that if we desire to learn some very important facts about the future of our society we must turn from the press that is owned by capital, and conducted in its interest, to the press that these struggling masses issue for themselves, and read the bitter cries that are there printed and sown week by week to the multitude. When these things bear their certain fruit we shall look back at our present sapient serenity and find it unaccountable. I apprehend, moreover, that the people are trying to make their wants known in the one form that is forcible enough to rise above the din of our competitive business warfare, namely, by anarchy, dynamite, and threats of monster strikes and uprisings. The trouble is, we have not learned the alphabet of those whom we call our common people yet. When we read that Spies and Parsons are to be avenged, the handwriting on the wall really says that the frightful infant mortality in the tenement districts, together with many other heinous abuses of humanity in the lower walks of life, have at length passed the point of endurableness. By residence in such a locality as Forsyth Street one becomes cognizant of these truths through absorption.

I must not omit some further mention of the part played by physical training in the University Settlement work. To combat the physical and mental inertness occasioned by unsanitary homes and factories, muscular training is of the highest importance. A member of the Seventh Regiment came down two evenings each week for several months, and for an hour gave the older boys military drill. For the younger boys, not yet devitalized by the unwholesome air and hours of shops, gymnastic drill was essential to tame their wild animal spirits, due to the roving, savage life they are compelled to lead in the streets from want of real homes and anything like yards or play-grounds. The most deferential courtesy could not call the few square feet of paved court allotted to a house, surrounded by towering, dreary brick walls, and shadowed by tiers of heavy-laden clothes-lines, where perchance twenty families go out to breathe, yards. In summer it is often a ridiculous mistake to go into these inclosures for a breath of fresh air, on account of the numerous closets and sewer connections they contain, and because they too, like the cavities between the buildings already mentioned, are open and ventilated only at the top. Apropos of the military drill, it is amusing to recall that some up-town person expostulated that it was all wrong, for it was simply fitting the masses to war against society.

The response of the boys to the efforts made in their behalf was most encouraging. The rooms became the favorite rendezvous of the larger part of them, some had appointments, such as committee meetings, classes in literature, physiology, etc., which occupied nearly every evening in the week. One said ruefully, at a time when the continuance of the guild work was uncertain, "If this club falls through, I'll never join another one." It must be remembered that the undertaking is still in its infancy; the agencies that will, it is hoped, be effectively used, are only crudely organized at best, many have not been even attempted. Yet the tastes of the majority of the boys have been greatly raised, they have been taught improved manners, their aspirations have been fostered, their ideas broadened and multiplied, and I am confident that the lives of some at least have been placed upon a permanently higher plane. Indeed, this settlement has not merely opened the window to give them a momentary view of another world, it has thrown the doors wide to them in this sense at least, that they have lasting friends among the workers. One of the boys has described in a letter what the Guild has done for him, and it is, with one or two slight alterations, as follows:¹ "The good it has done me is so much that I cannot write it all here. In the first place when I first joined the guild I could hardly read or write, and knew very little about arithmetic, but now as you see I can call myself a pretty fair writer and speller as you can see for yourself. I have taken lessons in elocution which have done me good service. What the guild might do for me as well as for everybody in the neighborhood is this, it will keep the boys from saloons and make men of them, what I mean by men is this, men who can talk on any subject which may be brought up and answer all questions brought up by anybody who may think that he is smarter than a member of the neighborhood guild, and not know only who keeps the best beer and which is the best place to play pool. It will also make men think when at the ballot-box if they are doing right. When people hear of the neighborhood guild they do not think very much of it but let them come down once and they will see a work going on that they never dreamed of in their own ward and go away with a different opinion."

And yet the powers of these bright, attractive, capable young men, quite as intelligent and lovable as yours, my dear Madam,

¹ In editing this letter I have merely changed the punctuation somewhat and omitted one or two sentences. The words are precisely as written.

who will enter the university next year, are being steadily broken down by the life society has consigned them to. They go to poor restaurants and eat execrably prepared food because their wages are low and they have had no teaching; they turn old and haggard early, — 't is wonderful what ancient, wizened faces some of the smallest children have! — in large measure for want of sleep, for, as one explained, they stay out of their hot, close, crowded bedrooms in summer, often until far beyond midnight, because they can hardly endure being in them, and cannot get to sleep.

It was a question how to reach the older people and how to extend the influence of the work beyond the limits of the neighborhood. The Social Science Club that was organized did much to resolve these difficulties. The original object of the club was to bring prominent labor leaders and intelligent workingmen of the city, and representative men of education, for convenience styled university men, together for acquaintance, for conference, for discussion of the vital problems that divide classes from masses. It was only partially successful, but it was pregnant in lessons. Perhaps the main reason why it was not a complete success was the unwillingness of men of standing of the university class to devote much time to it. When invited they consented to come one evening or two evenings to read a paper on the selected subject, but very few came regularly, giving in this manner the far greater weight of their continuous presence. The effect of this on the Proletarian side of the club, as they humorously styled themselves, was soon apparent. With certain exceptions the recognized leaders could not be attached to the movement. I suspect they perceived that the club could not accomplish what it proposed unless men holding influential positions among the capitalist class took hold of the project with coats off, if I may so speak, and they, as men of standing and prominence in the labor ranks, were shy of consorting with the unknown younger men who took vital interest in the meetings.

There was another obstacle to success, and it must be intelligently reckoned with in every attempt that is hereafter made to bring the two parting sections of society together. A large body, possibly the majority, of creators of public opinion among the working people, deprecate everything that tends to conciliate the factions. For, they argue, these efforts do not go to the root of the matter, the well-to-do people who are initiating these experiments have not the slightest desire to go to the root of the matter, for it would necessitate the relinquishment of privileges as

dear to them as life ; they wish to poultice the festering social sore merely, to administer opiates gratis, and purchase therewith the elevated joys of sweet charity, and hence, by disarming the prejudices of the people, to prolong their bondage and misery. Our Social Science Club was looked upon as one of these poultices. The workingmen of the extremer class asked incredulously what good it would do, and said they could accomplish more for the cause at their hearts by intensifying class feeling, and by teaching their followers that half-way measures were palliatives, worse than useless in the long run, and not to be abetted.

In spite of these drawbacks the club was in a way singularly successful. There were several workingmen of more than usual breadth — men of breadth for any position in life — who gave it their support, and it became an invaluable school for the “university men” who were faithful to it. Women as well as men attended, the discussions were perfectly free, and the incisive criticisms of the workingmen’s section taught, as no professor of economy or school of political science could possibly teach, what the poignant grievances of the masses are, and what their feeling and intention toward our social system. At each meeting a specially prepared paper was read or a topic was verbally presented, and discussion followed. There were no permanent officers. When a member of the lower class read, one of the middle class presided, and the reverse. Some of the subjects treated were the following: “Strikes,” by Edward King, a type founder of extraordinary intelligence and broad education, who, like Felix Holt, rejected opportunities and allurements to “rise in the world,” as we crudely say, that he might remain identified with his class to labor with and lift them, a man whom to know merely was an education in sociology and ethics. At another time Mr. King spoke about the tenement house, and methods of reforming it. Lawrence Gronlund, author of “The Coöperative Commonwealth,” defended Socialism, dealing particularly with the inveterate objection that individuality must be crushed by it. Professor Felix Adler, leader of the Society for Ethical Culture, gave a critique of the advanced socialistic scheme, and urged ethical methods of meeting the social crisis. Gregory Weinstein, a printer by trade, showed in a valuable paper, afterwards published in “The Christian Union,” what labor organizations had done to improve the condition of the men employed in printing establishments. Other topics considered were “Wages as affected by the Eight-hour System,” by George Gunton, author of “Wealth and Progress”;

"The Forsyth Street Neighborhood Guild," by Stanton Coit, its founder; "The History and Nature of Trusts," by Ellis Gray Seymour, a lawyer; "Taxation," by Charles B. Spahr, one of the editors of "The Christian Union"; "Anarchism," by Dr. Gertrude Kelly; "Immigration," by Professor Richmond M. Smith, of Columbia College; "University Extension and the Working Classes,"¹ in which a People's University was advocated, and "What shall be done with Trusts?"² by the present writer.

The workers in this club made a very remarkable and gratifying discovery. The lines of social demarkation that are being laid down had led them to picture the workingman as a grotesque figure, coarse in fibre and devoid of sentiment, and emphatically not a gentleman. Measured by the standard of Mrs. Murray, in one of Howell's comedies, they were not gentlemen. "You're not going to tell me that a steamboat engineer is a gentleman?" this sturdy emanation of an overruling prejudice inquired with sublimity. But waiving the subtle and animating question how much of a gentleman is constituted by his shirt front, I wish I could be sure that all the members of the Union League Club were as strictly gentlemen as some of these. I speak of this because in our very Christian civilization these people are made to constitute a special caste, with whom the cultured have no intercourse or contact. If I may refer again to the sermon of Dr. Parkhurst, he hinted the suspicion that his parishioners would rather see the poor people of lower New York in hell than coming into their pews on Sunday, cluttering them up with their old clothes. Strange to say, however, these unworthy outcasts comprehend to some extent the refinements of life; they seemed capable of appreciating friendships; we could discern in them the rudiments of the æsthetic sense, for they seemed to love flowers; and it was a curious anomaly for one of them to invite me to accompany him to the Catholic cathedral on Easter morning to enjoy the grand music there. The Social Science Club shattered these baseless conventional figments in its sphere, which was a very extraordinary and memorable achievement, considering that the place was New York city, where money so much overtowers broad intelligence, refinement, and morality. It brought a number of persons on each side of the line into relations of cordial esteem and friendship. Commenting on a letter written by one of these proletarians, a woman of the cultivated class said in surprised admiration, "It

¹ The basis of a part of the present article.

² Published in *The Andover Review* for August, 1888.

would hardly be fair to take him as a type, would it, — for in poetic and delicate sentiment he seems to me far ahead of most of my acquaintances of the 'refined classes.' ”

It would be an important omission if nothing were said at this point of an undertaking carried through in Chicago in the winter of 1887-'88, somewhat similar in aim to the effort just narrated. This was the “Economic Conferences,” between business men and workingmen, of which the explanatory circular said: “It is proposed to endeavor to make business men and workingmen better acquainted with one another's views. How many business men have attended workingmen's meetings and know at first hand what their ideas and aims are? How many workingmen ever hear their employers or other leaders of business enterprise explain their views and the problems with which they have to deal? Business men have their clubs and various associations, at which they state and defend their views — but to people who are already convinced. Workingmen have their union and assembly meetings — and the same is true in substance of them. What is needed is to bring these people together, and to help each to understand the other.” The Conferences, whose aim it was to engender this mutual understanding, consisted of several addresses given without fee in a public hall, Sunday evenings, by leading labor and business men, alternately. They were as follows: “The Aims of the Knights of Labor,” George A. Schilling; “Banking and the Social System,” Lyman J. Gage; “The Labor Question from the Standpoint of the Socialist,” Thomas J. Morgan; “Is the Board of Trade Hostile to the Interests of the Community?” Charles L. Hutchinson; “A View from the Labor Sanctum,” Jos. R. Buchanan; “Socialism as a Remedy,” Franklin MacVeagh; “An American Trade-Unionist's View of the Social Question,” A. C. Cameron. These were “men fairly representing the great business interests of Chicago, and the different phases of thought and organization among workingmen.” In soliciting audiences it was pointed out that it would be “most desirable that working people should hear the addresses from the business man's standpoint, and that business men should largely make up the audience of the representatives of the workingmen.” It was also urged that business men should not allow it to be said that they were unwilling to take the trouble to hear the ideas of the workingmen when an occasion offered and a special invitation was extended to them. There was no miscellaneous discussion, but any one in the audience was allowed to question the speaker at the close of his discourse.

The lecture of Mr. Morgan was accompanied by a trenchant and expressive commentary which showed how the wage earner really stands before the public eye. "Referring to the slighting way the newspapers always spoke of him, he said: 'My social standing and dignity may be measured by the contemptible insignificance of the words "Tommy Morgan," and I am a type of the wage class.'"¹ And the next morning the newspapers came out in their usual manner with reports of "Tommy" Morgan's talk. But a week before a banker had spoken in the same course, and Mr. Morgan was able to call attention to the "obsequious deferential way" in which these papers had referred to his utterances. The writer from whom I have gathered these statements — himself a decided critic rather than supporter of Mr. Morgan's social views — goes on to observe that there is not one rich man in Chicago, outside of the learned professions, "who can present an argument in such logical shape, and with such oratorical power, as Mr. Morgan presented his reasons for State Socialism." To be a wage worker is, in fact, the base that neutralizes, to the thinking of the piquant multitude, all the acid of genius. It does a miracle, making what is, not to be. If you are a wage-earner, though you are gifted you are not gifted, and though noble you are ignoble.

It is now hoped by the promoters of these Conferences² to give them permanence through a supporting organization.

In a quiet way Edward King has been for years an indefatigable educator among the working people of New York. Last winter he was conducting free evening and Sunday classes in Psychology and Sociology, composed of the more promising sort of persons who were likely in their turn to become teachers. At the same time he was working ten hours daily in the type foundry, at average wages of two dollars. But these classes were compelled to shift from place to place for want of a reliable meeting room. In the spring the University Settlement was enabled to open its doors to them, which made it the home of another branch of work. It is almost needless to point out how much could be made to grow from such a connection as this. Evidently it was a step toward that most desirable of ends, helping the working people to help themselves. It was the utilizing of agencies already organized; perhaps, also, one of the beginnings of a new form of popular education.

¹ "Economic Conferences," by "Wheelbarrow," in *The Open Court*, for July 19, 1888.

² Mr. William M. Salter, Lecturer for the Ethical Culture Society, was the originator of the plan.

It is time to inquire more closely about the future of this work, what may and should develop from it. The feature of University Extension lectures has not yet been added, but it may be expected. Single lectures are frequently given. A moment's consideration of the extension movement in England will show that it has a mission on this side of the ocean. Under the auspices of the great English universities advanced students go forth to Extension centres — to towns or city districts — to deliver courses of twelve lectures on their specialties. These lectures cover twelve weeks. An hour for weekly conference is also appointed, when those most interested meet the lecturer for more intimate study. The use of books is then taught. The courses on various subjects are combined in groups, and one who desires to follow the lectures of a group may become a "Student affiliated to the University." After passing a preliminary examination, one on the lecture courses, and performing the other work required by the lecturer, such as themes, reading, etc., he may obtain a degree by two instead of three years' residence at the university. The lecturers do not themselves conduct the examinations, but special examiners are appointed by the universities.

It is well to know how, after fifteen years of trial, this phase of education impresses leaders of British thought. In an address to the students of the "London Society for the Extension of University Teaching," John Morley spoke of it in these terms: "What is the object of the movement? What do the promoters aim at? I take it that what they aim at is to bring the very best teaching that the country can afford, through the hands of the most thoroughly competent men, within the reach of every class of the community. Their object is to give to the many that sound, systematic, and methodical knowledge, which has hitherto been the privilege of the few who can afford the time and money to go to Oxford and Cambridge; to diffuse the fertilizing waters of intellectual knowledge from their great and copious fountain heads at the Universities by a thousand irrigating channels over the whole length and breadth of our busy, indomitable land. . . . I can conceive nothing more democratic than such a movement as this, nothing which is more calculated to remedy defects that are incident to democracy, more thoroughly calculated to raise democracy to heights which other forms of government and older orderings of society have never yet attained. No movement can be more wisely democratic than one which seeks to give to the northern miner or the London artisan knowledge as good and as ac-

curate, though he may not have so much of it, as if he were a student at Oxford or Cambridge." ¹

The advantages of the Extension system are manifold and decided, and they are attainable not less in America than in England. It substitutes consecutive and thorough treatment of a subject for the brief and superficial handling of an occasional lecture. Many, both young and old, who can never go to universities, have knowledge and culture brought to them. The educational value of one of these courses is very great, but when we remember that there are several during the year the result is tremendously increased. It is a task of some magnitude to deliver the preoccupied, newspaper-nourished public mind from one fallacy. Without time to peruse a reasoning book, the ideas that most people are able to attain to on a subject not touching the price of tea or railroad stocks are ill-matched mosaics. This was told by one's father, that taught by a pedant at school, something more once read in a magazine article, a little gained from the sermon of one who had prepared himself to elucidate with authority by an afternoon's reading, and the remainder added by conversation with this and another business contemporary who had amassed their fund of wisdom in the same heedful way, with the confirming opinion of an editor ordered by his financial chief to establish this principle and exterminate that for the benefit of the circulation. With this conglomerate of accidental and unmeditated material the prevailing man is caparisoned to cope with every question in ethics, economics, and politics, and to settle them, too, and to vote the non-conformer a blockhead or knave. The owner of his favorite newspaper, who hires thinkers to think as he tells them, assures this man he is right, in return for his subscription and advertisement. And so the ruts wear deeper and progress slower, and the man fossilizes. Even the enlightened collegian becomes a victim to the pressure of appointments the day after graduating, and has no further time to complete his investigations and grow again. Thus no one understands his place in the social organism, and no one is prepared to fit into it. Instead of harmonious and coördinate activity and progressive motion, each cell squirms on its own account, and the whole body halts and languishes. In this dire excess of specialization there is some considerable need of a machinery for assisting the precipitate and disheveled public to form correct ideas on themes whereon it must act, and it appears that the extension

¹ *On the Study of Literature*, pp. 3, 4, 5.

lecture system is the best mechanism that has yet been devised for the purpose.

Many, too, are stimulated by these lectures to go to the university, who without them would never think of going, and many are enabled to go by the lessened expense of a briefer term. Public libraries are made more fruitful, for communities are taught the value of books and how to use them. Moreover, the libraries have an important function in the extension scheme. They furnish rooms and facilities for whatever special work is done, and place reference books at the convenient disposal of lecturer and students. It is usually most convenient for the regular conferences to be held in one of these rooms. When all library buildings are supplied with lecture halls, the lectures also may be delivered there, and the library will become an extension centre. Carlyle said, it will be remembered, that the true modern university is the library.

But English experience has shown that something remains to be added to the extension plan as it is now operated. It has been necessary to confess that the masses are not reached by it. The clerks and those with some leisure and property avail themselves of the new opportunities, but the least cultured class have not yet been won. To interest the masses we must rely upon the University Settlement and its organization of the neighborhood. The members of the settlement will make their house attractive, first from the side of amusements, adopting the primary idea of the people's palace. They will gain the confidence of the people by helping to establish coöperation among them. Whereas they now buy coal by the bushel, [they must learn to manage a co-operative coal cellar. Much fuel and oppressive heat might be saved in the summer by a coöperative kitchen in the tenement house, and if different families cooked for the whole house by turns for the space of a week, how much time and labor would be saved! Better meals could be served for less money, since, in addition to the other economies, provisions could be purchased at something approaching wholesale rates. The streets might be kept clean and healthful if the people but organized to determine it. Now the worst characters disperse themselves through the tenement houses, and those who would have their children grow up in purity must not only battle against all the ordinary degradation of a wretched and super-crowded human habitation, but they must see their boys and girls constantly exposed to the vilest influences of abandoned persons. In some quarters profligate

women leer out of every other window. It is a passing marvel — all influences weighed — that any child is reared to respectability in the slums. But by organization neighborhoods have been, and may be, cleansed of this particular evil. Perhaps they might be rescued from the tyranny of the pestiferous gin palace and the fangs of the lawless ward boss and his pack of debauched mercenaries. It is possible by neighborhood organization to reach even the boards of health and the landlords. If a tenant now complains and is discovered it means eviction. In New York the chances are that nothing else will come of his trouble. If the real informant is not detected a vicarious punishment is inflicted, and the most convenient victim is ordered out for moral effect. Many of the officials are directly or indirectly bribed by the landlords. A resident of the University Settlement reported to the proper authorities a house that had been examined by two sanitary engineers and a competent builder, and condemned by all, taking great care to specify that the defective place was the foundation wall in the cellar. Nothing was done. The complainant again sought the officials, and was shortly informed that the building was safe. By arduous cross-questioning, against insolent rebuffs, he at length forced the admission that the visiting officer had not entered the cellar. When it is known that an inspector will appear the house is put in order. The income enjoyed by the owner of a tenement house is equal to the rent of a Fifth Avenue mansion, but it comes out of the blood of fifteen or twenty families. The condition of the closets is commonly pestilential. The halls which should be kept lighted are dark and unsafe, and immorality prevails. The father of a neighborhood guild boy was struck heavily on the head from behind one night in the inky hallway of his home tenement. It transpired afterward that another resident of the same house, a ruffian with a grudge against some one else, had mistaken his man. There was no redress, and no way of getting redress. There is criminal overcrowding; people live and sleep and work in dark cellars. But by organization even the landlord, who is very largely responsible for these abominations, and the sanitary and police authorities, who are anything but alert when not in actual collusion with the landlords,¹ may

¹ It is encouraging to note an occasional waking up of these authorities, and it is easy to see what would take place if they, in all cases, refused to allow tenants to occupy houses not kept in perfect sanitary condition. The property would cease to yield an income, and the landlords would either immediately put it in repair or sell to some one willing to do so. The editorial paragraph

be reached and these abuses crushed out. This is a part of the mission of the University Settlement, and having begun to do these things and thereby gained the faith of the people, other results will follow naturally. The people will begin to have hope, and a new life will awaken in them. They will yearn for improvement, and the extension lectures will be welcomed.

The "Guild Journal," a feature lately introduced by Mr. Stover, is a practical training in coöperation, and must aid as hardly any other agency could in centralizing the neighborhood and preparing it for the more advanced forms of education. The "Journal" is to assist in the support of the guild through its advertisements, and the members and friends of the guild will purchase of the advertisers. The first issue, November 1, 1889, stated that clubs had been organized at 340 Cherry Street, the model tenement house, and that when more workers come, there too, as in Forsyth Street, "there will be a complete set of organized bodies of young people, from the kindergarten age up to twenty-five years. It is our aim to multiply these sets of clubs, especially in the place of our first settlement, the Tenth Ward. We believe that we can accomplish more by concentrating our efforts in one particular district of the city than by scattering them." The patient and self-sacrificing efforts of Mr. Stover are being rewarded by a dawning appreciation on the part of some of the clearer-sighted business men of the Tenth Ward of the important experiment he is trying. One of them takes occasion to say that it is the best thing that was ever in the ward. And that finished monstrosity of republican government, the ward boss, has grown respectful. When first he heard that some college men had come to dwell on his estates, who proposed also to interest themselves in his politics, he exclaimed contemptuously, "College men! What do I care for college men!" and perhaps he swore. He now be-

below quoted, giving an incident of this kind, is from the *San Francisco Chronicle* for March 14, 1889:—

"The New York Board of Health has just ordered the tenants of a house to vacate the premises because the landlord refused to remedy grave defects in drainage. It would be a great thing for the sanitary condition of other American cities if their health boards would take such action in similar cases. It is warranted to bring the contumacious or the niggardly landlord to terms and to insure the good drainage of the premises. In New York such heroic measures are necessary because of the enormous growth of the residence portion of the city and the danger from zymotic diseases. In other cities they would greatly reduce the death rate from diphtheria and kindred complaints that are mainly due to sewer gas."

gins to find that all college men have not had the action educated out of them.

The value of the extension movement to the universities themselves, and through them to the whole education of the country, is not less palpable than its direct benefit to the people. It must be admitted that universities do not stand quite in line with the real world. Men go through college and come out detesters of books and study. Other men, capable enough, spend four years in contact with superior minds and yet no spiritual fire is kindled in them, they are not touched. The fact is that not all teachers are warm with the consciousness of real life. And this being so, I do not see how it is possible for them to awaken enthusiasm in their followers. The young man throbs with a desire to live and be a part of the real world. And it is only the man who has himself lived, who has fused in himself all the multitudinous elements of life as well as of scholarship, who can assist him and inspire him and start him wisely and safely on the desperate journey that human existence is. But, sadly enough, the sole food of too many instructors has been books. Scholarship is inestimably precious, but it must be the scholarship of a human, not scholarship that has absorbed and atrophied the man, not scholarship that has shut him out from all the progressive movements of his age and race, and blinded him to his relation to them. My criticism of the college and university is that the specialist is so dimly conscious of the world outside his *Fach* that he cannot set another right with that world. His moral enthusiasm, if he has any, is too narrowly bound. The marrow quality of his training is judicial indifference, — the scientific habit, it is called. He did as the guides to learning and reputation bade him — plucked up all constructive admirations by the root. He lacks dynamism. What shall be thought when a man in whom the human element survives after years of study in the leading universities of the world writes from one whose faculty he has joined: "I think I never suffered so for companionship. At times it seems as if one could not breathe for want of *fresh air*."

I hold it to be indispensable for the specialist to get into the workshop of concrete life for a period, and can imagine no better situation for him to familiarize himself with things as they are than in a university settlement. Here he will obtain perspective, will acquire some sense of the wholeness of things, of proportion, and instead of leading the student hap-hazard, as a man wholly absorbed in his own department must, trying too often to submerge

the student, body and mind, in it, he will discover that his department is not the universe, and that his business with the student is the production of a broad, nineteenth-century, rich-blooded, human personality. Through observing the pallid, sunken-eyed, hollow-breasted mothers, sitting listlessly on tenement doorsteps, watching their puny offspring play on the cobblestones and garbage, he would learn that no man, however exalted his speculations in physics or metaphysics, can exempt himself from the responsibilities of a citizen of the world, that he is not fit to be a teacher of the calculus or Sanskrit unless he is aroused to his duties to society. What I wish above all to impress is, that our world is not the Greek world, is not the Roman or the mediæval, nor even the modern world of fifty or twenty-five years ago. It is a world for whom it has been reserved to meet a mountainous avalanche of postponed problems, and the massed intellectual and moral forces of civilized humanity will not be more than sufficient, may not quite suffice, to stem its oncome. Under this stress of a world in travail let all educators and specialists assume at last their human office and come forth, once for all, from the tottering though majestic sanctuary of surviving scholasticism to live and work in the light of reason. By all means let the chemist and philologist and historian live in a university settlement and work with permanent residents there, among the people, trying to comprehend this society of ours, where there are palaces and profusion, and in the adjoining street a family of ten persons in two barren coops, a society where they themselves are learned and imposing, while brains not less than theirs waste in shops and garrets, and let them deliver their extension lectures, meditating on these things. I am sanguine enough to think that on their return to the ancient seats of learning some alterations would follow there.

Finally, out of these pregnant efforts why shall not a completely organized and carefully articulated system of mass education arise, an education adapted to humanity as it is, based on industry, yet conveying the highest culture, freed from the prejudices and defects of our existing schools and colleges? We have what we call popular education, but if this means education of the people it is a fiasco. A distinction must be made between popular education and mass education. When a serious, well endowed boy is obliged to confess, "When I first joined the guild I could hardly read or write and knew very little about arithmetic," we lose faith in our proud, democratic shibboleth. The

majority of the children of the masses leave school in the first or second year of their teens, or before, to work for bread and the enrichment of their landlords. We must have, in fact, great transformations of our educational machinery, and some additions to it. There is undoubted need of a People's University. Not even the son of an aristocrat can longer be content with our colleges and universities as they are, much less one whose birth places no perennial dividends in his hand. Professor Seeley has sounded the note of progress in England in his strong address on "A Midland University."¹ The English university of the future will no longer be either a mere public school for older boys, or a mere young men's club, or a mere racing ground, where the favorites of the betting world run for plates, called in this case Senior Wranglerships, Craven or Ireland Scholarships, but it will be — well! for the present I will only say — it will be a true university." Is not the American college becoming more and more a place for rich young men? It is true that prizes and scholarships and fellowships are being multiplied, but I earnestly deprecate an education that rests on these. It is not, and cannot be, normal. A history of the havoc wrought by these extraneous instigations has yet to be written, and it will contain sombre chapters. The college is an expensive place, and many a poor young man has gone home to drone or die from the overwork of trying to put himself through. I read of a brilliant young German who had worked himself up and passed his entrance examinations to Princeton. Should he go on? His father was a porter, and they conferred together. No, it had to be given up; the undertaking was too desperate. At Princeton, as I am told, wealth plays a very important rôle. How many men in lower New York go to college? None, so far as I ever heard, or with great exertion can imagine. Yet I am acquainted with young men there who would very much like to go, and they would not waste their time.

Another fact is worth consideration. Thinking workingmen have scanty faith in our institutions. Capital, as they reason, stands behind them, and influences the teaching. The influential trustees, like United States senators, are likely to be rich men, and they will see that vested interests are not undermined through college chairs. Perhaps you are inclined to laugh at this. I myself know of an able thinker who spoke truth somewhat too openly, and lost his position in an eastern college thereby. An experienced friend has remarked that the person who would give

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, vol. xlii., p. 706.

a million dollars to the average college could do what he liked with it. Did not Macaulay say that "if the admission of the attraction of gravitation were inimical to any considerable pecuniary interest, there would not be wanting arguments against gravitation?"¹

There is undisguised need of institutions that are in no way hampered, that rest on a sounder, wider basis than any present one does. There is evidence that society is awakening to this need. Listen, again, to Professor Seeley. "The sense that true and pure knowledge is not nearly enough diffused among us has taken many forms. Sometimes it has been a perception that the working classes are shut out from all the great thoughts and great discoveries of the age; then a perception that women have been shut out; sometimes a perception that our supremacy in manufacturing is endangered by a want of technical training and a scientific habit of mind; sometimes a perception that education has fallen in quality behind the age, that it has remained too literary and classical, and has been too little scientific; sometimes a perception that grave political dangers may grow from the want of economical and historical knowledge, and thence of those clear convictions which might protect us amid the reckless falsehood of party polemics. Various, too, have been the remedies proposed, colleges of science, university colleges, workingmen's colleges, Queen's colleges, Newnham and Girton, University Extension, teaching of politics, impartial discussion of politics, University Settlements, and Toynbee Hall."²

What I suggest is a great educational institution embracing whatever is helpful of all these experiments and founded upon them, but in the special and supreme interest of the masses. A People's University should offer an education suited to those who are to work with their hands as well as with their brains for a living, it should be arranged so that young men and women could support themselves while following its courses, it should make for its end the attainment and spread of truth without fear of consequences, and the development of a new humanity based on knowledge.

As yet, I suspect, we survey these new movements with some condescension. They savor of Sunday-school, border on dilettanteism, are like play education, have not examinations, lack the marking system, are withal not education, but a hybrid philan-

¹ See *Progress and Poverty*, Henry George, p. 381.

² "A Midland University," *Fortnightly Review*, vol. xlii.

thropy. But in thinking this are we not like "The Lounger," in "The Critic," who is taken aback when men like William Morris and Walter Crane declare for Socialism or anarchism and the rights of labor, and vainly wonders why "these gentle and æsthetic spirits don flannel shirts and range themselves on the side of the blatant bomb-thrower?" We think that we are still living in the good old times when education was simple, authority unquestioned, society stable, and the masses unknown. But a new period must face its issues with adequate weapons.

Morrison I. Swift.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

SHALL EPISCOPACY BE REINSTITUTED?

THIS title sounds strangely. Episcopacy never having been abolished in the Church, how can it be reinstituted? It is true, it has not been abolished in the Church at large, but it has been abolished in many parts of the Church, and therefore the question, Shall Episcopacy be reinstituted in the Church? means, of course, Shall it be reinstituted in those regions of the Church in which it has been abolished?

This question implies an utter repudiation of all definitions of the Church which make Episcopacy a necessary note of it. It acknowledges the Holy Church Universal as "the blessed company of all believing people," and only allows any external institute whatever as a necessary note of this when its absence is, at the time, conclusive proof of factionousness or defect of faith.

The question implies, therefore, not only that non-episcopalians Christians belong to the Church by virtue of their faith (and, secondarily, of their baptism), but non-episcopal churches likewise. It implies that their Baptism is valid, their Eucharist acceptable, their Ministers validly, and regularly, ordained.

It implies, moreover, that in abrogating Episcopacy they have done what they had a right to do, and what, under various circumstances, it may have been their duty to do. This implies again the belief that Episcopacy has not been instituted by Christ, and has either not been instituted by the Apostles, or was instituted simply in view of needs of the times, and committed to the future to unfold whatever of permanent efficiency for good there might be found to be in it. But the present writer having been

strongly predisposed to the latter view, and having read and pondered, with docile and favorable attention, every sentence and note of Rothe's masterpiece in defense of it, "*Die Anfänge der christlichen Kirche*," was compelled by the book to give up the thesis of the book, and to accept the subsequent conclusions of Bishop Lightfoot, that Episcopacy is contemporaneous with the later apostles, and altogether approved by them, but, as Professor Fisher has lucidly developed in his Dudleian lecture, in no proper sense instituted by them, or set by them in opposition to the elder Presbyterian polity, resting on a basis of popular consent. This is mentioned, not as having any value as argument, but by way of explication.

And yet, in an important sense, Episcopacy is not only of apostolic institution, but has been instituted by Christ himself. For what can we conceive the mind of Christ to be, but that his Church should be guided for her high ends according to the essential principles of human nature? Now it seems to be an essential principle of human nature that every human unity should seek to express itself in a personal centre. And as the apostolic Christians of each city and each considerable village formed a human unity, they naturally sought to realize this more thoroughly and effectively in a personal centre. When this was done, there was the Episcopate.

Why did not the Apostles institute the Episcopate from the first? In other words, why did they not, from the first, set the church of every town, and its overseers, under the lead of an individual chief pastor? The sufficient answer seems to be: It was easier for them at first to ascertain that, say out of a hundred brethren, eight or ten had the gifts of guiding the rest, than that one had the gift of guiding the whole. Therefore, except in particular places, the natural polity of the first generation of the Church, for the Christians of the cities, was the *Collective* Episcopate. But as gifts became better known, as schisms multiplied, as persecutions became more searching, and the presence of the Apostles began to fall away, which had in a manner held the chief office in abeyance, it was natural, desirable, and therefore divine, that this should now begin to appear, and that the *Collective* Episcopate of each city, evolving the *Individual* Episcopate, should itself gradually sink into subordination as the *Presbyterate*.

The whole question of Episcopacy is greatly confused by the neglect of the fact, that the early and the modern Episcopate,

though in a continuous line of succession, are no more the same thing in their relations and functions than the Roman Consul under Justinian, who abolished the office, was the same functionary as in the time of Cicero. The succession was continuous, but the elder reality had evaporated. Nay, this illustration is itself insufficient, for here the office remained unchanged in ostent, though not in fact. But the Episcopate, at least in the West, is really no longer, even in form, the same office. The early bishop was the chief pastor of a single body of Christians, who knew themselves as one, who met together every Sunday to receive the Eucharist in the same place, from the same hands. Rothe informs us that even in the fourth century, when Alexandria numbered her Christians by hundreds of thousands, and when necessity had multiplied chapels of ease throughout the city, the archbishop's church remained the only one in which the Eucharist was celebrated. If we want to find a modern parallel (though already beyond the lines) of the ancient bishop and bishopric, we should look to Trinity parish, New York. There the rector and his assistants are of one order; the parish has many stately houses of worship, and a congregation especially attached to each. Yet all form one body; the rector has full control in every chapel; and the mother-church is the only house of God in the parish which has full ecclesiastical character. Suppose, now, that (except for the sick) the Eucharist could be celebrated nowhere else in the parish than in the mother-church, and we have an ancient bishop and an ancient bishopric. And the very designation, *Parœcia*, is that which expresses an early bishop's jurisdiction.

The Diocese, in its modern sense, as indicating the immediate jurisdiction of an ordinary bishop, is, according to Dr. Hatch, a Western creation of the eighth century, a creation of St. Boniface, and of his organizing activity in the Frankish kingdom. It was obtained by throwing out the episcopal authority, hitherto confined to the cities, over the *latifundia* of the country, which had previously, though obtaining their clergymen from the bishops, remained totally independent of these. But, subsequently to this, the bishop was no longer the personal centre of a human unity. He was the superintendent of a stretch of country, sometimes a vast stretch, containing very many distinct congregations of Christians, for each one of which the *parochus* (a term of true episcopal significance) was the one from whom they heard the gospel, received the sacraments, and stood under his pastoral care. The charge of the flock had devolved on him; the charge of the

pastors only, or chiefly at least, thenceforth belonged to the bishop. The latter was thenceforward, in the fullest sense *Prelatus*, a prelate, in reality an *episcopus episcoporum*. In other words, the Episcopate was from now on the lowest gradation of the Archiepiscopate. For purposes of administration, the simple bishops are thenceforward to be sought in the parish priests.

Strictly speaking, therefore, the Episcopalians ought to be called Archiepiscopalians, and the non-episcopalians simple Episcopalians. The Presbyterians and Congregationalists are so far from having *abolished* the Episcopate, that they are rather chargeable with so exaggerating it as to have suppressed the Presbyterate. The Presbyterians, it is true, give the bishop a council of assessors, his co-presbyters, but do not allow them to celebrate the sacraments, even by his deputation. And the Congregationalists have wiped them out altogether, leaving the bishop in solitary and precarious dignity. It is true, the human instinct to seek an intermediary link between the monarchical centre and the democratic circumference asserts itself even here, but fur- tively. It instigates the Deacons, who were meant to be consecrated Servitors, to turn themselves into unconsecrated Usurpers. This, in part, explains their intense unpopularity (which does not appear to fall upon elders), and provokes the Presbyterian Baptist, Charles Spurgeon, to declare that "deacons are worse than the devil, for that if you resist the devil he will flee from you, but if you resist your deacons they will fly at you."

What claim, then, has Episcopacy, in the ordinary sense, to solicit reinstitution among those churches which have withdrawn themselves from under it? Simply, so far as I can see, the claim of Historic Continuity and Dignity. The churches ordinarily called non-episcopal will assuredly never consent to receive it back as the vehicle of sacramental blessings which they do not enjoy now. They know that they enjoy precisely the same blessings of communion with Christ, and inspiration from Christ, as their prelatical brethren. If Episcopacy, or more properly Prelacy, lowers its pretensions, and consents to almost unbounded modifications of its form, only after all in order to impose itself on the exempt churches as a means of raising them out of the inferior standing of Proselytes of the Gate, it ought as much to be resisted as the subtle Clementine heresy of the second century, which was willing to strip itself of almost every manifest feature of Judaism, provided it could extinguish the distinctive liberty of Christianity. To yield to such claims would be to fall out of the freedom for which Christ has made us free.

Nevertheless, there were important compromises in the second century, and very necessary ones, for the sake of unity, and there is no reason why there may not be such compromises for the sake of unity now. Paul himself, towards the close, was by no means so stiffly uncompromising against the Judaizers as at the beginning of his apostolate. He had made sure that the gospel should not be dwarfed into a mere school of Judaism, and was now prepared to abate a good deal of the rigor of his first terms. In writing to Philippi he evidently looks forward to that amalgam which was effected in the next century and baptized as the Catholic Church. What has been affirmed politically is true ecclesiastically, that some men must aspire too high, in order that the whole world may not sink too low. The Redeemer's own precepts cannot be applied to the present state of the world without large dilution. "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it," and "For the hardness of your hearts," are his own indicated limitations. The gospel of Paul burst out in Luther in a fullness that would have delighted, and in an extravagance of speech that would doubtless have shocked, Paul himself. Luther's work will not be forgotten or undone, but doubtless it will suffer abatement and reaccommodation to the elder forms of the Church, doctrinally and ecclesiastically. If Leo the Thirteenth could only be persuaded to canonize St. Martin of Wittenberg, we might make a very comfortable arrangement even with Rome. But as that can hardly be expected at present, and as Roman Catholics themselves, or those that wish well to them, seem to be getting out of conceit with Rome, and looking towards London, why should not Protestantism specify a little further, and look towards Lambeth?

Anglicanism is often narrow, arrogant, and fearfully formal. But it is solid, devout, free, and eminently honest. There is no "Italian fox" hidden in its overtures, we may be sure. Its American and Australasian extensions, moreover, are largely reacting upon it, and without in any way overpowering its proper character, are helping to make it more plastic, more sympathizing, in other words, more Christianly fraternal. If the Lambeth Conference and the Congregational Union of England and Wales were just now compared, I think that the latter would be found to take up a good deal the more arrogant position. The bishops only plead for the acceptance of the Historic Episcopate as an actual fact in the Church. The Independents, on the other hand, stiffly refuse even to consider it, and take up their stand on an extreme High Church position. Certainly that numerous body

of Christian thinkers who are unable to find any specific church polity prescribed or forbidden in the New Testament would have to declare that of the two bodies the Conference was the more brotherly. St. Paul thought that the *mutual* acknowledgment of every good thing found among Christians is a very desirable temper, and it might have been as well if the English Congregationalists had studied a little more fully to display it towards their mitred brethren, who were still their brethren, and who certainly stood abundantly ready to consider with them how that great principle of integral unity in each specific congregation of Christians, for which Congregationalism stands, could be more fully applied in the Church at large.

Dr. Arnold has rightly said, that the Elizabethan separations, and those that succeeded, were schismatical, certainly, but that both parties were the schismatics. The incarnation of schismatical haughtiness is found in Archbishop Whitgift, the imperious Elizabeth's favorite ecclesiastical instrument, her "little black husband," whom Izaak Walton supposes that he is portraying as a saint, but only succeeds in rendering him absolutely odious. He was certainly enough to provoke a Martin Marprelate, or twenty of them. Nevertheless, the Puritan principle, objectively speaking, was also schismatical, namely, that Episcopacy is in itself an evil. That to which so many myriads of enlightened and holy Christians have warmly adhered is not in itself an evil, and should be acknowledged, in its various transmutations, as one of the various agencies of good which the providence of Christ has developed in his Church. So long as the assumption that the Episcopate, as that term is now used, is essentially a corruption that has to be withstood, is declared to be a constitutive element of English Congregationalism, so long may this, I think, be fairly regarded as infected with the temper of schism.

At the same time we all know that no non-episcopalian clergyman could be guilty of the intolerable indecency of haughtiness of which a great many particular Anglican clergymen are capable. Take this single diocese of Massachusetts, and take simply two specimens, well accredited, of the outrageousness of behavior still possible among Episcopalian ministers. In one of our towns the venerable Congregational pastor (who, of course, had historically the right of precedence) solicited the young rector to join with him in calling a public meeting in promotion of a town library. The rector replied: "I consent, provided that you do not presume to sit on the platform with me as a clergyman, but

content yourself with acting as a gentleman-usher." In another case, when a Convocation had been, by invitation, addressed by clergymen of several denominations, a well-known Doctor of Divinity afterwards introduced a resolution (of course not passed) providing against future invitations to "Congregationalists, Mormons," and other such people. There is narrowness and bitterness enough among the non-episcopalians towards the Episcopalians, certainly, (mostly provoked), but such scandalousness of behavior is scarcely conceivable in them. And until the spirit of Christ in Anglicanism shall be strong enough to drive such unclean spirits out of those possessed by them, and down into some lake of oblivion, negotiations for reunion are likely to undergo what the Scotch call a "sist of proceedings."

Nor is it likely that negotiations will advance very far until the Church of England has rendered a much larger tribute than even hitherto to the Church of Rome. There is in England a perfectly legitimate movement, one of which the present Bishop of Lincoln is the centre, "for the revival of old forms of Church life with adaptations to suit the changes of modern society." For this, as is known, Bishop King is now undergoing trial before his Metropolitan, with a possibility, though hardly a probability, of deprivation. But of his loyalty to the Reformation I believe that even his prosecutors express no doubt. And Professor Sanday, whose Protestant sympathies are beyond all impeachment, emphatically declares his belief that the greater activity of what is popularly called Ritualism has been in England an essential benefit both to Anglicanism and to Christianity. But, on the other hand, there is a large company of English clergymen, certainly numbering hundreds and possibly thousands, to whom Catholicism is delightful because it means to them unbounded spiritual domination exercised by the priesthood and abject submission rendered by the people. It is to them, not, as to the school of Bishop King (as of Bishop Ken) a powerful auxiliary to Christianity; it is a substitute for it. An excellent exhibition of it is found in Dr. Frederick George Lee's "*Life of Reginald Pole*." This servile and hollow book gives Pole with the soul of Pole left out. His deep attachment to the doctrine of Justification by Faith, the high conferences held by him, Contarini, Vittoria Colonna, and other noble souls of Rome that hailed the advent of a more spiritual and filial teaching of the gospel, the hatred borne to him on this account by the furious Caraffa, and the persecution with which Caraffa, as Pope, disturbed the Cardinal's dying bed, all this is passed over in perfect

silence, or, in one slight mention of the Pope's displeasure, so disguised as wholly to lose its essential significance. Pole's part in negotiating for England a submission whose hollowness, saving it from being fatal, left it ridiculous, is in Dr. Lee's eyes the glory of his life. For the Reformers all that he has to say is, that he is sorry it was necessary to burn them, and that they really died with some fortitude. Dismissing them thus, he fairly revels in the delights of obsequious servility towards Authority, which he invariably spells with a capital letter, and by which he always means the Pope. He lavishes titles of honor, and describes the unsubstantial pageants in which Mary Tudor celebrated the futile reconciliation of her kingdom to Rome, with all the unction of a true ecclesiastical Jenkins. Indeed, he lugs in the title of "Eminence," wherewith to trick out the Cardinal Legate, some seventy-five years before Urban VIII. first introduced it. Now it is certain that so long as such men flourish and figure in the Church of England, the Nonconformists have small temptation to reënter it. But let these men find their own place (the name of which, assuredly, cannot be doubtful), leaving genuine and manly Christianity free to breathe, and the hopes of ultimate reunion around the banner of Canterbury seem very fair. There is also abundance of genuine and manly Christianity on the Roman side, which is anxious to escape from the Curialistic incubus, and perhaps an exchange on equitable terms could be negotiated. Certainly a single Dr. F. G. Lee seems enough to give an unsavory relish to the Convocation of a whole province. The true place of such as he is with those Italian Ultramontanes who ecstatically declare, that the great end of Jesus Christ's coming into the world was to make a priest.

Of course, supposing other reasons for reunion to suffice, it would be no reason against it in the mind of non-episcopalians, that an unbroken succession of episcopal consecrations from the apostolic age is something that cannot be proved, something that all probabilities are against, something, in fact, as Cardinal Newman admits, which we cannot suppose to have been maintained without a miracle, and finally, something of which Ignatian episcopacy has no need. A reunion would not be sought by the non-episcopal churches on account of any special importance attached by themselves to Episcopacy, and if the Episcopate exists in such a measure of historical continuity as satisfies Episcopalians, of course it will satisfy Presbyterians and Congregationalists. If their Anglican brethren cannot feel free in their minds to recognise

their coördinate ministry without episcopal ordination, and they are willing to reintroduce it for the sake of meeting their brethren's scruples, they will naturally leave all questions of the succession to those for whom alone these have doctrinal significance. To speak a little humorously, but I hope not disrespectfully, they would be inclined to say to an Anglican, as to all inquiries touching the Nag's Head consecration, and other such matters, "Please thyself, and thou 'lt please me." At the same time, since we naturally like to have anything in which we are engaged acknowledged as widely as possible, it may be worth while to observe, that so soon as a Roman Catholic breaks with Rome his scruples about the Anglican succession commonly begin to disappear. Dr. Döllinger, the most learned of Catholic theologians, so far as I know, remarks, as I have seen him cited, that if Rome had as good reasons for being sure of the papal as of the Anglican succession she would be in a better case. And that is all the space that there seems occasion for us to bestow on the question of the Anglican succession.

Surely, however, if Episcopalians want their brethren of other churches to make to them the large concessions which they require, it behoves them to be ready in their turn to advance as far towards them as their own principles of ecclesiastical order admit, when interpreted by those two rubrics which Dr. Muhlenberg used to declare are the true canons for explaining all others, namely, the rubric of common sense and the rubric of Christian charity. At the Lambeth Conference a proposal to approve the reception of non-episcopalian ministers into Anglican pulpits received, it appears, only four votes. Judging those votes by weight, however, rather than by number, they were a good many. For one was given by Henry C. Potter, who is the metropolitan bishop of the American Episcopal Church in a good many more senses than that of being the bishop of her principal diocese. Another was that of the Bishop of Minnesota, whose combination of simplicity, saintliness, sound sense, and energetic philanthropy, has given the mitre more lustre in America than it has had since Las Casas laid it aside. Another was that of the Primate of Australia, and the fourth that of an English bishop. Whatever motives may have led the bulk of the Conference to withhold their assent, they cannot plead that the function of preaching requires a sacerdotal ordination, or any ordination at all. A Roman Catholic journal gives account of a saintly young layman of Italy, since canonized (I forget who), that having begun to preach without

authorization was arraigned before the church tribunals, not, however, because any exception was taken to a layman's volunteering to preach, but merely because he had not taken his course in divinity. As I understand, the church gave the excellent decision that in his case saintliness superseded theology. So far as I see, the sole tenable ground on which Anglicans can justify the requirement of episcopal ordination as a condition for preaching is the assumption that the defect of it is a note of rebellion against the Church of God. If that ground is assumed, then negotiations may as well come to a term. And only the final consent of the Anglican Episcopate as a body to the initiative of Barry, Whipple, Potter, and Carpenter, will be conclusive evidence that it makes no such accusation.

Negotiations, in the strict sense, are feasible between Anglicanism and Presbyterianism, but hardly between Anglicanism and Congregationalism, so far as this really answers to its name. You cannot tie anything with a rope of sand. But Presbyterianism, as Dr. Briggs remarks, has never rejected the possibility of an administrative distinction between a Superintendent (who may easily be called a bishop) with specific powers of ordination and simple Presbyters. Nor is there any vital reason why such a superintendent, or bishop, may not receive a special inauguration or consecration, and why this may not be so ordered as to bring it into connection with the ancient *linea ordinationis* on which most Christians lay stress. Presbyterianism only insists on synodical government, with lay representation, which Episcopacy in this country fully concedes, and is ready to concede elsewhere, and insists also that the Bishop, if distinguished from Presbyters in function, is one with them in order, a tenet which is freely maintained among Roman Catholics, and which Bishop Lightfoot says appears never to have been called in question in the Latin Church before the Reformation.

On the other hand, the rapid multiplication of bishoprics in England, and elsewhere, is fulfilling Dr. Arnold's wish, that every considerable town (why not say now, every town?) may have its bishop. This is bringing the Episcopate back towards its earlier form, in which the bishop was the chief pastor of a true unity. This gives a reason grounded in present efficiency, which may well appeal to many who care little for historical continuity, and who do not believe the Episcopate to be a channel of specific supernatural powers.

The "Churchman" is doubtless right in esteeming the Presby-

terian Church as at present mainly responsible for the success or failure of the Lambeth overtures, which originated with our own House of Bishops. It is also equally wise and kind in declaring that, whatever may be the issue of these, the time for superciliousness has passed, and the time of coöperation has come. Humanly speaking, the cause could not be in better hands, nor be conducted in a temper giving testimony that its agents are borne on a current of diviner power. And the deep and hopeful interest which the communications between these two great denominations have engaged from their brethren of other churches, instead of the half amused, half scornful attention which they might have excited once, is also a sign that it is not mere diplomatic adroitness which is perceived to be here at work (such as that which has mocked hope from the days of the Council of Florence to our own), but a Higher Presence, guiding deeper aims, through a more genuine meekness of wisdom.

There is no inconsistency with this in the fact that almost the last testimony of a man like Dr. Hatch, borne at the opening festivities of Mansfield College, was directed against "the chimera" of corporate union. Corporate union is doubtless a chimera, if understood in the Roman sense, of a hierarchy of jurisdiction, centralized in one head, collective or individual, with power to command. Indeed, as the spirit of Christ develops in the Universal Church, *Auctoritas*, Moral Influence, may be expected more and more to take the place of *Potestas*, Jurisdiction, the instrument of government for "the kings of the Gentiles." But so far as the lumbering weight of jurisdiction does still subsist in the churches, there is no necessity that a universal jurisdiction should become a note of the Church. The Orthodox Oriental Church knows herself, and is known by others, as one, yet she subsists in ten entirely distinct jurisdictions. It is true she suffers for want of a centre of influence, to give effect to whatever common moral force she might have. But she does not suffer for the want of a centre of Gentile imperiousness, such as is found at Rome. Anything that should involve, whether in Constantinople or London, the necessity of creating a new Curia, would be the abomination that maketh desolate.

It is plain that the immediate goal is mutual recognition of sacraments and ministries throughout the Church. Some will be more and some less inclined to an administrative unity throughout the Church, although all must acknowledge that it is desirable that there should be so much of this as to make it practicable to concen-

trate the whole weight of the Christian consciousness at any point where any vital interest of righteousness requires it. But mutual recognition is an undeniable good. Unless we absolutely relegate the unity of that mighty "league of spirits" known as the Christian Church to Plato's world of archetypes, while on earth it is to appear only as a disorderly congeries of clubs, or "causes," disputing each other's baptism, excluding each other's ministers, and standing aloof from each other's Eucharist, there is abundant occasion for the most unwearied efforts for reunion. But to dilate on this would be to go into platitudes. Any man who needs to have it proved to him may be an Episcopalian, Lutheran, or Baptist, but he has not yet come to the consciousness of being a Christian.

Towards such a comprehensive mutual acknowledgment undoubtedly the same two dispositions will be found coöperative which coöperated in the Apostolic Church. The first, and fundamental, disposition was the readiness to recognize, that "where Christ is, there is the Church," that the fundamental and only absolutely indispensable prerequisite of Christian fellowship is the recognition of the fruits of the Spirit. The second coöperative disposition is that which led Paul, while utterly refusing to consent to the circumcision of Titus, when it was the hinge on which turned the recognition of Gentile equality, to consent to that of the half-Jewish Timothy, when it was only a question of avoiding needless offense, even among unbelievers. The former disposition is to be peremptorily required of all those who occupy or conceive themselves to occupy, in the Church, a position of historical or ritual superiority. The latter is equally to be demanded of those who occupy, or conceive themselves to occupy, a position of greater spiritual freedom and greater nearness to the ultimate meaning and mind of Christ. The former temper is especially obligatory upon those who, maintaining themselves to be Evangelical, love especially to describe themselves as Catholic; the latter temper is especially obligatory upon those who, admitting the name of Catholic, much better love the name of Evangelical. Doubtless there will yet, among those that are best disposed for unity, be many a hard push and pull, many a surge of advance and retreat, of action and reaction, before these two dispositions come to a satisfactory adjustment and equilibrium. But *Finis coronat opus*. The whole Apostolic age was just such a time of unstable equilibrium. James could never quite surmount his ritualistic prejudices; Peter, whose intellect was with Paul, could never quite surmount his dread of

displeasing Christ's brother; Paul, like his heir of Wittenberg, was sometimes a little inclined to carry matters through with a high hand. But a stable equilibrium was found at last, and for essential ends endured for many centuries. The violences of the later semi-pagan ages never disturbed this common substratum. And even so, undoubtedly, the present fluctuations of mutual antagonism and attraction in the Church, or to use a term that has not so shrunk into an inordinately devotional and ritual sense, these impulses in Christian mankind, will ultimately find a widely prevailing and long-enduring equilibrium of brotherhood. One of the signs of this — hardly one of its most potent instruments — will probably be a wider recognition and greater honor once more accorded to the Historic Episcopate, as "an ancient, decent, and convenient polity." And as it in no way derogates from republican independence when we gracefully recognize, on occasion of the visit of a king, the ancient honor of his great office, so it surely cannot be necessary, for the maintenance of evangelical freedom, that those churches which have laid aside the episcopal office should refuse to pay to it, and to its incumbents, a frank and free deference, corresponding to its immemorial dignity, and to the manner in which, in its various modifications, it has been bound up with all the fortunes of the Church of God. Before long it is to be hoped that such intense silliness will be impossible as that which led a prominent religious journal, in giving an account of an episcopal election in the Protestant Church of Ireland, to put "bishop," every time that it had occasion to use the term, in quotation marks, as if by way of pious protest against a use of it which has subsisted for eighteen centuries, and which differentiated itself from a wider original use by insensible degrees in a perfectly legitimate historical development. It is to be hoped that the unlucky fracture which befell the American Episcopal Church by reason that one of her bishops participated in a joint Eucharistic service of many denominations has not frightened every bishop of this church for good and all out of doing the like. There is not likely a second time to be found prowling outside an episcopal nonentity, who, having, as Dr. Livingstone said, "looked at his African diocese through a telescope," and run away from it, shall come hither to obtrude his advice upon a foreign church, and provoke good men into a superfluous schism. But if such an occasion of manifesting brotherhood recurs, it is no less to be hoped, that the bishop will be asked to preside. There is no reason why any body of Christian ministers should

affect to slight the whole history of the Church, and to confuse a distinction which three fourths of the Church still maintain.

I may be reminded that I have been all the while tranquilly proceeding on the assumption that there are no Protestant Christians except those of English speech, or that, at all events, if there are, they will have no choice but to consent to any terms on which it may please their Anglo-Saxon brethren to agree. Perhaps such an assumption might suit the mind of that great Presbyterian divine who, it seems, brings back the report that Germany appears to him to have less religion than any other country that he is acquainted with. They think just the same in the Vatican, and, as Hermann Grimm remarks, look upon the German members of their own church as merely heretics of a somewhat less aggravated description. Two centuries back other Scottish Presbyterians declared: "We cannot swear allegiance to the Prince of Orange, for His Highness is clearly a malignant, inasmuch as he consorts with Lutherans, and a Lutheran is as much a child of the devil as a Jesuit." "Nevertheless, the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal: The Lord knoweth them that are his." Religious observance is certainly not a strong point with the countrymen of Luther, and doubtless they often suffer spiritual detriment thereby. And it is to be feared that if one of their sheep should fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, they would side with the Redeemer in holding it lawful to lift it out, rather than with that North Irish presbytery which condemned an offender in this kind to an ecclesiastical penance. And doubtless there are many other signs that godliness is at a low ebb among German Christians, the chief being, that they believe so confidently that Christ is the Truth, and that therefore the freest range in the fields of truth will never endanger his central place in human history. Yet even taking into account this last dangerous demerit, we must still insist that God has done, is doing, and doubtless will continue to do, great things for Christian mankind through Germany, and that these excellent and orthodox men who are so troubled about her spiritual estate are preparing for themselves as great a surprise, when God shall disclose the multitudes of his elect, as once overtook Elijah in Horeb.

Certain it is, that this present powerful impulse towards Christian union has come, through Anglicanism, from the Lutheran Church. The original moving spring, as Dr. Newton, of Pittsfield, through whom its force was propagated, has emphatically declared, was William Augustus Muhlenberg, whose great-grandfather, Mel-

chior Muhlenberg, was the patriarch of American Lutheranism, and who himself always remained, in character and affection, a Lutheran, acting through the kindred forms of that church which the Germans call *ecclesia lutherizans*. Any one who wished to ascertain which was fundamental in his feelings, Lutheranism or Anglicanism, had but to speak with a slight disparagement of the two. He would never be likely to repeat the experiment with respect to Lutheranism. Thus this impulse of reunion, taken up by Canterbury, has come, through New York and New England, in right apostolic succession from Wittenberg. If it gains in the Anglo-Saxon world a force that shall carry it over the German and the Scandinavian seas, it will be but coming back to its own.

Lutheranism, indeed, has a union of churchliness, evangelical freedom, personal devotion, and intellectual independence, which can hardly be said to have been realized in as intimate an interfusion in any Anglo-Saxon church, though undoubtedly the Church of England comes nearest. On the other hand, Lutheranism has never pretended to any great felicity in constructiveness of polity. It costs it no mortification of self-love to admit that in this more external range the English race, ecclesiastically and civilly, has the preëminence. Nor has Lutheranism, or indeed either school of German Protestantism, ever quarreled with Episcopacy, which, indeed, the Scandinavian Lutherans have retained, — Denmark and Norway in a broken, and Sweden, it appears, in an unbroken, succession. Nor has Germany, the mother of nations, the fountain of modern knowledge, the hearth of the rekindled gospel, any occasion of humiliation in the acknowledgment that to her daughter, England, has been providentially assigned a central position among the tribes of mankind, and a mediating position in the Church of God. The ultramontane Le Maistre, it seems, believed that the Church of England was the pivot on which Protestantism would swing back into obedience to Rome. Considering the growing religious importance of England, and the dwindling religious importance of Italy, even in eyes to which the Reformation has little significance, it is equally open to us to believe that she is the pivot on which the better parts of continental Catholicism will swing back into fraternal association with the emancipated churches of the North, a great tide of blessing, spiritual and civil, doubtless redounding to either region thereby.

Some gentlemen inclining to the negative side of thought expressed, some years ago, considerable uneasiness at the prospect (not yet realized) of a reunion of simply the different branches

of American Presbyterianism. Unless they have made up their minds since then that Christianity, anyhow, is doomed (its familiar experience from of old), one would suppose that their dismay would be overwhelming in the view of such multiplied perspectives of general reunion. One or two of these gentlemen addressed a pathetic remonstrance to the Presbyterians, entreating them to have pity on our national liberties and hold themselves apart, lest their united weight should in some way or other overturn these. There seems, on the face of it, something so exquisitely impertinent in such an appeal, that, as it proceeded from gentlemen who were certainly quite incapable of an insolent intention, one is tempted to ask what could possibly have been their actual meaning. Positive Christian belief and negative Christian unbelief are, however, so mutually incomprehensible, that we may as well give up the hope of explaining this inexplicable expostulation. Undoubtedly, if we come together in such a way as to save the inordinate friction of present incoherencies and antagonisms in the Church, or even in the Protestant churches, the force of Christian convictions and principles will be immensely augmented in Christendom, and the designs of those who wish to substitute an order of Secularism for the order of Christ will become more difficult to realize. But this is a strange reason to assign to Christians why they should remain at variance !

The ultimate future assuredly does not belong to Antichrist. But it does not follow that the proximate future may not belong to him, first in the form of devastating anarchy, and then in the form of persecuting despotism. Can we expect fruits of any common or easily mitigated malignity from those long ages through which the representatives of Christ have been so largely the representatives of tyranny, cruelty, and repression? The mighty catastrophe of the French Revolution may have been only the prelude to a mightier overthrow throughout Christendom, at least throughout European Christendom. President Garfield, speaking not as a theologian, but as an observing statesman, is said, in the last year of his life, to have expressed his belief that the order of Christian society in the Old World was about to be subverted. How can the terrible policy of the Orthodox Czar have any other fruits than apples of Sodom? And Russia now, herself infected from the pessimism of Germany, has a singular power of reflecting it, in waves of infernal lava, over the regions from which she received it. Even in England, the leadership of Liberalism seems about passing from Mr. Gladstone to Mr. John Morley, a gentle-

man who not only avows unbelief in God and immortality, but who sets before him an ideal to be realized in society from which these two elements shall be shut out. He, however, would not, we presume, consent to do more than to discourage religion, and to plunder the Church of England. But, as he is to Mr. Gladstone, so his successor will probably be to him. We may look to find him in some more refined Bradlaugh of the next century, who will be ready to carry out the recommendation of the present Bradlaugh, to prohibit religion, and punish parents who shall teach it to their children. If, as many maintain, there may be infants just born who, in a life of great length, will come to see the gospel accepted throughout the planet, it is surely reasonable to expect that the kingdom of darkness, visible and invisible, will strain its utmost energies, before it yields final possession of the world to the Galilean. The Diocletian persecution was the most terrible of all, and it was that which indicated that the Church was about to take possession of the Empire. And, in our own time, it was the final dedication of our nation to human freedom that for four years caused the existence of our nation to tremble in the balance. The more ardent our hopes, the more certain ought we to be of the speedy advent of Antichrist to tear and rend the body of mankind, from which he is about to be driven out. And even Mr. Froude, I believe, much as he hates that ministry of the Church of England which he has forsaken, allows that bishops make valuable columns of strength in times of persecution. A definable number of leaders, combining flexibility to present necessities with ancient historical claims, is, doubtless, in times of stress, whether they be absolutely times of persecution or not, a providential help that Christians ought not to despise. No ministration or channel of the Spirit of strength, old or new, familiar or unwonted, which Christ may disclose, will be too much for that supreme necessity of the Church which the Lord appears to intimate when He declares that those gates of the underworld, which for a little while swallowed Him up, shall not prevail against her, leaving us free to believe that there may come a time when she too shall for a little while appear to have vanished out of all farther influence upon the life of mankind.

Unquestionably we are not to ascribe an inordinate significance to a simply ecclesiastical reunion. Ceremony and formulas of doctrine adopted by vote will not have the relative part in the future that they have had in the past. Christ has entered more deeply into the life of mankind, and is not so easily compassed in

sentences. The ultimate issue of a faith in God of which Christ is the origin, the norm, and the mediator, must be found in an energetic reconstitution of the relations of mankind, according to that apostolic word which the President of Harvard has propounded as the signature of the future society: "Ye are members one of another." If bishops are to go for much in such an order, they must be men who are ritually careful, who do not neglect the tithes of mint, anise, and cummin. Reanimated Christian faith will not express itself in bareness and poverty, but in variety and magnificence of rite. But assuredly the future leaders of the Church must be men in whose thought judgment, mercy, and faith shall have finally and forever assumed their place of unmistakable, unique supremacy. And we have a good omen that we may hope for a multiplication of bishops of this stamp in the future in such names of the present as Manning, Temple, Gibbons, Potter, Whipple, Lavigerie.

We have to reason concerning the future in the forms of the present. The prophets themselves could do no otherwise. The infinite capabilities of Christ have but begun to be tested in rude, preliminary essays.

"For we are ancients of the earth,
And in the morning of the times."

We do not know, and cannot worthily imagine, what form of the Universal Church, under the unexhausted energies of her Head, impends, a form that shall render her more worthy to be described as the City of God. And as we know not the form of the city, so we know not the manner of its Leaders. Yet we doubt not that into it will be emptied the whole fullness and significance of all true leaderships of the past, and that as all the citizens will be both kings and priests, so, in a more eminent sense, will be the guides. And a present readiness in all Christians to recognize every great institute of Christian society for all the value of which it may still prove capable will be one of the best auguries that universal Christendom is ready to be led forward into a fuller achievement of the mind of Christ.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

PRETERITION.

THE Presbyterian Church is in the midst of a great struggle. Its General Assembly has submitted to its various Presbyteries the questions, Whether any changes are desired in its Confession of Faith, and if so, what changes? It is as when Congress submits to the various State Legislatures the question of a change in the Federal Constitution, but it is as much more momentous than this as the relations between God and man transcend in importance those between man and man. It calls for a re-statement, not of a social compact between men, but of man's belief about God. It has started what may yet become one of the greatest controversies even of an age that has waged, as perhaps no age before, the needless conflict between science and religion. It may be that this controversy is embittered by that view of the Confession of Faith, which would declare it binding upon men's consciences, and one of the outcomes may be a change in this view. There is a world-wide difference, after formulating what is intended to be a compendious statement of Biblical doctrines, between presenting it for men's approval, and prescribing it for their acceptance, and in this difference may yet be detected the theory, which fundamentally divides Protestantism from Roman Catholicism.

The doctrine is thus stated in the Confession : —

“ By the decree of God for the manifestation of his glory, some men . . . are foreordained to everlasting death.” (Ch. iii., § 3.)

“ These . . . men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished.” (§ 4.) “ The rest of mankind God was pleased . . . for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.” (§ 7.)

This language is found in a chapter entitled “ Of God's Eternal Decrees.” To state it more concisely, it asserts that God has decreed some men to everlasting death; that certain men are born into this world, in regard to whom it has from the beginning been God's will that they should, after a brief existence here, be consigned to an eternity of woe. If in any way they should escape this, God's will would not have been done.

If what has been said is not the true construction of the language used in the Confession; if it does not mean to deny that

God offers salvation to every human being, that each one may have it if he will, and can only lose it by his own free choice and act, the opponents of revision have only to say so plainly. There will be nothing then left of the present discussion, but the question, whether it is not better to change language, which at least may be, and by many is, so understood. But the fact cannot be disguised, that the Confession is by many others believed to intend just the meaning above put upon it, and still is defended by them, as stating a true doctrine. The controversy which now absorbs the Presbyterian Church is over the question, "Is it true, or not?"

What is the full import of this doctrine? What does it involve to say that God has from all eternity willed that some of his creatures should be forever lost? The will of God includes the ideas both of intelligent design and of active causation. It is He alone, who can not only form a plan, but resistlessly bring to pass the thing planned. The doctrine of preterition, then, is this. A man is born into the world. That he cannot help. He inherits a sinful nature. That he cannot help. He therefore leads a sinful life. Some of his fellow-creatures, while also leading such a life, are called by God to repent and believe, and obey the call. No call is given to him. He does not repent and believe, and he cannot repent or believe, save as the devils are said to believe and tremble. At the end of his allotted time he dies, and is condemned by God to an eternity of — shall we say punishment. For what? It cannot be a punishment, if we are to preserve the meaning of language. Punishment necessarily involves the idea of moral accountability. Moral accountability necessarily involves the idea of the power to choose between right and wrong, and a free choice of that which is wrong. All this is out of the question, when the object of thought is a being to whom Omnipotence has given a sinful nature, and denied the possibility of being saved from that nature, by any power from without or from within.

The Confession says that God has willed and done all this — for his own glory. In other words, He not only does not regret it, nor is He merely content to have it so, but He actually glories in it. And He glories in it because it manifests to the universe his sovereign power over his creatures, that is, it shows that He can do just what He will with the creatures whom He has made. He also does it to the praise of his glorious justice. It matters not that the human mind cannot grasp the idea of there being any justice in the infliction of endless misery for the doing of what

could not have been left undone. This is the statement which the Confession still makes to the world, and which, it is insisted, is a correct statement.

Within the limits of this article one can neither notice all the arguments in favor of the doctrine of preterition, nor fully answer even a few of them. It is said that the Presbyterian Church in abandoning this doctrine would be going over to Arminianism; that it is no objection to unpopular doctrine in the Confession, if it is also in the Bible; that there are hard things in Scripture, and therefore may be in the Confession. None of these arguments reach the point under discussion, which is, whether the Confession really finds this doctrine in the Bible. If we find some parts of the Bible which seem to teach it, while many more teach a doctrine to our minds utterly inconsistent with it, we are bound to ask: "Which are we to believe is actually taught?" We are entitled to doubt the soundness of interpretation of the former passages. We may well say that we find in them statements whose exact meaning we do not clearly see.

It is said that if we strike out this doctrine from the Confession, we are in danger of being led to strike it out of the Bible. This is a clear *petitio principii*. It assumes that the doctrine is in the Bible, whereas the whole discussion is, whether it is, or not.

It is said that instead of its being true that this doctrine is unpreachable, every sermon enforces it, and every prayer presupposes it, in thanking God for choosing to visit us with his mercy. Such a sermon and such a prayer do not by any means necessarily imply, much less involve, the belief that there are others of our fellow-creatures to whom his mercy never has been, and never will be, extended, and who will be inevitably lost for lack of a chance to accept it. It is said that sections of the Confession are retained, which teach that if any are saved, it is only because God has both persuaded and enabled them to come to Him.

The last two arguments may be answered together, and that, in part, by a plain re-statement of unquestioned Bible doctrine. Man is by nature sinful. He cannot of himself come to God. The salvation possible through the atoning work of Christ would, therefore, be of no avail to him, unless God drew him to Himself, unless — if any one prefers to put it in this way — God both persuaded and enabled him to come. But while all this may, and must be, said, we are not, therefore, forced to add that there are those for whom He is not ready to do the same. Indeed, we seem

rather to be taught not only that He is ready to do this for all men, but that He does actually do that which only needs their co-operation to bring about a like result — their salvation. In other words, He is ready to do, and does, his part, but not theirs too. He offers them salvation, but does not compel them to accept it. He is ready to give, to help, but not to coerce. In short, He does not and will not destroy free agency.

It is said that the advocates of revision hold that God has foreordained only good things, and it is seriously urged that if we assert that God's love includes all men, that salvation is open to all, and yet that some are lost, we assert that which enables God's enemies to boast that He has to that extent been defeated in his purposes of love and grace. To say this is to lose sight of what his purposes are. He has not willed that all men should be saved, whether they would or not. He has pitied them in their lost estate, and has so loved them as to give his only Son to redeem them from it, but He only purposes to save those who, by an act of their own free will, yield to the invitation which He gives, follow the good impulse which He sends, and lay hold of the helping, enabling hand which He holds out. He does not propose that men should enter heaven like helpless captives of a Roman consul, but that they should come as willing captives of his conquering grace.

It is said that if we abandon this doctrine the result is Universalism. Not unless Universalism has been greatly misunderstood. It has been supposed to mean that in the end God will in some way or other actually save all men. Is there no difference between saying that and saying that He always did, and always will, offer salvation to every man, leave him free to accept or reject it, and punish him if he does reject it?

It is said that we must recognize in the doctrine of preterition one of the inscrutable mysteries, before which man can only bow in reverence and faith. Here is another *petitio principii*. No doubt, if the doctrine is true, it is an awful mystery. But the very question, which we are now discussing, is whether it is true. If it is not, there is no mystery at all; there is only a mistake.

And, lastly, it is said again and again, that if we accept the doctrine of God's sovereign election, we are logically bound to the doctrine of preterition.

There are two answers to this. First, it may not be the fact. It is certain that there are those who believe themselves to accept the former doctrine, and reject the latter, and yet do not admit

that there is anything illogical in so doing. Is it impossible that they are right and the others wrong? Logic belongs to the domain of reason. Reason is a part of humanity, and as such shares in its fallibility. Therefore, those who think they see so clearly a necessary, logical connection between these two doctrines may after all err.

The second answer is, that if in truth the idea of sovereign election, as at present understood, does logically lead to the doctrine of preterition, it may be necessary to ask whether we understand yet just what God's sovereign election really is. We are driven back once more of necessity to determine whether this doctrine of preterition is true. If not, no other doctrine can be correctly stated, which would compel us to accept it.

There is no time to refer to all the practical results of this doctrine. Let us take but one, and that the one which will present its consequences in the clearest light. The Confession tells how "elect infants, dying in infancy" are saved. (Ch. x., § 3.) An honest champion of the doctrine of preterition says that the qualifying word "elect" is added, because that is as far as the Bible enables us to make a positive statement. He "hopes" that all infants who die are saved, but the Bible does not warrant any one in stating it as a fact. But even this guarded statement of the Confession certainly implies that there may be infants who are lost. What shall we then say, or think, when we turn once more to Chapter Third? If any one man enters the world, fore-ordained by God's eternal, omnipotent decree to everlasting death, what matters it whether he die in infancy, or live to mature years? Can he escape or evade God's will by anything that he can do, however long his life? If not, how does it, or why should it, affect our ideas of the case, that he may die in infancy, instead of living a few years more or less? If the sentence of everlasting death can be inflicted by a righteous Judge in one event, it can in the other.

If we are free to inquire into the claims of this doctrine upon our belief, in what way shall the inquiry be made?

Had God revealed it explicitly, and with certainty, there could be no discussion. But it seems to be conceded that He has not. It is laid down by its adherents as "deduced by good and necessary consequence." That admission remits the discussion to the forum of reason. Faith cannot begin to receive a deduction, till reason has made it out. We may, then, say that the first step is a pure matter of reason. This is not irreverent; it is unavoid-

able. When good and able men differ, while all are seeking to know what the Bible teaches about God, and when, as must be admitted, it plainly does make statements which seem to be opposed to this doctrine of preterition, we have a right to reason in the matter. And when we reason about Him, we have a right to do it as if He were in some sense like ourselves. It will be said that this is anthropomorphism. True it is. But the Bible is full of anthropomorphism. According to it, God is a being having many attributes, of which some are attributes that we see in our fellow-creatures, and are ourselves conscious of possessing. He loves and hates, and pities, and rejoices, and grieves. He is angry, and He is pleased. He is just, and merciful, strong, and yet kind. These are some of his attributes, which He is not ashamed to share with us. There are others, which He does not now share with us, but in regard to some even of these He tells us that in due time we may and shall attain unto them. He even spurs our halting steps by the injunction, "Be ye perfect, as your Father in Heaven is perfect. While, then, even in regard to such attributes as are common to Him and us, there is all the difference between the infinite and the finite, yet there is also a likeness, which after all is all that enables us in any way to conceive of Him. So far, therefore, from its being wrong for us to reason about Him along these lines, it is a necessary condition of human thought, and if so, He must have intended us thus to think of Him. Nor can it be irreverent, when He himself tells us that we are made in his image.

Can the doctrine of preterition stand when tested in this way? Not unless we are prepared to believe that God has revealed himself to us in a light which does violence to our ideas of justice and love, and shocks our moral sense.

A punishment must imply a fault, while we remain what God has made us. Sin, whether defined as the Westminster Divines defined it, or in any other way, requires as a *sine qua non* a free agent for the sinner. Justice cannot pronounce sentence upon a prisoner, whom the Judge himself by an omnipotent will fore-ordained to do the act declared to be the crime. An infinitely merciful and loving Father cannot shut out from his mercy, and exclude from his love, his own creature, who has helplessly done what He designed and willed.

To assert the contrary of these things is to call upon the human mind to stultify itself as to its innate and, we believe, God-given ideas of justice, mercy, and love. It is no answer to

talk of mysteries and faith. There is still abundant room and need of faith, and there will, no doubt, be mysteries through all eternity, but they do not call upon us to stifle our ideas of right and wrong, when we think of God. Nor do we need to think of Him in this way, in order to think of Him as infinite. There are things beyond reason, and there are things contrary to reason. We may believe that "His ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts," without believing that with Him justice and love are capable of acts which are not merely inexplicable, but truly revolting, to all that is highest and best in us, and which He himself put in us.

What shall be the conclusion of the whole matter? Shall it not be that this doctrine of preterition be stricken from the Confession of Faith, if on no other ground, then upon the ground that it has no place in a professed statement of what the church believes to be revealed of God? As has been well said, the fact can never henceforth be concealed that many in the church do not believe this. The very most that can now truthfully be affirmed, is that it is a doctrine as to which the belief of the church is divided. If so, it does not belong in the church's Confession of Faith.

There need be no bitterness on either side. The acceptance of this doctrine did not prevent many a devoted minister from holding up the Cross, and preaching the infinite love of a merciful Father. Still less can anything severe be rightfully said against those who do not accept it. They may range themselves at the side of an apostle, who when he tried to express in briefest compass his ideas of the essence of the infinite God gave to the world the assurance, "God is Love." Nay, more. They may close up their ranks behind the great Captain of their salvation, who said, "Come unto Me, *all* ye who labor and are heavy laden." And they may look up to a God who, remembering that we are dust, is willing to confirm, even by an oath, a revelation of himself, on which the most timid faith may trustfully repose, and swearing by Himself, because He can swear by no greater, has said, "As I live, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live."

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WHAT IS REALITY?

VIII. PANTHEISTIC THEISM.

THUS far we have considered the hypothesis that *the human organism is a hierarchy of beings* solely with reference to scientific requirements. We have tried to show that this is a view of things forced upon us by honest investigation. Now, I ask the reader to see in it a symbol that meets the requirements of a most important desideratum, both in philosophy and in theology. We have tried, in the earlier articles of this series, to show how utterly without foundation is the belief that philosophy can dispense with symbolism, and attain to a purely intellectual or abstract apprehension of God and of the universe. We have seen that one system after another has failed in the attempt to achieve this, because it has been striving for the impossible.

The difference between the method common to these systems and the method which we advocate is most clearly brought out by Spinoza when he compares his own superior knowledge of God with that possessed by Moses and the prophets. They, he affirmed, had no true knowledge of the nature and attributes of God, because God was revealed to them simply through figures, and through the pictures of the imagination. These shadows of things, he maintained, serve a useful purpose for the instruction of undeveloped minds, because the pictures of a lively imagination have a far greater effect upon such minds than purely reasonable considerations. But men of intellect are not shut up to this kind of knowledge. To them a higher, purer, more definite apprehension of God is possible. If they will use their God-given reason, they may rise above symbolism, and know the nature and the attributes of God as they really are.

In his view the imagination is the antithesis of reason,—its counter-worker and frustrator. The more lively the imagination the more defective the reason. In short, imagination plays just the opposite part in his method that it does in the philosophy that commends itself to us. We hold that reason leans upon imagination at every step, that all our organized, connected knowledge of things has been gained through its use; that it is the sole constructive faculty; and that without its activity, conscious or unconscious, we could have nothing but isolated, unintelligible sensations. Reason can undo and criticise the work of the imagi-

nation. It can bring together and compare and measure its multitudinous constructions, it can select from them those which embody most fully and harmoniously the facts of experience, and it can make deductions. But it cannot turn its back on the god-like, creative faculty. It cannot by itself fathom *any* of the problems of the world, let alone the most abstruse and difficult. Whenever it seems to do this, it is only sagely taking to pieces that which imagination has slowly elaborated from the elements of experience.

The only true philosophy, therefore, we argued, is that which takes its stand on some concrete reality. We sought for the highest product of the disciplined imagination, — that is, the largest, most comprehensive reality of experimental synthesis. This we found in the human *ego*, not the abstract ego of the idealistic philosophy, but the actual, complex ego of experience; *the ego, plus all the relations that it sustains to other forms of being.*

It is legitimate, and in perfect accord with the methods of science, we further argued, to use this reality, — this most comprehensive unit of experience, analogically, for the interpretation of the universe. We therefore hypothetically assumed that the universe and its essential principle, or centre, sustain something the same relations to each other that the microcosm, the little world of the ego, and its essential principle sustain to each other.

We had to recognize this method as one that had long been in use; and we at once encountered two well-worn and approved forms of its application, which at first sight seemed fully to pre-occupy the field. But, we argued, the existence of these applications of our analogy have not exhausted its capabilities. Nor is it necessary, if we introduce others, to exclude these from our philosophy. They are useful, just as the symbols of science are useful, for the exploration of certain realms of thought, and they are *necessary* as the exponents of certain relations; but they are not sufficient of themselves to meet the requirement of modern thought, either in philosophy or in religion. Having brought the reader to this point it remains for us to show, first, as briefly as possible, in what respects the familiar forms of symbolism are deficient as regards philosophy and religion, and then how these deficiencies are met by the view elaborated in the last two articles.

Let us observe, to begin with, that the two most widely accepted forms of anthropomorphism, though they connote very different

relations, are alike in this, that they concern themselves solely with that which is *external*. Whether we occupy ourselves with purely personal relations, or with those that exist between a person and a machine, there are always two factors conceived of as quite outside and independent of each other. In the one case individuals confront each other; and in the other it is the inanimate machine that stands over against the inventor, constructor, and supervisor. In short, the familiar anthropomorphism, standing alone, is antagonistic to the thought of the world as a unity. But the goal of all philosophy is unity. The task that it assumes is the discovery of a principle, or a conception, that shall set the totality of things before the mind as an harmoniously related whole.

Descartes dazzled the philosophic world when, from the standpoint of physics, he exclaimed: "Give me extension and motion and I will construct the world." Here was suggested a foundation and method for a philosophy like that of Spinoza. Descartes did not himself use it as the basis of a monistic view of the world, for the very good reason that he recognized a real constructing *ego* outside of that which was to be constructed from extension and motion. *Cogito ergo sum* had settled that question for him, and his system remained a dualism.

This dualism Spinoza undertook to reduce to unity. He essayed to get the *ego* inside the world, by mixing the mechanical and the spiritual conceptions up together. His system takes its departure from a unity of nonentity, — a *substance*, which is *one* because all differences have been thought out of it. From this fount of pure nothing he proceeds to deduce the universe with a most imposing array of method. By what exercise of reason the unity of nothingness has become transformed into the fullness of all things does not appear. It is simply assumed that the former is the same as the latter. But if we ignore this difficulty, the world that Spinoza brings out of his transformed nothingness, is a *bizarre*, unreal sort of world.

It manifests itself in two great streams or categories, — *thought* and *extension*. These are the two sides, or aspects, of the one substance or God. But in neither of these categories, or *attributes* of God, do we find the real things of our experience. Mind and matter are each distorted and made to appear what they are not, in the interests of unity. From the divine power of thought proceed the definite *modes* of thought, or ideas; and from extension the *modes* of extension, or things. Spinoza represents these as two coördinate series. There is no relation between them of superior-

ity and subordination, determining and being determined. That which reveals itself to us as thought, or mind, is no more the cause of the universe than that which reveals itself to us as extension. In such an adjustment it is necessarily the higher concept that suffers most. Purpose, foresight, will, vanish from the world of realities. When, therefore, we come to the summing up of this most brilliant attempt to present the cosmos as a unity, I think we must say that its leading principle is mechanical necessity, and that the *non-reality* of the *ego* is its most important deduction. But even so, with mind assimilated to mechanism and with the multiplicity of the world reduced to an illusion, there is no *unity*, save that unity of nonentity with which we set out.

The philosophy of modern realism has many points of resemblance to that of Spinoza. In the place of his indeterminate substance it postulates an unknown and unknowable reality that underlies phenomena. The two modes of its manifestation are, as in his philosophy, assumed to stand on an equal footing. The mental element, or aspect of things, gives no more clue to the idea of cause than the mechanical. And, also, as in that philosophy, the mechanical idea of unintelligent determinism dominates the system as a whole. But, so far as popular thinking is concerned, modern Realism has one great advantage; namely, the discovery and general recognition by science of certain great universal principles, or laws, that seem, independently of symbolism, to demonstrate the unity of the world. That this is a mere *seeming* becomes evident as soon as we subject the idea of a law-established unity to criticism.

The unity that seems to be involved in the existence of universal principles rests, in fact, upon an exceedingly crude symbolism. A symbolism that represents the orderly classifications of phenomena, which the human mind has made for itself, as real entities, standing by themselves outside of and above phenomena. In short, it is a symbolism derived from abstractions. For until we assume a being of whose nature these laws are the expression, they are nothing more than the subjective formulas into which the mind of man necessarily casts its perceptions.

Lotze has given the following weighty expression to this thought. "There is nothing," he says, "besides being and its inherent states; and a universal order, before that of which it is the order has come into existence, cannot spring up between beings as a self-existent back-ground holding them together. . . .

We are apt to be led astray in these speculations, by a widely diffused usage of thought and speech that exercises no prejudicial effect on our judgments of the incidents of daily life in reference to which it has arisen. We speak of ties uniting things, of relations into which they enter, of an order which embraces them, finally, of laws under whose sway they respectively stand; and we hardly notice the contradiction contained in these notions of relations lying ready before the things came to enter into them, of an order waiting to receive the things ordered, finally, of ties stretched like solid threads — of a material we could not describe — across the abyss that divides one being from another. We do not consider that all relations and connections exist only in the unity of observing consciousness, which, passing from one element to another, knits all together by its comprehensive activity, and that in like manner all efficacious order, all laws, that we are fain to consider as existing between things *independently of our knowledge* can exist only in the unity of the One that binds them all together. Not the empty shadow of an order of nature, but only the full *reality* of an infinite living being of whom all finite things are inwardly cherished parts, has power so to knit together the multiplicity of the universe that reciprocal actions shall make their way across the chasm that would eternally divide the several distinct elements from each other.”¹

It will probably strike the reader that this extract suggests pantheism. Unquestionably it does, if it stands alone as an abstract statement. And it is just at this point that the usefulness and truth of our analogy is most apparent. Pantheism is the unavoidable goal of all constructive ontological thinking. The philosopher is drawn into it as floating material is drawn into the vortex of a whirlpool. Yet, as is so often the case with processes of abstract thought, the thinker awakes from his dream to find himself hopelessly at odds with the real world. He is involved in a conclusion that his experience pronounces to be a lie. If the Supreme being embraces all things, does it not follow that the individual is nothing? Is not his thought of himself as an independent centre of intelligence, deliberation, and will, a pure illusion? Can he, as part of the supreme being, guide his own action, or be responsible for it?

Abstractly considered he assuredly cannot. But if, leaving his abstractions, the thinker adopts, as his guide to reality, the analogy with which we assail the problem, his pantheism is at once robbed

¹ *Microcosmus*, vol. i., p. 380.

of its bane. In the mystery of the human person he encounters, as a reality, a combination that abstract thought pronounced to be unthinkable. He finds an innumerable multitude of diverse beings so united in their intricately woven relations as to form one. Each of the subordinate beings is a part of the life of that one that unites them all. But each pursues also its own life with a large measure of independent action.

A philosophy that grounds itself upon this reality of experience is not simply not in conflict with our theology, it is most helpful to it. It supplies it with a symbolism of which it stands very much in need. Why is it, let us ask ourselves, that one side of our thought of God appeals to us as the practical, and the other as the mystical, somewhat unreal side? The belief that God works in and through man is a vital and fundamental part of our theology. All our knowledge of God that comes to us through the prophets, all that comes through the Incarnation, all that comes through conscience grounds its claim upon the truth of this view. The doctrine of the spirit that works with our spirits, that inspires, guides, and regenerates men, owns the same origin. It is a part of our religion upon which we wish to take a very strong hold, which ought to be exceedingly *real* to us.

But does it not stand in the thought of most of us as a cloudy, unsubstantial, theoretical kind of belief? Is it not a view of things that impresses us deeply in the hours of meditation, but which slips away when we come back to the things of earth? Are we not dogged by a sense of inconsistency and paradox in view of all our anxious forecastings of the future, our carefully laid plans, and the cautious exploration of our own way through the world? And do not these strivings sometimes present themselves to us as a practical surrender of our higher beliefs? an acted expression of distrust in the Power that is able and willing to do for us more than we can ask or even think?

The antidote usually prescribed for such a state of mind is *increase of faith, or greater spirituality in our conceptions*; and with such prescriptions I have no fault to find. But it is one thing to point out the goal to be attained and another thing to show how to attain it. In so far as the difficulty under consideration has originated in a defective conception of the relations existing between God and man, I think we should try to overcome it with a truer conception. All we have to offer is a homely matter-of-fact analogy. But let us not despise the instrument, if it helps us. The doctrine of the Spirit, if I am not mistaken, is

vague, because it has always appealed to us as an abstract, undefined, unrestricted principle. The divine efficiency in its relations to human efficiency has nowhere been presented to us in the terms of a real symbol.

The Apostle Paul, it is true, made use of a symbolism very closely resembling ours to illustrate the unity and interdependence of the church and its members. So, also, Christ made use of the figure of the vine and its branches. But the real individuality and semi-independence of the subordinate units of an organism has only recently been made known to us; and it is only by emphasizing this that the full value of the analogy becomes apparent, — that the interaction and mutual limitation of divine and human efficiency finds such a clear and concrete expression as to make it impossible for the one to overshadow the other in our thought.

Emphasize as we will the doctrine of the immanency of God, there is no tendency to the obscuration of man's personality. For our symbol so regulates and restricts the two truths as to make them not antithetical but complementary. That form of enthusiasm which enjoins passivity on the part of man, in order that the Spirit may have free course within him, finds no encouragement. It is the *activity* of the subordinate beings that furnishes the opportunity for the Supreme to work. It is when they are the most earnestly engaged, each one according to his special endowment, in working out their own salvation, that the higher power energizes most effectively within them. Neither, on the other hand, is it possible for us to lose sight of or underestimate the agency of the Spirit in our lives. For this, through the medium of our symbol, is represented by the over-ruling, determining, constantly modifying action of the *ego*.

But, it will be asked, is not the use of this analogy, so useful in some respects, embarrassing in others. Does it not tend to the conclusion that the Supreme Being and his subjects are utterly unconscious of each other? I think not.

In the first place it is not true that the human *ego* is wholly unconscious of its subordinate beings. It has knowledge of them, both directly and indirectly. It knows them *externally*, as if they were beings quite foreign to itself; it knows them *internally*, through direct communication, as part of its own being. And, in this twofoldness of its knowledge, we have to recognize a most serviceable phase of our analogy. All through the Christian ages the thought of God as immanent has lived alongside the

thought of a God who is transcendent. Both those aspects of being are necessary to a comprehensive theism. But their development in history has been characterized by a vast amount of antagonism. The advocate of the immanency of the Deity has felt it necessary to emphasize the deficiencies of the transcendent view, and the upholder of transcendency has pronounced the doctrine of an immanent God to be no better than pantheism. But in our symbol we find immanency and transcendency united in a living and abiding reality.

As *immanent*, it is true, the *ego* is not conscious of the separate individuality of nerve-cells. It cannot discriminate between them so as to judge of their faithfulness or their unfaithfulness, or so as to feel approval or disapproval of the way in which they use or abuse their opportunities. It knows them directly only in organized groups. It deals with them as Jehovah is represented to have dealt, in primitive times, with Israel. As *transcendent*, it knows them and ministers to them, for the most part, in the same way. Yet it has acquired, in these later days, some acquaintance with the being and characteristics of individual cells. It is able to distinguish diseased cells from normal ones; it knows how to promote the growth of the one class and how to discourage the other. All this, to be sure, falls very far short of the knowledge that we believe the Supreme Being to possess of our souls. But there are two considerations that should prevent this deficiency from being an obstacle to the use of our analogy.

In the first place the knowledge of the human *ego*, both as transcendent and as immanent, is progressive. The history of medical science is the record of this progress. And, in the second place, our consciousness, though it may afford us a conception of the divine consciousness, cannot be regarded as a measure of it. I do not mean to intimate that our knowledge of nerve-cells, because progressive, is ever likely to approach in completeness the knowledge that we conceive the Supreme Being to have of us. But the fact that it is not a fixed quantity, that it is a thing of degrees, limited only because we are limited, should predispose us to postulate a far more perfect knowledge as the attribute of a far higher being. As we look the other way, that is, towards the animals below us in the biological scale, we can see clearly that, beginning with the lowest organisms, there is a gradual increase of this element of consciousness as we ascend the scale. When, therefore, we reason from man to a being higher than man we must keep on enlarging our thought of the

extent and acuteness of this quality; and if it is the Supreme Intelligence of which we are trying to form a conception, we are justified in giving the utmost freedom to the imagination. Nay, we are *obliged* to say to ourselves, — the knowledge and the intuitions of such a being must, both in quality and extent, far exceed anything that we can imagine. They are properly represented to our minds only by the word *infinite*.

But now how does the case stand with reference to the knowledge which we believe ourselves to possess of God?

Unquestionably, if we were confined to the symbolism of this particular analogy for our conception of being we should be poorly off. Our knowledge of cellular individuals gives us no intimation that they are conscious of the *ego* that dominates the organism to which they belong. We have, it is true, referred to these subordinate beings as if we had some knowledge of their psychical states; and it was perfectly legitimate for us so to do, hypothetically. But we have to recognize clearly that we drew nothing from them except what we first put into them. We invested them with characteristics known to us through other relations, — the relations that separate and *semi-independent* persons sustain to each other in the social organism.

It is clear, therefore, that it is only by combining the knowledge which comes to us from two quite distinct sources that we can reach a satisfactory thought of our relations to the Supreme Being and of his relations to us. We have, on the one hand, a store of experimental knowledge gathered in our capacity as the supreme units of a physical organism, and another store of experience, of a different kind, gathered in our capacity as the ultimate units of the social organism; and each one of these is fitted to throw light on the other.

We have, then, to face about, as it were, that we may supplement the study of man as related to a vast aggregate of beings, of which he is the organic head, with our experience of his relations to that other aggregate of beings that constitutes the nation. When we do this we find ourselves confronted by a similar scene, upon which we are looking from a reversed point of view. In the first case we were on the mountain looking down its slope to the ever-widening plain, seeing, or thinking we saw, the dim uncertain forms of diverse beings working together for their own interests, but having the centre and reason of their existence in the self-conscious unquestionably real observer. In the latter case our mountain-top has become a wide-spreading table-land, on

which the observer finds himself one of a multitude of similar beings whose reality is no more a matter of doubt to him than his own. The relations which the individuals of this multitude sustain to each other are matters of personal experience. They are known as exceedingly varied and complex, yet so connected and interdependent as to suggest a unity. And when, in the effort to grasp this thought of unity-in-complexity, he casts about him for a symbol that shall embody it, nothing offers itself save that very aspect of things upon which he has just turned his back.

This multitude of apparently independent units closely resembles an organism. But the analogy is imperfect; for, in the latter case, there is wanting that well-defined central consciousness that was the most certainly real part of the organism of his experience. As in the former case, this symbolism is luminous on one side and dark on the other. But that which was in light before is the one that is in shadow now. The dim uncertain part of the conception is the central, dominating entity. This no man has seen nor can see. It is a reality that lives in men's thoughts, controls their actions, inspires them for noble and self-sacrificing deeds. But when we try to fix its position it disappears; or leaves as its representative only a specialized individual like the king, the prime minister, or the president. This, however, does not prevent us from cherishing the conception and living in the light of it.

When the political philosopher tells us that the nation is a living organism, that it is a "conscious organism," that it is a "moral organism," and a "moral personality,"¹ it may seem to us that words are used in a highly figurative sense. But, none the less, are we convinced by sober reflection that this thought, and this alone, makes coherent a class of phenomena that more than any other renders the study of human history inspiring. So, too, on the other hand, when the ethical philosopher tells us that the individual man, isolated from the race, is a mere abstraction, that he is but a fragment of social tissue, we are certain that this expresses man in view of only one set of his manifold relations, but we cannot question the truth of the language so far as these particular relations are concerned. As a social moral being he is one of many, a fractional part of a great whole.

Thus we see that, in all our practical conceptions, man occupies a pivotal centre. He is himself the reality from which all his knowledge takes its start. But he cannot look in all directions

¹ *The Nation*, by Elisha Mulford.

at once. Turning his face this way, he knows what it is to be the intelligent and supreme head of a great and diverse multitude of organically connected living agents. Turning in the reverse direction, he knows what it is to be one of the multitude, and how it is possible for individuals to be fractional parts of a great unity without losing their individuality. The most evident deduction from this is that the one set of relations may be employed to elucidate the possible relations of the Supreme Being to his creatures, and that the other may be expected to throw light upon their relations to him. But, if I am not mistaken, much more than this is contained in these two departments of experience. They touch each other at too many points to admit of such a hard line of separation. There is a continuity in them; and each throws light on the dark spaces of the other. It is, in fact, by an unconscious reciprocity of this kind that we have attained to even the most vague conceptions in either department. The social organism has been the analogical expression of the physical, and the physical of the social.

Let us pass in review some of the relations existing between the human *ego* and its subordinate beings, and see whether, as interpreted by this allied symbolism, they are capable of throwing light upon our relations to God.

We may take it for granted that the primary interest of a nerve-cell centres in itself; that self-preservation and the gratification of natural wants command the lion's share of its attention. Its distinct consciousness of other beings, we will say, extends only to those of its own kind, or of nearly related kinds. Its interests are cell-interests, or at most we can hardly suppose them to rise higher than ganglionic interests. At the same time, knowing what we do of the efficiency of the central *ego*, we can hardly doubt that its determinations are represented in some way, however vaguely, in the consciousness of cells directly affected by them. When the attention of the *ego* concentrates itself upon a particular interest, the vitality and strength of the organism is directed to a special part of the brain, or nervous system; and in that part there is superabundant life, activity, and growth. Somehow, we know not how, when this concentrated attention is accompanied by constructive effort on the part of the *ego*, its activity results in a more or less elaborate organization of nerve-cells corresponding to the form of thought in the *ego*.

In what guise this organizing activity appears to the agents of it we shall never know. But we may reasonably conjecture that,

had they the power of reflection, it would seem to them much as it now seems to us when our plans and strivings appear to be tributary to larger and nobler ends than those which we have set before us. We may believe that they would have a vague but profound conviction of a destiny more important than that of the individual; and that in the moments of their highest activity they might conceive themselves to be inspired.

We might further illustrate this thought by referring to the well-known power of the *ego* over the organism for the preservation of health, and for the overcoming of disease. When all goes well we say that the organs of the body are doing their work normally and thoroughly; and we little think how much of this desirable state of things is to be credited to the confident, cheerful attitude of the central consciousness. When disease comes, each organ and cell has its own way of contending against it; and if when hard pressed in the conflict there comes a great inflow of strength, it is perhaps that the *ego* has heard good news, has found a new interest in life, or has thrown the whole force of a hitherto unused will-power into the battle.

In all these cases we have illustrated to us the greatest mystery of being, — the mystery of life within life, of mind coöperating with mind, not externally, but internally and immediately. We do not understand any better than before *how* such interaction is accomplished, nor how it is possible that man, while leading a life of his own, should at the same time be the unconscious agent of a higher Being of whom he is a part. But it brings the *fact*, the *reality* of a similar relationship, on a different scale, within the range of our ordinary experience. In one sense it remains a mystery; but, in the same sense, all the processes of nature are mysterious. It no longer has that most trying kind of mystery that inclines to doubt, — the kind that must always cling to a fact that stands alone, that can in the wide universe find no other fact to which it can be likened.

There is another class of relations, not so direct, but very intimate, that is capable of being turned to account in our theology. The *ego* is a *providence*, both general and special, to its little world of subjects. It might seem, indeed, almost as true to say that they are a providence to it. For it owes its existence and development to their increase and organization; and its present state of existence would cease except for their constant activity in the performance of functions that they only know how to perform. But from the time that the *ego* begins to be conscious of itself, as an individual

with wants to be satisfied and interests to protect, there begins also an activity of the *one* for the welfare of the many. The first cry of the infant for attention is a demand of the *one* in response to the inwardly manifested clamors of the multitude that have suddenly become dependent upon it. And, from this time on, the destiny of the diverse beings that make up the cosmos of the human organism becomes more and more dependent upon the intelligence, the energy, and the morality of the *ego*.

When the *ego* suffers hunger or thirst, what is it but that its myriad subjects are urging it with inarticulate prayers to consider and minister to their wants? Unless the *ego* bestirs itself they must starve. They, indeed, are able and willing to work for their living; but only when they are directed and led by the *ego* can they work to any purpose. It must be the divinity that shapes their ends, that combines and directs their skill and their energies in such a way that they shall accomplish the thing that is required. And when the constantly recurring wants of the multitude are regularly met by a bountiful supply of meat and drink it must seem to their consciousnesses something as the early and the latter rain and the timely sunshine seem to ours.

Again, in view of hostile influences the lives and the welfare of this great throng of beings are largely conditioned upon the wisdom of their sovereign *ego*. They depend implicitly upon its sagacity, its vigilance, its courage, and its prudence to carry them safely through the innumerable dangers that beset their existence, — dangers which they can neither foresee nor guard against. They assist according to their several endowments. One great division is organized as a corps of observation, another has been detailed and specially trained to gather information by the use of articulate speech, and this other constitutes the auditory system; but their activities are of no avail unless the *ego*, or one of its trained representatives in a subordinate nerve centre, elaborates the information received, and gives effect to it through other sets of carefully educated, executive workers.

The higher we rise in the scale of being the more prominently does the non-mechanical aspect of this relationship appear, the more clearly is the function of the *ego* seen to be that of a far-seeing and overruling wisdom. In the lower organisms the quickness and the uniformity of the responses to external influences may suggest mechanism; but the more the *ego* becomes developed the more critically does it consider the reports and petitions that are sent up by its subjects, and the more competent does it

become to correct, to refuse, to modify, to reconstruct, and even to revolutionize. It becomes too wise to satisfy every appetite that importunes according to the measure of its demands. The word *discipline* calls up to the memory of every moral man numberless occasions on which he has played the part of an inflexible ruler and governor. He has found himself hardly beset by the opposing claims of diverse interests in his little world; and he has found his wisdom sorely puzzled to adjust these, to give a reasonable satisfaction in many directions so that there shall be no cause for desolating rebellions among his subjects.

All this is familiar enough to our experience and to our reflection. We have, perhaps, dwelt too long upon it already. But before passing on to other thoughts I would call attention to the use that may be made of our analogy in illustrating another side of the matter; that is, the *worth* of the subordinate individual.

Cells, it is true, are continually perishing, and their places are taken by others. They succeed each other as the generations of men succeed each other in the social organism. But, while it lives, every living cell has functions to perform, the significance of which cannot be isolated from the significance of the whole. The faithful performance of its part contributes something to the vitality of the other members of the organism, and, at the same time, to the happiness and efficiency of the *ego*. In this dual relationship we have a unique symbol for illustrating the significance of the dual statement of the moral law. The organic unity of the symbol brings very clearly before us the unity that underlies the two statements: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." Duty to one's neighbor is not something separate from and superadded to duty to one's God. It is, in the organic unity of the world, only a different aspect of the same duty. Devotion to the Supreme Being can realize itself in only one way, — faithfulness to organic relations. The immediate concern of each individual element, or being, is the discharge of its special functions as related to other subordinate beings. But this is made sublime and inspiring for man by the knowledge of his connection with the Supreme *Ego*.

But it may still seem to the reader that there is something forced and artificial in striving to combine, in our thought of the Supreme Being and his human subjects, ideas acquired in departments of experience so separate as those of the physical organism and the body politic. It may therefore be worth while to add to what has been said of the similarity and continuity of these de-

partments the consideration that they are in all respects *homogeneous*. They differ not in kind but only in degree. Every important characteristic of the one is represented to some extent in the other. In the social organism, as well as in the physical, the relations which we study are relations between organized groups of nerve-cells. The characteristic that specially distinguishes the relations of the social organism is that of externality. When one individual has relations with another he seems to be dealing with that which is no part of himself, but a separate entity, — a separate focus of interests. A natural chasm has to be artificially bridged by some means of communication. Contrasted with this, action within the physical organism seems to be direct, instantaneous, and accomplished without the intervention of means.

But if we penetrate beneath this outside appearance of things, we shall see that, in both cases, there is another phase of the reality than that which has preoccupied the imagination; and that when this is taken into account, the two sets of relations declare themselves to be not *essentially* different, but different only in the degree of prominence developed in certain elements. A little reflection convinces us that our thought of ourselves as contained within the little world of a physical organism is a false suggestion of the imagination. Our existence extends as far as our communications extend. The head of the body politic, the ideal king or statesman, whose sight extends to every quarter of an extended realm, and whose comprehensive intelligence understands all the varied interests that balance each other within it, is a vast being compared with the day-laborer who has no thought above the routine of his occupation, though he may, perchance, have a larger body and a heavier brain.

The difference consists in this, that the statesman has brought into vital connection with his own brain the brains of a multitude of diverse individuals. If we allow our thought to be captured at this point by a contemplation of the means by which all this is brought about we shall assuredly rest in that which is secondary and incidental, and lose sight of the essential fact. The man of high position in the state has, it is true, extended the field of his consciousness and power by means of such things as articulate sounds, printed books, letters hurried by steam from one end of the realm to another, and by the use of electric wires stretched to every town and hamlet like the nerve fibres of the body. But we must look underneath all this machinery to find the essential condition of its effectiveness; namely, the fact that the brain

masses belonging to all the individuals of the nation are homogeneous, and capable of being linked together so as to pour all their knowledge into the combining consciousness of any individual whose capacity is equal to its reception.

From this point of view, therefore, the externality of the relations between individuals has to give place to another phase of the truth, that is equally real, and more vital. On the other hand, when we examine the phenomena that characterize the interaction of the elements within the physical organism the impression of immediateness, and absence of means vanishes. There is no internal communication that does not require time for its transmission; and all the intercourse that takes place between individual elements within the organism is as dependent upon means as that which takes place outside of it. Much attention has been successfully given, of late years, to the accurate measurement of the intervals that elapse between the reception of stimuli by different exterior organs and their perception at headquarters. In short, scientific research tends continually to the abolition of those special marks by which we have discriminated between the intercourse of beings within and without the organism.

None the less, however, when we have ceased from our analysis, do the two relationships continue to represent different aspects of the connection of souls with each other. The one emphasizes the thought of separateness,—of units instrumentally connected. The other makes prominent the aspect of internal unity and apparent immediateness of communication. Limited as we are, we shall do well to make the most of our privilege of looking now upon one side and now upon the other of this dual reality.

When we think of God as our sovereign and as the ruler and director of the universe, that department of our experience that emphasizes the separateness and externality of the relations of beings to each other will provide the terms for the framing of our conception. We may picture to ourselves this vast universe as a network of means for conveying the knowledge of itself to the being who dwells apart, separate in his individuality, yet so connected with each one of his creatures that nothing passes unnoticed or fails to share his attention. On the other hand, when we think of our relations to the great sum of things so connected in every part as to form an organic unity, and of the one life and order that flows through all things, we have to put the thought of separateness far into the background, and concentrate our attention upon the one organic Being.

Each of these views in its own place is best. No greater mistake can be made than to array them against each other. God is immanent in the world, the very life and breath of all things. He is the great heart and brain of the universe. He is the *ego*, for whom and by whom all things exist. Every plant and flower and every animated form is an expression of some thought of his. Every event that takes place in the world is an incident in his life. But, on the other hand, God is also transcendent. He is the Supreme Being of a vast hierarchy of beings. He is distinct from all the others, and above them all. They are his ministers that do his pleasure. He is their sovereign, they are his subjects. He is their Father, they are his children. He is their Creator, they are his instruments. He directs and overrules their activities for the attainment of ends that dwell in his thought as ideals.

Will any one still say that these two views are contradictory, that we have thrown reason to the winds in the attempt to combine opposites. We have no argument to prove that they are not contradictory. We only point to our symbol. These opposites, if opposites they are, are combined in experience. We have found a firm basis of analogy on which to rest our most comprehensive theology. If I am entitled to think of myself as a real person, as a unity, and at the same time as a unity conditioned upon, and embracing within myself, a multitude of other living units, I am also entitled to think of the Supreme Being of the universe as, at the same time, immanent and transcendent. I am a pantheist without ceasing to be a theist. As a pantheist I cannot help being keenly alive to the deficiencies of transcendent theism. But as a theist I am equally clear as to the untruth of abstract pantheism. And if I confine myself to these negative aspects of the two views I become, by necessity, an agnostic. But reason does not indorse such a procedure in relation to *one* class of my beliefs, unless I extend it to *every* class; and I am not prepared to relinquish all my positive views of things. The common-sense ground of life, the basis of all successful action, commends itself to me as better than this universal nescience. I resolve, therefore, to put my trust in those positive convictions that experience furnishes, believing that they are aspects of the truth as related to me and to my present requirements.

This brings us to the close of one long stage in our argument. We have developed the principles that are to be our guide in the determination of reality. And, in the application of these prin-

ciples, we have found good reason for believing, first, that *mind* is the essential reality of the world ; and, second, that a Supreme Being sustains something the same relations to it that the human *ego* sustains to the little world of its manifold activities. That is, we have found ourselves justified in assuming this to be the true hypothesis, so far as our examination of phenomena has extended. It now remains to be seen whether this hypothesis is sustained when a wider application of it is made.

Up to this point we have not interrogated our symbol as to its bearings upon the problem of creation. The idea of creation, unquestionably, owes its origin to a different symbolism. It has sprung from our notion of the relations which man sustains to objects external to himself which his intelligence has called into being. And, at first sight, the implications of our analogy as well as the history of the world seem to be the flat contradiction of the assumption that the Supreme Being is also the *creator* of the universe which he dominates. In the evolution of the individual the *ego* appears as the *result*, the latest product of the myriad subordinate beings that constitute its kingdom ; and in the world-process the appearance is the same. Intelligence and creative skill are seen to be not the preëxistent cause, but the goal attained. In the next article I shall try to show that this appearance is not destructive of our hypothesis.

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EDITORIAL.

THE LATEST THEOLOGICAL ALARM.

A BOOK has appeared this year in England which has stirred up a commotion among conservatives, especially in the Established Church, almost unequaled since the disturbance caused by "Essays and Reviews," which was published at Oxford thirty years ago. The new book also is from Oxford, and is likewise representative of a party, or rather a coterie, in the University. The offensive publication is entitled "*Lux Mundi*," and is a collection of theological essays written by a number of friends who were together at Oxford between the years 1875-1885, engaged in the work of instruction there. They were moved to attempt the task of putting the Catholic faith into its right relation to modern intellectual and moral problems. At various meetings a common body of thought and sentiment, and a common method of commending the faith to the acceptance of others, tended to form itself. As the essays were written they were read to the whole company for criticism and suggestion, and thus, although signed by individuals, are the expression of a common mind and a common hope. Such is the account given in the preface of the genesis of the book. The twelve writers belong to the High Church party, which, in theology, is the conservative body, and for this reason their departures from accepted beliefs have excited so great a disturbance. That Cheyne, Driver, and others, exhibit some divergence from the current orthodoxy, on certain points, is less significant, because they belong to the Broad Church party, whose theology has long been looked on with distrust. The subjects treated are Faith, the Christian doctrine of God, the Problem of Pain, the Preparation in History for Christ, the Incarnation in relation to Development, the Incarnation as the Basis of Dogma, the Atonement, the Holy Spirit and Inspiration, the Church, Sacraments, Christianity and Politics, and Christian Ethics. The preface is dated Michaelmas, 1889 (which, from trustworthy sources of information, we learn is September 29), and the book appeared in the holidays. Since then it has been the subject of discussion in the religious and secular press of England, the "*Guardian*," a High Church paper, devoting several columns to it weekly. One Bishop made it the principal topic of his address at the annual meeting of his Convention, and an Archdeacon has entered a formal charge of heresy against the writers. The feeling is somewhat as it would be if from the Princeton or Chicago Theological Seminary there should come a book adopting the opinions of "Progressive Orthodoxy."

One who should come to the book from the discussions of it would probably be surprised to find that, through essay after essay, it is thoroughly orthodox in opinion and tone. If he should read it consecutively he would find it necessary to force his attention into wakefulness

as he plods along the almost interminable approaches through which some of the writers grope their way towards the heart of a subject. The reader might also be amused at the boldness assumed in advocating opinions which are no longer in controversy, as in respect to science and religion, the limitations on Christ's humanity, the importance of the Incarnation as the basis of doctrine, and cast-off theories of Atonement. One can only smile as he reads serious assurances that it is safe and necessary to admit as true what is conceded by the great majority of educated Christians. But we expect Englishmen to be cumbersome and ponderous in the movement of their thought, and a little tardy in recognizing the accepted changes of advancing opinion.

The fact is, that no part of the book is objectionable to conservative theologians, but a few paragraphs in the essay on the Holy Spirit and Inspiration, written by Rev. Charles Gore, Principal of Pusey House, who is also editor of the volume: Some of his statements concerning the inspiration of certain portions of the Old Testament have raised this great uproar in the Church. The discussion is, therefore, of interest chiefly as exhibiting the theory of inspiration which is still current among conservatives in England and elsewhere, and as indicating the considerable change which must occur before a more reasonable opinion, which agrees with the facts, is adopted.

Mr. Gore maintains that a theory of inspiration may and should be held which leaves certain undecided questions entirely open, so that, whatever the facts may prove to be, inspiration will not be invalidated. He holds that the inspiration disclosed in the writings of the Old Testament consisted in discernment of truth concerning God in his Being, character, and government of the world; that in these respects those writings are distinguished from all others; and that this value will not be sacrificed by any conclusions of scholarship concerning matters now at issue:—

“Thus there is built up for us in the literature of a nation, marked by an unparalleled unity of purpose and character, a spiritual fabric, which in its result we cannot but recognize as the action of the Divine Spirit. A knowledge of God and of the spiritual life gradually appears, not as the product of human ingenuity, but as the result of divine communication: and the outcome of this communication is to produce an organic whole which postulates a climax not yet reached, a redemption not yet given, a hope not yet satisfied. In this general sense at least no Christian ought to feel a difficulty in believing, and believing with joy, in the inspiration of the Old Testament.”

As to the New Testament, it is maintained that the facts asserted by the Creed can be assented to quite independent of the *inspiration* of the evangelic records, and that as historically trustworthy they are sufficient for the moral disposition which predisposes to belief. In the course of the discussion, however, very much more is claimed for the New Testament. But all that is important for the inspiration of the

Old Testament is secure if certain questions which have recently been raised by Biblical criticism are left open to be decided by the facts. It is assumed that the record from the time of Abraham downward is a substance historical, but that there may still be room for an admission of that which, though marked by spiritual purpose, is yet not strictly historical, as, for instance, the attribution to first founders of what is really the remoter result of their institutions, a feature which characterizes all early history.

"Now historical criticism assures us that this process has been largely a work in the Pentateuch. By an analysis, for instance, the force of which is very great, it distinguishes distinct stages in the growth of the law of worship; at least an early stage such as is represented in 'the Book of the Covenant,' a second stage in the Book of Deuteronomy, a last stage in the 'Priestly Code.' What we may suppose to have happened is that Moses himself established a certain germ of ceremonial enactment in connection with the ark and its sacrament, and with the 'ten words'; and that this developed always as 'the law of Moses,' the whole result being attributed, probably unconsciously, and certainly not from any intention to deceive, to the original founder. This view would certainly imply that the recorders of Israel's history were subject to the ordinary laws in the estimate of evidence, that their inspiration did not consist in a miraculous communication to them of facts as they originally happened; but if we believe that the law, as it grew, really did represent the divine intention for the Jews, gradually marked out upon the basis of a Mosaic institution, there is nothing materially untruthful, though there is something uncritical in attributing the whole legislation to Moses acting under the divine command. It would be only of a piece with the attribution of the collection of Psalms to David and of Proverbs to Solomon. Nor does the supposition that the law was of gradual growth interfere in any way with the symbolical and typical value of its various ordinances. . . . What we are asked to admit is not conscious perversion, but unconscious idealizing of history, the reading back into past records of a ritual development which was really later. Now inspiration excludes conscious deception or pious fraud, but it appears to be quite consistent with this kind of idealizing; always supposing that the result read back into the earlier history does represent the real purpose of God and only anticipates its realization."

Mr. Gore also considers it a tenable theory that some books of the Old Testament are dramatic, not historical. The Song of Solomon is a drama, the book of Job is mainly dramatic, although perhaps on an historical basis, and so may be the books of Jonah and Daniel. Dramatic composition admits of being inspired as well as poetry and history.

"It is maintained, then, that the Church leaves open to literary criticism the question whether several of the writings of the Old Testament are or are not dramatic. Certainly the fact that they have not commonly been taken to be so in the past will be no evidence to the contrary, unless it can be denied that a literary criticism is being developed, which is as really new an intellectual product as the scientific development, and as such, certain to reverse a good many of the literary judgments of previous ages. We are being asked to make considerable changes in our literary conception of the Scriptures, but

not greater changes than were involved in the acceptance of the heliocentric astronomy."

Mr. Gore also thinks it probable that the Jewish history back of Abraham had a mythical stage, as the history of every nation of antiquity had, a period of childhood containing the preface and germ of the history, philosophy, and theology which came later, and that some narratives of Genesis are partly mythical.

"Now has the Jewish history such earlier stage; does it pass back out of history into myth? In particular, are not its earlier narratives, before the call of Abraham, of the nature of myth, in which we cannot distinguish the historical germ, though we do not at all deny that it exists? The inspiration of these narratives is as conspicuous as that of any part of Scripture, but is there anything to prevent our regarding these great inspirations about the origin of all things, — the nature of sin, the judgment of God on sin, and the alienation among men which follows their alienation from God, — as conveyed to us in that form of myth or allegorical picture, which is the earliest mode in which the mind of man apprehended truth?"

It is shown that the church has never tied itself down to any theory of inspiration, and that in various periods spiritual leaders in the church have shown indifference as to the form and exact accuracy of the records in which religious truth is contained.

It is claimed, also, that the use made by Jesus of the Old Testament forecloses none of the critical inquiries which are now being made, that his reference to Jonah would be equally pertinent whether it is drama or history, that his assumption of the Davidic authorship of Psalm cx. is not the decision of a purely literary matter, but is directed to showing the Pharisees that on their own premises they do not understand their own teaching.

Mr. Gore argues, finally, that as the critical attack on the New Testament has been defeated by facing the problems raised in fair and frank discussion and not by foreclosing the question with an appeal to dogma, the same course should be pursued in respect to the Old Testament. If the questions raised can be regarded as open, great obstacles will be removed from the path of many who wish to believe, but who suppose they must accept a traditional view of the complete historical accuracy of the Old Testament.

These are the concessions to criticism which have caused a general alarm among the conservative theologians of the Church of England. The replies offered by the Bishop to whom we referred, and by others, are to the effect that the Jews accepted the Scriptures literally, and, living nearer the time of composition and having more familiarity with the language, were better judges than we are, and that critics of the Old Testament are not agreed, therefore we may hold by the old theory till some new theory is unmistakably established. It might as well be argued that because the Greeks believed Homer composed the whole of

the Iliad and Odyssey we have no right to set up a different opinion, and that because scientists disagree about the nebular theory, therefore we should insist that the world was created in six days. Some who object to the views of "Lux Mundi" maintain that no literary evidence can overthrow the Davidic authorship of Psalm cx., for if it could Jesus made a mistake in alluding to it as David's, and at one stroke the authority of the Old Testament and the divinity of Christ would be swept away. And so the Christian religion itself is committed to the reported allusion by Christ to a psalm which the Pharisees supposed was written by David, and from which he argued on their own supposition. Evidently many devout Christians in England have yet to learn that inspiration is not dependent on literal accuracy nor complete infallibility, but that it worked according to the degree of knowledge through which the revelation of God was received.

We have but one consideration to urge in respect to the adjustment of the results of critical research to theories of inspiration. While reconciliation is going on the feeling is general and natural that the authority of the Bible is reduced and the scope of inspiration narrowed. There is a consciousness of loss rather than of gain. There is a disposition to stand on the defensive and yield one point after another only as necessity with its logic of facts compels, as was the case in the conflict with theories of science concerning the origin of things. And when it is said that the spiritual truths remain as of old, the suspicion is aroused that further demands will be made, and that our religion in accommodating itself to so many revolutions will come to be considered vague, mystical, destitute of positive reality, and resting on no secure foundation.

Now, it needs to be understood that the influence and authority of the Bible have never depended on belief in its inerrancy and infallibility, but that theories of its literal perfection and miraculous origin have been adopted to account for its power. This literature, Hebrew and Christian, has had a charm, has made an appeal, has exercised a power unique and spiritual. It has interpreted God to the soul, and has found men, as Coleridge says, in the depths of their being. Such is its direct, natural, irresistible impression. But after a time men began to theorize about it, to surround it with a mystery of miracle or magic, and became blind to the imperfections of its form, insisting that such a treasure could not be in an earthen vessel, but that every word, date, name, place is absolutely correct. These notions came to be held as essential to the power the book had, as the very source of its power. By and by it is found that such theories must be modified, that the form has human imperfection, and then many fear that the sanctity and authority of the book will be lost. But the power is there all the same, and remains to be accounted for. Here is the alternative; if this literature has no spiritual power which makes it sacred, theories of miraculous origin, of freedom from inaccuracies and the like, cannot give it real authority over

men, but if it has that power over the human heart which proves it a revelation of God, no conditions of date, authorship, and composition, can rob it of its authority.

The fact that although men think this of it to-day and think that of it to-morrow, it is always bringing God to the conscience and heart with unabated influence, should enlarge our view of the revelation which it contains, and bring us to the broadening use of it in positive and aggressive forms, rather than merely to the defense of it with growing solicitude. It may safely be predicted that after adjustment has been made of the results of historical criticism to theories of inspiration, the Old Testament will regain a larger degree of spiritual meaning than it had while the history it described was partly misunderstood, as the Person of Christ stands out more real, more human, and more near since hostile attacks have brought the church and the world to a better knowledge of the writings which describe and interpret that unique character.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF THE TIME GAINED BY THE EIGHT-HOUR MOVEMENT.

It remains to be seen how much, if any, loss will be incurred financially by the last reduction in the hours of labor. In some of the more exhausting industries, where complicated or rapid machinery is in use, probably as much good work can be done in eight as in ten hours. It is reported that some English manufacturers, noting the poor quality of the work done at the close of the day, are considering the advisability of a reduction to eight hours in the interest of their business. And in some of the skilled trades, when work is crowded into certain seasons of the year, it is quite possible that any pecuniary loss may be averted by a more equal distribution of labor over the year. Taking the year as a whole, with masons and carpenters, the aggregate of time may remain the same. If, however, there shall prove to be actual loss of productive power, the loss must be made up out of profits, or out of increased prices in the goods produced, a loss which in the latter case would fall most heavily upon the laborer as a consumer. If profits must bear the loss, it will soon be discovered whether capital will find some industries profitable enough to continue them. We are evidently experimenting on a very close margin. There must be a limit in the reduction of hours of labor at which profit will cease. We are not aware that any one is disposed to hazard a reduction below eight hours.

Leaving this part of the problem to work out its own solution, we turn to the consideration of the value of the new time gained to the laborer himself. The eight-hour movement represents something beyond previous movements for the reduction of hours of labor. The new time won, if it shall prove to have been permanently won, has a distinct value above that gained by the reduction from fourteen to twelve hours, or from

twelve to ten. The former reductions meant rest, the relief of the overworked laborer. But the man who works ten hours a day in ordinary manual employment — we make exception of the more exhausting industries — is not an overworked man. His physical system makes no protest against that amount of time, and even if it did, he would have no grievance beyond that of multitudes of brain workers who cover ten hours in the daily task, and carry over no little worry into the remaining hours of the day. We assume that the new time will not be used in rest. With some it will doubtless be spent in idleness and dissipation. That result is incident to any gain in personal freedom or leisure. But with the majority of skilled laborers, and especially with the leaders of the labor movement, we believe that the extra time represents in intention, and will represent in fact, an advance toward social position and general influence and power. The new time is opportunity.

Socially, the wage-earner suffers by comparison with at least two classes of persons who may work the same number of hours with himself. One class is made up of those whose work is mentally improving. Their labor fits them for society. There may be a good deal of drudgery about their task, they may be poorly paid, they may be paid in wages dignified by the name of salary, but they have ready entrance into society. They have a recognized social standing in every community. The professions which offer the most scant and the most precarious living have their social compensations. Dr. Dale remarked after his visit to this country in 1878 that the clergy still remained a kind of aristocracy in New England. Yet we suppose that at least one third of the clergy of New England receive lower wages than the majority of skilled mechanics. But five or six hundred dollars a year, paid in an uncertain salary, with frequent losses by change of pastorate or supply, is better socially than nine or ten hundred dollars paid week by week to the mechanic. The bank account of the mechanic, small as the regular deposits may be, shows his advantage in wages, but in nothing else. The average weekly earnings of the Yankee school-mistress are no more than the earnings of the better female weavers and spinners, native or foreign, with the loss of at least one quarter of the year in vacations, but the social advantage of teaching above weaving or spinning is at present immense. And the social advantage of brain work above manual must remain until the various classes of manual laborers have sufficient leisure for mental improvement. It was more than a conceit of Edward Bellamy that the hours of labor should be in inverse proportion to the disagreeableness of the business, so that the disagreeable kinds of labor should be chosen for the larger freedom and leisure which they might afford. There is a working principle in this suggestion which is beginning to find expression in larger time for the school life of the children of workingmen, and in the persistent demand for a margin of time in the day of the workingman himself for self-improvement.

The other class is made up of those who have opportunities of making money through their work or business. It is the opportunity for money-making which puts trade above the mechanic arts socially. The merchant takes the risk of frequent failures, but he has the chance of a fortune, and at some time in his business life, not always at the close, he is usually a prosperous man. The anxieties of business are very great, and he carries them with him far beyond the long hours of actual labor, but the result is money; and money means a certain amount of culture, books, pictures, travel, social entertainments, and the like. It is this power of money to yield equivalents in personal culture which has put trade socially above the common industries. And all who are in business in the technical sense share this advantage. The average salesman works as many hours as the mechanic, earns no better wages, may have no better education, may be no more of a man in any respect, and may never make the money which trade seems to represent, but from his subordinate connection with an occupation which has already gained social position he inherits the gains of the past. The manufacturer has already reached through the same process the level of the merchant, but he does not bring up his employees with him. They see that they must take their own measures for social advancement. And the social gain through more time is greater than through more money. Put manual labor at six hours a day at the same wage as now, and it would advance in social rank much faster than by doubling the present wage, and increasing the day's work to twelve hours. Time is more than money.

We have said that the wage-earner suffers at present socially by comparison with those who may work as hard as he in the poorly paid professions, and with those who may work as hard in business, but with a better chance at money-making. Compare now his position with the agriculturalist. The small farmer works more hours at seasons than the factory operative. But he is his own master. He owns the land he tills, or is struggling for ownership. In a small way he is a recognized capitalist. He has little ready money, but he pays taxes. He is a citizen with permanent holdings and with a permanent kind of influence. And at times in the year he has an enforced leisure which is often put to good account in reading and in discussion with his neighbors. He may lack the brightness which belongs to those who are used to the ways of a town, even though it be in depressing kinds of labor, but he has a sort of dignity which always goes with the ownership of the land. And his position in the community is accepted from tradition, whether he may or may not personally fall below it.

We conclude that at whatever point the comparison is taken between the wage-earner in manual labor and his fellow-workers, it is at present to his social disadvantage. And we believe that the leaders of labor organizations are right in seeking to equalize his condition socially by the gain of time for mental improvement. It is, of course, to be expected

that the greater part of the time gained will at first go to waste. But the better minds of this generation of labor will use the new time to advantage, and their children will use it still better and more generally. Idleness does not pay in the long run. An active nature set free from prescribed work will seek, after the novelty of leisure is over, some method of personal gain or personal improvement. We expect, for one thing, to see a marked increase in the interest of workingmen in politics. Already the better leaders in labor organizations have advised educational campaigns in the place of strikes. They have counseled a thorough understanding on the part of workingmen of the questions which economics are forcing into politics. With a larger knowledge of these questions there will come political influence and political power. Labor will be represented, and intelligently represented, in state and national legislation. And though there may be, for the time, much effort and struggle of a partisan and selfish kind, we believe that the end will be the broadening and humanizing of our political life. Evidently labor is on the road to power, and the safest thing for society to do is the generous thing, namely, to see that the road lies through intelligence and social recognition, rather than through violence and greed. We need not be concerned as to who shall be our future masters, if we allow the justice of the present demands, and further the reasonable methods, which are now put forth, for a truer social equality.

LETTERS AND LIFE.

This Department of the "Review" is under the editorial care of Professor
A. S. HARDY.

II.

ISOLATED facts are meaningless. The preoccupation of the scientific observer is their correlation. His note-books are full of facts waiting coördination. To see is not enough, to explain is everything. The discovery of a germ is important, but vastly more so is its unknown relation to that other fact, the diseased organism. Does it kick, or bite, or poison? Until observation can answer, we imagine; hence the theory of plagues. For so strong is this desire to unify, so imperative the necessity for explanation, that when the relations are lacking we invent provisional ones, stringing facts like beads on the thread of hypothesis, weaving webs in the looms of speculation. Thus the use of the imagination has been conceded to the scientist; not only that imagination which reproduces, but also that which combines. Intent upon the discovery of relations, he cannot do without it. Newton announces a connection between the moon's curved orbit and the straight path of the falling apple; thousands of observations confirm it, or furnish data for the formula

which prove it; but the eye of the imagination first saw who brings together things sundered, disclosing a so subtle as to have escaped us, yet so real that its announcement, can lay no stronger claim to this faculty than Nature. The distinction lies in the fact that in Science the use of the imagination is governed by Reason, whereas the poet often takes the real and gives them to Fancy. But both alike are primarily the real — the one with its truth, the other with its hidden undiscovered relations, the subtle affinities, the unity which hides from grosser vision, but which the eye of the remotest fragments and brings together in a single line, expressed the system of the world in a single formula. Science has insight, so delicate the shades he matches, so fine the covers, that he seems to subordinate Nature to expression, creator instead of the interpreter. But in reality he creates and discovers.

And for what the scientist would term the *unscientific* imagination there is less and less necessity every day. Modern scientific research discloses wonders which transcend those of the highest flight, and affords surprises which surpass the dreams of the poets. With a velocity which would enable Puck to travel eight times a second we ascend on the wings of light to visible stars to sift the matter of which they are composed of which Comte, not many years since, affirmed we might know sizes, distances, motions, but nothing more! What a comparison is Al Borak, the steed which bore Mohammed to heaven, with its step of five leagues and jacinth eye Aladdin ever disclosed such marvels as may be seen through the microscope. No shining spirit ascending from the world as mysterious as the human consciousness revealed by modern study. For it seems to be a universal law that conquest only leads to greater mystery. The clearer our comprehension the more puerile and fantastic seem all our former conceptions. No image of him projected from the shadow of ignorance and weakness is comparable with that suggested by knowledge and power. As we toil along the inscrutable path of being majesty becomes more majestic, and the material for thought multiplies. What grander meanings we read to-day into the world which the Oriental poet silenced the murmurs of Job, stated the doctrine of immortality. In an age to come when the wonderful ceased to be wonderful if it proved the preoccupation of the poet and story-teller was to conform to his thought and nature subordinate to expression, we may prove to be more wonderful than we thought. The power

behind the visible put to shame all our former conceptions of them. The possibilities which lurk in the atom outrun our credulity. The whole tendency of investigation into the "promise and potency" of this atom is to stimulate the imagination to syntheses more daring than ever were dreamed of by the poets of the world's infancy. Like the geni which rose from out the copper vessels of Solomon, the thought of to-day outgrows the figure of yesterday, and is not easily recommitted to its former habitation. The splendid symbolism of Homer, Dante, and Milton is of as little service to the modern poet as the Ptolemaic system is to the modern astronomer. Deity can no more be depicted by statues, nor the penalties which pursue the lawbreaker adequately represented by hell fire. If we employ old words and images it is with new meanings. But it is folly for us to suppose that we have done with imagination and idealism. The bare altar suggests a greater Presence than did ever the statue which once stood upon it. The toys of to-day were the educators of yesterday, and are discarded, not because we have done with what they stood for, but because they are inadequate to represent it.

But the simple observer takes what Nature offers, notes the sequences, originates nothing; and it were a futile task to investigate the relations between phenomena if we were unable subsequently to utilize them for definite ends. Knowledge for knowledge's sake is the half-way inn; its uses, coarse and fine, are the goal. The end of all experiment and observation is man. He wishes to produce more than the desultory effects he observes, is not content to watch the steam escape from the lid of the kettle, but will harness the energies he discovers, and adorn and ennoble life with the beauty he unveils. What avail laws of elastic vapors and vibrating membranes if we cannot have steam engine and telephone? What matters it how far it be to Arcturus, whether the Pleiades be stars or dust, except as by our sidereal scales and plummet we can obtain a juster view of the universe and free our religious instincts from the cerements of dead theologies. Scientist and artist work towards the same end, — to know, in order to bring our thought and life into harmony with reality, which is the only mastery of nature possible. All the elements of truth and beauty and utility are in Nature, but, so far as our purpose and need are concerned, in disorder and confusion. The truth is veiled and complicated with other truths; the beauty is accidental and fugitive; the utilities potential — energies, but not machines; trees, grasses, and streams, but not gardens; sounds, but not music; forms, but not Parthenons, or Notre Dames. In passing from ignorance to knowledge, man changes rôles with Nature; who was master becomes slave.

Herein the artist will forsake a realism which limits him to the reproduction of what he observes, to the raw product; and he will do so because he cannot help it. There is no art which carries semblance to so high a degree as sculpture, yet at its very birth begins the struggle

between that imagination which reproduces the sensible objects with which it deals and that imagination which combines them for definite ends. If we go back to the crudest productions of archaic sculpture, wherein the intention of the artist was to imitate, and imitate faithfully, the objects which interested him, we discover either a conventionality foreign to nature, or a dawning purpose which differentiates the copy from the original. Consciously or unconsciously, he is dominated by an impulse to produce something more than a faithful copy. Be his aim high or low, to instruct, to ennoble, or to amuse, *some* such motive impels him; and as his facility of representation increases his ideas multiply, his ambition expands. It is this ambition which distinguishes his work from that of Nature. "Art is art because it is not nature." The effects of one are random and intermittent, those of the other deliberate and sustained. It is impossible to conceive of an artist who should remain satisfied with simple reproduction; who, having after long effort acquired the power to reproduce all that Nature offers, should remain contented with a mere choice of models, with the perpetual representation of things as they are. The beauties of the model are but partial and fragmentary; once able to delineate them accurately, he will inevitably and rightly attempt to combine them. For he wishes to produce effects more beautiful, more terrible, more pleasing, more striking, than any he has observed; to intensify or to soften the emotions and passions which nature and experience awaken; and to this end it is not necessary that he himself should have seen or experienced exactly what he portrays. Thus, within the limits of the real, he disposes of its elements, and chisels a face which, though he never saw it, may at any moment be born. What is true of sculpture is still more true of painting, which, as Charles Blanc says, "conquers space by fiction;" and of the novel, whose images are destitute of form and color, the glance and voice of whose passion reach neither eye nor ear. How can literal realism exist here? The personality of the artist forbids it. All his material passes through the crucible of his genius, whatever genius may be. No two mirrors give back the same reflection; photography itself is not literal reproduction; and the human eye, in its soberest attempts to observe the data, views them through a medium of feeling and emotion, so that the note-books of separate observers of the same fact, or the sketches by separate pencils of the same face, are as different as a landscape under different skies. Far more difficult than the task of the scientific observer is this of the reporter on things incorporeal, whose eye, itself clouded by prejudice, is fixed on motives, feelings, and ideas, — far more difficult, and far more dangerous. But his report is not false to nature, because its elements have not been seen in precisely the combination under which he presents them, and the justification of such a presentation is found in the effect which it produces. For it is man's privilege to teach in a better fashion what Nature teaches imperfectly, to so charge his work

with the truth or beauty which Nature but inadequately suggests that it will not let us go till these are brought home to us. A hundred photographs may be necessary to represent completely the man we know; but the artist is not condemned to so laborious a process, and can seize and imprison in a single portrait the spirit of those hundred moods whose outward signs are the despair of the camera. We have seen many death-beds, but not one like that of Prince André as described by Tolstoi; yet that, of all others in fiction, is perhaps the truest, the most natural and real. There is not a detail which is false, though one might have to search through a long and varied experience to find the counterparts of them all, and might never surprise them all together. "*La vérité*," says Gounod, "*vaut mieux que la réalité*." On the other hand, realism is more, as well as less, than it pretends to be. One never sees all that is. The philosopher, the poet, the moralist, the practical man, will draw up for us different accounts of the same phenomenon without exhausting the facts or their reach. Nature is an ocean from which each fills his tiny cup with what he may.

The liberty of the artist is his power of choice. Its exercise charms us because we seem to see in his work a product, not of Nature, but of that mind to which we refer Nature. To set a bound to this idealizing process is to set bounds to our hopes, our aims, and desires. We persist in living in to-morrow, though to-morrow never comes; our desire is for the beauty Nature never attains; our aim is the sum of truth whose fragmentary and often contradictory manifestations cannot detain us. To decry the process because it sometimes leads us astray is to decry our noblest instincts. The artist can get no further from his models than the scientist from his facts. Wandering too far in the region of fancy or speculation, we feel the tug of humanity and nature to which we are tethered. Far more dangerous than the pursuit of ideals is the conversion of great works of art into models for imitation. Nature only can furnish models. To paint, to chisel, to write, as the Masters did, we must observe as they did, as well as possess their idealizing genius; and no genius, however great, can wrest a human being from his commonplace life, and make him a symbol of the race, putting into his eye the hopes and fears of humanity, and into his mouth its universal cry, by the study of masterpieces. It is their function to fertilize the imagination, — "Originality," said Goethe, "challenges originality," — to stimulate our own powers of observation, to quicken our perception of the truth and beauty of nature, to widen the range of our vision. We cannot achieve them by imitating them. To study them exclusively is to fix our eyes upon the sun instead of the world which it reveals. It is out of this false worship of *chef d'œuvres* that grow those systems of rules which are so many swaddling-clothes to the efforts of creative genius; which, so far from emancipating the artist from the limitations of the real, shut him out from the world of marvelous variety where is all his

material. It is from this substitution of effects for causes that proceeds the academic classicism which asserts the permanency of ideals and the indestructibility of types. These are but the symbols of a language in which the great observers record what they have seen. They furnish the basis of all classification and comparison. Darwin could not study Nature without resorting to them, but never studied them for Nature. Though he could not assign the limits of a species, he was at no loss to describe it, and thus to convey to us an altogether clearer and juster idea of it than can be obtained from any one of its varieties. The artist must have recourse to like symbols, but, as symbols of phenomena far more various and sensitive to change than the organic structure of a species or the constitution of rock strata, their substitution for the thing signified is still less admissible. They serve our present need and purpose. Those of the past cannot fully meet the want of to-day; those of to-day cannot be imposed upon to-morrow.

The attack of Realism upon imaginative literature resembles the invasion by Science of the splendid regions of Faith. It is characterized by the same audacity, the same sweeping generalizations, the same complacency of statement. It marshals the same array of facts, appeals to the same eye of sense, publishes its edict for the destruction of the idols in the same lofty language of duty; and its leaders, whose contributions to literature are as indisputable as those of the scientist to knowledge, enter, with the prestige and conscious strength of achievement, the domain of the imagination, and apply to its creations the touchstone of reality. There is no reason to lament the fierceness of this Edomite onset. The vessels of the House of the Lord are safe. Only the perishable perishes. We cannot escape the heroic by an excursion into the commonplace. The Real is the best hunting-ground of the imagination. Our best dreams are our waking ones. If we move away from things long cherished it is in the arc of the spiral, whose sweep brings us back again on a larger radius of motion.

Arthur Sherburne Hardy.

BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

A POINT OF GRAMMAR IN THE GLORIA IN EXCELSIS.

Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνῃ ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκία.

— PSALTER, Cod. A, Hymn xiv.

Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνῃ ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας.

— LUKE ii. 14.

It is unfortunate for English-speaking and English-singing people that there is a textual difficulty in the *Gloria in Excelsis*. It makes very little difference in Greek which of the two forms given above is used. It is a matter of only one letter, and a chorus of singers need not raise

a nice question of syntax on that account. So in Latin one might parallel the twofold Greek, though not in good idiom, by giving the second clause, *In terra pax, erga homines benevolentia*, and *In terra pax erga homines benevolentia*. But in English it makes a real difference whether we say and sing "On earth peace, good-will toward men," or "On earth peace among men in whom He is well pleased."

There is no escape, however, from the evidence that εὐδοκίας is the true reading in Luke. A clear and full discussion of the text may be found in Westcott and Hort's New Testament, vol. ii., Appendix, pp. 52-56, Am. Ed. The learned editors also discuss the interpretation as subsidiary to the settlement of the text, although the text does not of itself determine the construction and meaning. The following are the principal points that they present: (1.) Origen's Homily, translated by Jerome, combines εὐδοκίας with εἰρήνη — "pax bonæ voluntatis." Peace among men, the peace of good-will. (2.) Εὐδοκία, the reading of the ancient Greek Psalters, may be combined with ἐν ἀνθρώποις in two different senses: (a) "good pleasure in men," (b) "satisfaction among men" — the satisfaction of fulfilled desires and hopes. To both it is objected that it makes three clauses in the song instead of two, that the three are not naturally coördinate, and the third is not introduced by a conjunction. To (a) it is objected that the order of words is unaccountable, for ἐν ἀνθρώποις should come last. The objection to (b) is that the words are not a natural, though possible, expression of that thought. (3.) Εὐδοκίας may be taken in two ways, (a) as limiting εἰρήνη, as Jerome, but leaving ἐν ἀνθρώποις to be local — "among men," or (b) as limiting ἀνθρώποις — men of good pleasure, that is, "accepted mankind." This latter is the interpretation adopted.

We wish now to show that there is a third construction with εὐδοκίας — and the true one — making it limit εἰρήνη, and limited by ἐν ἀνθρώποις, thus giving this meaning to the second clause — "and upon earth peace, the peace of good pleasure in men," or of favor, good-will towards men.

Let us first mention some objections to the construction "men of good pleasure."

1. There is the very serious objection that the meaning is not obvious. If εὐδοκία meant good-will as a moral quality, then "men of good-will," as the Rheims version has it, would be intelligible. But what does "men of good pleasure" mean? The meaning "men who are the objects of some one's good pleasure" certainly is not very natural.

2. The construction is foreign to Greek, which does not admit a "genitive of characteristic" with a personal noun, except as a predicate. Whether it is a Hebraism or not will be considered presently. Is there not reason to think that it has passed unchallenged as a Latinism, perhaps from the influence of the Latin versions? But it goes even beyond the Latin, which does not allow this genitive without a modifying adjective — a difficulty escaped in the Vulgate by the phrase "*hominibus bonæ voluntatis*." The point we make is that εὐδοκίας combined with εἰρήνη is genuine Greek, but combined with ἀνθρώποις is not.

3. It is not clear that the construction is a Hebraism, if it carries with it the meaning "men who are the objects of favor, or good pleasure." Cremer says (Lex., p. 215, Edin. Ed.) that if εὐδοκίας is the correct reading the phrase is to be explained like τέκνα ὀργῆς, and υἱὸς βασιλείας. But this very striking Hebraism is very different from the far simpler idiom "man of" which is perhaps as common in Eng-

lish as in Hebrew. We find in the New Testament *κριτὴς τῆς ἀδικίας* — which certainly does not mean “judge who is the object, or victim, of injustice” — and a few other similar phrases that signify persons *possessed of* certain qualities expressed by the genitive. Neither in the New Testament nor in the Septuagint, outside of this passage, is *εὐδοκίας* found in combination with a personal noun that expresses the object of *εὐδοκία*. Such a phrase as *καρπὸς εὐδοκίας* in Psalm lxxviii. 14 (lxix. 13), “time of favor,” is quite different. What is more, the nearest Hebrew equivalent of *εὐδοκία*, *רֶצוֹן*, furnishes no parallel. There is no “man of favor,” although we have “day of favor” (Isa. lviii. 5), and “year of favor” (Isa. lxi. 2), which latter is quoted in Luke iv. 19, as *ἐνιαυτὸν δεκτόν*. The usage with *רֶצוֹן* appears to be the same. *רֶצוֹן* (Prov. xi. 16) is translated in the Septuagint *γυνὴ εὐχάριστος*. In Daniel x. 11, 19, we find the original of “man greatly beloved” to be *אִישׁ רָצוֹן*, translated in the Vulgate *vir desideriorum*, but probably meaning “a man of charms,” literally “man of precious things.” Everything seems to show that the Hebraism “son of” stands by itself. To identify this with “man of” seems to be putting a grammatical — we might almost say mechanical — identity for an identity of idiom. The distinction is well illustrated by English usage, for we say “A man of wealth, of influence,” etc., but not “a man of kindness (received), of anger (incurred), of caprice (inflicted).” To put the case in terms of grammar, the limiting genitive must be equivalent to an adjective, and not to a passive participle. This distinction between “son of” as meaning often “the object of,” “in the condition of,” and “man of,” as meaning always “possessed of” certain qualities, seems to be accepted by Gesenius in the articles under *רֶצוֹן* and *אִישׁ*. If it is valid, the basis for the interpretation “men of good pleasure” disappears.

To put the three objections into one, we may say that an over-strained Hebraism displaces a normal Greek construction and leads to an obscure meaning. Professor Westcott, in his separate opinion (App. p. 26), says well, “*Ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας* is undoubtedly a difficult phrase.”

In support of the translation “on earth peace — the peace of good pleasure in men,” we offer —

1. The *ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκία* of the early Greek Psalters. The Biblical Codex Alexandrinus, assigned to the fifth century, contains the Gloria which we have placed at the head of this article. There is some advantage in coming to the Gloria of Luke by way of this one in the Psalter, which is believed to represent the consensus of the Psalters. Here we find — dropping the Egyptian peculiarity of *-εία* for *-ία* — *εὐδοκία*. Now we grant that this nominative case is not entitled to a place in the text of Luke, but we must not therefore be accused of interpreting a false reading. What is false for Luke may be true for the Psalter. Even if its reading be a corruption of Luke’s text, it is genuine Greek, with a respectable history of its own and a right to a fair interpretation. What, then, does the phrase *ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκία* mean in the Psalter? We answer, “good pleasure in men.” This meaning is maintained by Cremer, on the supposition of its being the true reading in Luke, but doubted by Westcott and Hort. It is favored —

(a) By the combination of *ἐν* with *εὐδοκέω* in the accounts of the baptism: *ἐν σοὶ εὐδόκησα*, Mark i. 11. Luke iii. 22. *ἐν ᾧ ηὐδόκησα*, Matt. iii. 17; also of the transfiguration, Matt. xvii. 5. The other similar ex-

amples in the New Testament are οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν αὐτῶν εἰδοκῶς ὁ θεός, 1 Cor. x. 5, and (of things instead of persons) διὸ εἰδοκῶς ὁ ἀσθενείας, ἐν ὑβρεσιν, κ. τ. λ., 2 Cor. xii. 10. Examples in the Septuagint are ὅτι ἠὺδόκησεν ἐν ἐμοί, 2 Kings (2 Sam.) xxii. 20, and οὐκ εἰδοκῶς ψυχῇ μου ἐν αὐτῷ, Heb. ii. 4, cited in Heb. x. 38.

(δ) The order of words, which Westcott and Hort consider "unaccountable," might certainly be in prose εἰδοκῶς ἐν ἀνθρώποις; but in a lyrical outburst like this would not the order with εὐδοκῶς last be not only allowable, but more forcible?

(ε) The absence of examples of the substantive εἰδοκῶς used with ἐ and the dative, which seems to us the only weak point in this interpretation, may be met by the general principle that verbal nouns imitate the construction of their verbs. We have examples enough of their governing the dative even without a preposition. The following are instances in the New Testament: εἰς διακονίαν τοῖς ἀγίοις, 1 Cor. xvi. 15; διὰ πολλῶν εὐχαριστιῶν τῷ θεῷ, 2 Cor. ix. 12.

(δ) This interpretation allows a natural division of the song into two clauses. A threefold division is hardly admissible, but would result from understanding ἐν ἀνθρώποις locally, "among men." In the twofold division each part would have three subdivisions. Changing the place of one word to facilitate comparison, we have

ἐν ὑψίστοις	δόξα	θεῷ
καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς	εἰρήνῃ	ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκῶς.

A verbally exact parallel would give at the end of the second clause simply ἀνθρώποις — "On high glory to God, On earth peace to men," — but instead of peace to men we have a larger thought which includes this, namely, the peace that comes from the divine favor towards men, reconciliation with men. No connective is needed before ἐν ἀνθρώποις because this phrase is appositive and explanatory of εἰρήνῃ; the same thought that we sing, with amplification, in the lines, —

"Peace on earth, and mercy mild,
God and sinners reconciled."

All this in interpretation not of Luke ii. 14, directly, but of a part of Hymn xiv. of the ancient Psalter. Let us now make use of this in explaining Luke.

2. The phrase ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας in Luke ii. 14 should be combined in the same manner as the corresponding phrase in the Psalter. Several considerations point to this.

(α) A genitive case is found here instead of a nominative. This would change the grammatical connection of the phrase, but why should it break up the composition of the phrase itself? It certainly does not invalidate any of the reasons just brought forward in the case of the Psalter. It merely offers us another possible construction, namely, as a genitive limiting ἀνθρώποις only, the objections to which we have already considered.

(β) If the εὐδοκῶς of the Psalter arose from a scribe's error in copying Luke, the error would be more likely to take place if the construction with ἐν ἀνθρώποις were understood to be the same. Constructions so different as "among men of good pleasure" and "good pleasure in men," would arrest the attention and prevent mistake from carelessness. If the change was intentional, the scribe could have best justified it by claiming that the accompanying construction was unchanged, while a probably

original conformity to the case of *εἰρήνη* was restored. Is it not a sound textual principle that in variations the least possible disturbance of context is to be assumed?

(c) A song like this, short, easily remembered, and of intense interest to the Christian communities, must have been communicated largely by oral tradition. This makes for the same combination, whether the nominative or genitive were used. The phrase-meaning would naturally remain unchanged, while the variation in the last word would simply determine the relation of the phrase to *εἰρήνη*. The difference in meaning would pass for nothing in repetition from memory. The thought in both cases would be "peace on earth, good pleasure in men," the second phrase being in the one case an explanatory appositive, and in the other an explanatory genitive suggesting the origin of the peace.

This unstudied oral transmission, which leads us back of the scribe bending laboriously, or, as the case may be, carelessly, over his parchment, may be assumed from the very early difference between Luke and the Psalter. Indeed we do not know that Luke was the first to pen the angel-song in Greek. When therefore we find in the Codex Alexandrinus *εὐδοκίας* in Luke, and *εὐδοκία* in the Psalter, both from the hand of the same scribe, we may well suppose that both words came down independently from the time of those traditions spoken of by Luke in his Preface. It does not take many generations of manuscripts to reach from the fifth century to the first.

(d) If the order of words is an objection to combining *εὐδοκία* (nom.) with *ἐν ἀνθρώποις* — though we cannot but think it of small account — the objection is removed by the use of *εὐδοκίας* (gen.); for if *εὐδοκίας*, as modified by *ἐν ἀνθρώποις*, is combined with *εἰρήνη*, it would be a natural order even in prose to put *ἐν ἀνθρώποις* between the two. Without doubt, we should in prose look for the article after *εἰρήνη* — *ἡ τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας* — but this burst of song is not prose. No article is found in it, although the generosity of Greek might have given us six or seven in prose. Compare Luke xix. 38, *ἐν οὐρανῷ εἰρήνη καὶ δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις*, where we might have had four articles.

The argument from a comparison of the Gospel with the Psalter is this: in the Psalter the meaning "good pleasure in men" is the only one admissible. The substantial identity of the two versions demands the same meaning in Luke; and this is somewhat confirmed by Luke's order of words.

Our general conclusion, then, is that the meaning of the second clause in Luke ii. 14 is "On earth peace — the peace of good pleasure in men," reconciliation with men, good-will towards men. It is a pleasant result of our discussion to find that what we still sing in the Gloria in Excelsis and what we read in the Greek of Luke are so closely alike. The peace on earth is "the peace of God," and the song of the heavenly host is constantly echoed in the gospel benedictions — "Grace, Mercy, and Peace."

L. S. Potwin.

ADELBERT COLLEGE, CLEVELAND, O.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

I.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.

PART II. THE TREATMENT OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL CLASSES.

THE order of the advance of society in the treatment of crime and the criminal classes is indicated in the topics which follow in alternate numbers. *See February number.*

TOPIC 2. THE DEFINITION OF CRIME.

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 Upham's Salem Witchcraft.

NOTES.

Attention has already been called to the value of the advance which society has made in the treatment of crime and the criminal through the improvement in the means of justice. Next to this advance may be placed that which has come through a proper discrimination in regard to crimes, such a discrimination as seeks to satisfy the claims of justice and to gain the full support of morality. Much of this advance has been due to the better judges. A great decision may be more lasting in its effects upon society than a great battle. A judicial decision fixes a point from which society is not apt to retrograde.

There are three principles or axioms which concern us in tracing the definition of crime.

First. Law and Morals are not coincident and can never be made to be. Law does not cover the same area with morality, nor does it reach the same depths. Hence the need of limitation in determining the true field or province of law.

Second. Law is strongest and most operative at those points where the moral sense of the community is most sensitive and alert. Hence the dependence of law upon the growth of public sentiment.

Third. When law passes beyond the sphere of common morality, and creates a morality of its own, the danger of injustice and tyranny is greatly increased. Witness the history of religious and political persecutions.

1. *The principle that law is not and cannot be made to be coexten-*

sive with morals. "Crime is conduct, either in commission or omission, of which the state disapproves and for which it demands a penalty." Contrast this legal definition of crime with the religious or ethical conception of sin. Crime is restricted to conduct offensive to the state, and is determined by the development of the civic conscience: sin involves all conduct offensive to God, and is determined by the moral training of the individual conscience. Crime is the overt act or neglect, because that is all the state can take cognizance of: sin may be in the intention or motive, because God can reach that as well as the act. Crime is reached by proof: sin by confession. Crime is punished: sin may be forgiven. Pardon, if it is extended by the state, is for some other reason than that which calls out forgiveness. Repentance will not satisfy the state, and the element of vicariousness does not enter into the relation of government to the criminal.

With these distinctions in mind it will be seen that law must be restricted to its proper field. It is better on the whole that law should fail in some cases for want of power to go below the act, than that it should attempt to usurp the place of religion. Law may be pushed too far (1) when it tries to locate crime in the intention or motive without a corresponding result in action. Account must be taken of motive in determining the meaning and degree of the crime, but that is very different from making crime consist in the unexpressed or even in the unsuccessful purpose. Speculative crimes are not legal crimes, unless conspiracies are reckoned as such, or the assumed disposition of habitual criminals. And (2) when the effort is made to gain evidence by other than legal methods, as when confession is extorted when proof cannot be found. This would justify the inquisition with its system of torture to secure evidence incriminating the prisoner. And methods of deception, like the "sweating box," are hardly more justifiable.

2. *The principle that law is strongest and most operative at those points where the moral sense is most vital and active.* The gain to law through the growth of the public moral sense has been chiefly at three points.

(1.) Through giving a moral quality to acts which had been recognized altogether in their physical relations. It is in this manner that the great laws pertaining to persons and property have arisen. Under early tribal conditions property is of little value, and life, if possible, of less. The feebler tribe is the prey of the stronger, as is still the case in Africa. Robbery, seizure, and murder, are the attendants of war. They are war. As society outgrew the tribal condition the physical continued for a long time to overpower the moral. Throughout the Middle Age the idea remained active under changed forms. Chivalry was the romance of force. Comparing England of the fourteenth century with England of the nineteenth century, private murders were in the proportion of eighteen to one. If the same ratio of murder obtained in England to-day which obtained in 1348 we should have 4,400 murders a year. Robbery was also organized pillage. The fairs held from time to time were raided for plunder, and London was subject to continual attacks of plundering parties, some of which were made up of regular citizens. Law could not guard the rights of persons or property till the moral sense had advanced beyond the false conception of mere physical power.

(2.) Through the development of the idea of personality. The slave

had no rights because he had no personality. He could not steal property; he was property. Woman lost her personal rights in the fortunes of war. The child was unrecognized in its individuality. The growth of the moral idea of personality freed the slave, elevated and established the place of woman, and secured to the child the natural rights of education and moral development.

(3.) Through the growing conception of the public good. This is a late conception. The more complicated society became, the greater the number of laws required to regulate the individual in his social relations. The higher requirements of business integrity and honor made necessary new laws to prevent embezzlement and forgery. The growth of the power of the press required a stringent law of libel. The refinement of the social habits of the people demanded the regulation of public amusements. Gradually the public good gave rise to laws which to-day modify the conditions of private conduct.

3. *The principle that when law passes beyond the sphere of common morality and creates a morality of its own, the danger of injustice and tyranny is greatly increased.* The state has its own life to protect. Even when the state is not altogether good it must defend itself against treason. Rebellion, though it may mean reform, must always take its chance. But the state must be on its guard against incitements to rebellion and treason. It may be guilty of political persecution. Laws may be passed, as under Henry VIII., dealing altogether with constructive treason. And examples are not wanting, as in the administration of law in Ireland, showing the dangerous margin along which the state may work in governing dissatisfied peoples. Of course the arbitrariness of Russia in dealing with political prisoners belongs to despotism, and is not worthy of consideration under the study of constitutional law.

The most serious illustration of the principle appears whenever the state has undertaken to do the work of the church. This attempt has always been fruitful in religious persecution. There are, however, some facts of a modifying character to be kept in mind in any study of religious persecution. It must be remembered that what appears to be a struggle between belief and unbelief, or orthodoxy and heresy, may be in reality only a struggle between nations for existence. Political conspiracies are often carried on within a state under the guise of religious rights. The religious persecutions of England were intimately connected with the foreign relations of the nation, especially with France and Spain. Or, persecution with an apparent religious animus may be associated with business affairs, as in some instances in the persecution of the Jews. Or, persecution may be the result of a superstition which for the time possesses a community, and makes its action exceptional, as in the treatment of witchcraft in New England. See "Diary of Judge Sewall."

But when due allowance has been made for such facts, there is an immense remainder of religious persecution to be explained on no other ground than that of the unwarranted interference of the state, in the interest of the church, with the rights of private opinion and belief. The history of non-conformity and of Catholic disability in England are recent illustrations. In New England the chief illustration, apart from the history of the Quakers, is to be found in the enforcement of Sunday laws. Under the separation of church and state, laws which are restrictive are based not on the demands of the church but on the requirements

of the public good. The presumption is that they will not be unjust, or if they are found to be in their practical working that they will be allowed to fall into decline, or will be repealed.

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ANDOVER.

II.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

SOME suggestions are made here on a proposed classification of social institutions and facts as they appear in our own country and times from a sociological point of view. Some classification is needed, and a new one seems to be demanded at the present time, for several reasons which may be briefly noted at the outset.

Social problems are pressing upon us from every direction, and there is a rapidly growing purpose to grapple with them in every helpful way. That they are social problems is evidence of the truth that they are intricate in their relations. That they are the incidents of an intensely vital condition of things points to the probability that this condition, or social order as we call it, has a more or less definite structure capable of analysis and an orderly interpretation if we only know how to get at the task before us. And an approach to the subject by aid of a scientific classification of its material would apparently be relatively as useful practically in this as in any other field of human investigation. For when one can bring system, with its analysis and classification, to his material, he has greatly increased his ability to handle it. This is true even though, as in sociology, it lie in a field where only the loosest lines can be drawn.

There is no doubt that sociology is a growing science, both in itself and in its claims upon the attention of thoughtful people. And it is easy to see that the earnest attempts which many are making to solve social problems in a practical way will be more successful when made with that scientific knowledge of them and orderly approach to them which the true sociologist seeks, and which distinguishes him from the one who has only practical experience for his guide in such matters. For it should be clearly recognized that a practical study or even a practical solution of social problems does not make a sociologist of a man. The same distinction holds here as in the other sciences and arts. A man may solve many a practical problem in quarrying granite or the old red sandstone, and be utterly ignorant of geology as a science. So the solution of a social problem does not necessarily carry with it the solution of any sociological problem at all. Not every man who works in a garden is a botanist. So there are many who are earnestly at work on social problems without sociological knowledge or training. Their methods are often unconsciously scientific, but, on the other hand, they are sometimes in more or less direct violation of scientific principles. People often confound social problems with the problems of sociology, and so never come to have an intelligent knowledge of their own field from its true point of view. We greatly need to have the principles, methods, and present conclusions of sociology outlined and put into shape for general use. There is no good text-book on the subject suitable for the class-room, or as a hand-book in the study. One or two books approaching this class treat of the philosophy of society rather than of its science.

It is proposed here to offer suggestions regarding some fundamental

distinctions and methods of the classification of social institutions, giving the merest outline of a system in two of its leading directions. For no one but an experienced sociologist can hope to do what needs to be done in the development of a full system. Even this little attempt would not have been made had any one else entered the field, and had not friends urged the present effort. Such as it is, it is the outgrowth of personal necessities in the study and class-room.

There is an old system of classification of social institutions into family, church, and state that gained wide currency before sociology was thought of as a science, and which is now in very general use. The Germans and some in this country have added to these three a fourth class, which they call civil society, thereby designating economic life and institutions. The former system probably had a theoretical origin, and is used now in discussions that are philosophical rather than scientific. The latter classification is more scientific and so far better. But I have found that neither of these is easily worked in the class-room, or meets the requirements of the study. It has been difficult for one thing to place the family. It is commonly held to be the unit of society. But some have objected to this statement with apparent force. And then it seems unscientific to make "the unit of society" stand at the same time for a cardinal *class* of the social institutions. Moreover, the school in our American social system is not easily divided up between the church and the state, even though we do not put it with the family, unless we forsake the inductive method, and are governed by the historical and philosophical explanation of its origin and development.

Suggestions are, therefore, made in these notes of the outlines of another system, which it is thought is more scientific and of much greater practical use to the student of sociology or of social problems. Its presentation at this time has two objects in view. One is to invite scientific attention to it, that it may be amended and developed if substantially correct, or else be rejected wholly, and a better system put in its place. For there is urgent need of something in this direction. The other object is to give the general student of social problems a clue to their better comprehension. A crude system, like the earlier classifications in Botany and Zoölogy, may prove useful in practical work, and indirectly, at least, advance the science. Even where any exact classification is difficult, as in Zoölogy, it is often extremely useful to follow some general lines.

Such a system should be inductive. It should, certainly in the earlier stages of sociological study, be drawn from the observation of familiar material. It should be scientific in origin, rather than philosophical or ethical. It should also be as simple in method as possible. And yet in attaining these ends it should not be false to the facts of universal society. Mr. Herbert Spencer seems to me to afford little aid through his classifications to the student of modern social life as we see it, because his material so largely lies outside our own. We gain, I think, by limiting early work to a section of the modern field. For these reasons, I have refused to begin with the earliest social conditions as these are determined historically and comparatively, and then advance from them down through their successive developments to the present. The present has supplied our material. A single way of approach has also been selected. This is the one that takes us along the line of institutions in their corporate social forms. For it is these that make the framework of society, and it is a knowledge of social structure that lies at the basis of an understanding of social life and movement.

The resort for our material of study to the familiar facts of our own American social life as they lie about us, and especially to them in their simple conditions, follows the well-known method in Botany. It has a similar justification also. For he who has a good scientific knowledge of the social structure of a simple country village and its sociological history has a large amount of sociological power, and can easily take up the city, and go on to still more complex life. He has learned to observe, to analyze, to classify, and to interpret familiar things. He has acquired power and method, and cannot help applying them to whatever else comes in his way.

As was suggested some years ago,¹ the social phenomena of a country village present the most convenient and the best material for the beginning of sociological study. The same is true regarding the classification of our social institutions. And by social institutions are meant those tangible forms of social life into which the habitual activity of a community has been drawn. These need not be named here in full detail. They include, of course, the churches, schools, houses, and other buildings connected with them, farms, mills, stores, shops, roads, post office, town hall, and similar objects. Now it is suggested that this material will, if classified inductively, take a twofold direction. The first will be a classification by the *kind* of institution as shown in the chief characteristic of its nature. It will be dominantly either religious, educational, economic (or industrial), or political. Institutions in each class will, however, have more or less of the characteristic quality of each of the others. The church has its educational, economic, and political, as well as its religious, features. But these are all subordinate or incidental. The same thing, the reader will immediately recollect, occurs in classification in the science of physiology. The nervous system is not isolated entirely from that of the circulation of the blood, nor the digestion from either or from the muscular system. But some one function predominates in each class. Here four classes appear, as is the case in the method I have called the German. But the family is dropped, and educational institutions come in as a distinct class. The descriptive term is put in the adjective form instead of the nominal, as being more appropriate to the idea involved. If the philosophical or ethical point of view were the one taken, the educational class might not appear. But our approach is meant to be inductive, and our educational institutions seem to be clearly differentiated facts. Sub-classes, and perhaps something like the orders in botanical classification, will probably appear in any extended work, especially as it is carried into more complex social life. But it is not to the present purpose to pursue the subject in this direction.

The family, as just intimated, does not appear here as a distinct class. Probably it has given the student who has actually attempted to assign it to a place among the classes of social institutions a good deal of trouble, just as it has in the contention over what constitutes "the unit of society." On the principle by which our classification is made, it seems impossible to put it into either one of the four classes. It does not clearly belong by some one dominant quality to either class. It seems at first to belong by itself, and the temptation comes to make a separate class of it. But it is not so much a *class* like the others, and separate in kind from them, as it is an institution of itself profoundly and peculiarly related to them all. It seems to be social life in the most concrete and universal

¹ See Sociological Notes in *Andover Review* for March, 1886.

form we know. Let us, then, for a time let it alone. And now if we look farther, we shall see that the institutional life of society has other peculiarities than those of kind by which we have put it into classes. For religious institutions take different shapes or forms. Educational work, for another example, is not all done in schools, and we may detect similar varieties in organization in the other classes. Where, then, is to be found a relief from this dilemma? And how shall our classification be made to include all the facts?

The answer, in part certainly, is that a classification by sociological form needs to be made. Now the ultimate and constituent social cell is clearly the human individual. It is the ultimate and indivisible thing of which sociology takes cognizance. But it rarely is found outside an assemblage which we call the family, and almost never during the entire period of its existence, except in sporadic instances. It is, then, clear that the family is the primary social form in which this cell is found. The family is as universal as tissue in the ranks of biology below sociology, which is the higher department of biological science. The family appears as the primary form in each of the four classes, and it might be hard to say in which it is the more important. Indeed, it is not a question of relative importance at all, but of fact and of necessity to vitality. *The family is the primary social form in the religious, educational, industrial, or political life of society.* This is its true place. It is not a class, but a social form. It is the primary, germinal form of society.

Next in the order of forms is the communal. This is made up of those who assemble as individuals coming together from the families of a people in a given place for a common purpose, or it is found in those institutions which represent and serve the ends of such communal life. The congregation, local church, Sunday-school, Christian guilds, and similar associations in their simplest forms are examples of this secondary sociological form in the first cardinal class of social institutions. The local school, especially the primary school and kindergarten, the shop, the factory, and the town or town meeting, belong to this form in the other classes. The student will find here peculiarities of form and divergences of type more marked by far than in the family, and he will see that they are especially modified to fit the class of institutions in which a given form appears. But I think the general type is unmistakable to the careful observer.

Then we come to those larger sociological forms which are the result of a more or less distinctly apparent use of the principle of representation, that principle whose successful introduction into political organization by the Teutonic races, Mr. John Fiske has said, did more than almost anything else towards giving them their wonderful triumphs in political organization. Its introduction begins the differentiation of the city from the town, and marks the sociological place of our American States. Its corresponding development in ecclesiastical bodies gave rise to the council, synod, conference, diocese. Its essentials may be traced in the higher schools and colleges, and its features may be discerned in economics in the local banks or like institutions for exchange.

Carrying this classification by form still higher, we finally come to the largest types of form in the religious denomination, the Christian Church of the world, as well as to the other efforts at universal religion. The nation and international relations or alliances of the nations may be reached in politics; the clearing house and foreign exchange in economics; and the university and literature in education.

But enough, perhaps, has been written here to show the leading points in the outline, and to indicate the twofold direction which I would suggest that sociological classification should take. Probably, as a friend has already suggested as true regarding botany, those familiar with the principles and lines of classification in the other sciences will find that this method has some interesting analogies. Striking differences may also be expected, since social life is widely separated in its very elements from the material given us in the lower biological sciences.

It appears important to make use both of classification in the ordinary use of the principle by which system is defined, and also of morphology or the science of form, a method which fills an important place in the other sciences. The relief we get by the introduction of social morphology in our efforts to find a fitting place for the family is a pretty good proof of the necessity of taking this direction in sociological classification. It gives us on the scientific side, the family as the primary social form, which Dr. Mulford, in his "Nation," approaching the subject as a student of political philosophy, called the "unitary form of society."¹

But other practical advantages are secured by this system in our study of social problems. Before taking up one or two illustrations of this, however, let us note a peculiarity of these problems arising from the nature of the social atoms or cells. These cells are always individual human beings capable of self-determination in a high degree, and always and everywhere acting in their individual integrity. The first of these facts, that we are dealing with free independent human beings, introduces into the material of sociological study the element of free choice, and thereby makes its task very different from that of the student in some of the lower biological sciences. But, after all, the isolation is less than the separate life of plants or animals. The second fact, that human action is always in individual integrity, so that the whole man always acts, and not simply his religious or other nature by itself, makes classification less definite than elsewhere. It also calls attention to the truth that we cannot divide man in our sociological study of him into anything like four "water-tight compartments," and treat him, now solely as a religious being and now as an exclusively economic force or as a mere citizen. He is everywhere and always a man acting in his wholeness. It is only as we find a dominant tendency of social action in one direction or another that we are justified in putting human activity into one or another of these classes. Each institutional class, therefore, exists by the aid of the others, and for their ends as well as its own. No sound study in either class can be made so long as the student ignores its relations to the other and related sociological classes and their sciences. For whoever forgets these inter-relations of all social activity leaves out of his working thought the elementary truth of the integrity of human activity through the individual.

This leads to some remarks on the determination of the moral quality we may assign to social institutions. With this subject we now have to do only on the sociological side. And for an example, let us take the mooted question of the secularization of the State and school. The dread which many have of the separation of the school from all distinctively religious instruction rests upon an assumption which will meet a

¹ His statement is "The family is the natural and the normal condition of human existence. It is not the unit of society, that is, the ultimate and integral element, but it is the unitary form of society." *Nation*, p. 276.

challenge from sociology at the very outset. For this science will question the existence in social fact of any such separation between the religious and the secular — that it is possible to secularize any of the institutions of a religious people. The activity of a people in their religious institutions, especially if these are Christian, is the unfailing guaranty against secularization anywhere else. We classify institutions as religious because this function is specialized in them, and not because there is no religious life and action elsewhere.¹ A nation of Christian people is a nation of Christians acting as such in every direction of their life. Blood builds tissue everywhere, whether in brain or muscle or bone, and where blood goes there is life. So it is with the religion of a people. It must from the very necessity of its nature go into everything into which their own activity takes them. The division between the religious and secular life does not seem to have any support from sociology. This science does not appear to concede either the necessity or the possibility of the secularization which some advocate and others dread. It denies that the differentiation of function by which the school is restricted in its field is necessarily a secular movement. For it may only indicate, as increased differentiation of function generally does, a higher type of life. If properly embodied in institutions elsewhere, if it vitalizes social life, and so lives in those who act through the school, the formulated expression of religious life in the exercises of the school-room itself is of little consequence. It is simply a social impossibility to secularize the American schools or the American States until we have first got religion out of the American churches and life. As sometimes the unceasing consciousness of a nerve is a sign of disease, so it may be with the presence of a conscious formulated religion. Its very presence may be a token of weakness in the State or the public school. It is a singular confirmation of this position that defective religious or moral life elsewhere is so often urged as a reason for resort to the school-room to increase its power. The division into religious and secular may well be maintained by the Roman Catholic Church. It seems vital to its theory of Church and State. But it hardly fits social facts. It is unnecessary to the American relation of Church and State, which, after all, is only a highly perfected differentiation in the functions of one common social whole. To make the distinction between religious and secular seems needless and contrary to scientific notions of society. It practically leads to an ecclesiasticism among Protestants which is hardly less objectionable than that which they dread. We do not need to take the so-called secular theory of the State and school in order to escape the difficulties of the situation. We can point to the inseparable union between religion and life, and between education and life. Differentiation of function does not, we can say, change the common nature of humanity.

Space remains for only one or two illustrations of the practical value of sociological classification by form. The history of social development is very intimately connected with that of sociological classes and forms in their relations to the individual and to each other. In a primitive social order the great classes are but indistinctly separated, and the chief, if not the only social forms, are the two primary ones of the family and the community with more or less lack of distinct outline between the two, while the individual is almost lost in the common group. The advance to

¹ The term religious, as applied to a class, is for this reason unfortunate, but no good substitute is at hand, and I have, therefore, retained it.

the highly organized modern social order is an advance by which both class and form are separated, developed in themselves and into the broader types. The present outcome is the result of the slow differentiation of the institutions of politics, education, and economics from those of religion, and the attendant expansion of social life from the two simple forms of domestic and communal life into larger and larger forms by what I have called rather loosely representation, until society is well-nigh cosmopolitan and the individual has grown into a large personality. These classes and these forms make good working points for the study of social history. To tell how the country village of to-day is related to its antetype in the household community of the past, to trace the ancestry of a New England farm and its structure, or to show how the Trust has grown from the earliest germs of corporate property, is to study the graphic outlines of social history. It is to survey the elements of a sociological study of our modern social problems.

The Nationalism of the hour affords another study in class and form. Certain people find that there is a confession on all sides that the last word has not yet been spoken concerning the ultimate industrial order. Recent great changes and the conscious need of others lead to the search for the next steps before us. The Nationalists come forward with their remedy. This is claimed to be scientific, but more on the ground that the work must be gradual than for any other reason. The remedy proposed is that as quickly as practicable many of the social functions now performed by the other of the three classes of institutions, and more especially the work of the economic class of institutions, shall be put upon the fourth, and that chiefly upon its highest form, whence comes the term Nationalism. This at least seems to be substantially a fair statement of Nationalism when put into sociological terms. Now by thus putting it we have got the subject into sociological position. It can be examined scientifically. If the Nationalists can convince us that their chosen course properly calls into greater activity the one social organ in the one class, and that this alone can bring the needed relief and secure the future development of society, we shall all become Nationalists ourselves. We cannot help it. But they must first prove that their tacit assumptions concerning the burdens now resting elsewhere are well grounded. They must show the needlessness of the vigorous development of other sociological classes and forms, and the ability of their own favorite social organ, the State, to perform the desired task. The presumptions from past experience, from the social trend, and from the law that requires the utmost regard for the principle of proportionate activity among all the organs of a body in successful therapeutics, at present lie heavily against their panacea. The historical and comparative method certainly challenges their main proposition. The difficulties which confront the Nationalist when he meets political economy and the science of politics will not grow less when he turns to sociology and finds that he is proposing to ignore its principles of class and form and recast the social structure which has been the growth of centuries by throwing the whole into one of its leading moulds. He is simply preparing a revolution in the very structure and theory of society instead of changing the direction of a single stream. He virtually denies fundamental principles of life and class and form, and superficially concludes that these latter are the results of arbitrary human action, which can be changed in an arbitrary manner.

The department of the organization of the Christian Church would be

another excellent field for the illustration of the usefulness of these methods of sociological classification. So, too, would that of economic institutions. The historical and comparative study of the growth and peculiarities of class and form as between the various classes, observing the high degree of movement in one and the tardy advance in the other, the relation of each to geographical bounds, are suggested as interesting and useful. But enough has been said, I trust, to incite the scientific mind to further study and to special contributions, and also to show those who are doing practical work on social problems that these may become both more interesting and more manageable when approached with better instruments of classification.

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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

STUDIES IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By J. MACBRIDE STERRETT, D.D., Professor of Ethics and Apologetics in the Seabury Divinity School, New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1890.

There is a prevailing impression that Hegel is synonymous with the "mystical," that is, misty, and that his very touch upon a commentator leaves confusion of thought and speech behind it. Dr. Sterrett has not so suffered. A more vigorous and straightforward piece of writing as well as of thinking it has not often been my fortune to meet with. The book before us is fairly buoyant in its vigor; fairly aggressive in its straightforwardness. The purpose of the book is, as Dr. Sterrett frankly informs us, in his preface, apologetic. But he has a worthy conception of Apologetics. To show forth religion as a necessary and genuine factor in the conscious life of man, to show forth Christianity as the fruition of religion — this is what Dr. Sterrett understands by Apologetics. Early in the book he tells us that his "own interest in the study began and continues as a purely theological one — the intellectual search for God as the self-conscious Reason of all that really is." (P. 14.) More particularly Dr. Sterrett considers Hegel's Philosophy of Religion in the assistance which it may give in the *present* needs of Apologetics — in the attempt to conceive God and religion under the conditions imposed by the changed state of modern science and culture. This is not, Dr. Sterrett remarks, the highest vindication that thought can make of religion; the highest is to show the authority of the absolute *idea* of Religion. Both in this higher work and in the translating of the ever-valid religious ideas out of outworn and inadequate forms and language into more adequate and convincing modern forms theology has much to learn from Hegel. This is the spirit in which Dr. Sterrett has undertaken his task.

His basis is, therefore, a broad one. It is nothing more nor less than that a Philosophy of Religion is the only final Apologetics for Christianity. "Either this Philosophy of Religion must be attained, or we must rest on the external evidences of miracle and councils. The only other alternative is to refuse to examine, to ask for no evidences, to keep the simple faith of childhood in mature years by arbitrary repression of thought." (P. 96.) "The Bible, Reason, and the Church, one after another, are made the standing ground of Apologetics, and yet not one of

them is infallible. Each one needs a larger apologetic to vindicate its authority. They are all relatively sufficient grounds when *themselves* grounded upon the authority of the absolute idea of Religion." (P. 97.) I emphasize this conception of the Philosophy of Religion as the basis of any Apologetics, because it seems to me the key-note of Dr. Sterrett's whole book. Discussion of this position is out of the question within the limits of my space, but I find myself in heartiest sympathy with it. A few words regarding the method of the book may be useful. The first two chapters are a running sketch, wholly informal and yet as accurate as their purpose requires, of Hegelianism and of the development of the philosophic treatment of religions. The third, fourth, seventh, and eighth chapters follow Hegel in the main, giving expositions of his Introduction, of his chapters on the "Vital Idea of Religion," the "Classification of the Pre-Christian Religions," and "Christianity as the Absolute Religion." Chapters five and six do not claim any direct relation to Hegel, but are expositions from an independent, yet sympathetic, standpoint of the matters treated in the other chapters. As Dr. Sterrett, even when expounding Hegel, keeps in view not students desirous of making themselves specialists in the Hegelian technique, but those interested in the broader movement of the Hegelian ideas, it should be evident that he has produced a work of great value to all interested in the fundamental questions of modern theology. I cannot but think it a happy omen in the present juncture of our theology, when the attempt to find God immanent in the world and in history is becoming so manifest, that Dr. Sterrett should give us a book whose whole trend is so forcibly and consciously in that direction.

I cannot close without briefly calling attention to three further features of the book — and first, the notable appendix upon Church Union. For one, I am thoroughly convinced that when the happy day of church union comes, it will come not upon the lines laid down by Dr. Sterrett, for he refuses to lay down hard lines, but in the spirit which breathes through all his words. Another is the spirit of honesty, of fairness, of love for straightforward intellectual dealing which animates what Dr. Sterrett writes. It is sometimes reported that our Theological Seminaries are not favorable to intellectual light and honesty. There will hardly be a question about the Seminary from which issues this book and the one of Dr. Kedney's recently noticed in this "Review." The third feature is that rare thing in philosophical writing — the happy and really illustrative use of the dangerous metaphor. I had a number of passages marked for quotation, but one or two must suffice. Speaking of agnosticism and mysticism, Dr. Sterrett says: "The one utterly saps the vitality of thought, the other only floods it with more sap than it has channels prepared to receive." And speaking of the way in which spirit finds itself in that which seems at first to limit it, he says: "Thus it was that old Rome realized herself. Her god *Terminus* was elastic enough to include and transform all *hostes* into *cives sui*, and she became the imperial mistress of the world."

John Dewey.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

This work has the great merit of being readable. It is un-German, clear and concise, even brilliant. This does not mean imply superficial thinking, though Paulsen's treatment of the subject is not as profound as Wundt's. If Paulsen is much it is perhaps owing to his empirical standpoint, though I doubt whether he could be dull even in psychology or metaphysics.

The work is divided into divisions which we may name Speculative, Descriptive, and Applied Ethics. The opening of the Introduction is significant. In it he accepts the word in its historical sense of a "science of customs." It is thus empirical, resting upon historical sociology. Like any science it gets its laws from observed facts. Moreover it is eminently practical, for it looks toward the future, having to do with "the human life," as far as perfection is possible under the given conditions. As the science of healthful conduct it is to be compared with medicine. From this follows the relativity of moral laws. For as not a uniformity of medical practice under different conditions of human welfare are different in different societies. There is no perfect society, and the limitations of a fault lie upon all its ideas of right, as well as upon the philosopher's these ideas.

Paulsen introduces the historical portion of his work with an interesting observation that Grecian ethics is naïve naturalism of virtues, looking toward perfection of life; Christian ethics is naturalism or a doctrine of God and sin, looking away from the human life, while profoundly Christian in spirit, has yet the classic question, "What is that highest good which conduces to human welfare?" Considering that Paulsen himself answers the question exactly as Aristotle did — indeed is strikingly Aristotelian — his historical account of Aristotle seems very inadequate. He is accused of offering no final test of conduct; but as his test is in Paulsen's own, the criticism is ungracious. Aristotle certainly declares, *eudaimonia*, welfare as the ultimate good (Nic. Eth.), which is sufficiently explained by his doctrine of means and the end of life. Paulsen's exposition of Christian ethics is the most interesting portion of his work, but at the same time the most paradoxical. If the New Testament ethics appear to differ in some respects from Greek ethics, it is because the emphasis was necessarily different owing to historical and local causes, and not because the ideas of the Greek ethics are opposed to Christianity when interpreted. This brilliant chapter will be of service if it helps to the appreciation of the fact that the church has over-emphasized virtues to the neglect of others; for example, altruism as against regard for self-interest, suppression of natural instincts as against healthful exercise, correctness of belief as against beauty. But it should never be forgotten that the so-called New Testament virtues are the opposites of vices to which human nature is peculiarly prone.

Turning to the constructive portion of the work, the author takes the utilitarian position, and defines a good act as "one which tends to further the welfare of the doer and the community."

will is defined in corresponding subjective terms. Paulsen here puts the welfare of the doer before that of the community. Elsewhere he says that the community will enforce an opposite view in the rare (?) cases where there arises any conflict. Indeed, the task of morality is to bring the individual into harmony with the community, moral laws being the expression of the condition of social life. His attempt to show that there is no real conflict between egoism and altruism satisfies the intellect as a speculation, but scarcely appeals to common sense as a rule that is practiced. The assumption that the real transcendent interests of the individual and society coincide is a true one, but what we want is a criterion when the apparent interests clash. This he does not give us except as force, that is, the will of the majority. He discards Hedonism or pleasure as the "*summum bonum*," holding that pleasure follows gratification of impulse, but does not precede it as a conscious cause. But if pleasure or pain are not impulses or motives, our impulses are entirely divorced from feeling, a position not sanctioned by psychologists. We must either admit an antecedent belief in pleasurable results or a simultaneous feeling of pleasure, itself a motive. Furthermore, if one discards the intuitive, that is, purely intellectual test of right and wrong, there remains but one other ultimate psychological test, that is, feeling. Naturally, then, we ask what Paulsen means by "normal" in defining the "*summum bonum*" as the "normal or healthy exercise of all the functions of life, such exercise being at once means and end." Evidently he means nothing more than Aristotle does by his doctrine of means, such a mean between too much and too little being the specific virtue.

Accordingly a true life consists in the exercise of all the virtues, especially of the highest measured according to their comprehensiveness, the more personal virtues being lower than the social virtues. Of the virtues one can give no *a priori* definition. They express relations which society has discovered to be conducive to its life, and therefore to the life and well-being of the individual whose life is only possible in society. Life is then the supreme good, first the life of the community, then that of the individual. Naturally Paulsen is very far from Pessimism. But he has discarded Hedonism, and we are inclined to ask, In what sense is life the supreme good unless it brings a surplus of pleasure? How does he escape Hedonism?

To illustrate the sense of obligation in conscience, he compares the morals of a country to animal instincts which, coming into every life with accumulated authority, have there become conscious. Here objectified they appear to command, as imperative as instincts, and yet conscious. Not remembering when we learned these rules, we regard them as intuitive, when they are really the product of evolution. Upon the will he is, like Wundt, a psychological determinist. An act is self-determined in the sense that it is an expression of character. Character itself is a resultant of forces. Practically responsibility is as real as though the individual were the cause of himself, even if, logically, responsibility ceases. Evil is, however, only apparent, being a condition to the development of goodness, which is the constant purpose of Reality, or God. All laws are thus self-determinations of his being and merely progressively discovered by man. Religion is the idealization of morality, and all but essential to it. Paulsen discards supernaturalism. After a purely empirical examination and rejection of the doctrine of the future life it is like giving stones for bread to plunge into metaphysics and say "past

time is not, future time not yet, and the present a movable point, therefore all existence is out of time, accordingly eternal." In the connection one does not know whether to take this seriously or not.

The second and much the larger volume is concerned with *Descriptive and Applied Ethics*. Here the author is thoroughly at home, and there is no ethical work in English that will compare with this second volume in interest. It is thoroughly fresh and modern, a little inclined to run into Political Economy at the end, but always interesting. He attacks vigorously modern over-culture, defining the modern idea of the cultured man as one "who can join in a conversation upon any topic, whether it be Plato, Kant, Raphael, or Goethe, and can make large use of foreign words," but "cannot earn his bread just because of his culture." The growing classification of people as cultivated and uncultivated excites his wrath, though to most minds it is better than the old division into noble and common or rich and poor. Doubtless our industrial civilization must modify education somewhat in its own interest, but it must also adjust itself to an educated people; there can be no retreat here. In one point Paulsen is thoroughly German. It is well known that Germany is the most backward of civilized countries in the education of woman. And notwithstanding an element of truth in his criticism of the new movement as tending to make woman less womanly, he must be classed among the rear-guard of his countrymen. "Woman's calling is the care of the home and rearing of children." "Science and art are reserved for men." "The book-girl is sadly overestimated (!)" etc. To be sure he grants that women may be teachers and physicians, but in vain. Naturally the utilitarian principle leads to some indefiniteness in this part of the work. For example, he leaves us in the dark as to when dueling and divorce are to be sanctioned, or even suicide — points upon which a more stringent utilitarian would throw much light. Upon the question of socialism he seems to share the common German idea that government is designed chiefly for manufacturing operatives, forgetting that these constitute but a fragment of the community. Yet his views upon Political Economy and Political Science are remarkably fair, all in all; nor can we here insist too much upon his fundamental contention that, English and French to the contrary, in these fields the vital questions are not questions of rights, but of means to ends. And this is just the test that portions of the modern German Political Economy cannot survive. Paulsen's arguments for and against German State Socialism are full and candid. His remark that Bureaucracy, in politics, leads to a "curvature of the moral spine" is worth remembering. He attacks with great boldness and vigor Bismarck's anti-socialist law. "The forcible suppression of the socialistic agitation was not demanded by the exigencies of the government, nor has it been justified by its effects." This portion of the work gives the American reader an insight into many of the burning questions of German politics.

Indeed, however one may differ at points from the author, he lays the work aside under obligations for his large sympathy, practical knowledge, and, not least, his lucid style.

D. Collin Wells.

ANDOVER.

GOD IN HIS WORLD. An Interpretation. Pp. xli, 270. New York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS book is anonymous. If the author's name should be disclosed it would acquire some new honor. For his book is very unique—in parts, at least, the most original and quickening book of the kind, we think, since “*Ecce Homo*” appeared. As to design and plan it is very informal; as to method and language entirely untechnical. The chapters have sufficient connection, but little interdependence; any may be profitably read with little reference to the others. The author's abundant learning is kept to very subordinate service. He fully recognizes science and philosophy, but employs neither; in parts of his book he transcends both. The best characteristic of the book is spiritual insight.

He entitles it an Interpretation, and rightly: “Not an invention, a mental construction, a speculation, but a vision of living reality seen in the light of its own life.” His subject is Christian Realism, that is, “Divine Life, shown to us only in the Real—in Nature and in Man, and chiefly in Christ.” This is presented in its own light; the author is a seer; the sections of his book are a series of views, or direct apprehensions, taken under the effect of this life.

After an Introduction of forty pages, which opens the subject in a free and salient way, the author orders his views of God in His World under three titles: I. From the Beginning; II. The Incarnation; III. The Divine Human Fellowship. The first part is on the ways of God in nature, and in the ancient history of mankind. For all the realities of both are from the life of God and reveal his traits.

There is a gospel of nature, preparatory to Christ's completeness, feeding us with locusts and wild honey until He gives us, in his flesh and blood, the heavenly bread and wine. Even in Nature there is no life that is not of love. The wandering of man is the great world Epos. But the divine life is not excluded from this. The wandering children escape not the everbesetting love of the Father. Grace was from the beginning. There was always the kingdom of heaven. All humanity was included from the beginning, and in every age there has been a human response to the divine love. Even in the unregenerate there has been a development of a spiritual nature. In this part of the book the author sketches the development of faith among ancient nations, specially the Aryan and Hellenic faith. He thus enlarges our view of the vital connection of God with the whole spiritual history of mankind. We omit further reference to these sections, because the interest of the other parts of the book is so much greater.

In the second part we have views of Christ. Their essential content is doubtless the same as that of definitive orthodox theology. Yet these views are as different from formal doctrines about Christ as landscapes are from maps. Divine revelation must become human. The eternal Son of God must become the Son of Man, and must illustrate the human type. The ever-repeated Parables of Nature must be translated into Parables of human speech. The completeness of Christ's humanity is the clearest revelation man can receive, and the only one effective for his restoration. It is self-evidencing. It takes possession of us. We apprehend it as we feel the heat in sunlight. Here we affirm nothing on grounds of authority. It is a vital communication, and it is regenerative.

These views, like a succession of stereoptical pictures, are taken all

along the life of Christ in his relations to men. They make no claim to completeness. Others might be taken just as true and real, but such are rare. These evidently rectify somewhat the perspective of evangelical truths. To us they have a singular charm; it is the interest of reality; it is the freshness of life. As we thus see and feel how vitally the Son of God is united with mankind, with all human conditions and interests, we cannot repress large joys and hopes.

The third part of the book presents in the same way, under the title of the Divine Human Fellowship, the other revelation and operation of God, that is, by the Divine Spirit in and through a regenerate society. The ultimate Gospel is unfolded in Human Brotherhood. Here also historic realities are kept in the foreground, but the views extend but little beyond the first three centuries. After the ascension the development of the Christian life, left wholly to the children of the kingdom, is wholly the work of the spirit. The new society has no theory; the Apostles have no plan. The wonderful association grew out of the vital spirit in believing hearts. It had lapses, some even in apostolic times, the greatest when it gained worldly supremacy in the Roman Empire; but its lapses are within the scope of the divine plan. It altogether transcends all schemes of civilization. The Divine Spirit is working in a regenerate society for the regeneration of mankind.

We cannot outline these interesting chapters, nor even mention their salient points. The limits of a notice preclude any adequate representation of the contents of the book as a whole. Its table of contents, which is brilliant with attractive subtitles, serves that purpose better.

But in this connection we may observe very briefly: 1. The book is throughout a disclosure of the Divine Love. 2. According to the author, the functions of nature are higher than in our common conceptions. Accordingly, the line between nature and the supernatural must be re-located. 3. Our common concept of justice, derived from human relations, when attributed to God, is a great misrepresentation. 4. The author's final outlook for mankind is proportioned to the diverse data; the book encourages the larger hope.

It will profit all who, with souls open to spiritual light and air, crave eternal life. It will relieve some who are pestered with various religious difficulties; for in the light of such views many difficulties disappear altogether, or appear as very intelligible features in the divine designs. It will be like a day in early spring to some who realize the barrenness of formal concepts of Christianity. The author often leads his reader to favorable outlooks, some of them unfrequented. His pages are fertile in suggestion. They often glow with the natural beauty of sacred things. Many passages are like psalms in prose. The thought sometimes rises to worship, and takes on very suitably and gracefully the language of worship. We think that all who walk awhile with this Interpreter will be much refreshed with his views.

W. E. Merriman.

BOSTON.

CHRISTIAN THEISM. By the Rev. C. A. Row, M.A., Oxon, Pp. viii, 318. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1890.

This book is interesting because of its aim, which is to state the theistic argument in a popular way so that it may be comprehended by per-

sons of ordinary understanding, though without special philosophical training. The author has succeeded in making his work easy reading. The thought is clear and vigorous, and yet always within the limits of ready comprehension. The argument, especially in the criticism of anti-theistic theories, is strong and keen. Because the thought is clear so far as it goes, one is the more dissatisfied with its limitations. The author gives us to understand that he is not opposed to that view of the world which represents God as dwelling in it and energizing in and through it, but he has not woven this conception into the texture of his argument. He indicates (p. 10) that this would lead to needless complication and extension. We regard this as a mistake in judgment. It is connected with another mistake, which is, that he has limited his examination of anti-theistic theories to the more coarse and materialistic forms. To be sure, these are the forms, mostly, which pervade common thought, but our observation is that the finer, pantheistic thought has also, to some extent, filtered into the popular mind. We believe that very many of the class for whom this book is designed will, on reading it, feel that it does not reach them, that they do not hold to any such cold, barren, anti-religious theories as are here combated. Many such persons have been drawn away from the traditional conception of God into this pantheistic thought, because they found in it more richness, warmth, and imagination. They are to be won back only by presenting in Christian theism a still more rich, spiritual, and living conception of God. The idea of the immanence of God (the expression occurs but once in this book, and the word is there printed mistakenly "imminent," p. 83) is finding a place in popular preaching, because it supplies a felt need. A book on Christian theism which is not deeply penetrated by this higher idea of God cannot be satisfactory to the present generation.

The idea of the immanence of God would have helped in another respect. The argument of the book starts out by assuming the validity of the mind's primary intuitions (p. 6). In the chapter on causation the argument is based on the fact that the mind is so constituted that it must assume the existence of a First Cause. But the ordinary agnostic has been trained to object to all assumptions. An argument starting out from an assumption would be of no avail to him. This difficulty would have been largely avoided if the author had adopted the more recent method of stating the argument from causation, the method which turns upon a better interpretation of the intuition of cause. The first cause which is posited by this intuition means not the first cause in a series of causes, but the underlying cause or ground of the whole series. The argument from causation therefore arrives at the idea of God as Preserver and Sustainer rather than as Creator. It has been found best to leave out the discussion of creation from the theistic argument. It is a question for cosmology to settle. The agnostic is much less able to object to the assumption of the validity of the intuition of cause when it is interpreted in this way. There is much less of a remove between the intuition and its object when the intuition is seen to be an insight into the present working of God rather than an assumption that he performed a work of creation somewhere in the infinite past. We cannot see that this turn to the argument would have made it more complicated or difficult of apprehension for the popular mind, and it would have lessened the opportunity for an objection which even the neophyte in agnosticism will advance at once.

this depends on the author's exegesis. Hence he should be plainly told the quality of the latter.

Dr. Kendrick is inclined to attribute the Epistle to Apollos. He thinks that it was written before the destruction of Jerusalem. Its readers were not the members of the church in Jerusalem. Perhaps they were a section of the church in Rome, but to quote his own words, "the question is open."

Edward Y. Hincks.

THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS: The Greek Text with Notes and Essays. By BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT, D. D., D. C. L. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1889.

THIS handsome volume of 588 pages is the best commentary on Hebrews in English, and is even superior in some respects to the foremost of recent German works on the subject, by B. Weiss.

In an admirable introduction (lxxxiv. pages) Dr. Westcott treats the Text, Title, Position, Original Language, Destination, Date, Place of Writing, Style and Language, Plan, Characteristics, History, and Authorship of the Epistle, and also compares it with the so-called Epistle of Barnabas.

No one familiar with Dr. Westcott's work in that field will need to be told that under the first head, combined with the margin of the text, and the additional notes on readings (pp. 60, 110, 339, 384), we have a full account of the principal manuscripts and versions of the Epistle, so far as they affect the reading. The Title, he says, "forms no part of the original document; but it must have been given to the book at a very early date, when it first passed into public use as part of a collection of apostolic letters. And it was rightly given in regard to the permanent relation which the book occupies to the whole message of the Gospel." Under this head he gives an admirable proof that the book referred to in the "Claromontane Stichometry" cannot be the so-called Epistle of Barnabas, but is to be identified with Hebrews. To be fully appreciated, this ought to be contrasted with the very unfair statement of Lünemann.¹

Under "Position" we are shown how "the places occupied by the Epistle in different authorities indicate the variety of opinions which were entertained in early times as to its authorship." The original language of the Epistle was, of course, Greek, and its destination probably Jerusalem, a view which we are glad to see now gaining ground, as Weiss also holds it. Under "Characteristics" we find an all too scant outline of the teachings of Hebrews. We much wish that this, with the material scattered in many of the "additional notes," had been combined into an orderly exposition of the Theology of the Epistle. The materials already given are so full and so admirably presented, that this would only have been following Riehm, whom our author values most of recent commentators in the fuller delineation of the "Lehrbegriff." Dr. Westcott regards Hebrews as "a final development of the teaching of 'the three,' and not . . . a special application of the teaching of St. Paul." This seems to us undoubtedly the true view, and we are glad to see it advocated in England, where not only is the authorship by Apollos widely held, but even the Pauline authorship is not yet aban-

¹ By Professor Gardiner (*Journal of S. B. L. E.*, June, 1887, p. 22, n. 2) the case was put fairly, but not so conclusively.

doned. Accordingly Dr. Westcott rather favors the opinion that the Epistle is to be ascribed to Barnabas, though he hardly puts the case as strongly as we think the data warrant. But his keen analysis of the patristic testimony for the Pauline authorship shows, even better than Weiss has done, the real weakness of it.

Turning now to the commentary proper, we find it very full and judicious. Especially valuable are the frequent summaries of the reasoning, or analyses of the course of thought, though there are places where Dr. Westcott's love of a philosophical or logical completeness seems rather to impress the scheme upon the passage than to find it there, for instance, in the artificial grouping of xi. 33 f. on p. 377, in which he seems to have followed Hofmann. Everywhere great attention is paid to the separate words and their usage, to an extent unrivaled since Bleek's great commentary, and often adding to the materials there found. The author warmly recommends Thayer's New Testament Lexicon, but his own use of it should have prevented his neglect of current interpretations of xi. 19, v. 7.¹ Indeed, Dr. Westcott's note on the latter passage (p. 127) is, of course unintentionally, unfair. "The sense 'heard and set free from his fear' or 'from the object of his fear' is wholly untenable." Here are two different interpretations put aside with a single word, as if equally impossible. Of course the second, Calvin's, is untenable, because *εὐλάβεια* cannot mean "object of fear." But it is wholly misleading to link with this the other view, which is perfectly tenable on linguistic grounds, and adopted by many leading exegetes. Not only did this interpretation deserve to be carefully considered by Dr. Westcott, but the arguments in its favor (given best and most recently by Weiss) ought, if possible, to have been answered. It is to be deplored that Dr. Westcott shows no knowledge of some valuable recent commentaries. His preface names only Delitzsch, Riehm, and Lünemann, and even where he adopts a view specially sustained by some modern commentator (for example, vii. 27), he never mentions a name or acknowledges indebtedness. Probably he has not seen the footprints of his predecessor. While such ignorance favors originality, it cannot foster breadth or completeness. What can excuse Dr. Westcott from never having seen, so far as this book shows, Weiss's admirable commentary, whose preface antedates Dr. Westcott's own by eighteen months? Contrast with this the use, on every page of Weiss's Commentary on John's Epistles, of Dr. Westcott's previous work on the same. It follows, perhaps, from this difference, that Weiss's departures from the usual interpretation (for example, xiii. 10 ff., and his brilliant exegesis of iv. 1) seem better justified than those of Dr. Westcott (for example, iii. 9; iv. 12; viii. 3; x. 20; xi. 19, 27).

Two passages deserve notice in this connection. On ix. 16 f. our author says all that can be said in favor of retaining "Covenant," but we do not think he makes out his case, and are glad to see that Dr. Edwards, in the "Expositor's Bible," gives this up, characterizing his own previous rendering in the "Expositor" as a "desperate attempt." In x. 20 Dr. Westcott translates: "A fresh and living way through the veil, that is to say, a way of his flesh," abandoning the ordinary rendering because "it is most unlikely that the Apostle would describe Christ's 'flesh' as a veil hiding God from men, through which they too must pass, though it is true that his humanity did, during his historic Presence, veil his Godhead, and that in one sense, 'the flesh profiteth nothing.'" Is not

¹ Thayer, s. vv. *παράβολή*, *ἀπέ*, 3. d.

this a confusion of ideas? Hebrews makes a passing comparison in a single direction between Christ's flesh, rent by his violent death, and the veil of the Holiest. Our author applies this comparison in a totally different direction, with the aid of two Biblical truths which have nothing to do with this, and hardly any relation with each other. The result is naturally "most unlikely." On the previous page he had said with still another mingling of ideas: "The veil is not indeed removed so long as we live on earth, but we can pass through it in Christ." This is false to the meaning of Hebrews, that the veil was removed by the death of Christ. Such instances of the introduction of ideas exegetically irrelevant are not uncommon. Thus on v. 8, "Though He was son, yet learned obedience by the things which He suffered," we find: "Though Son and therefore endowed with right of access for Himself to the Father, being of one essence with the Father, for man's sake as man He won the right of access for humanity." On x. 22, "Hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience" is styled "a veiled allusion to the Eucharist." And on xiii. 12, our author presents Christ's fulfillment of the type of sacrifices burned outside the camp, thus: "His mortal Body, laid in the grave, was glorified, consumed, so to speak, by the divine fire which transfigured it." But Hebrews says that Christ fulfilled the type in that "he suffered outside the gate."

Dr. Westcott not only does not limit himself to the suggestions of the passage, but he does not even confine himself to the circle of the author's ideas. Thus he refers several times to the priesthood, once indeed to the high-priesthood of all believers, neither of which is ever mentioned in Hebrews. It may be that the philosophical cast of his mind rather hinders the perfect application of the inductive method which gathers the materials of exegesis. Sometimes, whatever the cause, the result is vague. After reading three pages on x. 1 one must still ask: What, then, are "the good things to come," "their shadow," "their very image"; and the same must be said of his interpretation of "the great tabernacle," ix. 11. There is abundant discussion of the Old Testament quotations, and yet the student will look in vain for any justification of the use made of them by the author of Hebrews, which to many is the crucial question on the subject.

After all, these are but spots on the sun. The theological bent of the writer makes his pages rich in suggestion to the preacher and the student of the Bible. The affluence of patristic quotation in the notes is remarkable, and the passages are most judiciously chosen, yet of course they include a good many interpretations which would be deemed absurd from a modern exegete, and others which are valuable, though they are not exegesis. The Christology of the Epistle is admirably treated. We close by quoting a representative passage (p. 66). "It is unscriptural, though the practice is supported by strong patristic authority, to regard the Lord during his historic life as acting now by his human and now by his divine Nature only. The two Natures were inseparably combined in the unity of his Person. In all things He acts personally; and, so far as it is revealed to us, his greatest works during his earthly life are wrought by the help of the Father through the energy of a humanity enabled to do all things in fellowship with God (comp. John xi. 41 f.)."

C. J. H. Ropes.

A CRITICAL AND GRAMMATICAL COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL'S FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS. By CHARLES J. ELLICOTT, D. D., Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. Andover : Published by W. F. Draper. 1889.

The debt which American scholars owe to Mr. Draper is increased by the recent publication of Bishop Ellicott's Commentary upon First Corinthians. This is a reprint of the book as published by Longmans, Green & Co., London, in 1887. Though not quite equal to the English edition in appearance, or, apparently, in typographical accuracy, it will, doubtless, serve the purposes of ordinary use almost as well as that. A hasty reading of the Greek text discovers about fifty errors in proof reading — a few of which are copied from the English edition. These are, however, of secondary importance, and are easily corrected.

It is now more than thirty-five years since Dr. Ellicott published his commentary upon Galatians, the first in his series of commentaries upon the Pauline Epistles. In the preface to that book he plainly announced his plan for the whole series. Recognizing the fact that Biblical exposition is a many-sided science, and makes demands for a variety of gifts and attainments, he frankly affirmed that "one mind is scarcely sufficiently comprehensive to grasp properly these various subjects; one judgment is scarcely sufficiently discriminating to arrive at just conclusions on so many topics," and, modestly admitting his own limitations, he added, "I will then plead no excuse that I have made my notes so exclusively critical and grammatical." In this spirit and with this aim the commentaries upon the ten shorter Pauline Epistles were written and the last of them published nearly a generation ago. It is interesting to note how steadily the learned author holds to this plan. In every preface to the various volumes and to later editions of them, he reminds his readers that this is his aim; and in this latest work assures us that "the general plan remains precisely the same," and that "this professes to be, and is, a grammatical commentary and must be borne with as such."

If consulted with this constantly in mind, the book will render invaluable assistance to the critical study of the epistle. The results of forty years of patient study of grammatical and critical minutiae are here given to younger and less laborious and patient students. The conclusions upon such points to which the author arrives will, doubtless, in general, command the assent of the majority of scholars; as, for example, upon the use of *iva* in the New Testament, and the opinion expressed on page 177, concerning certain constructions of the infinitive. To his interpretation of the subjunctive with *ἐάν* it is not so easy to give assent. Is the thought of the Apostle expressed in ix. 16, by the translation, "For if I should preach the gospel, I have no glorying, for necessity is laid upon me; for woe is it to me if I shall not have preached." In this sentence both conditions seem clearly to define that which occurs in the present time. Moreover, whatever may be the occasion for the change from the present subjunctive in the first instance, to the aorist subjunctive in the second, the change does not seem to be accounted for by saying that "the thought of the Apostle glances from the present to that future which in 2 Tim. iv. 7, is contemplated as having then begun to merge into the past."

Though one may not accept at every point the conclusions to which our author has arrived, he cannot fail to admire his devotion to truth and the unflagging zeal which is not content to know, in a general way, what the Apostle taught, but which seeks to weigh every word and letter by which he expresses his thought.

But there are some dangers attending this minute study of literature, perhaps especially the literature of the Scriptures. The tithing of mint and anise may be right, but it may lead to a neglect of weightier matters, and there is such a thing — to use a phrase of Dr. Ellicott's, in a somewhat modified sense — as "the trammels of laborious scholarship." In the preface to his first volume the author says, "If the Scriptures are divinely inspired, then surely it is a young man's noblest occupation patiently and lovingly to note every change of expression, every turn of language, every variety of inflection," expecting to gain by the study of "the subtle distinctions that underlie some illative particle, or characterize some doubtful preposition," "a less dim perception of the mind of Christ." This is true, if it means simply that one must be willing at least *patiently*, if not *lovingly*, to study illative particles and doubtful prepositions that he may gain the sense of Scripture. But this must not lead one to forget that the Apostle wrote in a free and somewhat rugged style, and that his thought may be misunderstood by applying rigidly to his words the strict rules of grammar and rhetoric. For example, when it is said in the note on xv. 22, "the second *πάρες* cannot, on any sound principles of interpretation, be regarded as quantitatively different from the first," the argument would be decisive in a treatise written by Xenophon, or by the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. But it is not so decisive in a letter written by the Apostle Paul. To interpret such a writer it is more important to catch the general trend of his thought than to apply rigidly the laws of exact speech. Indeed, there is some danger that in the effort to apply these laws the interpreter fail to gain the larger aspects of truth which the Scriptures contain, just as one may fail to gain the sense and beauty of "Paradise Lost" by the old-fashioned method of "parsing" it, or may destroy the beauty and fragrance of a flower by dissecting it.

The commentary under consideration will render most efficient aid to any student of this epistle who recognizes, as constantly as its author does, that it approaches the epistle from one point of view, and needs to be supplemented and its conclusions tested by light which comes from other sources.

W. H. Ryder.

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS. By the REV. MARCUS DODS, D. D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1889.

Hardly anything is better fitted to impress a reader with the breadth of the field of Biblical exposition, and the variety of methods in which it may be successfully cultivated, than a comparison of this volume with Dr. Ellicott's Commentary upon the same epistle, noticed above. Dr. Dod's book, like all in the series to which it belongs, the "Expositor's Bible," consists of expository lectures, which aim to be practical rather than critical, to elucidate and apply the central teachings of Scripture rather than to follow out the finer shades of thought, or note the minutiae of the forms of expression. While these two methods are by no means antagonistic, or even independent of one another, they imply a somewhat different spirit, and may involve a somewhat different conception of the nature and office of Scripture. If the man who expects to find in every illative particle and doubtful preposition the mind of Christ is made a little timid and uncertain in his grasp of larger truths, so the

man who fixes his thoughts upon the great practical doctrines which surged in the Apostle's mind and broke forth in somewhat turbid streams, will soon begin to doubt the precise accuracy of his forms of expression. We are not surprised, then, to read in his exposition of ii. 13, "Whoever gathers from this that every individual word Paul spoke or wrote is absolutely the best, does so at his own risk and without Paul's authority. Certainly it was not Paul's intention to make any such statement; and it is quite as dangerous to put too much into Paul's words as to put too little."

This view of inspiration does not seem to lead to any want of confidence in the reliability or authority of apostolic writings upon those questions upon which they profess to give judgment; though occasionally an incidental but important matter is so lightly touched as to leave the suspicion that the author does not hold that at this point the Apostle was declaring a word of the Lord; as, for example, when he says on page 250, "In the eye of the angels, who, according to Jewish belief, were present in meetings of worship, the woman is disgraced who does not appear 'with power on her head.'" It would be interesting to know whether, in the opinion of the author, the Apostle shared in this Jewish opinion, and whether, if he did, he spoke by revelation. Though it should be added that at this very point the elaborate comment of Bishop Ellicott leaves the reader in, perhaps, equal doubt as to the author's opinion.

As a practical application of the doctrines of the Epistle to the affairs of modern life, the lectures are inspiring and must be helpful. The style is simple and direct, possibly sometimes a little too rude. It jars a little on the sensibilities of good taste and reverence to hear Christ spoken of as "gibbeted"; nor is it an exact use of the term. The views of Christian ethics are sensible, and the doctrines of the spiritual life practical. The book will help to impress the conviction upon its readers that the Apostle wrote not for his generation alone but for all time, and that his writings reveal an insight into truth which proves a divine illumination.

W. H. Ryder.

HISTORY OF EGYPT. By F. C. H. WENDEL, A. M., Ph. D. 16mo, pp. 158. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1890.

A handbook on Egypt was much needed. It was fortunate for the publishers and the public that so competent a specialist as the author should have consented to prepare one. A distinctly modern flavor pervades his primer. The student of Erman and of Dümichen there gives us in a pleasing style and with just perspective views of the Pharaohs which are fresh as monuments just unearthed.

In tone the book is helpfully positive. The author does not stop with the exposure of Greek legends. He cross-examines the Papyri. His maps have a commercial and military directness. He adopts a downright Chronology. He speaks with technical precision of Egyptian architecture. He furnishes an original sketch of the Egyptian religion which contrasts with Brugsch's fancies, and which rests on a foundation like that of the Nile-bed at the Cataracts. There are believers in an original monotheism under the shadow of the Pyramids. Such receive scant sympathy at his sturdy hand.

Necessarily the volume is brief. We do not know of another in the same compass spanning more correctly, broadly, and vitally the period from Mena the Steadfast, the Founder of Memphis, to Alexander the Great, the Founder of Alexandria, and son of Amon.

John Phelps Taylor.

THE SEVEN CHURCHES OF ASIA, or Worldliness in the Church. By HOWARD CROSBY, pastor of the Fourth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York. Pp. 168. New York, 18 & 20 Astor Place : Funk & Wagnalls ; London, 44 Fleet Street. 1890.

Opening this little book the thoughtful reader will scarcely close it to the end. It is written with the author's wonted clearness and force. His long pastorate in a great city with his critical and studious insight have fitted him to do justice to his theme. He could not write a dull book. He speaks of the "Letters of the Lord to the seven Churches," of "Worldliness as the one gigantic Anti-christ ever at the Church door," of the ruin from sheer worldliness "of once flourishing churches in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, Macedonia, and the Countries of the East." He holds that "in the Apostolic day the fashion of the world had what would be to us a grosser form in its idolatry and sensuality, but in its principles and practice it differed in no respect then from what it is to-day." The seven churches of Asia are thus representative churches. The churches of Smyrna and Philadelphia are two "without rebuke." That at Laodicea is "a lost church." Our author uses these churches so conspicuous in the sacred narrative as an encouragement and a warning. He holds them up as a burnished mirror in which the churches of to-day may see their own life if they dare to look. He points out the fatal tendencies, the exact resemblances. He sees in our churches the same increasing and alarming worldliness. It is so insidious, so captivating, so hidden beneath fair, external forms as to deceive and fatally allure. Its fruits are manifest in thirst for accumulations, in unscrupulous methods, in luxurious living, in distrust of the truth, in practical rejection of Christ the Lord himself.

It is an arraignment of modern church life that calls for immediate thought. Is it true? The book is needed; let it be studied. Let pastors and people take it with them for Sunday reading in the summer vacation, and make it the occasion of prayerful scrutiny whether these things are so.

S. H. Hayes.

BOSTON.

FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH. Three sermons on stages in a consecrated life. London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1890.

This little volume, which bears upon its cover the inscription "In Memoriam, J. B. D.," is Dr. Westcott's tribute to the memory of his friend Bishop Lightfoot. Besides the memorial sermon preached in Westminster Abbey, it contains two others most fitly associated with it, because called out by and interpretative of "two great crises" (to use their author's phrase) in the life of his friend.

The first (they are printed in chronological order) was preached at the consecration of Dr. Lightfoot to the See of Durham in 1879; the

second was delivered at the consecration of a church in the bishop's diocese built in commemoration of the completion of the tenth year of his Episcopate; the third was preached in Westminster Abbey on the first Sunday after last Christmas. How intimately these sermons are connected with each other in substance as well as occasion may be inferred from the brief and touching preface:—

“Probably it has never before fallen to the lot of any one to give expression under the most solemn circumstances to thoughts suggested by three great crises in the life of a friend, for death is for the Christian a crisis in life. As each occasion came I sought to say what the occasion itself told us through him whom we loved, of the office with which he was charged, of the society which he served, of the character by which the servant of God is enabled to do his work; and in each region the description of the Christian life and the Christian faith seemed to find a fresh fulfillment: From strength to strength.”

The sermons have in full measure the delicate beauty of style, the refined spirituality, and the graceful use of learning which characterize Dr. Westcott's writing. They have besides, especially the last, a warmth of feeling, which, in the nature of the case, his other works could hardly possess. Indeed, the last discourse, for its deep and chastened emotion, its hearty yet sober and discriminating praise, its exquisite taste in revealing just so much as was fitting of the speaker's intimate relation with his departed friend, as well as for its finished form, may be pronounced an almost ideal eulogy of a scholar by a scholar. Those who have known Bishop Lightfoot only through his noble contributions to Christian learning will eagerly welcome this sketch of his character by a skillful hand. They will have pleasure in finding the conception of the man they had gained from studying his works put into felicitous language. They had regarded him as a noble example of the Christian scholar, a man who united in the pursuit of learning the love of truth and the love of Christ. Therefore they will make no deduction on the ground of a friend's partiality when they read:—

“His learning was always an instrument and not an end. No investigation of detail ever diverted his attention from the main issue. He mastered two outlying languages, Armenian and Coptic, in order to deal more surely with the secondary materials of the Ignatian controversy, but no ordinary reader would know the fact. For him the interpretation of ancient texts was a study in life. He held books to be a witness of something far greater, through which alone they could be understood. A Greek play, or a fragmentary inscription, or a letter of Basil, or a homily of Chrysostom was to him a revelation of man stirred by like passions with ourselves, intelligible only through a vital apprehension of the circumstances under which they were written. . . . So it was that he found the Holy Scriptures to be as he was never weary of proclaiming, *living oracles*, the utterance of the Spirit through living men, articulate with a human voice, as long as souls strive and faint and exult in God.”

Edward Y. Hincks.

EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION. A Study in Social Science. By RICHMOND MAYO SMITH, A. M., Professor of Political Economy and Social Science in Columbia College, Membre de L'Institut International de Statistique, Vice-President of the American Statistical Association, etc. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1890.

This is a popular and at the same time careful discussion of an important subject. The general reader will welcome it as the only available work in this field. Probably his predominant feeling will be one of concern for the future, in view of the facts presented. Certainly the author takes no pains to conceal his concern. Just at this point the author may be open to criticism, for there is some declamation in the book and a manifest tendency to advocate a thesis notwithstanding a constant attempt to be judicial. Questions of pure economics on the one hand, and of sociology and ethics on the other, are so interwoven in the subject of emigration that one cannot wonder that the author does not always succeed in keeping them distinct. Though we should much like to have a strictly scientific investigation of the subject upon the economic side, it is perfectly true that the question is really one of sociology, and Professor Smith is right in calling his work "A Study in Social Science." The headings to the chapters indicate the scope of the work. "The History of Emigration," "The History of Immigration," "Immigration and Population," "The Political Effects of Immigration," "The Economic Gain by Immigration," "Social Effects of Immigration," etc. It seems to us that he has underestimated the relief to crowded populations by emigration. That population eventually fills up the vacated places does not at all disprove the fact that at the moment and long afterwards the pressure of population is relieved. Later, he himself says, "In some cases the large emigration of agricultural laborers has given rise to a scarcity of labor. . . . This is the case in Italy and has been the case in Sweden and Norway, . . . where the Emigration, if it continues, threatens to leave a portion of the country without inhabitants."

The magnitude of the immigration movement is little appreciated. According to Professor Smith, "Since 1820 fifteen million persons have come to the United States, and more than one half of these have come since 1870." When one compares these Germans, Irish, Italians, etc., with the settlers — mainly English — of colonial times, and considers further that these modern immigrants crowd into and colonize separate quarters in our great cities, the problem of assimilation becomes indeed a serious one. It is certainly interesting to be reminded that "In the city of Boston in 1885 only thirty-one per cent. of the inhabitants were of native (that is, born in the United States) parentage, . . . in Fall River seventeen per cent., and in the city of Holyoke only sixteen per cent.," or that, "Less than one half of the total population of the United States are descendants of the original white colonists"; that is, of those who came previous to 1790.

That we have assimilated such masses in the past does not prove a like capacity at the present. If Professor Smith is right, — and his facts are startling and arguments weighty, — we have already reached the point of satiety. However much we do for our immigrants from the moral and social point of view, it is now evident that they are taxing us to the utmost in these regards. Probably at the present time even the most philanthropic will be ready to admit that a nation is bound to defend its morals and culture as well as its property. In the interesting chapter

upon the Population and Immigration, Professor Smith emphasizes the neglected fact that while the possession of the right of suffrage by foreigners degrades our politics, it is itself the most potent factor in the Americanizing of the foreigners themselves. The chapter upon the political effects of immigration is a disappointment, perhaps, because some of the questions that belong here are worked into other chapters. It certainly is in politics, if anywhere, that the baleful effects of unrestricted and excessive immigration are seen. That the author is fully alive to this appears from the manly chapter upon Chinese Immigration, which characterizes in fit terms our anti-Chinese legislation, particularly that of 1888. The principle was good, but the exigencies of practical politics rendered the measures taken brutal and disgraceful. The chapter upon the "Social Effects of Immigration" neglects some important questions, such as Sabbath observance, habits of temperance or the contrary, standards of living, morals, etc., but contains interesting facts about illiteracy, insanity, and crime, in all of which the foreign born show to disadvantage, a fact which is partly explained by their being in many cases assisted emigrants sent to us to be taken care of.

Professor Smith's treatment of assisted emigration and immigration is thorough and satisfactory, — about the necessity of stopping immigration of this kind no one is in doubt. Professor Smith's discussion of the economic side of immigration contains some rather captious criticism of those who consider an able-bodied immigrant upon landing as so much invested capital, and it neglects his economic value as a consumer as well as producer. On the other hand, he shows with great effectiveness how immigrants in competition with American labor usually lower the standard of living and wages. Here again the most ignorant and degraded are the most obnoxious.

In view of all these facts Professor Smith would restrict, not prohibit, immigration, excepting, perhaps, the Chinese and certain alien races. The means he suggests are consular certificates issued to would-be emigrants after proper examination and guarantee that they are neither paupers nor criminals, — a contrivance at once costly and demanding qualifications not always possessed by our consuls. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the difficulties would be as great as with our present Contract Labor Law. This plan seems the only relief if we are not to accept the evils of the present situation as temporary and unavoidable.

D. Collin Wells.

PROBLEMS OF GREATER BRITAIN. By the RT. HON. SIR CHARLES WENTWORTH DILKE, BART. With maps. Pp. 738. London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1890.

This is an immense repository of useful information concerning the colonies of Great Britain. It touches upon every phase of their life : political, social, economic, religious. There are to the work eight parts, dealing respectively with North America, Australasia, South Africa, India, Crown Colonies of the Present and of the Future, Colonial Problems, Future Relations between the Mother Country and the Remainder of the Empire, and Imperial Defense. Five excellent maps and a splendid index greatly add to the value of the book.

Any work on such a subject by so keen and circumspect an observer as Sir Charles Dilke could not but be profitable reading throughout. The

most interesting chapters are upon the colonies farthest removed from us either socially or spatially. Very instructive is the description of the Newfoundland experiment of dividing the public school funds among different religious bodies, Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist. Popular education in this province is entirely denominational, though fully paid for by the State. There is no governmental superintendence, and the whole power is left to the independent jurisdiction of the denominational superintendents and boards. Newfoundland furnishes a new argument against Henry George's policy of taxation, for its population is so sparse that the collection of direct taxes there would immensely and needlessly raise the rate. Labrador, belonging to Newfoundland, may yet, so Sir Charles believes, rival Norway as a health resort.

Of the Australasian group the most interesting colony is Victoria, partly from its wealth and energy, partly from its advanced political experiments. The land nationalizers constitute here a strong party, and their influence is seen in two forms of taxation directed against great estates — the succession duty, graduated from one to ten per cent., according to the extent of the property which passes, and a one and one fourth per cent. yearly tax on all land held by any person above \$125,000 in value, this being intended to bring land into the market. A movement still further to tax land progressively according to the amount of unearned increment accruing has failed thus far through fear of State landlordism. Yet the State owns and operates the railways, a system which has worked well on the whole, especially since it was placed in charge of a non-political commission. The railway system is not only self-supporting, but earns four and one half per cent. yearly profit. This might be much greater but for the policy of making the roads benefit the country. The profit that would elsewhere have gone into the pockets of shareholders with no check save by the competition of new lines — which always mean unnecessary routes and the sinking of capital — has in Victoria been made to lighten the burdens upon farmers, and to enable distant graziers to supply Melbourne with beef at moderate rates. The State also owns and administers the telegraphs, at rates lower than those charged anywhere else outside of Australia. The secret of all this is the prevalence of a non-political civil service, which, after a long fight, has conquered for itself an inexpugnable hold in this colony. The same has made safe another Victorian experiment, that of street railways built by cities on government loans, the State borrowing money for the city on the best terms it can make in the market. This colony has also expended vast sums of money in different localities for the purpose of irrigation. In fact, nowhere else on earth has State Socialism gone so far, and the results to date seem promising.

The chapters on South Africa and the Cape are so good that it were a pity to broach them in a sketch like this. A leading political question at the Cape is whether Dutch, widely spoken among the people, shall be recognized along with English as an official language; and a long debate has been held in Parliament to decide whether Dutch members should, as now, be required to address Mr. Speaker as "*Mynheer Speaker*," or be permitted to call him "*Mynheer Voorzitter*." We cannot too strongly commend Sir Charles's treatment of the various problems of all sorts which confront the South African peoples. Conflicts of English with Dutch and of both with natives; German encroachments; advance toward self-government; agriculture and trade; schools and culture — all are made luminous.

Most space upon India is devoted to the problem how to defend that country against Russia, a discussion naturally little interesting to us. The author does not believe, with certain liberals, in relinquishing India, and urges for it better fortification and a larger army. He points out the terrible evils of English rule in this great land, and seconds Lord Randolph Churchill's demand for a general inquiry into affairs there, with a view to needful changes of administration if not of constitution. The immense mass of human beings in India have not yet, he says, been touched by Christian or European influences; the few who have become educated being by this very fact cut off from all power with the people proper. Sir Charles thinks that provincial self-government in India would have a civilizing effect, and that it will come. He has no doubt that federation has a great future in the British Empire, creating, first, other federal groups like Canada, which will then come together in one great British Confederacy of federations. He concludes that the world's future belongs to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Chinese races, most certainly to the first two. In another century, he prophesies, France and Germany will be pygmies beside either Britain, the United States, or Russia, which latter alone among the continental nations of Europe possesses unbounded fertile land outside Europe, yet where white men can work the soil.

E. Benj. Andrews.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

MY COUNTRY IS THE WORLD: MY COUNTRYMEN ARE ALL MANKIND. WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON. 1805-1879. The Story of his Life Told by his Children. Volume III., 1841-1860. Volume IV., 1861-1879. New York: The Century Co. 1889. Pp. xii, 509; ix, 425.

These beautiful volumes, the third and fourth in the series, complete what we may call the "Life and Times" of Mr. Garrison. The whole work is a worthy memorial of the great reformer, and is as remarkable for its literary quality as for the outward dress in which it is presented to the public. It is a memorial, also, such as the subject of it would have valued above any other, reared in deepest sympathy and with filial appreciation by those whom he loved so well. Happy the father who is worthy of such appreciation, and whose children are both able and eager to give form and expression to it.

When the first and second volumes of this work appeared, five years ago, they were made the basis of an article in this "Review,"¹ by an eminent man not now living, the Rev. Dr. Post, of St. Louis, who, as a Christian man and minister, had been true to the precepts of the gospel in their bearing upon the system of American slavery, and who was familiar with the whole history of the agitation which preceded its overthrow. Dr. Post, in this article, covered in effect the entire period of the anti-slavery movement in the United States, and the whole public career of Mr. Garrison. He did full justice to the reformer and to the man, — to his character, his purposes, his achievements, and his triumphs, while freely pointing out what he believed to be his limitations and his mistakes. What was so clearly and fully stated then need not be repeated now; but it should be referred to and carefully read by those who would make a thorough study of the agitation against slavery in

¹ *Andover Review*, vol., v. pp. 476-490.

this country, and who would judge broadly and fairly of the various agencies which prepared the way for the great consummation, when, at length, freedom became national and slavery was not even sectional.

The relation of the American churches to the anti-slavery movement will always be remembered to the reproach of the religion which it misrepresented and dishonored. In their greatest opportunity to exemplify the precepts and to exalt the personality of their Divine Master, the churches of the South were found utterly wanting, and they paid the penalty for their lack of fidelity, with all the institutions about them, when the enormous sin, which they had not so much apologized for as eulogized and glorified, was full-grown and finished, and brought forth death. But how shall we account for the attitude of the churches and clergy of the North at this crisis? That they were not altogether wanting in moral courage, was made evident by the readiness and heartiness with which they entered into the temperance reformation which swept over the country shortly before the demonstration against slavery began to take shape and direction. We have thought that the ties which held the great religious communities in the South and in the North, mutually, in correspondence and fellowship, might explain, in part at least, the hesitancy of the clergy in the latter to place themselves in open and utter antagonism to their brethren in the former. While Northern laymen were alarmed by the threat of political disunion with which every protest — even the mildest — made by them against the “peculiar institution” was sure to be met, Northern ministers were frightened by the threat of denominational division, which division, however, with all their disposition to be conciliatory and compromising, they could not altogether prevent.

But it must not be forgotten that there was a Christian conscience in the North, which from the first began, slowly and earnestly, to respond to the appeal made to it in behalf of the millions held in bondage under the national flag. It has been well said that Mr. Garrison himself was the product of American Christianity, and that if it had not been for the unerring instinct of right which was latent in the hearts of his countrymen, and which he did so much to arouse into activity, he could never have accomplished what he did. The Northern conscience for a time was dormant; it may have been drugged; but it was not dead. However it may have been with many of the prominent ministers, — those in the commercial centres, those who occupied representative positions in the denominations, those who sat in Moses’s seat, — there was a minority in the churches of the North which honestly and intensely hated the system of slavery, and longed and prayed for its overthrow, although it was unable to see how the nation was to be delivered from it. From the beginning of the agitation this minority took its position faithfully and manfully, in religious conventions, in ministerial associations, in presbyteries, and in the benevolent organizations, and it worked with steady persistency until it had become the majority. Not to take into the account the establishment of the Free Churches, one of which, the church in Marlboro’ Chapel, Boston, gave a platform to Mr. Garrison and his associates, when there was no other standing place in the city for them; the foundation of Oberlin College as an anti-slavery institution, and the vast influence in behalf of the cause of freedom exerted by it as such in the Northwest; the secession from the American Board of Missions, and other similar movements carried forward in a self-sacrificing, and, often, a

heroic spirit, by earnest and devoted Christian men in all parts of the North; — to pass all this by, or to give to it only incidental mention, is to leave the history of the anti-slavery movement in the United States only half written.

We shall never cease to regret, therefore, that Mr. Garrison felt it to be his duty to break, not only with the Church, but with institutional Christianity. He had great provocation in the treatment which he and his message received from those who claimed to represent the Divine Founder of our faith, but not more than other reformers had had before him. The Pilgrims and the Puritans separated from the Church of England, but they could not be driven out of the visible Church of Christ. John Brown did not renounce his Christian profession. Mr. Garrison never arraigned the American churches for their complicity with American slavery, — for setting themselves as bulwarks for its defense, — with greater severity than, for example, did Judge Birney, Mrs. Stowe, and the poet Whittier; but these latter never entered into alliance with men, who, if they could, would have broken down and destroyed organized Christianity. Nor would Mr. Garrison have done this, had it not been for what we must regard as the extreme tolerance of his spirit for all sorts of opinions and for their advocates. Certainly, so far as his religious belief at the time was concerned, he was out of place on the platform of the Chardon Street Convention, which was held in Boston in 1840, in opposition to the Christian Sabbath, specifically, but really to Christianity itself; and he suffered greatly in reputation, and so did the anti-slavery cause, of which he was the embodiment, among Christian people, both in the United States and in England, from his attendance at this meeting. It was not chiefly for what he said on this occasion that he was blamed, but because he gave countenance to the proceedings by his presence and participation in them. Even Joseph Sturge, himself a Friend, and, consequently, anything but extreme in his views concerning the Sabbath and its observance, said that to defend Garrison under the circumstances, was "a gratuitous giving up of the slave's cause." The venerable philanthropist, Thomas Clarkson, was grieved in like manner; after an interview with him, an agent of the American Anti-Slavery Society wrote to Mr. Garrison: "The Sabbath Convention has completely changed the issue. Woman's rights and non-governmentism [the introduction of which upon the anti-slavery platform in this country had already caused lamentable divisions among the friends of the slave], are quite respectable when compared to your religious views."

The group of men and women in the midst of whom Mr. Garrison stood preëminent, and with whom, after the division described in the second volume of his *Life*, he was identified before the public, — the abolitionists, as they were called, to distinguish them from those known as anti-slavery men, — was not a particularly pleasing or attractive one, if we except a few leaders like Edmund Quincy, Francis Jackson, Wendell Phillips, and Frederick Douglass. This much his biographers concede: "The logic of the picturesque group we have in mind was severe and relentless, their discourse 'harsh,' and not seldom grim, their invective sweeping; and, in one instance in particular, a deliberate policy of church intrusion brought upon itself physical and legal penalties but little softened by passive resistance." These "moral ploughshares" may have been fitted for the work of abolition, but it is difficult to believe that

they did not do much more harm than good to the cause of the slave. The following seems to us to be an explanation, rather than a justification, of Mr. Garrison's association with these agitators: "He sympathized with every honest motive and effort for the regeneration of mankind, and could make allowance for aberration either of judgment or of intellect. He saw the abolition cause (like other fervid moral movements) unavoidably draw to itself the insane, the unbalanced, the blindly enthusiastic. He remained calm, collected, steadfast; hewing to the line of principle, but tolerant to the last degree, of temperament, expression, measures, not his own."

When the final consummation came, Mr. Garrison showed his sagacity as a leader, and his superiority as a reformer over many of his coadjutors, by recognizing and accepting promptly and cordially the changed condition of affairs. When Fort Sumter was attacked, he gave the full weight of his influence to the patriotic demonstrations in support of the Union everywhere made throughout the Northern States; he discriminated wisely, and we think fairly, between secession and disunionism; he defended himself successfully, as an abolitionist, in his support of the government at this crisis; and he recommended the temporary effacement of the abolition party. He gave a general support to Mr. Lincoln, and although he freely criticised his policy from time to time, he did not judge him more harshly than did many of the leaders of the Republican party. He favored the renomination and reelection of the President; and, in so doing, he joined issue and was obliged to part company with Wendell Phillips, who declared publicly that a million dollars would have been a cheap purchase for the administration, of an article on the presidency recently published by Mr. Garrison in the "Liberator." Mr. Phillips said further, that he should consider the day of Mr. Lincoln's reelection as the end of the Union in his day, or its reconstruction on terms worse than disunion; and he charged the President, whose hand had drawn up and signed the proclamation of emancipation, with carrying on the war to conciliate the disloyal white man and to reelect himself. Oliver Johnson and Henry C. Wright stood with Garrison at this time; Stephen S. Foster and Parker Pillsbury with Phillips. After the election, Mr. Garrison was one of the party which made the famous visit to Fort Sumter and the city of Charleston, — one of the most interesting and suggestive occasions recorded in modern history, — and which was broken up by the dreadful news of Mr. Lincoln's assassination. Soon after he formally withdrew from the American Anti-Slavery Society, whose distinctive work he regarded as finished; and, at the end of the year (1865), he published his memorable valedictory in the paper which he had edited amid so many changes, through evil report and through good report, beginning with these words: "The present number of the 'Liberator' is the completion of its thirty-fifth volume, and the termination of its existence." A few days later Edmund Quincy celebrated "the Euthanasia of the 'Liberator'" in the "Independent." Thus old friends joined hands once more, and the divisions of thirty years were healed.

Hamilton Andrews Hill.

BOSTON, MASS.

STUDIES IN LITERATURE AND STYLE. By THEODORE W. HUNT, LL.D., Professor of English Philology and Discourse in the College of New Jersey. Pp. xiv, 303. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1890.

PROFESSOR HUNT is known to readers of his earlier works as a methodical and painstaking expositor of rhetorical art. A pervading seriousness and a conscientious purpose to present the principles of the art in a complete and orderly way are noticeable characteristics of this book not less than of those which have gone before. The author advances from point to point in his well-ordered scheme with a substantial independence of judgment, and, at the same time, with constant recognition of previous writers on the subject. Indeed he seems almost too ready to buttress, or to adorn, his opinions with scraps of sentiment and nomenclature culled from a wide range of professional literature. He distinguishes the following varieties of style: the intellectual, the literary, the impassioned, the popular, the critical, the poetic, the satirical, the humorous. The classification is sufficiently minute for expository treatment, and for practical purposes more minute than is necessary. There is, too, a suggestion of a double principle of division, having reference both to the substance of discourse and to the form of it. It would be ungracious, however, to cavil at a classification that admits of so many just and interesting remarks in the description and illustration of the several divisions. In addition to the chapters treating of the above-mentioned varieties of style there is a chapter devoted to the style of Matthew Arnold, and another to that of Emerson. The concluding chapter, on Independent Literary Judgments, is sound and forcible throughout.

Professor Hunt's desire to make his exposition complete has led him to append to the chapters which describe the several styles brief examples from well-known authors. The evident motive was a good one, but the result is unsatisfactory. Some of the examples might be interchanged without loss of illustrative fitness, and, at the best, they are too brief to serve the purpose of exhibiting style with any degree of adequacy.

With respect to the title, and in the interest of exactness, it may be questioned whether the book consists of "Studies" in the accepted meaning of the word, or is, on the other hand, a connected and systematic treatise on Style, with an introductory and a concluding chapter on allied topics. If it is, however, a volume of "Studies," they are hardly "Studies in Literature," unless we give to that title a thinner and more superficial meaning than it is usually understood to bear.

Henry Leland Chapman.

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GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Die Lebensanschauungen der Grossen Denker. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des Lebensproblems der Menschheit von Plato bis zur Gegenwart. Von *Rudolf Encken*, Professor in Jena. Pp. viii, 496. Leipzig: Verlag von Veit u. Comp. Mrk. 10. — It is a hopeful sign of the present that there is a strong inclination on the part of many leading German philosophers to emphasize the ethical side of philosophy and turn

to the history of thought for guidance in the treatment of its problems. Some of the most striking utterances of both speculative and experimental Methodists lead to the conclusion that philosophy is thrown back upon its history for consolation in its inability to advance or to find light in its present position. Professor Encken has reviewed the large field of history with reference to the needs and interests of the present, by a method which seems to us to be singularly successful. His plan is to take representative systems and phases of practical philosophy and show, under the names of their authors, the force and direction of their influence upon the problems of life. Grecian philosophy is studied under Plato and Aristotle. The second part of the work, pages 135-308, which deals with the ethico-religious philosophy as represented in the Stoics, Christianity, and Scholasticism, is of great value in its appreciation of actual influences. We may notice two points of excellence. First, the judicious parallel which is drawn between Christian and Greek views and methods of dealing with life problems. Secondly, the position which is given to Augustine, pages 158-295. One of the results which we may expect from a study of the history of philosophy is the placing of Augustine alongside of Aristotle, Locke, and Kant for actual service rendered to theory and practice. His anticipations of modern philosophy, especially in method and theory of knowledge, are matters the true force of which are yet to be determined. The ideal of human culture in modern times, pages 308-482, forms the concluding chapter. Here we have an excellent survey of the general features of the period, the beginnings of which were made in the Renaissance and the Reformation; the high point attained by Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, and Adam Smith, and the period of criticism which followed Hume. The study concludes with an estimate of the value of Darwinism and Positivism. The work has many points to constitute it one of the most valuable contributions that has been made to bring the main features of philosophy into public view. First, it gives a strong and faithful presentation of the mind and temper of the great thinkers concerning the practical questions of life. This involves the spirit of the age in which the thinker under consideration lived. Secondly, it brings into discussion and places in an agreeable and intelligible form the chief problems of philosophy, and shows how these problems have been affected by time. Thirdly, it shows a continuity of thought, and even rises to the dignity of a history of the development of human thought as conditioned by its powers and experiences. These features are prominent in the work, and give it great advantage over the ordinary histories of philosophy. By making life and its problems the central point of the whole investigation there is a comprehensiveness which could not be attained apart from the history of the thought itself. The problem of all problems is, "whether we are to recognize an independent spiritual world or not, whether we find here a high ideal to grasp or a vain illusion to combat." But what are the results of more than two thousand years of thought expended on the problems of life? The answer to this question is not flattering. Philosophers are still toiling over the letters of the alphabet, but with more diversity of opinion as to their use and value than ever before. Life has drifted away from certain crotchets of the Middle Ages and is drifting from national exclusiveness and harsh aristocratic forms. But this movement brings new problems and the confusion increases. Division has gone so far, Idealism and naturalism are so stupidly dogmatic, that readjustment or compromise are impossible. The

only outlet seems to be in a great spiritual revolution,—a thorough rejuvenation of the entire inner life. The work of Professor Encken is admirable. He has made an important contribution toward bringing the history of philosophy to the assistance of practical life and at the same time furnished one of the best introductions to philosophy which we possess. We regret the omission of Cicero from the circle of great thinkers, as he, more than any other, was the teacher of the philosophers of the seventeenth century, especially of Grotius and Locke. The index brings under its numerous topics the entire content of the work.

Der Römische Staat und die Allgemeine Kirche bis auf Diocletian. Von Karl Johannes Neumann, Professor an der Universität Strassburg. In zwei Bänden. Erster Band. Pp. xii, 334. Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp. Mrk. 7.—We are told, in the introduction, that the present work had its origin in an investigation of the Decian persecution. This investigation revealed the fact that it is impossible to understand one without understanding all the Roman persecutions of the Christians, this again involving a thorough knowledge of the constitutions of the Roman State and the Christian Church. Thus has grown up an elaborate study of the relations of these two conflicting universals and a very substantial contribution to early constitutional history been produced. The present volume is more concerned with the Church than with the State. "Only in connection with the development of the church constitution can the attitude of the State to the Church be properly estimated." The subject is introduced by an excellent exposition of the inner and outer relations of the State and Church antedating the full establishment of the latter. This part shows large knowledge of the constitution of the Empire, and involves the results of much recent work in this department. The first chapter, pages 55–94, considers the reign of Commodus and the beginning of synodical constitution. Perhaps the most important part of the work lies in the second and third chapters, pages 95–209, which treat of the reign of Septimius Severus, of the persecutions of that time, and of the relations of Christianity to the world. The fourth and fifth chapters present Maximinus, the Christian clergy, and the peace of the church under the quasi-Christian, Philip the Arabian. Added to the work, pages 257–334, are three critical expositions, having for their subjects Hippolytus, the books of Origen against Celsus, and a criticism of the *Acta Sanctorum*. Professor Neumann has done good service in noticing this vast undertaking of the Jesuits, and placing before us some of the results of his study of this enormous mass of material. The second volume of his work is promised for 1891. The present volume assures the completed work a very high place. Of it, Professor A. Harnack says: "Ich vermisse fast nichts, was in eine solche Darstellung gehört, und ich möchte nichts von dem missen, was sie enthält."

Das Hauptproblem der Evangelienfrage und der Weg zu seiner Lösung. Eine Akademische Vorlesung nebst Excursen von Dr. Paul Ewald, Professor der Theologie. Pp. xii, 257. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Mrk. 6.80.—We have here a clear and extended treatment of the problem of the origin of the four gospels. It is supposed that the great questions of theology and church history fall back into this somewhat shadowy field. To this main problem is added that of the relations of the three gospels among themselves, and again of the three gospels to the gospel according to John. The treatment of these problems is opened in a preparatory lecture, pages 1–36, after which

the subject is taken up in four critical studies. First, the problems are formulated and the historical character of the fourth gospel shown; then follows an extended survey of the fruitless attempts which have been made to solve the problems, pages 98-160, and finally the solution of the problem, with the sources of the same. Professor Ewald does not find insuperable difficulties between the Synoptists and John, but a harmony and completeness of the whole in the fourth gospel. "It is the keystone which crowns and supports the arch of the divine temple; it is artistically prepared and fixed in its place by the Spirit of God." "The four gospels entwine themselves into one gospel, the glad messenger of Him who is made manifest, the promised Son of Abraham and David, the bearer of the Kingdom of Heaven (Matt.), the Son of God before whom all spirits must bow (Mark), who is praised from Jerusalem to the ends of the earth, a light to lighten the Heathen (Luke), the light which is the life and which works life in the world (John). This is the result with which our investigation concludes." The work appears to be written with great ability and learning. It shows a critical spirit of high order. It involves in its discussion all the chief theories as well as the best results of the historian. While recognizing certain impenetrable fog banks it arrives at results which neither violate "the Christian Consciousness" nor disturb the lines of common sense. As a handbook and treatise on this fundamental question it seems to meet most of the requirements.

Elemente der Philosophie. Ein Leitfaden für akademische Vorlesungen sowie zum Selbstunterrichte. Von Dr. Georg Hagemann, Professor der Philosophie an der Akademie zu Münster. Fünfte, durchgesehene und vermehrte Auflage. *Logik und Noetik.* Pp. ix, 213. Mrk. 2.60. *Metaphysik.* Pp. viii, 223. Mrk. 2.60. *Psychologie.* Pp. viii, 207. Mrk. 2.60. Herdersche Verlagshandlung. Freiburg im Breisgau. Zweigniederlassungen in Strasburg, München, und St. Louis, Mo. — Among the numerous handbooks of philosophy which have been compiled in recent years, few have given so much satisfaction both as to form and content as that of Professor Hagemann. That he stands in his logic with Aristotle, and in his entire system with Aristotle somewhat modified by Augustine and Aquinas, is proving at present a source of strength rather than of weakness. There is no disposition to belittle modern fruits or to overlook what may justly claim an advance upon old lines of thought. In the history which is incorporated in each of the three main divisions, as well as in the systematic exposition of the various departments, there is ample reference to the leaders of modern methods of thinking on philosophical questions. The most valuable feature of the work is its systematic completeness. There is no point omitted, none upon which there are not valuable reflections and references. German pedagogy has seldom shown itself to better advantage in the arrangement of text-books than in these works of Professor Hagemann. The introduction of each separate department of philosophy comprehends its idea and purpose, its relation to associate subjects, its method and division, and a sketch of its history. Another feature which gives the work a great advantage is the clearness with which each point is grasped and stated. The work in its present form is well worth the attention of educators, and will also be found of great value by those who would become acquainted with the outlines of a venerable and very respectable system of thought.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, Boston and Chicago. The Mormon Delusion. Its History, Doctrines, and the Outlook in Utah. By Rev. M. W. Montgomery. Pp. 352. Cloth, 75 cts., paper, 50 cts.

J. G. Cupples Co., Boston. In Divers Tones. By Herbert Wolcott Bowen. Pp. 124. 1890.

De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston. Lake Champlain and its Shores. By W. H. Murray, author of "Adventures in the Wilderness," "Daylight Land," "Adirondack Tales," etc., etc. Pp. 261.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. Robert Browning. Personalalia. By Edmund Gosse. Pp. 96. 1890. 75 cts.; — Baldwin Lectures, 1889. The Church's Certain Faith. By George Zabriskie Gray, Late Dean of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass. Pp. xii, 228. 1890. \$1.50.

John Wilson and Son, University Press, Boston. Hymns of the Church Universal. Compiled by the Rev. Henry Wilder Foote. Revised and Edited by Mary W. Tileston and Arthur Foote. Pp. ix, 392. 1890.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. The Expositor's Bible. Judges and Ruth. By the Rev. Robert A. Watson, M. A., author of "Gospels of Yesterday." Pp. viii, 424. 1890. For sale by DeWolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston. \$1.50; — The Expositor's Bible. The Prophecies of Jeremiah. With a Sketch of his Life and Times. By the Rev. C. J. Ball, M. A., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn; Contributor to Bishop Ellicott's "Commentary," "The Speaker's Commentary," etc. Pp. vi, 424. 1890. For sale by DeWolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston. \$1.50.

American Swedenborg Printing and Publishing Society, New York. Angelic Wisdom concerning The Divine Love and Wisdom. By Emanuel Swedenborg. Originally published in Latin at Amsterdam, 1763. Pp. viii, 375. 1890.

William H. Alden, Philadelphia. Why I am a New Churchman. By the Rev. Chauncey Giles, author of "Man as a Spiritual Being," "The Incarnation and Atonement," "Heavenly Blessedness," etc., etc. 16mo. Pp. vi, 128. 1890. Cloth, 25 cts., paper, 10 cts.

Charles Potter, Government Printer, Sydney, Australia. United Australia. Public Opinions in England as expressed in the Leading Journals of the United Kingdom. Pp. viii, 142. 1890.

New Church Board of Publication, Room 20, Cooper Union, New York. On the Relative Advantage of Tubs With Bottoms and Tubs Without. Being a Rambling Letter from a Cooper's Apprentice to a Swedenborgian Clergyman. Pp. 345. \$1.00.

Scribner & Welford, New York. Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions. By E. E. Constance Jones, Lecturer in Moral Sciences, Girton College, Cambridge: Joint-Translator and Editor of Lotze's "Microcosmus." Pp. xv, 208. 1890. \$3.00.

Porter & Coates, Philadelphia. Essays of an Americanist. I. Ethnologic and Archæologic. II. Mythology and Folk Lore. III. Graphic Systems and Literature. IV. Linguistic. By Daniel G. Brinton, A. M., M. D., Professor of American Archaeology and Linguistics in the University of Pennsylvania, etc., etc. Pp. xii, 489. 1890. For sale by DeWolfe, Fiske & Co. Boston.

T. Fisher Unwin, London. In Thoughtland and in Dreamland. By Elsa D'Esterre-Keeling, author of "Three Sisters," etc. Pp. 300. 1890. — A London Plane-Tree and other Verse. By Amy Levy. Cameo Series. Second Edition. Pp. 94. 1889.

PAMPHLET. *Moritz Diesteweg, Frankfurt am Main.* Die theologische und die historische Betrachtung des Alten Testaments. Vortrag gehalten auf dem Thüringer Kirchentage zu Jena am 25 September 1889. Von C. Siegfried, Dr. theol. et phil. Kirchenrath und Professor der Theologie an der Universität zu Jena. Pp. 28. 1890. 40 pfe.

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
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